There were proposals to abolish the penitentiary mode of punishment and return to hard labor, corporal punishment, and even banishment

Tuesday, September 29th, 2026

The American prison experiment has a 250-year history of good intentions and bad results:

Eastern State Penitentiary is one of the places where the American prison experiment began, and where one of its most bizarre iterations was tested on human beings. After it opened in 1829, Eastern State was, as it is now, a tourist attraction. In 1858, more than 10,000 visitors paid entry fees to gawk at the building and the men confined inside it.

The walls are what everyone sees first when they come to Eastern State. The prison, located on a rise in what is now Philadelphia’s Fairmount neighborhood, is skirted by imposing 30-foot-high granite walls, crenelated turrets, and a medieval gatehouse. It was designed to intimidate, and it has always done its job.

When the Marquis de Lafayette, a hero of the American and French revolutions, passed through Philadelphia on an 1824 tour of all 24 U.S. states, city leaders showed him the facade of Eastern State, then still under construction. According to all accounts, Lafayette recoiled at the sight. Thomas B. McElwee wrote in an 1835 history of the prison that the “form of the edifice was disapproved by LaFayette, in the memorable expression which he uttered as he crossed its threshold for the first time, ‘What! Have you Bastilles in this country?’”

Eastern State cost $780,000 to construct, making it one of the most expensive buildings in the country when it opened and one of the most expensive in the world. The paradox of the place was that this fearsome fortress represented the liberal ideals of the young American republic and an investment in building a more humane justice system.

[…]

The modern prison is widely considered an American invention, one born out of a peculiar American mix of Christian theology and Enlightenment confidence. Much as the Founding Fathers sought to constrain the passions of majorities and lawmakers through checks and balances, prison advocates in the early republic wanted to use architecture and discipline to mold convicts into productive citizens while avoiding the sadism and spectacle that typified criminal justice in Europe.

[…]

Unlike in the jails of the 18th century, everything in Eastern State was designed for the purpose of corrections. The prison was built around a central hub, from which cellblocks extended radially like spokes on a wagon wheel. Newly arriving prisoners were brought in wearing hoods, given identification numbers that replaced their names while they were incarcerated, and put in isolation cells where they spent 23 hours a day. Inside each cell were a bed and a worktable, where inmates spent daytime hours at trades such as making shoes.

The thing former Eastern State inmates most often recalled was the profound, tomblike silence. Prisoners were never allowed to talk to each other. The barrel-vaulted ceilings were designed to amplify sound, so from the central hub a guard could hear the faintest whisper or languid sigh. To maintain the atmosphere, guards padded through the cellblocks in wool socks.

The only human contact the incarcerated people of Eastern State Penitentiary were allowed was a weekly meeting, through a grated door, with local ministers. The ministers acted as “moral instructors” and kept notes on the prisoners’ prospects for rehabilitation.

The philosophical cornerstone of Eastern State was laid in 1787 at Benjamin Franklin’s house, when the humanitarian Benjamin Rush first proposed building a “house of repentance” for convicts. Rush wrote that inmates should be subjected to strict routines of “BODILY PAIN, LABOR, WATCHFULNESS, SOLITUDE, and SILENCE,” joined with “CLEANLINESS and a SIMPLE DIET.”

[…]

Since the American Revolution, the nascent states had been working to reform their jails—usually nothing more than a filthy common room that held men, women, and minors together—and rewrite their laws to sever themselves from England’s despised criminal code, which by the end of the 18th century included more than 200 capital offenses. The reform movement was propelled by anti-royal sentiments, by the spread of Howard’s theories among the elite, and by theological objections to capital and corporal punishment—particularly in Pennsylvania, with its high number of Quakers. “As the sect with the strictest definition of what was due Caesar, [Quakers] were in perennial conflict with Caesar’s laws,” Ignatieff writes. “Hence of all sects they asked the most searching questions about the right of the state to coerce citizens.”

The problem with getting rid of the whipping post and stocks was figuring out their replacement. In 1786, Pennsylvania briefly tried sentencing criminal offenders to public labor repairing roads and digging ditches, but it discovered that leaving gangs of convicts to wander freely through the streets was a poor idea. The laborers, who became derisively known as “wheelbarrowmen,” wore degrading uniforms and were mocked by onlookers. There were also escapes, violence, and, in one incident, an attempt to rob Alexander Hamilton’s carriage as it returned from the Constitutional Convention. Public opinion quickly turned against what one Philadelphia Evening Post columnist called the “lawless and wandering banditti of wheelbarrowmen.”

Rush argued convincingly that public punishment degraded both the convict and the society that witnessed it. In 1790, Philadelphia’s Walnut Street Jail opened a wing of 16 isolation cells based on Rush’s ideas. It was initially touted as a success and copied in many other U.S. cities, but within several years these “proto-prisons,” as Rubin calls them, fell prey to the same overcrowding, riots, and arsons that they had supposedly cured. By 1810, the newfangled “penitentiary house” that had made Philadelphia a worldwide leader in criminal justice reform was widely seen as a failure, too small and poorly designed for its requirements. State authorities had to call up militias to quell prison riots and mass breakouts in New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia.

“American states’ first sustained experiments with long-term confinement as punishment for convicted offenders, drawing on Pennsylvania’s example, had failed—visibly and spectacularly,” Rubin writes.

In response to the failure of the proto-prisons and a rising fear of social disorder, there were proposals to abolish the penitentiary mode of punishment and return to hard labor, corporal punishment, and even banishment. In his 1818 address to the New York Legislature, Gov. DeWitt Clinton called incarceration a “failure” that enrolled criminals in a “school of turpitude.” Several states reauthorized capital punishments they had stricken from their books.

