In China’s business culture, this is exactly how a successful commercial fixer operates

Thursday, November 19th, 2026

Desmond Shum suggests that the spy narrative misses Alice Huang’s real business:

I suspect Alice Huang is primarily a commercial fixer, known in Chinese as a qian ke, who may also have served as a bai shou tao, literally a “white glove,” for other business interests, rather than a CCP intelligence operative.

What makes me think so is the career path she has traveled.

Recent Chinese-language investigations, drawing on corporate records, court judgments, regulatory penalties, and stock exchange disclosures, reveal Huang’s involvement in a series of complicated capital-market transactions.

The recurring pattern was the use of intermediaries and layered ownership structures that could separate the people appearing on transaction documents from those with the underlying economic interests.

When Huang subsequently emerged as the public face of Megaspeed, a little-known Singapore company purchasing billions of dollars’ worth of Nvidia chips, she was just repeating the same business model she has perfected.

A commercial fixer connects people with money to those who control resources, arranges financing, and helps transactions overcome commercial or political obstacles. Their most valuable asset is access.

A white glove performs a more specific function: acting on behalf of others while concealing the identities or interests of the real principals behind a transaction.

This is particularly useful in mergers and acquisitions, where related-party transactions can trigger disclosure requirements, shareholder approvals, and regulatory scrutiny. By inserting an apparently independent intermediary, connected parties can make a transaction appear to be conducted at arm’s length. Similar arrangements can also be used to circumvent sanctions or export restrictions.

During my decades in China and Hong Kong, I encountered many such intermediaries. Some were sophisticated financiers; others knew little about the businesses they represented. Their expertise lay in arranging financing, structuring ownership, and moving assets between companies while keeping the real beneficiaries out of public view.

Others simply served as frontmen—or, in this case a frontwoman.

[…]

Access to Nvidia was not merely incidental to Huang’s business. It was something she and Kang reportedly offered to investors as a commercial advantage.

In China’s business culture, this is exactly how a successful commercial fixer operates: identifying a scarce resource, cultivating access to the person who controls it, and connecting that access to people willing to pay for it.

Huang did not need to understand how Nvidia’s GPUs worked.

She needed to know how to secure them.

And with advanced AI computing capacity in enormous demand, that ability could be worth billions.

How Thailand resisted colonization

Saturday, November 14th, 2026

Derek Hopper explains how Thailand resisted colonization:

By the 1830s, the Siamese court was watching nervously as British power radiated outward from India. Just a few years before Mongkut’s discovery, during the First Burmese War of 1824–1826, British gunboats sailed up the sacred waters of the Irrawaddy River and humiliated the ancient kingdom of Burma, extracting huge territorial concessions from Siam’s long-term rival. To the east, French missionaries were active in Vietnam and Cambodia, representing the earliest phase of France’s colonial ambitions and its mission civilisatrice. One by one, Siam’s neighbors began to fall and it found itself the sole Southeast Asian holdout against European colonialism.

The vanquished countries pursued a range of resistance strategies, all of them unsuccessful. Burma fought a series of doomed wars against Britain, only to be annexed. Cambodia willingly allowed itself to become a French protectorate, viewing this as the lesser of several evils after decades of encroachment from neighboring Siam and Vietnam, only for that protection to evolve into colonial rule within French Indochina. Vietnam relied on the country’s historic ties to China to ward off France, but its harsh treatment of missionaries and minorities gave Europeans an easy pretext for intervention.

Instead, Siam’s leaders hoped that demonstrating it already had clear markers of civilization would undermine the pretexts for colonization. Even in the nineteenth century, countries did not want to be thought of as engaging in naked land grabs. Successful colonial ventures usually combined ostensibly noble justifications and straightforward power-hungry motivations. Europeans believed that technologically advanced, Christian nations had a moral duty to bring progress to ‘backward’ peoples who lacked proper government, writing systems, and cultural refinement. This ideology created domestic political support and international legitimacy for territorial conquest.

Mongkut’s discovery of the Stele was comparable to finding a lost Magna Carta at just the right moment. Siam’s rulers realized that written language was key to civilizational legitimacy in Western eyes, and the inscription provided exactly what they needed: tangible evidence of a tradition of literary sophistication that overturned European assumptions of primitiveness.

In 1855, a new British special envoy to Southeast Asia arrived in Bangkok. Sir John Bowring was governor of recently conquered Hong Kong and represented a nation at the height of its powers. By this point, Britain controlled almost a fifth of the world’s land mass, produced over half its industrial output, and had the most powerful navy the world had ever seen. Siam, on the other hand, had been in self-imposed relative isolation from the West since 1688, and had recently been accused of dealing contemptuously with British and American trade missions. John Crawfurd, a British envoy, described the Siamese as ‘unusually sordid, insincere and rapacious’. Under Rama III, Siam’s king and Mongkut’s older half-brother, most people thought Siam was headed down the same path as its neighbors.

After Rama III died in 1851, Mongkut was crowned king, taking the name Rama IV. Mongkut was popular with the British, who thought him more friendly to their interests than the other contenders for the throne. As a monk, he had studied Western languages, sciences, and technology. He spoke English and Latin and had continuous contact with diplomats and Catholic and Protestant missionaries. He was fascinated by the Western concept of material and technological progress, an idea in stark contrast to Buddhist cosmology’s emphasis on repeated cycles of decay.

European diplomats had often found Asian rulers, including Mongkut’s predecessors, to be aloof and disdainful. Arriving in Siam for his meeting with the new king, Bowring would have expected more of the same. Instead, he found a ruler who displayed a sophisticated understanding of the Western world. King Mongkut received Bowring in his private apartments for cigars and wine. They bypassed interpreters and spoke in English. Bowring noted that the king’s library had a vast array of books ranging from Western science to novels by Sir Walter Scott.

British imperialists were unaccustomed to negotiating with Asian rulers who could meet them on their own intellectual ground. This was an era in which Thomas Macaulay, the colonial administrator and historian best known for his History of England, could write that ‘a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia’. Bowring, however, was willing to believe the Siamese were cultured. His influential 1857 work, The Kingdom and People of Siam, featured the Ramkhamhaeng Stele, recognizing it as a major historical document that provided evidence of early Thai writing and was crucial to understanding Sukhothai’s sophisticated governance and society.

The treaty that Mongkut and Bowring negotiated was a decisive shift in the relationship between Britain and Siam. Three decades earlier, in 1826, a treaty had opened limited trade between the two countries. The 1855 treaty was by no means generous. It capped Siamese import and export duties at 3 percent and gave significant extraterritorial rights to British subjects, meaning Britons could not be tried in Siamese courts. But the treaty massively increased foreign trade, and crucially, Siam continued to be treated as a sovereign negotiating partner.

