Here were located all our uranium separation plants — the plants designed to separate the easily fissionable Uranium-235 from the more abundant but much less fissionable isotope, Uranium-238. There were a number of ways we thought this could be done, but for practical reasons, to suit our immediate purposes, they were whittled down to two, the electromagnetic process and the gaseous diffusion process.
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We had decided at the start that the several uranium process plants at Oak Ridge should be well separated, so that in case a disaster struck one it would not spread to or contaminate the others. For that reason, the electromagnetic and gaseous diffusion plants were located in valleys some seventeen miles apart. Later, when the thermal diffusion plant was built, we had to disregard this policy and put it quite near the steam-generating plant for the gaseous diffusion process, in order to take advantage of its supply of extra steam.
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It is a physical rather than a chemical process, although a great deal of chemistry is involved in the handling of the material. Basically, electromagnetic separation of isotopes is based on the principle that an ion describes a curved path as it passes through a magnetic field. If the magnetic field is of constant strength, the heavier ions will describe curves of longer radii. Therefore, the various isotopes of an element, since they differ in mass, can be isolated and collected by such an arrangement.
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Rather early in the American effort, Lawrence had proved to his own satisfaction that electromagnetic separation was feasible, but he stood almost alone in this optimism. The method called for a large number of extremely complicated, and as yet undesigned and undeveloped, devices involving high vacuums, high voltages and intense magnetic fields.
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Dr. George T. Felbeck, who was in charge of the gaseous diffusion process for Union Carbide, once said it was like trying to find needles in a haystack while wearing boxing gloves.
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The first estimate for construction alone was for an unrealistic sum of between $ 12 and $ 17 million; soon afterward this was increased to $35 million. These figures were for a plant much smaller than the one we finally built. In its first report to President Roosevelt early in December, 1942, the Military Policy Committee estimated the cost of the entire project as of the order of $ 400 million. At that time we thought that over $100 million would be needed for this process as a whole.
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Exclusive of the value of silver borrowed from the Treasury for electrical conductors, the construction costs, by December 31, 1946, totaled $304 million; research cost $20 million, the engineering $6 million and operation $204 million. The cost of operating power was almost $10 million.
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Originally we had thought we would need a work force of 2,500. This was a sad underestimate, resulting from our inability to anticipate how complex and difficult the job would be and how many units would be needed. Eventually we had over 24,000 on the payroll.
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We could not permit or even consider the unionization of the operating forces of any of the plants turning out U-235 because we simply could not allow anyone over whom we did not have complete control to gain the over-all, detailed knowledge that a union representative would necessarily gain.
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Later, when our needs grew even more pressing, we were unable to find enough pipe fitters to maintain our schedule. Investigation showed that there simply were not enough in the United States to fill the demands. The solution we adopted was to locate a considerable number of pipe fitters, all union members, who had been inducted into the Army. These men were given the opportunity to be furloughed to the inactive reserve on condition that they would accept employment at Hanford as civilians at the going rates of pay.
When they arrived they were kept together as a group so that their output would not be held down by the pressure of any union officials or of the men already working there. In a direct comparison on identical work, they produced about 20 per cent more than the other men. Pressure was brought on them to slow down, but they refused. A typical comment was: “I’m not working as hard as I did in the Army, nobody’s shooting at me, I’m being paid a lot more and, what’s more important, I’ve a lot of friends in my old outfit that I hope to see come back alive.” As time went on, the other men were apparently shamed into greater effort, with the result that their output went up about 10 per cent.
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On my next visit to Oak Ridge I talked for five or ten minutes to some two thousand of these men. I was not introduced by name but merely as the general in charge of the work for the War Department. The reason for this was to avoid drawing attention to me personally; this was our policy throughout the project until security no longer required it. (My wife once commented that I was undoubtedly the most anonymous major general in the history of the United States Army.)
As simply as possible, I told the group that, as the officer in charge, I could state positively, both officially and personally, that their work was of extreme importance to the war effort, and that my views were a true reflection of those of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, of Secretary of War Stimson and of President Roosevelt. I added that they could see for themselves how important it was from the terrific effort we were making, our obviously enormous expenditures in money and labor, and our evident ability to obtain materials that were in critically short supply. I said nothing about what we were working on or our hope that its success would quite possibly end the war. There was no flowery oratory; I would have been incapable of it, and it certainly would not have appealed to the audience.
Creedon estimated that after this meeting the efficiency of his construction operations improved by as much as 15 to 20 per cent. I never quite believed this, but the progress reports did indicate an increase of well over 10 per cent. This was far beyond anything I had anticipated; indeed, I would have been pleased with any improvement at all.