But reformers convinced state legislatures that what was needed were networks of larger penitentiaries located outside of major cities. This launched the first wave of American prison building.

America’s cities are, by and large, bad

Friday, September 25th, 2026

America’s cities are, by and large, bad:

The easiest way to see this is to understand the primary reason why they’re so bad: crime. The big benefit of cities for countries is that they’re economic engines of progress due to agglomeration effects: benefits and cost-savings that appear because companies, services, and workers are geographically collocated in them. But agglomeration effects are negatively related to crime.

[…]

But is this causal? Does crime reduce the extent of agglomeration economies? To a major extent, yes, and we know it thanks to a suite of different disasters—bombings, fires, earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.—, to random events that displaced populations—the Mariel Boatlift, Japanese internment, close elections that appointed discriminatory mayors, etc.—, to the historical period known as the Great Migration—the mass movement of African Americans from the southeastern U.S. to the rest of the country’s urban areas.

[…]

The Great Migration accelerated thanks to World War II, when draft- and casualty-related labor shortages allowed Blacks to move from low-skilled to semiskilled jobs en masse, and it accelerated once again with the Supreme Court’s 1948 decision in Shelley v. Kraemer, which forbade neighborhoods from having state-enforced racial covenants—agreements to evict Blacks from certain neighborhoods and to prevent them from buying homes in them. What remained post-Shelley were merely private, much more loosely-enforced agreements not to sell property to members of certain races.

Labor shortages and racial covenants provide us with causal leverage: the former are driven by random deaths and pre-war demographics that are displaced by draft boards; the latter are driven in all sorts of unclear ways and broken due to preferences that are plausibly unrelated to the existence of the racial covenants in the first place. Interesting, no? Accordingly, where African Americans wound up and the occupations they were able to enter there had a large degree of randomness to them.

These facts, coupled with African Americans’ persistent association with violent crime, allow us to leverage their inflows to assess effects on agglomeration economies via crime. We can say ‘via crime’, since a mere racism angle doesn’t fit the data given that other racially distinct but lower-crime demographics that were discriminated against do not seem to lead people—in particular White people, in the phenomenon known as ‘White flight’—to leave from the places African Americans show up, even controlling for socioeconomic status, and because anti-agglomeration effects are particularly distinct for violent crime, which is the type of crime African Americans are associated with, as opposed to property crime.

Cities that received more African Americans during the Great Migration saw larger increases in homicide.

Cities attempted to counter this, and those that received the largest African American inflows increased hiring and funding of police in response.

Nevertheless, the homicide rates increased, violent crime overtook America’s urban centers, and White flight went into full swing, with Whites leaving metropolitan areas in favor of suburbs and new homes further afield. As a result, city total populations and population densities declined and labor productivity became worse off for it.

Agglomeration is about two margins: density and returns to density, and crime is bad for both. We can observe and quantify the costs of crime-reduced density and density returns. The cost of the Great Migration density effects alone is about $888 per year per American, and the effect of the 1960s to early 1990s crime wave is another $392 per capita, but even those are lower bounds, as they’re just the costs we see.

Cities are also arranged worse, leading to tangible and intangible losses. On the tangible side, cities are arranged in strange ways and their architecture is hostile so people can avoid crime; on the intangible side, patents are foregone, nightlife is more limited, police presence has to be greater and more concentrated, segregation is stronger, and NIMBYism—which is suboptimal for policy, as it also harms agglomeration, labor mobility, etc.—is reasonable as a means of exposure control.

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention had no provisions for inspections

Monday, September 14th, 2026

Biohazard by Ken AlibekIn October 1990, Ken Alibek explains (in Biohazard), they were informed that a “trilateral agreement” had been reached between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain to organize a series of reciprocal visits to suspected biological warfare facilities:

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention had no provisions for inspections, a limitation that continues to frustrate the international arms control community to this day. Visits were to depend on the trust and goodwill of all sides.

[…]

The memo from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notifying us of the agreement had left it to us to decide which facilities to open. The defense ministry quickly signaled it wanted no part in this charade. You can show whatever you want in Biopreparat,” General Yevstigneyev snapped when I asked for his suggestions. “But no foreigner is getting into our military sites.”

Kalinin, sensing a political opportunity, volunteered that Biopreparat act as the host. He ordered me to decide which of our installations could be “sacrificed” in the interests of East-West relations.

The choices were grim. Though some of our explosive test chambers had been dismantled since Gorbachev’s decree, large industrial fermenters at Stepnogorsk and Omutninsk furnished unmistakable evidence of our activities.

At the time, Biopreparat controlled about forty facilities in fifteen cities across the Soviet Union. About a dozen were used exclusively for offensive work, but many others mixed civilian and military functions. Judicious exposure of the Western delegation to these dual-function facilities would protect us while demonstrating our good faith.

[…]

I never believed that we would be able to pull it off. Anyone with basic knowledge of biological weapons would recognize the signs of our activity.

[…]

The strategy, carefully worked out over the previous weeks, was to waste as much time as possible during the nonessential parts of the tour, to reduce the “official” segments in which our visitors could exercise their curiosity. We had also notified our institute directors in advance to stock up on supplies of vodka and cognac, in the hope of befuddling them with Russian hospitality.

[…]

Obolensk, our next destination, was more difficult. It would require finesse to explain the heavily insulated buildings and labs, the animal cages in our bacteriological genetic engineering program, and other elements of a biowarfare infrastructure. It would be hard, I thought, to conceal our projects to develop antibiotic-resistant strains of tularemia, plague, brucellosis, glanders, melioidosis, and anthrax and to pass our work off as biodefense.