The contrast with other countries in the region is stark. Following its defeats in the Anglo-Burmese Wars of 1824–26 and 1852, Burma had been forced to surrender four provinces, pay a crippling £1 million indemnity (about $160 million today), and accept the presence of a British overseer with veto power over the king’s decisions. Similarly, China’s attempt to enforce a ban on Britain’s opium trade in 1839 had resulted in the loss of Hong Kong and the start of what nationalists would later dub the ‘century of humiliation’. Mongkut demonstrated what strategic compromise could achieve when resistance failed.

[…]

In comparison to its neighbors, Siam strategically adopted and demonstrated the markers of civilization that European powers used to justify colonization elsewhere from a position of relative strength.

In 1868, Mongkut extended invitations to British and French officials to observe a solar eclipse. This was a grand affair with pavilions and accommodation prepared for the attendees, the goal of which was to showcase Mongkut’s commitment to science. Mongkut accurately predicted the timing and location of the eclipse using a combination of traditional Thai timekeeping methods and Western astronomical techniques. According to some stories, his calculations were so precise that they trumped those of the French astronomers present.

The Siamese court knew what to perform to whom. France had long considered science to be the true marker of civilization, while Britain championed international law and free trade. Mongkut demonstrated Siamese civilization through measures that European powers used to justify colonization elsewhere.

No group of people have ever destroyed more books than librarians

Friday, November 13th, 2026

Double Fold by Nicholson BakerThe most interesting rabbit hole on the real banned book list, Kulak says, is the complete disappearance of Augusto Pinochet’s books, both in Spanish, and in their official English Translation:

Thousands of English Copies of Augusto Pinochet’s 4 Volume memoirs “A Journey through a Life” had been printed… And seemingly completely disappeared.

Such that even discovering such books had ever existed were an extraordinary challenge in 2024.

If one searched “Pinochet Memoirs” in Amazon or Google they’d encounter works by communists like “Pinochet and Me: A Chilean Memoir”, “Something Fierce: Memoirs of a Revolutionary Daughter”, “I Surrender: A Memoir of Chile’s Dictatorship, 1975” “At the Edge of the World: Memories of a Judge Who Indicted Pinochet” and “Memoirs of a cyclist who disappeared during the Pinochet Era”

There is an entire book “Pinochet in Piccadilly” just whinging about Thatcher’s friendliness with Pinochet.

And yet the Actual works of the man, or the fact that they had been officially translated into English Was entirely gone.

Not on Archive, not on the Dark Libraries like Annas Archives, not in google search… And not in university libraries even.

I searched University websites and JSTOR… Not In the Entirety of Canada, The Oxford or Cambridge Systems, Seemingly the entirety of New York city… Nowhere except 1 or 2 obscure universities in US Midwest or Australia could I find a single copy of a Single Volume of the 4 volume memoirs… To even confirm they existed.

I had found the faintest low resolution Google image search results linking to now defunct Spanish language Facebook posts, and dead link websites…

But Even hammering down the publication history was a challenge…

[…]

You see I had a VERY good inkling of how these memoirs had disappeared.

Chile you see, much like Spain post-Franco… Almost immediately fell under intensive political influence by the Communists and their descendants immediately after the right wing dictator fell.

Catholic Dictators, despite what communists will tell you about atrocities and mass killings… Are almost overwhelmingly FORGIVING of open treason, conspiracy with foreign powers, joining armed factions, and generally being an open enemy of Man, God, and Civilization… Not just in word, but in open Armed Deed.

The Reason we endlessly hear about the “crimes” of Franco or Pinochet against the poor suffering innocent socialists… but not say, the Weimar Republic against Rosa and Karl, or Interwar Poland’s brutality against Polish communists during the Polish-Soviet War (1919-1921), or Pre-Anschluss Austria, or what the Finns did to Finnish Communists during the Winter War… Is because almost all the communists in those societies were killed or exiled at one point or another… Very few went on to get careers in government or academia once the mean dictator fell were they could pass laws against “Denial” of “crimes” against treasonous socialist revolutionaries.

Meanwhile… despite dropping communists out of helicopters over shark infested water… Pinochet only ever killed 3-8 thousand… In the middle of a near civil war. Then let the rest live out their lives knowing they had lost…

So most of his enemies survived to publish their Memoirs about being disabled lesbian bicyclists under “The Dictator”… Until one day, somehow, Democracy returned.

So I knew what had happened to Pinochet’s memoirs… across South American, American, Canadian, British, and seemingly the entire university system… Communists of the more daring sort had stollen and dumpstered them, but even more commonly Left-leaning librarians, one at a time had quietly ‘mislabelled’ the books, and then thrown them in a pile of books for shredding.

No group of people have ever destroyed more books than librarians. Like school teachers, they’re one of those nice sounding groups of people, til you apply any scrutiny and realize they’re all ideologically captured, exist largely to destroy the thing you’d naively think they exist to protect and, in my moderate conservative opinion, deserve to be lined up and shot to the last.

You should be trolling and buying up things at bookstores if you ever want to hold onto a work… Somehow my local library today has entire aisles of Monster fucker erotica, yet all the local history books that I remember occupying shelves when I was a kid… All the nice old regimental histories that had been there since the local regiments themselves had donated the copies in the 1950s? Gone. Not even on the library interloan system… I have to troll thrift stores located in barns to find a former library copy (with the library card slot still glued to the inside of the cover) of a Gilded hardcover history of the Grey-Simcoe Foresters or the Lincoln and Welland Regiment… With a “For Destruction” stamped on the first page.

I have ordered off Ebay, for $10 Canadian, an Arthur Rackham illustrated English Edition complete Ring Cycle by Richard Wagner… With a “Pittsburg Public Library” card slot in the cover.

See also the book Double Fold: Libraries and the Assault on Paper.

A quest for a more humane ‘socialism with a human face’ kept arising from deep within the system

Thursday, November 12th, 2026

Why did the Communist regime collapse in the Soviet Union?

Many observers credit the advent of the first Polish pope, John Paul II, in 1978. His moral authority gave the Polish authorities fits, and helped inspire the formation of Solidarity, a societal-wide opposition group, in 1980. Starting in late 1981, however, the Polish regime declared martial law and drove Solidarity underground, where it remained until Gorbachev opened space for it to return. Nationalism is the favored explanation among academics, but little possibility for nationalist mobilization existed until Gorbachev permitted it in a desperate quest for social support of his reform program known as perestroika. Boris Yeltsin, the Russian nationalist, was an obscure provincial apparatchik until Gorbachev had him transferred to Moscow and empowered him and comparable figures in the fifteen republics by introducing competitive elections.

