Russian fighters are optimized to perform three functions:.
The first is maintaining medium- to high-altitude combat air patrols for defensive counter-air (DCA) operations. The second is the delivery of precision firepower in support of ground operations, with a particular emphasis on the reduction of enemy strong points rather than interdiction. Third, Russian fighters have been tasked with escorting bombers or naval vessels and conducting periodic intercepts beyond Russia’s borders.
The first mission set of DCA operations grew out of Soviet anxieties as to the paucity of the country’s radar coverage. From the 1970s, Soviet planners came to acknowledge that they were unlikely to keep pace with NATO airpower in a symmetrical competition. As a result, the Soviet Union prioritised the maturation of its air defences as a means of asymmetrically countering NATO airpower. A major limitation for ground-based radars, however, was their horizon, and the resulting possibility for NATO air forces or cruise missiles to fly at a low altitude to approach defended sites.
In turn, Soviet planners, and later the VKS, appreciated that their A-50 airborne early warning aircraft, their MiG-25 and MiG-31 interceptor patrols – perched at medium to high altitude over friendly air space – could use their radar to detect NATO aircraft approaching frontline areas at low altitude. In addition, the MiG-25 and MiG-31 interceptors could take advantage of launching R-33 missiles from a high altitude to outrange many NATO air-to-air missiles. Even if the target would have had sufficient time to ‘turn cold’, away from the missile, and thereby avoid being hit, this would have still defeated the low-altitude approach into Russian air space. Conversely, were the NATO aircraft to approach at a higher altitude to push back the Russian Combat Air Patrol (CAP), they would be well within the radar coverage of Russian ground-based air defence. The significance of this defensive mission expanded further as the Soviet Union, and later Russia, assessed NATO’s growing stocks of precision air-launched cruise missiles. Here, interdiction from the air was seen as essential by Russia, especially considering the size of Russian territory and the corresponding difficulty of tracking low-flying targets from all possible approaches.
Russia has notably had significant success in its use of the Su-35S to provide DCA-CAPs during its invasion of Ukraine. Russia has largely deterred Ukraine from using aircraft at any significant scale near the frontline, other than when shaping operations create limited windows of opportunity, or when employing stand-off weapons. The Russians have also inflicted a steady rate of air-to-air kills against the Ukrainian Air Force, including at significant range. The R-37M air-to-air missile, in particular, has been used to destroy several Ukrainian aircraft at long range, with one kill recorded at 177 km. This is significantly beyond the engagement range of most NATO air-to-air munitions, although the success of these engagements was heavily determined by Ukraine’s lack of effective radar warning receivers. The Russians have also significantly improved the performance and utility of their aircraft during the war, with a particular emphasis on using synthetic aperture radar imagery for targeting and battle damage assessment and improved data passing between the Su-35S and Russian air defence and ground-based fires.