[…]

“Could we finally get to work?” Davis said as Urakov paused for breath during an extended welcoming speech.

The general was undaunted. He told the foreigners that they were free to see whatever they wanted in his compound.

“However, I must warn you that biodefense work involves very hazardous organisms as I’m sure you know,” he said. “If you elect to go into some of our labs, we may have to ask you to stay in quarantine for a couple of weeks. Those are our regulations.”

This was partly true. We did have regulations requiring visitors to stay under observation, but they were totally unnecessary in this case: I had given orders that weekend for Obolensk and Vector to be totally disinfected. The delegation could have walked through any one of the labs in shirtsleeves.

Our visitors, naturally, were unaware of this. They hesitated.

“So,” said Urakov brightly. “What would you like to see?”

They asked for a complete tour of the complex. We got our first rude surprise when Davis pulled out a map and pointed to a large building.

“Take us there,” he said, pointing to the structure that contained Obolensk’s newest, and biggest, explosive chamber.

Ah, I said to myself, here it comes. I assumed the map was based on satellite reconnaissance photos. Pasechnik couldn’t have known about this.

[…]

The visitors were allowed to wander in the corridors until they came to a closed door.

“What’s in here?” Davis asked. No one answered. “Could you please open it?”

“We lost the key,” Petukhov mumbled. “I’ll see if I can find a copy.”

While the visitors waited impatiently, Petukhov took his time finding a “new” key. He eventually opened the door, but the room was dark.

“Can you turn the light on?” Davis asked in irritation.

“Not possible,” Petukhov said. “The bulb is out.”

Undeterred, Davis walked right past him and pulled out a flashlight. At that moment, the façade of international cooperation ended.

Petukhov lunged for the flashlight. Davis shouted. The two men tussled back and forth until someone suggested that they take the dispute back to the conference room, where I was awaiting their return.

[…]

When Davis finally went back and turned the flashlight on, he saw that the walls near the door were dented and pitted—the telltale marks left by fragments of explosives.

“You have been using explosives here,” he declared.

Then, in Novosibirsk:

I could see their eyes widen with astonishment as we took them past enormous steel fermenters, larger than what any Western pharmaceutical firm would ever use for the mass-production of vaccines. We had taken them to one of Vector’s principal research labs—but we made sure to keep them on the ground floor.

In the upper levels were floors dedicated to work on smallpox, Ebola, Machupo, Marburg, Junin, and other hemorrhagic fevers, as well as VEE, Russian spring and summer encephalitis, and a number of other deadly viruses.

[…]

They asked whether they could take air samples and smears from some of the lab areas.

“We haven’t tried to hide the fact that we work with dangerous strains—for defensive purposes,” I replied. “But I don’t have any instructions about allowing you to take samples outside the country. We don’t want to be responsible for a terrible accident.”

Neither did they.

“I can always ask for permission,” I added helpfully. “It might take time and you’d have to wait here for an answer, but I’m sure you’ll be well treated.”

They didn’t press further.

Sandakchiev and I noted with relief that they had not brought special equipment. We had feared for months that the visitors would be carrying advanced monitors capable of detecting viral DNA. Such monitors would have picked up irrefutable evidence of smallpox, and we would have a lot of explaining to do.

The poverty of the lab seemed grimmer by comparison

Saturday, September 12th, 2026

Biohazard by Ken AlibekIt was impossible to believe, Ken Alibek explains (in Biohazard) that their most important military rival, the U.S., wasn’t pursuing an active biological warfare program:

As part of my duties at Biopreparat I reviewed our budget regularly with Gosplan, the state economic planning agency. Every time I visited the block-long building on Gorky Street, the resources available to us seemed to increase. General Roman Volkov, the balding, scholarly official in charge of funding Ministry of Defense programs, practically begged me to look for ways to spend money.

“I’ve got three hundred million rubles for you in this year’s budget,” he told me in 1990. “You still haven’t supplied me with programs on which to spend them.”

When I suggested civilian medical projects, he brushed me off irritably.

“If you give me more suggestions like that, you’ll never get any money,” he said.

This made little sense to me. Our health-care system was getting worse every day, and conditions in our hospitals were abysmal. The previous year, Biopreparat had shipped boxes of disposable plastic syringes to medical facilities around the country in response to an AIDS scandal in Elista, a small city on the northern steppes of the Caspian Sea. Two hundred and fifty children at the city’s main pediatric hospital had been diagnosed with HIV after having been infected by contaminated syringes. Nurses complained that shortages of equipment and staff prevented them from employing adequate sterilization methods. Stories like these were rife throughout the country.

In February 1990, Valery Ganzenko, the head of the medical directorate, came to my office with a bagful of dirty vaccine vials.

“These are being produced at our facility in Georgia,” he complained. “Hospitals in the area are sending them back to us because they’re not sterile. When I ask the Georgians what’s going on they can’t explain it, but we just sent them a big grant to upgrade their equipment.”

I was responsible for the civilian institutes operating within Biopreparat as well as for our military research program. The supervision of vaccine production and antibiotic development for our state health system occupied almost 50 percent of our official functions. Kalinin paid almost no attention to this part of our agency, and neither did others in the senior staff. We gave civilian managers free rein, and inevitably much of our equipment ended up on the black market. No one seemed to care. But I found myself increasingly drawn to our medical programs and allocated time to them whenever I could.

“Maybe we should take a special trip down to Tbilisi,” I suggested to Ganzenko. He was pleasantly surprised.

“I didn’t think anyone around here wanted to spend time on this kind of thing,” he said.

So he goes to visit the lab:

“Why don’t we go to your lab?” I said.