Nor can Soviet dissidents explain what transpired. Not numerous, they were mostly in prison, exile, or house arrest, as Lyudmila Alexeyeva, courageous cofounder of the Moscow Helsinki Group, lamented in her first-rate history Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights. It was Gorbachev who released Andrei Sakharov, enabling him and others to participate in public life. Economic collapse, too, did not precede but followed reforms. The global oil price plunge in 1985 unsettled long-standing macroeconomic stability, but the Soviet economy formally descended into recession only in 1990, as Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich showed in The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: An Insider’s History.

Afghanistan constitutes another deceptive explanation. Whereas America deployed 550,000 troops at peak to Vietnam, the USSR never massed more than about 120,000 in a country almost four times South Vietnam’s size. Afghanistan’s decade-long budgetary cost amounted to a single year of subsidies for Soviet agriculture. Fewer soldiers died in the Afghan campaign than at home in suicides and hazing incidents. Public revelations of the campaign’s failures took place only thanks to Gorbachev’s glasnost. The Soviet military-industrial complex is blamed for placing a crushing burden on the country, but the civilian sector was far more wasteful, and a significant portion of production in the military complex consisted of consumer goods. Finally, some cite the peace-through-strength buildup of President Ronald Reagan between 1981 and 1988. Reagan made a deep impression in Moscow, especially after he demonstrated the resolve to fire illegally striking civilian air traffic controllers in 1981, but he also negotiated arms control agreements that helped ease any arms-race pressure on Moscow.

If the pope, nationalism, dissidents, economic collapse, Afghanistan, the military-industrial complex, or Reagan were not decisive, what was? The Soviet Union, paradoxically, was destroyed by the one thing that almost everyone thought was itself dead: Communist ideology. Political reform constituted a choice, not a necessity. True, whether in terms of living standards and technology or freedom and attractiveness, the Soviet Union had lost the competition with the United States. But Soviet leaders could have muddled on, as they had been doing, living off the revenues from Siberian oil and gas (as Russia is still doing half a century later). Instead, Communist leaders chose to reenergize their system, animated by a particular, and fatal, vision.

A quest for a more humane ‘socialism with a human face’ kept arising from deep within the system, and each time it unintentionally shook the system to its core — Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Gorbachev in the 1980s. Relaxing censorship, permitting debate, and holding competitive elections inside the party again and again galvanized more than a few people to use the opening to demand the formation of alternative parties. Communists have never found a way to limit political liberalization to the confines of the party’s monopoly.

The discovery that Communism had no political reform equilibrium induced panic and calls for a crackdown against the party’s own initiative. The Soviets dispatched tanks to crush the Communist political liberalizations in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. But if no crackdown ensues, the monopoly unravels all the way. The Soviet crackdown against its own reforms famously failed in 1991. One key reason was that Lenin had compelled a reluctant Stalin to implement a federal state structure, a Union of republics, rather than a unitary state, and once Gorbachev unwittingly set in motion the system’s suicide, elites discovered they did not have to pull out all the stops to save themselves. They could remain in power in the ethno-territorial republics — Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and so on.

Another key reason was that in the bargain, elites got to transform their de facto control over state assets into de jure private ownership of them, a further powerful incentive to go along with the unexpected collapse.

Markets do the good things that sounds bad

Tuesday, November 10th, 2026

Unbeatable by Bryan CaplanIn his upcoming book, Unbeatable, Bryan Caplan makes the brutally honest case for free markets:

Real-world free markets deliver one broad benefit that flies under the radar of economic theory: They shield humanity from its own Social Desirability Bias. Markets do the good things that sounds bad. Good things like driving incompetent, unresponsive, and obsolete businesses into bankruptcy. Producing “shameful” products people secretly love. Refusing to produce “admirable” products they secretly loathe.

Keeping costly products out of the hands of people who barely appreciate them. Putting convenience above safety. Firing superfluous workers so they search for constructive ways to spend their lives. Charging people to drive. Charging extra during rush hour.  Inducing teens to abandon their childish dreams. Persuading grown-ups to volunteer for the uninspiring dirty jobs that someone has to do.

You will not find a technical solution to politics and power

Saturday, November 7th, 2026

Dominic Cummins provides a “Hollywood pitch summary” of his perspective on AI and power:

a) the destruction will be greater than the optimists think, b) attempts by the old regimes to regulate it will probably generally do more harm than good, c) I hope it accelerates regime change because the old regimes are driving us to violence/war, d) the politics of the ‘stop’ people are generally somewhere between the worst kind of student politics and extremely dangerous and I’d rather take my chances defending the old Anglo civilisation than ‘we need a form of Stalinism for safety’, e) those most concerned about it should stop treating AI policy as another ‘policy’, where they try to ‘engage in rational debate’ and hope the old regime executes ‘better policy’, and face that the AI revolution is entangled with the death of the post-1945 world and the creation of whatever’s coming, so push what is falling, ditch rationalism, ditch ‘solving alignment’ is ‘the answer’ — you will not find a technical solution to politics and power; f) the most important thing is that a subset of elites now outside politics face they will have to abandon their happy lives and go to DC and build a new regime, as did Washington, Lincoln, and FDR…

England is, and has been, close to a meritocracy for many generations

Tuesday, November 3rd, 2026

Farewell to Alms by Gregory ClarkGregory Clark, the economic historian behind A Farewell to Alms and The Son Also Rises, has released the final installment of his trilogy on economic development and social mobility, To Have and Have Not:

Unlike its prede­cessors, To Have and Have Not did not come out through Princeton University Press—nor through any academic book publisher, for that matter. The peer reviewers just aren’t having it. Some won’t even read it.

Clark’s manuscript instead appears online in PDF form, free of charge but with the occasional typo still intact, via Econ Journal Watch, a publication focused on debates within economics.

[…]

The book advances a provocative argument, drawing together several of Clark’s recent academic papers—and several enormous datasets—to claim that social status not only persists strongly within families but does so specifically through genetic inheritance, to a far greater degree than virtually anyone has claimed.

[…]

To Have and Have Not is built on an incredible trove of historical information, including centuries’ worth of English genealogies and marriage records, as well as the population registers of modern Sweden and Denmark. The sheer scale of these data allows Clark to see how social status runs in families—across many links in the tree, both horizontal (from siblings to distant cousins) and vertical (from parents to kids to grandkids)—and to measure status in several ways, including occupational prestige, education, and housing quality.