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Although we were certain sabotage was not involved [in the “snag” with the magnets on the “race track”], in our detailed review of the situation we found that it would be possible for a saboteur, who would have to be an employee on one particular assignment, to throw iron filings into a feed opening in the oil circulation system and thus put an entire section of track out of action. Steps were taken at once to station counterintelligence agents on and around these spots.
One difficulty, which was unforeseen, because we lacked experience with magnets of such enormous power, was that the magnetic forces moved the intervening tanks, which weighed some fourteen tons each, out of position by as much as three inches. This put a great strain on all the piping connected to them. The problem was solved by securely welding the tanks into place, using heavy steel tie straps. Once that was done, the tanks stayed where they belonged.
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Other substances that had previously had very limited application were needed in staggering quantities. For example, each alpha track used four thousand gallons of liquid nitrogen every week.
One incident that delayed production on a bin in an alpha track for several days involved a mouse. In some unknown way, he got into the vacuum system, where his presence prevented the bin from reaching the necessary high vacuum. After several days of trouble-shooting failed to reveal the source of the trouble, the run was terminated and the bin opened. The remains of the mouse, a bit of fur and a tail, disclosed what had caused the trouble, but no one ever learned how he got into the system in the first place.
More serious in effect was the suicidal action of a bird which perched on an outside wire in such a way as to short the electrical system. We had to shut down an entire building, and, because of the nature of the process, it was several days before operations again became normal.
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Waste such as piping, scrap cloth, filter cloths, papers, rubber gloves, clothing and the like had to be carefully saved in order to recover the small concentrations of uranium, particularly of Uranium-235.
I don’t know if you caught that passage about the costs: “Exclusive of the value of silver borrowed from the Treasury for electrical conductors, the construction costs, by December 31, 1946, totaled $304 million; research cost $20 million, the engineering $6 million and operation $204 million. The cost of operating power was almost $10 million.”
Exclusive of the value of silver borrowed from the Treasury for electrical conductors?
Preliminary design calculations on the Y-12 electromagnetic plant in the summer of 1942 had indicated that enormous quantities of conductor material would be required. Because the demands for copper to be used in defense projects far exceeded the national supply, the Administration had decided that the need for copper should be reduced by substituting for it silver borrowed from the Treasury Department.
Colonel Marshall thereupon called on the Under Secretary of the Treasury, Daniel Bell. Mr. Bell said that he might be able to make available some 47,000 tons of free silver, together with 39,000 tons more which could be released from the backup of silver certificates, if Congress authorized its use through appropriate legislation. At one point early in the negotiations, Nichols, acting for Marshall, said that they would need between five and ten thousand tons of silver. This led to the icy reply: “Colonel, in the Treasury we do not speak of tons of silver; our unit is the Troy ounce.”
Under the terms of the final agreement, the silver required by the project was to be withdrawn from the West Point Depository. Six months after the end of the war an equal amount of silver would be returned to the Treasury. It was further agreed that no information would be given to the press on the removal of the silver, and that the Treasury would continue to carry it on their daily balance sheets. Our relations with the Treasury were most cordial, and Mr. Bell and the various officials of the Mint and the Assay Office were always very pleasant and helpful.
Because of the natural reluctance of any private company to accept the responsibilities for safeguarding and accounting for the large amounts of silver that were involved, the MED had to carry out this responsibility with its own forces. This meant organizing separate guard and accountability units, establishing special inspection procedures employing special consultants and arranging to convert the silver into the conductors that we so urgently needed.
We accepted the Treasury’s certification of the bar weights of the silver as we took it over at West Point. Then we delivered it to a processor, who cast the bullion bars into billets which could be extruded into forms more suitable for manufacture into bus bars, magnet coils and similar items. The casting was done by the Defense Plant Corporation and by the U.S. Metal Refinery Company. For the large magnets which used the bulk of the silver, Phelps Dodge Copper Products Company then extruded the billets into strips, which were rolled into coils about the size of a large automobile tire. These coils were shipped to Allis-Chalmers, where they were wound, suitably insulated, around the steel bobbin plate of the magnet casing.
Special MED guards watched the silver at all times while it was being processed, and accompanied every shipment except that of the final magnets from Allis-Chalmers to the Clinton works. We decided that at this point we could achieve adequate security by sending unguarded railway cars over different routes on varying time schedules. The silver coils were encased in large, heavy, steel shells which were completely welded together. Although silver is a valuable commodity, to have made away with any great amount of it during shipment would have been a major task, as our experience in opening one of these shells at Oak Ridge later confirmed. Moreover, the railroads always followed our shipments carefully, and we would have known immediately if any car had been waylaid.
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No recovery operation was undertaken unless the recoverable amounts were expected to be of more value than the cost of recovery. Nevertheless, throughout the entire operation we lost only .035 of one per cent of the more than $300 million worth of silver we had withdrawn from the Treasury.
That’s still $105,000, by the way — and back when that meant something.