“Later,” he said. “You must first enjoy Georgian hospitality.”

On our first night he took us to a restaurant where he’d reserved a private room. The table was laden with meat, cheese, fish, and bottles of wine—all in short supply at ordinary food stores in Moscow.

The poverty of the lab we visited the following morning seemed grimmer by comparison. Some of the equipment was over forty years old. Workers used tiny ovens to culture vaccines. Our host was unapologetic, insisting that Biopreparat’s funds were being spent on wages and operating costs.

I knew he was lying as soon as I began talking to the staff. Most of the three hundred employees were women. They told me they were earning such pitiful salaries that they couldn’t even afford lunch.

Those re-entering dummy warheads were seen by tens of thousands of people in Peru and Chile

Friday, September 11th, 2026

Debt of Honor by Tom ClancyA couple years ago I noted that Tom Clancy’s Debt of Honor, about a nationalist Japanese plot to cripple the US economy and seize US-controlled islands, is best remembered for presaging the 9/11 attacks, and Roo_ster found “echoes of Jerry Pournelle and his sci-fi buds from the 1960s through the 1980s,” which led Bruce to mention Jerry Pournelle’s foreword for Roswell by Karl Pflock. An old Jerusalem Post piece recounts Pournelle’s explanation for (some) UFOs:

During the Cold War there were reports of UFOs in Chile and Peru witnessed by thousands. And there was even a government conspiracy and cover-up related to the incident.

There are treaties in place that stipulate that no nation may place weapons in orbit and no nation may build or test orbital bombardment systems. This was also generally interpreted to exclude what’s known as fractional orbital bombardment systems, abbreviated with the acronym, FOBS. What is an FOBS? An FOBS is a weapon that is launched into Earth orbit, but is then de-orbited and made to re-enter the atmosphere before it makes a complete circuit around the globe. The Soviets thought they could launch a missile into orbit, swing it around the South Pole and then deorbit it so it came at the US from our southern border and thus avoid all our early warning systems which were watching for Soviet missile launches from the north. One day they decided to develop and test their system, despite the treaties, and they had their dummy missiles re-enter the atmosphere over South America. They hoped no one would notice.

Unfortunately, those re-entering dummy warheads were seen by tens of thousands of people in Peru and Chile, making it impossible to simply dismiss all the reports as hallucinations. So the KGB quickly concocted an explanation. They spread UFO stories and even made up tales of aliens being spotted.

Meanwhile, our government didn’t want the Soviets to know just how much we knew about their experiments. So the CIA did nothing to counter the Soviet rumors. Thus, the test was covered up by both the Soviets and the Americans, each for their own reasons, but with the same result: people believed they had seen “real” UFO’s.

88 million American adults own guns

Sunday, September 6th, 2026

According to the 2026 National Firearms Survey, 32.7% of U.S. adults (95% CI 32.2% – 33.2%) personally own firearms, suggesting that approximately 88 million American adults own guns:

Following the practice of major survey programs such as the General Social Survey, Gallup, and Pew’s American Trends Panel, household income is not employed as a weighting dimension. However, income-raked estimates, which range up to 34.9%, are reported as robustness exercises in an appendix. Ownership is demographically diverse: 45.7% of validated gun owners are female, 25.6% do not identify as White (alone), and the gap in ownership rates between White Americans (34.6%) and Black Americans (33.0%) has narrowed to less than two percentage points. The survey finds that 37.6% of gun owners have used a firearm to defend themselves, their property, a family member, or a member of their household, and it estimates that guns are used defensively by firearms owners in approximately 2.2 million incidents per year. In most defensive incidents no shot was fired (76.3%), about half (50.8%) involved more than one assailant, and in 70.6% of incidents respondents report that the defensive use was successful, such that no crime remained to be reported to the police. 8.4% of defensive incidents were directed against animal threats rather than criminal threats. Separate from these self-defense incidents, 34.7% of gun owners reported that the mere presence of a gun has deterred criminal conduct.

A majority of gun owners (70.0%) indicate that there are some circumstances in which they carry a handgun for self-defense. We estimate that approximately 33.6 million gun owners (39.3% of those aged 21 and over) are “public carriers” who are permitted to carry and carry at least sometimes. The average gun owner owns about 5.2 firearms, and handguns are the most common type of firearm owned (91.6% of owners). 50.5% of gun owners – approximately 44.5 million adults – report that they currently own magazines that hold more than 10 rounds (approximately 539 million such magazines in total), and 88.0% of these owners cite a defensive purpose for owning them. 25.0% of gun owners currently own an AR-15 type rifle, 12.9% currently own other similarly styled semi-automatic rifles, and 30.0% – approximately 26.4 million adults – currently own at least one firearm in one of these two categories, with approximately 40 million AR-15 type rifles and 20 million other similarly styled rifles owned in total. Overall, Americans own approximately 461 million firearms, consisting of approximately 208 million handguns, 154 million rifles, and 99 million shotguns.

Panamanian officials see them as retaliation

Friday, September 4th, 2026

Panama is paying a price for stepping away from Beijing:

Recent reporting indicates that Chinese authorities have sharply increased inspections and detentions of Panamanian-flagged ships after Panama’s Supreme Court struck down the concessions held by Hong Kong-based CK Hutchison at the Balboa and Cristobal container terminals. Beijing says the measures are based on safety concerns. Panamanian officials see them as retaliation for a decision that weakened China’s commercial position at both ends of the Panama Canal.

Panama is one battle in a much larger contest over who will shape the Western Hemisphere. For more than two decades, China expanded its reach by financing, building, and operating ports, railways, electrical grids, telecommunications systems, logistics hubs, and energy projects across Latin America. Those investments created influence that extends well beyond commerce.