[…]

To take a typical example, in Clark’s data on Britons born from 1910 to 1996, siblings’ home values correlated at about 0.33. In other words, if someone has an extremely expensive house, three standard deviations above the mean, our best guess would be for their sibling to have a merely nice house, one standard deviation above the mean—closer to the overall average than to the sibling.

[…]

When one moves from siblings all the way to cousins in that same housing-value analysis, the correlation drops only modestly, to 0.21. The general rule he discovers—across many different status measures, and across several centuries notwithstanding massive changes to society and technology—is that these correlations, despite starting out at a modest level, drop by only about one-fifth with each extra degree of relatedness. (Cousins are two steps more distant than siblings in this sense.)

[…]

When variables are measured poorly, or when they fail to capture important details of an underlying concept, the resulting correlations will appear artificially weak.

Thus, our focus shouldn’t linger on the modest correlations among immediate family members. Those aren’t a beautiful testament to the randomness of life and the possibility of change; they’re just misleading. Rather, the very slow decay of the correlations as we move through family trees is where the action is. It reveals a “latent” status that is extremely persistent. Clark finds measurable links in status even among fourth cousins, whose shared ancestors are five generations back.

[…]

Clark’s answer is assortative mating. If people marry others who are similar in their “latent” genetic social status—presumably by matching on a mix of education, intelligence, social graces, work ethic, family connections, and so on—each link in the family tree doesn’t simply add genetic randomness but rather springs from a careful romantic match of like with like. Using a formula that goes back to the pioneering British statistician and geneticist Ronald Fisher, Clark is even able to calculate how strong matching on this latent status must be: to explain the slow decay of social status across degrees of relatedness through genes alone, spouses must be correlated on their genetic status at 0.57. If someone has genetic social status one standard deviation above the mean, he’ll marry someone of status 0.57 standard deviations above it, on average.

[…]

Clark’s own takeaways from his analysis include that “England is, and has been, close to a meritocracy for many generations,” that “much of the 10 percent of national income typically spent on education by high income economies is largely a social waste,” that genetic transmission of status implies “an incentive to select high status immigrants, and reject low status ones,” and that the “relative fecundity of people at the top and the bottom of social abilities” will affect future social outcomes.

Hilger is willing to say truths that are often not said

Friday, October 30th, 2026

Parent Trap by Nate G. HilgerAlmost everyone, Alex Tabarrock notes, will find something to hate about The Parent Trap:

Hilger argues that the problems of poverty, pathology and inequality that bedevil the United States are not primarily due to poor schools, discrim­ination, or low incomes per se. The primary cause is parents: parents who are unable to teach their children the skills that are necessary to succeed in the modern world. Since parents can’t teach the necessary skills, Hilger calls for the state to take their place with a dramatic expansion of not just child care but collective parenting.

I can’t imagine why those parents might be unable to teach their children the skills that are necessary to succeed in the modern world.

No matter what you saw on The Wire, Baltimore spends more than sixteen thousand dollars per student, among the highest in the nation in large school districts and above average for the nation as a whole. Public schools are quite egalitarian in funding with any bias running towards more funding for poorer districts.

Schools, Hilger writes are “actually the smallest and most equalizing part of a much larger skill-building system.” The real problem, says Hilger, are parents.

[…]

In the twentieth century, Asians, Hilger argues, were discriminated against in the United States at least much as Black Americans. But the Asians that came to the United States had high skills while the legacy of slavery meant that Black Americans began with low skills. Asians, therefore, were better able to overcome discrimination.

Yes, those Chinese railroad workers were known for their immense human capital.

Parental investment is surely important but Hilger overstates his case. He writes as if poorer parents have neither the abilities nor the time to teach their children while richer, better educated parents simply invest lots of hours and money imbuing their children with skills.

[…]

The parental investment story also doesn’t fit my experience. I didn’t spend six hours a week helping my kids with their homework. I doubt most parents do. I simply assumed my kids would do their work. I do recall that we signed my kids up for tutoring at Kumon, the Japanese math education center. My kids would complain bitterly when we took them for drill on the weekend. It was mostly filling out rote forms and my kids would hide or bury their drill sheets so we were always behind. Driving my kids to the Kumon center, monitoring them. and forcing them to do the work when they rebelled like longshoreman on work-to-rule was time consuming and it was ruining our weekends. I felt guilty, but after a while, my wife and I gave up. Today one of my sons is a civil engineer and the other is a math and economics major at UVA.

At this point in the book, Tabarrok notes, it was almost inevitable that we were going to get yet another paean to the Perry Preschool Project:

The Perry Preschool project started in the 1960s and had just 123 participants (58 in treatment and 65 in control!). There are more papers about the Perry Preschool project than there were participants. I am jaded.

Aside from the small sample size, the project had imperfect randomization and missing data and most importantly limited external validity. The Perry Preschool project treated a small group of disadvantaged African American children with low-IQs (IQs of 70-85 were part of the selection criteria). The treatment is usually described as “active learning pre-school” but it was more intrusive than that. Every week counselors would go to the homes of the kids to teach the parents (mostly mothers) how to raise their children. The training was important to the program. Indeed, Hilger notes, without sense of irony, that “facilitating greater skill growth in low-income children was so complicated that it required home visitors with advanced postsecondary degrees.” (p. 89). And what were the results?

The results were good! (Heckman et al. 2010, Belfield et al. 2006). But in the popular literature the impression one gets is that the program took a bunch of disadvantaged kids and helped them read and write, making them more middle-class and successful. Some of that happened but the big gains actually happened because the participants, especially the boys, were so socially dangerous and destructive that even a bit of normalization made life substantially better for everyone else. In particular 82% of the treated group of 33 males had been arrested by age 40, including for one murder, 4 rapes, 8 robberies, 11 assaults and 14 burglaries. The control group were worse. In the control group of 39 males there were 2 murders. Indeed the reduction of one murder in the treatment group accounts for a significant benefit of the entire Perry PreSchool project.

Hilger, to his credit, is reasonably clear that what is really needed is an intensive program for disadvantaged African Americans, especially males.

Tabarrok hated much of the book, but “Hilger is willing to say truths that are often not said and for that I would rather applaud than cancel.”

3 lessons from past lab accidents

Wednesday, October 28th, 2026

Pandora's Gamble by Alison YoungAlison Young shares 3 lessons from past lab accidents:

Lab workers can be infected without a recognized accident

Initial local media reports said Shipilova broke a test tube before becoming ill, but Russian authorities have since told the WHO that no biosecurity incidents occurred in the laboratory.

Studies of lab-acquired infections have documented for decades that when workers become infected, they often can’t recall having any kind of exposure incident.