[…]

Panama recognized the People’s Republic of China in 2017, ended diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and joined the Belt and Road Initiative the following year. Chinese firms pursued the proposed Panama City-David railway, the Fourth Bridge over the Panama Canal, the Amador Cruise Terminal, and other large projects.

The greatest concern centered on the Balboa and Cristobal terminals at the Pacific and Atlantic entrances to the canal, operated by Panama Ports Company, a subsidiary of CK Hutchison. China did not own or operate the canal, but companies tied to Beijing had gained influence over commercial infrastructure surrounding it.

[…]

Washington increasingly viewed Chinese influence surrounding the canal as a national security concern. It elevated the issue in discussions with Panama, encouraged greater American investment, and supported efforts that led CK Hutchison to agree to sell its controlling interest in the terminals to a U.S.-led consortium.

Panama also withdrew from China’s Belt and Road Initiative. When Chinese opposition delayed the proposed sale, Panama’s Supreme Court struck down the port concessions, clearing the way for new management.

Catastrophic normal accidents will happen with increasing regularity

Wednesday, September 2nd, 2026

In the first decades of the twentieth century, Harold Robertson explains, the idea that individuals should be systematically evaluated and selected based on their ability rather than wealth, class, or political connections, led to significant changes in selection techniques at all levels of American society:

The Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) revolutionized college admissions by allowing elite universities to find and recruit talented students from beyond the boarding schools of New England. Following the adoption of the SAT, aptitude tests such as Wonderlic (1936), Graduate Record Examination (1936), Army General Classification Test (1941), and Law School Admission Test (1948) swept the United States. Spurred on by the demands of two world wars, this system of institutional management electrified the Tennessee Valley, created the first atom bomb, invented the transistor, and put a man on the moon.

By the 1960s, the systematic selection for competence came into direct conflict with the political imperatives of the civil rights movement. During the period from 1961 to 1972, a series of Supreme Court rulings, executive orders, and laws—most critically, the Civil Rights Act of 1964—put meritocracy and the new political imperative of protected-group diversity on a collision course. Administrative law judges have accepted statistically observable disparities in outcomes between groups as prima facie evidence of illegal discrimination. The result has been clear: any time meritocracy and diversity come into direct conflict, diversity must take priority.

The resulting norms have steadily eroded institutional competency, causing America’s complex systems to fail with increasing regularity. In the language of a systems theorist, by decreasing the competency of the actors within the system, formerly stable systems have begun to experience normal accidents at a rate that is faster than the system can adapt. The prognosis is harsh but clear: either selection for competence will return or America will experience devolution to more primitive forms of civilization and loss of geopolitical power.

[…]

The Air Traffic Control (ATC) system used in the U.S. relies on an intricate dance of visual or radar observation, transponders, and radio communication, all with the incredible challenge of keeping thousands of simultaneously moving planes from ever crashing into each other. Since air controlling is one of the only jobs that pays more than $100,000 per year and does not require a college diploma, it has been a popular career choice for individuals without a degree who nonetheless have an exceptionally good memory, attention span, visuospatial awareness, and logical skills. The Air Traffic Selection and Training (AT-SAT) Exam, a standardized test of those critical skills, was historically the primary barrier to entry for air controllers. As a consequence of the AT-SAT, as well as a preference for veterans with former air controller experience, 83 percent of air controllers in the U.S. were white men as of 2014.

That year, the FAA added a Biographical Questionnaire (BQ) to the screening process to tilt the applicant pool toward diverse candidates. Facing pushback in the courts from well-qualified candidates who were screened out, the FAA quietly backed away from the BQ and adopted a new exam, the Air Traffic Skills Assessment (ATSA). While the ATSA includes some questions similar to those of the BQ, it restored the test’s focus on core air traffic skills. The importance of highly-skilled air controllers was made clear in the most deadly air disaster in history, the 1977 Tenerife incident. Two planes, one taking off and one taxiing, collided on the runway due to confusion between the captain of KLM 4805 and the Tenerife ATC. The crash, which killed 583 people, resulted in sweeping changes in aviation safety culture.

Recently, the tremendous U.S. record for air safety established since the 1970s has been fraying at the edges. The first three months of 2023 saw nine near-miss incidents at U.S. airports, one with two planes coming within 100 feet of colliding. This terrifying uptick from years prior resulted in the FAA and NTSB convening safety summits in March and May, respectively. Whether they dared to discuss root causes seems unlikely.

Given the sheer size of the U.S. military in both manpower and budget dollars, it should not come as a surprise that the diversity push has also affected the readiness of this institution. Following three completely avoidable collisions of U.S. Navy warships in 2017 and a fire in 2020 that resulted in the scuttling of USS Bonhomme Richard, a $750 million amphibious assault craft, two retired marines conducted off-the-record interviews with 77 current and retired Navy officers. One recurring theme was the prioritization of diversity training over ship handling and warfighting preparedness. Many of them openly admit that, given current issues, the U.S. would likely lose an open naval engagement with China. Instead of taking the criticism to heart, the Navy commissioned “Task Force One Navy,” which recommended deemphasizing or eliminating meritocratic tests like the Officer Aptitude Rating to boost diversity. Absent an existential challenge, U.S. military preparedness is likely to continue to degrade.

[…]

The U.S. has embraced a novel question: what happens when the men who built the complex systems our society relies on cease contributing and are replaced by people who were chosen for reasons other than competency?