As far back as the 1950s, studies found that just 16% of lab worker infections involved recognized accidents.

[…]

Infected workers may not realize their illness came from their lab

Initial Russian media reports, which government authorities dispute, suggested that Shipilova died from pneumonic plague. This lung infection can be lethal if not treated within 24 hours of initial symptoms, which include shortness of breath and coughing.

It remains unknown what killed Shipilova or whether her lab work played a role. Before she died with severe pneumonia, her illness seemed like a typical respiratory infection, Russian health officials told the WHO earlier this month. Tests didn’t detect any microorganisms associated with her work, Russian authorities have said.

[…]

When a tularemia researcher at the prestigious U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases — often referred to as USAMRIID — started feeling ill with a fever, chills, and headache in 2009, she never alerted the lab’s medical team because she assumed she had just caught something from her children, who also were sick.

[…]

That same year University of Chicago plague researcher Malcolm Casadaban died after becoming infected with a weakened form of the Yersinia pestis bacteria he was studying. This particular strain was not known to cause lab infections or fatalities.

[…]

The public rarely learns the details of laboratory accidents

As I report in my book, “Pandora’s Gamble,” there is no universal, mandatory system for reporting lab accidents and lab-associated infections. Not in the U.S. or worldwide.

There also isn’t any comprehensive system to analyze biosafety breaches and share lessons learned so that safety can be improved. This makes it difficult to know how often accidents happen and how often workers become infected.

The 2025 systematic review of published reports during 2000 to 2024 identified 712 laboratory-acquired infections worldwide, including 276 infections and eight deaths involving research facilities. The researchers cautioned that the findings are likely an underestimate because biosafety lapses occur more frequently than are reported.

[…]

For example, after the critical lab waste sterilization plant serving USAMRIID at the Army’s Fort Detrick in Maryland suffered a catastrophic leak in 2018, the government assured the public that no safety threat occurred.

Only through months of digging into the government records behind the official statements was I able to report that a leaking tank had spewed thousands of gallons of unsterilized lab wastewater into an area with an open storm drain that emptied into a public waterway. While no illnesses were connected to the event, community leaders expressed concern about how they’d been kept in the dark about the extent of the incident.

USAMRIID used to publish some statistics about its lab incidents online. But the data was removed in 2022, around the time I was asking officials why more recent data hadn’t been posted. At that time, USAMRIID said the removal was part of a website update. A spokesperson for USAMRIID did not answer questions last week about why the institute hasn’t resumed posting the statistics.

Russia has its own history of concealing laboratory accidents. After dozens were killed by an accidental anthrax release from a Soviet biological weapons facility in Sverdlovsk in 1979, Soviet authorities blamed contaminated meat. It wasn’t until 1992 that the government acknowledged the outbreak was caused by military bioweapons research.

The idea was to “follow through” on the promise of Head Start

Monday, October 26th, 2026

Sold a Story Season 2, Episode 3 looks at Project Follow Through, The Forgotten Experiment:

The idea was to “follow through” on the promise of Head Start.

The study began in 1968. And lasted nearly a decade. It was one of the largest educational experiments in the history of the world. Nearly 60 years later, that’s still the case.

And Project Follow Through ended up providing some answers. Some information that could have influenced the direction of American education.

But it didn’t.

[…]

The government initially focused its data collection on basic academic skills. That worried the developers of some of the other programs. They thought it would give Direct Instruction an unfair advantage.

[…]

In response to complaints, the government added other measures. There were tests that looked beyond basic skills to things like abstract reasoning and problem solving. And there were measures to assess things like self-confidence and attitudes about school and learning.

[…]

The first year of data arrived on their desks. And it did not look good. In fact, it looked so bad that they decided — we can’t let people see this.

[…]

It showed that students in the Follow Through models were not doing better than students in traditional classrooms. Some of them were doing worse. That was bad news for the government because the goal was to find better approaches.

[…]

The government collected data for nearly 10 years. It had test scores and other information about more than 350,000 students in thousands of classrooms all over the country.

[…]

The government’s evaluation showed that Direct Instruction had outperformed all the other models.

It had done especially well compared to the other models when it came to math, reading and spelling skills. Exactly what Direct Instruction was trying to do.

But it had also done well when it came to things like abstract reasoning and problem-solving.

And perhaps the biggest surprise? Direct Instruction performed the best on those measures of self-confidence and how kids felt about school and learning.

[…]

The data showed that Direct Instruction was the only model that had positive results in every category that was measured. In all the other models, the kids did worse — on average — on at least one set of measures.

[…]

According to the government’s evaluation, the models that didn’t succeed — on average — had some schools that did relatively well. The teachers, the coaches, the principals — they made it work.

And the models that did succeed — on average — didn’t succeed everywhere. Even Direct Instruction had schools where things did not go well, where kids did not do better.

And that’s what Ernest House and his group focused on in their critique of the government’s evaluation.

[…]

Project Follow Through had not revealed a program that worked equally well everywhere, every time it was implemented. And for that reason, Ernest House and his group concluded that there was no Project Follow Through winner. There couldn’t be a victor.

[…]

After the critique by Gene Glass and Ernest House, the government did two things.

Number one: It started giving more money to the Follow Through models that had not done well. The rationale was that those models needed more support, more time to prove themselves.

And number two: The Office of Education shifted its focus from highlighting successful Follow Through models to highlighting successful Follow Through schools.

By doing this, it was possible for the government to showcase many of the Follow Through models because most of them had a school somewhere that was doing reasonably well.

[…]

The model that did the best — after nearly a decade with lots of kids in lots of schools in one of the largest education studies of all time — was a highly structured program that relied on carefully sequenced lessons and didn’t expect students to discover things on their own.

It was an answer. But it was not an answer a lot of people wanted to hear.

It now costs less than $100k to synthesize a pathogen

Friday, October 23rd, 2026

Biology is becoming programmable:

Two compounding technological trends are rapidly democratizing dual-use biotechnology: the cost of bioengineering is falling, and AI models are getting better at biology.

Together, they’re lowering the barrier to engineering bioweapons. It now costs <$100k to synthesize a pathogen, AI models are able to outperform experts on benchwork troubleshooting evaluations, and tools like AlphaFold and Evo2 are changing our ability to understand and engineer biology at will.

AI scales offense significantly faster than defense: the physical infrastructure to defend against biological threats does not scale by Moore’s law, but AI lab assistance and the quality of AI biological design tools might.

We are transitioning into a new regime, one where highly-resourced state actors, as well as unsophisticated and under-resourced actors, may be able to synthesize a pathogen far more dangerous than a natural virus.

Our current defenses are inadequate for this paradigm, and engineered bioweapons present a significant threat.

[…]

We break down global biosecurity into a stack of defense layers: Delay, Detect, Withstand, and Combat. We have also included two under-discussed enabling layers: Field-building and Policy & Regulatory.

[…]

Bioweapons are also not a new problem, but we have no effective policy in place to stop them.

For example, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was meant to end state bioweapons programs. While its overall effect may have been positive, it has no oversight or enforcement mechanism.

The international unit responsible for supporting the Biological Weapons Convention runs on a $2.2M annual budget with 4 staff. For context, the average U.S. McDonald’s restaurant takes in ~$4M/year.
As they signed the BWC, agreeing not to build bioweapons, the Soviets concurrently expanded their bioweapons program. The Biopreparat program ran for two decades after the treaty, employing tens of thousands of scientists and weaponizing anthrax, plague, and smallpox at industrial scale. They also built stockpiles of vaccines for their own population.

[…]

In a pandemic scenario, costs compound exponentially with the spread of the pathogen. Every day that passes before countermeasure deployment could mean tens of thousands of lives lost. Detection is the layer that gives every other intervention more runway.

The COVID-19 timeline shows the current system’s failure. The first documented cases occurred in Wuhan in early December 2019, but the sequence was not published until January 11th, 2020. When the WHO declared a public health emergency on January 30th, 2020, the virus was already on four continents. Retrospective wastewater analysis later found SARS-CoV-2 in northern Italian samples from December 18th 2019, nine weeks before community transmission was clinically identified at Codogno (La Rosa et al. 2021). This analysis used PCR designed against a published genome, and was therefore able to provide a sensitivity that current metagenomic surveillance for a novel pathogen would not have. However, it is possible that surveillance technology could be developed to achieve something closer to that level of sensitivity, even for novel pathogens.

If there had been wastewater surveillance approaching that level of sensitivity in Wuhan at the time, we could have added ~1 month of time to develop countermeasures and prepare our critical infrastructure for the outbreak, including distributing personal protective equipment (PPE) to critical care workers and ramping up manufacturing capacity.

If the system is unprepared for a pathogen like SARS-CoV-2, it is completely unprepared for an advanced bioweapon.

[…]

Advanced bioweapons enabled by AI could spread with extreme infection rates, often referred to as the “wildfire“ pandemic scenario, or they could spread silently, often referred to as the “stealth” pandemic scenario.

[…]

Pathogens designed to spread asymptomatically with long incubation times will be invisible to the current system, which detects pathogens through clinical surveillance.

The current system is set into motion by some threshold of patients seeking care or clinicians noticing unusual patterns, meaning one or more transmission generations have likely already elapsed. If a patient tests negative for known pathogens, their samples are not sent for metagenomic (agnostic) sequencing by default. In fact, their samples are not sent until a clinician decides to escalate after a prolonged period of ineffective standard treatments, worsening conditions, or unusual deaths, giving bioweapon-class pathogens weeks to spread, especially if designed to do so quietly.

To detect advanced bioweapons, a pathogen-agnostic surveillance system must be built.

The vertical hand-me-down of culture from previous generations is being replaced by a flood of horizontal transmission

Thursday, October 22nd, 2026

Happiness Hypothesis by Jonathan HaidtWhen Jon Haidt arrived at the University of Virginia in September 1995 for his first academic job, he was assigned to teach Psych 101, a large lecture class:

I found myself inserting quotations from ancient writings, East and West, to show that there is continuity and some degree of universality in humanity’s experience of being human. The ancients knew little worth preserving about physics or chemistry, but they sure were insightful about consciousness, relationships, suffering, and human nature more broadly.

Once I had been granted tenure in 2001 and had the freedom to follow my curiosity, I decided to write a book about ancient wisdom. I would categorize it and analyze it through the lens of modern psychology. Five years later, I published The Happiness Hypothesis: Finding Modern Truth in Ancient Wisdom.

[…]

As people spend ever less time reading books and ever more time watching very short videos, the vertical hand-me-down of culture from previous generations is being replaced by a flood of horizontal transmission, mostly low quality content that was made recently and will be forgotten momentarily, along with everything else that passes by in an hour of mindless scrolling. As AI begins to create much—and eventually most—of the content we all consume, the loss of connection to the past will accelerate, and people will be increasingly cut off from everything humanity has learned, or felt, or judged to be worth keeping around.

The distinctive feature of elite Victorian lifestyles was not laziness, but an extreme weighting toward what we might call team building and professional networking

Sunday, October 18th, 2026

The biggest empire the world has ever seen was run by a small elite, Samuel Hughes notes, who partied all night, drank liters of port, and stayed in bed until the afternoon:

Their schools and universities were not terribly academic and had very little STEM. As adults, they got up late, drank a lot, and spent a remarkable share of their waking hours partying. They loved feasting, sports, holidays, dancing, and dressing up. Contrary to their stodgy reputation, they were probably a lot of fun.

Despite this, the elites of nineteenth-century Britain were, by their own lights, extremely successful. For much of the century, Britain was the richest country on Earth. Its companies dominated global commerce, industry and finance. Its huge navy reigned over the world’s oceans, and its tiny army won a long sequence of wars while keeping watch over an enormous empire. Britain progressed gradually toward democracy with none of the revolutions and civil wars that wracked continental Europe.

[…]

But I want to explore the possibility that a relentless focus on soft skills, team building, and intra-elite networking actually worked rather well. Huel, STEM, and cold baths have their merits. But the example of the Victorians should make us hesitate before concluding that there is only one way to rule the world.

[…]

Traditionalists think that education should prioritize acquiring knowledge, that it should focus on ‘hard’ subjects like science, mathematics, and foreign languages, and that it should take place in a highly structured environment, where students’ time and behavior are tightly regulated. Progressives think that education should prioritize acquiring skills, that it should embrace ‘soft’ subjects beyond the supposed academic core, and that students should be given wide freedom in which to develop personally and socially.

One might assume that Victorian education was at the extreme traditionalist end of the spectrum, and modern educational progressives would indeed be horrified by the rote learning and corporal punishment of Victorian schooling. But in respect of all the controversies listed above, elite Victorian schools lean curiously toward the ‘progressive’ side of the spectrum.

[…]

Academic life was dominated by Latin and, to a lesser extent, Greek. The exact share varied, but the classical languages took up generally at least half of teaching hours, and sometimes as much as 80 percent, especially earlier in the century. Trailing in third and fourth places were mathematics and modern languages. There was resistance to the teaching of science, not because Victorians were hostile to science in principle, but because they thought it irrelevant to the kind of moral and cultural formation that a school for gentlemen was supposed to provide.