The answer is clear: catastrophic normal accidents will happen with increasing regularity. While each failure is officially seen as a separate issue to be fixed with small patches, the reality is that the whole system is seeing failures at an accelerating rate, which will lead in turn to the failure of other systems. In the case of the Camp Fire that killed 85 people, PG&E fired its CEO, filed Chapter 11, and restructured. The system’s response has been to turn off the electricity and raise wildfire insurance premiums. This has resulted in very little reflection.

[…]

The path of least resistance will be the devolution of complex systems and the reduction in the quality of life that entails. For the typical resident in a second-tier city in Mexico, Brazil, or South Africa, power outages are not uncommon, tap water is probably not safe to drink, and hospital-associated infections are common and often fatal. Absent a step change in the quality of American governance and a renewed culture of excellence, they prefigure the country’s future.

They gathered their neighbors, formed organizations, accepted responsibility, and built institutions together

Monday, August 31st, 2026

People often describe homeschooling as opting out, Robert Pondiscio notes, but he suggested something different to a group of “graduating” homeschoolers:

Your parents may have exited one educational institution. But they didn’t stop there. For just a moment, they were consumers. They looked at the educational marketplace and concluded, “This school is not the right place for our child.” Then something remarkable happened. They stopped consuming. They became producers. They didn’t merely purchase an education. They built one.

The most diligent homeschooling families are performing a profoundly American act of strengthening civil society:

Tocqueville famously observed that Americans possessed a remarkable habit of association. Faced with problems, they didn’t simply petition the state. They gathered their neighbors, formed organizations, accepted responsibility, and built institutions together.

I wanted the graduates to leave with something more than pride in their accomplishment. I wanted them to understand what their parents had really given them. An education, yes, but also a brilliant example of citizenship. Their parents saw something they believed needed doing and, instead of waiting for someone else to do it, accepted the responsibility themselves. Whether the graduates someday homeschool their own children is beside the point. What I hoped they would inherit was that instinct: When something important isn’t being done well enough, don’t complain or blame others. Build.

Americans live shorter lives despite being much richer

Friday, August 28th, 2026

The reasons Americans live shorter lives despite being much richer than their peers are well-understood at this point, Cremieux explains:

The biggest contributor is that obesity is very bad for health, as countries get richer their citizens tend to get fatter, and America is the richest country.

[…]

All Americans regardless of race are, in principle, exposed to a health care system of the same quality understood broadly, although there are gaps in access, but those access gaps don’t fit the order of the longevity gaps—as a close proxy, in 2024, the insurance rates go Asian > White > Black > Hispanic. These race results and the sex ones combine to produce a picture that cannot be explained by a simple health care-centric story. In fact, when it comes to things the health care system can plausibly intervene on, America is usually the highest-performing country—at least cross-sectionally—or it’s very nearly so. When it comes to lifespan and America’s lag despite its riches, look elsewhere than health care.

The benefits of automatic license plate readers outweigh the dangers

Sunday, August 16th, 2026

The benefits of automatic license plate readers outweigh the dangers, Richard Hanania argues:

There are now around 120,000 Flock cameras in operation across the US. These devices automatically read license plates and make their locations available to law enforcement. Flock now also makes it possible to look up cars by their descriptions, rather than just relying on plates. As one might expect, this has proved very useful in solving crimes. Just as predictably, it has caused a popular backlash.

[…]

On the plus side of this technology, a 2023 study from the company itself estimated that Flock cameras are used in solving 700K crimes each year, or approximately 10% of all reported crime in the US. This study involved surveying law enforcement agencies that were Flock customers, ending up with 123 respondents that provided data researchers considered adequate for analysis. They were asked “How many arrests have you made that can directly be attributed to the use of a Flock Safety camera?” and asked to provide corresponding case records.

From there, the authors make broader estimates of society at large. More recent research from Flock boasts about last year seeing 1,000,000 “cases supported” and helping to locate approximately 10,000 missing persons. The company estimates that its technology was involved in roughly one in five cases cleared in its customer jurisdictions.

These are absolutely massive benefits.

[…]

You would expect Flock cameras to have the biggest impact on auto theft, and here the results are particularly striking. In 2023, the crime reached a recent high. But in 2024, the Council on Criminal Justice, which relies on a sample of cities, estimated a 24% decline over the previous year. That was followed by an even larger drop of 27% in 2025, and a further 20% fall in the first half of 2026. Overall, this corresponds to a decline of over 50% in just three years.

[…]

Fifty known cases of stalking strike me as something that is barely worth mentioning in the context of plummeting crime rates. Moreover, these are all rogue actors, and they have been punished in cases where there is sufficient evidence that they’ve committed crimes, indicating that none of these instances are part of a larger plot to deprive large numbers of citizens of their rights.

The casualties inflicted by a brutal epidemic of typhus from 1918 to 1921 made a deep impression on the commanders of the Red Army

Tuesday, August 11th, 2026

Biohazard by Ken AlibekA year after taking power in 1917, Ken Alibek explains (in Biohazard), the Bolshevik government plunged into a savage conflict with anti-Communist forces:

Red and White armies clashed from Siberia to the Crimean Peninsula, and by the time hostilities ended in 1921, as many as ten million people had lost their lives. The majority of the deaths did not result from injuries on the battlefield. They were caused by famine and disease.

The casualties inflicted by a brutal epidemic of typhus from 1918 to 1921 made a deep impression on the commanders of the Red Army.

[…]

In 1928, the governing Revolutionary Military Council signed a secret decree ordering the transformation of typhus into a battlefield weapon. Three years earlier the fledgling Soviet government had signed an international treaty in Geneva banning the use of poison gas and bacteriological weapons. The weapons program was placed under the control of the GPU (the State Political Directorate), one of the predecessors of the KGB. It would continue to be supervised by state security organs until the early 1950s.