[…]

At Rugby School, weeks were divided into three ‘full days’, three ‘half days’, and Sunday. On a full day, students spent about five hours in the classroom, compared with maybe two hours on a half day. Other schools varied, but nearly all left many hours unfilled.

[…]

During the Victorian period, school authorities introduced programs of organized sports, chiefly cricket in summer and various forms of ‘football’ (including what became rugby) in winter. Many schools ultimately had four, five, or even six afternoons of sports per week: a student would certainly spend ten hours a week on the sports field, and might well spend twenty.

The Victorians thought extremely highly of sports, believing that they instilled team spirit and endurance, fostered mutual loyalty, channeled energy and competitiveness, and taught men how to win and lose graciously. An extreme but not entirely unrepresentative example was Hely Hutchinson Almond, headmaster of Loretto School, who described his school’s priorities as ‘First – character, second – physique, third – intelligence, fourth – manners, fifth – information’.

[…]

Another distinctive feature of the public schools, relative both to modern education and to other nineteenth-century school systems, was student self-government. The Victorians thought that close supervision by schoolmasters would inculcate servile habits in boys, compromising what one headmaster called ‘the great glory of an English public school – its free development of character, its social expansiveness, in short its liberty’. As a result, a system of prefects was developed in which, in theory, the more benevolent and mature boys were given extensive pastoral and disciplinary responsibilities over the others. The prefects would receive an apprenticeship in leadership, while the student body as a whole would come to see authority as something emanating from their peers rather than imposed upon them by an alien entity.

[…]

From school, most elite Victorian men went on to Oxford or Cambridge (‘Oxbridge’). Oxbridge was not necessarily a big step up academically. Virtually everyone who applied was accepted. Once you were in, you could pursue one of two tracks: either an ‘honors’ degree, which involved at least some serious study, or a ‘pass’ or ‘ordinary’ degree, which involved sitting only some very easy exams in classics and religion. In the early Victorian period, most Oxbridge students were ‘pass men’; this changed gradually as the century drew on, but there were still plenty of pass men around as late as 1914. The pass degree was particularly popular among aristocratic students, who tended to prioritize rowing, feasting, and social polish over disciplined study.

[…]

Nearly all students lived together in colleges. This contrasted with the situation in continental Europe, where students generally rented rooms off campus. Victorian pedagogues believed that colleges provided religious, cultural, and social formation, and that they prevented English students from acquiring the bad morals and habits of their continental peers. A typical day began with chapel; honors students and the less indolent pass men would then spend the morning reading and preparing assignments. Students normally ordered lunch to their rooms: rich students could have elaborate feasts brought up from the college kitchens, like Sebastian Flyte’s lunch in Brideshead Revisited. In the early afternoon it was customary to go out for rural walks or sports, especially rowing and cricket.

Around 4pm, students returned to college. Once or twice a week this was the time for ‘tutorials’, one-to-one or small-group discussions with tutors, often over tea or sherry. The tutorial system contrasted sharply with the more didactic and lecture-based teaching that prevailed in other university systems, and was seen as a way of inculcating independent thought. If a student had no tutorials, he would probably spend the early evening reading, socializing, or at one of the university’s various cultural, discussion, or debating societies, notably the Oxford and Cambridge Unions. The day concluded with a formal dinner in the college hall, often followed by conversation over dessert, digestifs and tobacco in college rooms.

[…]

For about five months a year, between February and July, the elite of Victorian Britain congregated in London for what was called ‘the Season’, essentially a sequence of parties and social events. They usually owned or rented houses in Mayfair and Belgravia, two small neighborhoods that face each other across Hyde Park, meaning that the bulk of the ruling class would live literally within walking distance of one another. Parallel institutions existed in most Western countries at the time – the social seasons in Paris, Vienna, St Petersburg and New York were famous – but the London Season had a particularly dominant role in the national life because it coincided with the Parliamentary session, making it a forum for political networking as well as elite matchmaking and court rituals.

[…]

Balls naturally had special significance for people in the marriage market. Arranged marriage in the strict sense had largely died out by the nineteenth century, but upper-class young people and their parents still hoped they would make advantageous matches, and balls furnished opportunities to do so. It would be quite wrong, however, to think that balls were simply mass dating events. Courtiers, bankers, judges, and cabinet ministers would have shared the dance floor with debutantes. In fact, with some exceptions like club lunches, the social events of the Victorian elite were notable for their lack of segregation by age or sex. A Society ball discharged the functions of both a teenage house party and a business networking convention: in fact, it was both a teenage house party and a business networking convention.

[…]

By one definition, then, elite Victorians did remarkably little work: they could easily spend just four or five hours a day actually in the office. But by another definition, they were working all the time. Lunches, balls, and dinners were certainly fun, but they were not just fun. In the words of the historian Leonore Davidoff, these social occasions provided ‘access to a vast information network: information about jobs, investment possibilities, secret political decisions’. Many Victorians were intensely ambitious and drove themselves hard: sleep deprivation, exhaustion and burnout were familiar companions. The distinctive feature of elite Victorian lifestyles was not laziness, but an extreme weighting toward what we might call team building and professional networking, and the near-total fusion of personal and professional life.

[…]

The ruling class were educated together from an early age, in schools and universities designed to inculcate shared values, a common identity, and ties of mutual loyalty. As adults they congregated every year in an area of central London that actually was village-sized, where they spent every night in one another’s company. Young members of the Victorian elite tended to meet their future spouses during these glittering evenings, so that the elite came to form, to some extent, a literal family.

[…]

The elites of the American South had a very different identity to those of the North, and ultimately led the country into civil war. Spain, Italy and France suffered from incessant conflicts between urban bourgeois and rural nobility. Germany was riven with strife along geographical, religious, and class lines. Some of these tensions existed in Britain, but except in Ireland, the elite finessed them peacefully.

[…]

For political reasons, most modern societies pay politicians and civil servants vastly less than they pay people with a similar level of responsibility in the private sector. As a result, they struggle to persuade their most talented people to enter and remain in public life. The Victorians did not have this problem. Until the 1880s, most local government roles in Britain were conducted on a completely unpaid basis by local landowners. They also administered the rudimentary welfare system, sat as magistrates in the lower courts, and staffed the boards of most schools and hospitals. A landowner who ignored these responsibilities would suffer no material consequences, but he would be diminished and resented in the eyes of his peers, and for most, that was inducement enough.

Something similar applied to Parliament.