The 1928 decree represented a momentous decision. Bred in the unsanitary conditions of the battlefront or the slum, epidemic typhus has ravaged mankind for centuries. It is carried by lice from one infected person to another and cannot reproduce outside its host. Unlike typhoid fever, which is caused by salmonella bacteria, typhus is a rickettsial disease, carried by tiny rod-shaped microorganisms.

Once inside the body, the rickettsiae swarm through the blood, breaking down the cell walls of blood vessels as they multiply. Around seven to ten days after infection, victims will abruptly develop the first symptoms, beginning with throbbing headaches and a high fever. The stricken tissues become inflamed as they try to fight off the invaders, triggering a rash that spreads over the body. Spots of gangrene will sometimes appear on fingertips and other extremities as blood circulation slows down. Without treatment, the disease will send its victims into weeks of delirium and is fatal in 40 percent of cases.

Improvements in hygiene eradicated epidemic typhus from most of western Europe in the twentieth century, but it continues to afflict Africa, parts of South America, and Asia. A typhus vaccine was developed during World War II, though it is rarely used today, other than to immunize travelers to regions where the disease remains endemic. Administered in three separate doses over the course of five months, it provides almost complete protection from the disease. It was at one time also used for treatment, but it has been replaced in that capacity by antibiotics.

When the Soviet Union first turned to typhus, there was no known way to control or contain this relentlessly efficient killer. The question facing our scientists was how to harness that efficiency.

Infecting lice with typhus and spreading them among a target population was not practical. Eventually someone hit on the idea of breeding typhus in the labs and spraying it in an aerosol form from airplanes.

Early biological weapons work involved primitive methods. The pathogens were bred in chicken embryos or in live animals such as rats that were killed when the concentration of pathogens was highest and were liquefied in large blenders. The liquid was then poured into explosives.

I learned about the 1928 decree and the early typhus experiments from a set of old reports at the Ministry of Defense. Summaries of experiments and testing, they were purposefully short on detail. No one wanted to commit the full information to paper.

[…]

The first attempts to cultivate typhus in the lab employed chicken embryos. Thousands of chicken eggs were sent each week to the Leningrad Military Academy—at a time when most Soviet citizens were lucky to get one full meal a day. By the 1930s, the Leningrad Academy had produced powdered and liquid versions of typhus, for use in a primitive aerosol.

[…]

The Leningrad Military Academy sent some of its scientists and equipment one hundred miles north to the White Sea, a barren Arctic expanse flecked with tiny islands used to house political prisoners. By the mid-1930s Solovetsky Island, one of the largest, was the second major site of the Soviet biological warfare program.

At Solovetsky, a Soviet prison which later became the hub of Stalin’s “Gulag Archipelago” concentration-camp system, scientists worked with typhus, Q fever, glanders, and melioidosis (an incapacitating disease similar to glanders). Solovetsky’s large laboratory compound was built by prison labor. Many of the prisoners may also have been involuntary participants in our earliest experiments with biological agents.

The summary reports compiled by the Ministry of Defense describe several dozen cases of melioidosis from that period. The material I saw was intentionally vague as to whether humans were involved, but the way the case reports were arranged—with nineteen in one group, eleven in another, and twelve in yet another—suggested an irregular pattern not usually associated with animal testing. And the symptoms described could only have been experienced by human subjects. There have been repeated allegations in the West about Soviet germ warfare experiments on humans, but I have seen no other reports to indicate that these took place after the 1930s.

The research exacted a grim toll on our scientists. One account of a test with plague in the late 1930s ended with a cryptic note: “This experiment was not finished due to the death of the researcher.” Another from the same period reported that twenty workers had been infected with glanders during experiments. The report didn’t say where these experiments took place, or whether the workers had died, but in the days before antibiotics, death on exposure was virtually certain.

[…]

The lieutenant colonel who told me about the tularemia production line at Kirov also suggested that an outbreak of Q fever among German troops on leave in Crimea in 1943 was the result of an attempt to use another one of the biological warfare agents developed by his facility. I was never able to investigate this further, but Q fever was practically unheard of in Russia prior to that outbreak.

One company, Flock Safety, has become the movement’s primary target

Monday, August 10th, 2026

Rafael A. Mangual argues that the pushback against Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) is misguided:

One company, Flock Safety, has become the movement’s primary target. Flock cameras, like other ALPRs, capture information about vehicles—not the people inside them—as they pass. They record license plates, along with details such as a car’s make, model, color, and distinguishing features, including bumper stickers, custom paint, or visible damage. That information is stored by flock on behalf of its customers (who actually own the data) for short periods, allowing them to track, and in some cases intercept, vehicles involved in criminal activity.

That police sometimes want to keep an eye out for vehicles of interest shouldn’t be controversial. Agencies have done that as part of AMBER Alerts for years. The idea was simple and uncontroversial: widely disseminating information about such vehicles could help turn ordinary citizens into intelligence assets in child-abduction cases, when time is crucial. AMBER alerts have unquestionably saved lives. The widespread adoption of advanced ALPRs would build on what has been gained from AMBER alerts by making it easier to find vehicles when time is of the essence.

But that hasn’t stopped politicians from across the spectrum—at both the federal and local levels—from announcing support for legislation banning or restricting the deployment of ALPRs.

[…]

For starters, there is no right not to be photographed in public—whether by private citizens or by the government. So-called First Amendment auditors take joy in illustrating this fact. There’s now a whole genre of YouTube content featuring self-styled auditors obnoxiously filming people in public to get them to call the police, who are often forced to admit they can do nothing. Filming public space is, in fact, protected activity.

In addition, the Fourth Amendment has never been understood to prohibit law enforcement officers from observing what is in plain view from a place where they are lawfully present. If an officer walking past a car sees contraband on the front seat, he may act on that observation—even without a warrant.

[…]

The notion that local governments are using these cameras to compile long-term logs of Americans’ movements runs up against several realities. For one, such an effort would quickly create enormous data-storage demands. For another, Flock cameras default to retaining data for no more than 30 days, a setting that most jurisdictions leave unchanged. Many police departments also impose their own restrictions on which vehicles can be searched and under what circumstances. To be sure, this doesn’t mean that the technology can’t be misused (as shown by a handful of cases involving police officers using department assets to track people for personal reasons). But these abuses don’t justify a rejection of the technology any more than some cases of excessive force justify condemnation of policing as an institution.

In Soviet government offices, an executive’s status could be measured by the number of his phones

Thursday, July 30th, 2026

Biohazard by Ken AlibekKen Alibek explains (in Biohazard) his position in the Soviet system:

My great grandfather had been a khan, a member of the nobility in what is now Kazakhstan, in Central Asia, but I grew up in a system that lavished few of its privileges on non-Russians. My wife and daughter and two young sons had risen with me to a lifestyle inconceivable to the majority of Soviet citizens. With the combined salary of a senior bureaucrat and a high-ranking military officer, I earned as much as a Soviet government minister. But in the Communist system, money was not the measure of worth. What counted was the special status that gave us access to perks and influence in our supposedly egalitarian society.

[…]

The desk held the real symbols of my authority: five telephones. In Soviet government offices, an executive’s status could be measured by the number of his phones—an indication of multiple sources of authority. I even had a kremlyovka, the small white phone that connects everyone in the upper reaches of the Soviet government, from the general secretary of the Communist Party to ordinary ministers of state.

Personal mementos of family or friends were taboo in the offices of senior government officials, but I had hung portraits of a few Russian scientists: D. I. Mendeleyev, who invented the periodic table of elements; Nikolai Pirogov, a nineteenth-century pioneer in military surgery; Professor Ilya Mechnikov, a Russian microbiologist who discovered cellular immunity.

[…]

Sitting in a corner was a Western computer. I never used it, but it was another sign of “special” status in a regime that prohibited its citizens from owning a copier. I would have preferred a television or radio, but the KGB had banned them from the offices of senior personnel. Our security chiefs claimed that Western electronic surveillance was so good that foreign agents could decipher our deepest secrets by analyzing the vibrations of our conversations on glass. It made little sense to me: why not then ban the computer as well?

The KGB was thorough, and it lived by its own impenetrable logic. Once a month, security officers shooed all the lab chiefs and division heads out of their offices to check for bugs. Some believed that they were really checking on equipment they had themselves installed to record our conversations.

[…]

The third floor was home to our “First Department,” the unit responsible for maintaining our secret files and all communications with Biopreparat facilities around the country. The only people allowed in, besides security personnel, were Kalinin and myself. It was administered by the KGB.

Sometimes I went upstairs myself. For one thing, it was the only place in the building where you could copy documents. The First Department was the sole custodian of our copier machine.

Mass politics, post-politics, antipolitics, and hyperpolitics

Friday, July 24th, 2026

Anton Jäger’s Hyperpolitics: Extreme Politicization without Political Consequences traces the evolution of modern politics through four eras: mass politics, post-politics, antipolitics, and hyperpolitics.

The years 1914 to 1989 mark the age of mass politics, when politicisation was high and institutionalisation was also high – so people engaged with politics electorally and on the streets. They were joiners – of political parties, unions, congregations, working men’s clubs, reading groups; they participated in multiple interlacing institutions. Not by coincidence, this was also a time when political struggle resulted in concrete gains. Then, 1989 to the financial crash in 2008 (the years often called the “long 90s”) was the age of post-politics, when institutionalisation was low (we emphatically did not join clubs then, we went to clubs), and politicisation was through the floor. It was a time when technocrats took care of business while everyone else went to a rave, and we said history was over. From the crash through to about 2020 (sometimes earlier, this boundary is the most fluid) was the age of anti-politics – a resurgent Tea Party in the US, Beppe Grillo and anti-establishment protests in Italy, the Arab spring, the Occupy movement. Politicisation in this period came back with a vengeance, and even while institutionalisation hasn’t recovered, these movements still have institutional ambitions. Protest movements in Spain and Greece bore political parties, Podemos and Syriza; protest candidates in the US, France and the UK, had their eyes on retaking traditional parties from which the revolutionary intent had long been stripped away.

Hyperpolitics is what came next: intense politicisation, with neither institutional roots nor ambitions. “On the surface,” Jäger writes, “the Black Lives Matter protests would seem to have little in common with the mob that stormed the Capitol in January 2021. Morally, they are worlds apart … Organisationally, however, these movements exhibit a striking set of similarities: fleeting in duration, they maintain no membership rolls and struggle to impose any real discipline on their adherents.” As a consequence, everything explodes and nothing changes; movements surge suddenly forward and yet no territory is taken. He quotes political theorist Paolo Gerbaudo’s evocative phrase “bodies without organs”. Modern political movements, he writes, are “concentrated and muscular, yet without an internal metabolism”.

He found this pattern across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and he only stopped there, he says, because “I don’t have the linguistic and cultural reach to fully tell this story globally”. His descriptions are powerful. He writes of climate strikers and anti-lockdown demonstrators alike as “a myriad animated by brief, potent stimuli, stirred to action by charismatic influencers and digital demagogues”. And that, you have to admit, is exactly what it looks like.