People continue to compete, but the object of competition changes

Friday, October 16th, 2026

Modern life makes it easy to forget the world in which we evolved, Marc Defant reminds us, the Environment of our Evolutionary Adaptedness:

Most people in developed societies live at a considerable distance from predation, starvation, and violent death. We can simply buy food without giving much thought to the possibility of starvation, let alone the struggle required to stay alive through most of human history. The institutions that protect us from once-routine dangers work so well that we can lose sight of why we need them. From this comfortable distance, it is tempting to regard competition or scarcity as artificial products of defective social systems. If only society were organized more rationally or compassionately, perhaps these disagreeable features of existence could finally be eliminated.

Anyone who has seriously studied the natural world knows otherwise.

[…]

People cooperate internally, while the resulting groups compete externally.
That pattern is visible throughout modern society. For example, scientists cooperate within research teams while competing for discoveries and recognition, and athletes cooperate with teammates while competing against other teams. Nations depend on internal cooperation while competing economically, technologically, and sometimes militarily. This demonstrates that properly structured competition can discipline cooperation by requiring cooperative groups to produce results.

[…]

Dominance obtains deference through control, intimidation, or the power to impose costs. Prestige attracts voluntarily conferred deference because others value a person’s knowledge, skill, judgment, generosity, or accomplishments. Anthropologists Joseph Henrich and Francisco Gil-White argued that prestige evolved partly because social learners benefited by identifying and copying successful individuals. A healthy society should restrain coercive dominance and encourage earned prestige.

[…]

The (political) challenge is therefore to be able to distinguish productive hierarchy from predatory hierarchy: prestige from dominance, contribution from extraction, and earned reward from political privilege. When economic competition is suppressed by the design of a political system, hierarchy does not disappear. It migrates into the state. People then compete for bureaucratic rank, party membership, favored occupations, access to planners, and influence over the distribution of resources such as licenses or housing allocations. In other words, society may compress visible differences in income while creating enormous differences in political power.

[…]

Capitalism is often described as a celebration of selfishness. That description misses its most extraordinary feature: a functioning market economy is a system of cooperation among strangers. Nearly every object in a modern household exists because thousands of people coordinated their activities. They may live on different continents, speak different languages, practice different religions, and disagree on nearly every political question. They need not love one another! They need only identify a mutually beneficial exchange in which the buyer prefers to have the product and the seller the money. Both expect to gain.
This is reciprocal cooperation extended beyond intimate personal loyalty. Money, enforceable contracts, property rights, and the rule of law allow people to cooperate far beyond the small circles of kin and acquaintances for which much of human psychology originally evolved.

[…]

Socialism often promises to transfer power from owners to the people, yet extensive central planning necessarily transfers immediate decisions to government officials. The more comprehensive the plan (someone must rank competing needs, distribute scarce goods, set wages, approve investments, etc.), the more domains of life become dependent upon administrative permission. Power is shifted away from voluntary relationships and toward the institutions that control allocation—the very concentration of power socialism claims to overcome.

Nor does socialism eliminate competition. People continue to compete, but the object of competition changes: they compete for political influence (instead of competing for customers), persuade planners (in place of persuading consumers), and cultivate relationships with the officials who distribute resources. Economic competition shifts toward political competition.

[…]

The twentieth century produced abundant evidence of the failures of centralized communist systems. Yet socialism continually returns as though it were a new idea. Historical memory fades, while the moral aspiration remains attractive. In 2022, Pew found that younger adults were more likely to hold favorable views of socialism and less favorable views of capitalism than older adults. In 2025, Gallup reported that capitalism remained more popular overall, but its favorable rating had declined to 54 percent, while socialism was viewed favorably by 39 percent.

[…]

Capitalism is compared with its actual outcomes: inequality, recessions, unaffordable housing, or even corporate misconduct such as environmental pollution. By contrast, socialism is compared with its aspirations: equality, dignity, solidarity, security, and universal provision. When socialist institutions fail, advocates often attribute the result to insufficient socialism, bad leadership, foreign interference, historical conditions, or the claim that the system was never truly socialist. Then, definitions shift: The Soviet Union was authoritarian rather than socialist, China is capitalist because it permits markets, and Venezuela failed because of dependence on oil and corruption. Meanwhile, Scandinavia is described as socialist even though it preserves competition, bankruptcy, private property, and market prices.

Either we reorient our system to post-Enlightenment principles or we risk staggering into the Endarkenment

Thursday, October 15th, 2026

That liberal democracy is in a state of terminal decline Martin Gurri takes to be beyond dispute:

Like Alice in the rabbit hole, those of us who dwell in democratic societies suffer from a nauseating sense of falling without ever landing on solid ground. The usual suspects blamed for this tumble—populism, inequality, the economy—are mere surface symptoms of an internal breakdown. We have arrived at the conclusion of a world-historical cycle. Liberal democracy is the procedural embodiment of Enlightenment ideology—and after two centuries of dominance, that ideology has lost all purchase and stands utterly exhausted.

Radical alternatives confront us. Either we reorient our system to post-Enlightenment principles or we risk staggering into the nihilist’s paradise I have called the Endarkenment.

Enlightenment philosophers placed their faith in reason and science. These are purely critical disciplines: liberal propagandists wielded criticism like a scalpel to dissect conservative laggards and utopian revolutionaries alike. Once triumphant at the “end of history,” liberal democracy turned the knife on itself—a process of self-criticism and self-doubt that has shredded its own ideals to ribbons.

The positive values inherited from the Enlightenment—equality, individualism, compassion—were always parasitic on Christianity. But Christianity, like all religions, has no place in a universe ruled by reason and science. Nietzsche long ago brought us the troubling news: the Christian God is dead. Oblivious to the implications of this calamity, liberal democracy kept marching like a cartoon character over the edge of the abyss, until the laws of moral gravity asserted themselves. So began the Great Fall.

Criticism is a force for progress so long as there are blatant irrationalities, like slavery or Jim Crow discrimination, to overcome. But under the hammer of Enlightenment ideals, modern society has been flattened, centralized, and rationalized. Deprived of obvious superstitions to debunk and totalitarian rivals to defeat, liberal democracy has been revealed in all its internal contradictions.

One such contradiction, I contend, pits the cherished principle of equality against the chosen few who actually practice reason and science: let’s call this the problem of the elites.

A second contradiction finds freedom of the press and of opinion arrayed against the need to protect objective truth: call it the problem of information.

Finally, freedom of worship and the life of the spirit collide head-on with the materialist criticism favored by Enlightenment ideology: the problem of meaning.

Each of these contradictions could prove fatal to the democratic project, but none is insoluble, and the search for solutions offers an opportunity for renewal.