This taboo is an asset to be treasured

Saturday, January 24th, 2026

Arms and Influence by Thomas C. SchellingThomas Schelling opens the 2008 edition of his Arms and Influence with a new preface:

The world has changed since I wrote this book in the 1960s. Most notably, the hostility, and the nuclear weapons surrounding that hostility, between the United States and the Soviet Union—between NATO and the Warsaw Pact—has dissolved with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. A somewhat militarily hostile Russia survives the Cold War, but nobody worries (that I know of) about nuclear confrontations between the new Russia and the United States.

The most astonishing development during these more than forty years—a development that no one I have known could have imagined—is that during the rest of the twentieth century, for fifty-five years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki suffered the world’s first nuclear bombs, not a single nuclear weapon was exploded in warfare. As I write this in early 2008, it is sixty-two and a half years since the second, and last, nuclear weapon exploded in anger, above a Japanese city. Since then there have been, depending on how you count, either five or six wars in which one side had nuclear weapons and kept them unused.

[…]

Nuclear weapons were not used in the United Nations’ defense of South Korea. They were not used in the succeeding war with the People’s Republic of China. They were not used in the U.S. war in Vietnam. They were not used in 1973 when Egypt had two armies on the Israeli side of the Suez Canal. They were not used in the British war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. And, most impressively, they were not used by the Soviet Union when it fought, and lost, a protracted, demoralizing war in Afghanistan.

This “taboo,” as it has come to be called, is an asset to be treasured. It’s our main hope that we can go another sixty years without nuclear war.

The nonproliferation program has been more successful than any student of the subject would have thought likely, or even possible, at the time this book was written. There are, in 2008, nine, possibly going on ten, nations that have nuclear weapons. When this book was being written, serious estimates suggested that three or four times that number would have nuclear weapons within the century. This outcome partly reflects successful policy and partly reflects the loss of interest in nuclear electric power, especially after the explosion in Ukraine of the Chernobyl reactor complex in 1986.

[…]

Smart terrorists—and the people who might assemble nuclear explosive devices, if they can get the fissionable material, will have to be highly intelligent—should be able to appreciate that such weapons have a comparative advantage toward influence, not simple destruction. I hope they might learn to appreciate that from reading this book.

[…]

Actually, I found the first sentence of the original preface to be even more portentous than I could make it in the 1960s. “One of the lamentable principles of human productivity is that it is easier to destroy than to create.” That principle is now the foundation for our worst apprehensions.

I had to coin a term. “Deterrence” was well understood. To “deter” was, as one dictionary said, to “prevent or discourage from acting by means of fear, doubt, or the like,” and in the words of another, “to turn aside or discourage through fear; hence, to prevent from action by fear of consequences,” from the Latin to “frighten from.” Deterrence was in popular usage not just in military strategy but also in criminal law. It was, complementary to “containment,” the basis of our American policy toward the Soviet bloc. But deterrence is passive; it posits a response to something unacceptable but is quiescent in the absence of provocation. It is something like “defense” in contrast to “offense.” We have a Department of Defense, no longer a War Department, “defense” being the peaceable side of military action.

But what do we call the threatening action that is intended not to forestall some adversarial action but to bring about some desired action, through “fear of consequences”? “Coercion” covers it, but coercion includes deterrence—that is, preventing action—as well as forcing action through fear of consequences. To talk about the latter we need a word. I chose “compellence.” It is now almost, but not quite, part of the strategic vocabulary. I think it will be even more necessary in the future as we analyze not just what the United States—“ we”—needs to do but how various adversaries—“ they”—may attempt to take advantage of their capacity to do harm.

We have seen that deterrence, even nuclear deterrence, doesn’t always work. When North Korea attacked the South, it wasn’t deterred by U.S. nuclear weapons; nor was China deterred from entering South Korea as U.S. troops approached the Chinese border (and the United States was not deterred by Chinese threats to enter the fray). Egypt and Syria in 1973 were not deterred by Israeli nuclear weapons, which they knew existed. Maybe Egypt and Syria believed (correctly?) that Israel had too much at stake in the nuclear taboo to respond to the invasion by using nuclear weapons, even on Egyptian armies in the Sinai desert with no civilians anywhere near.

But “mutual deterrence,” involving the United States and the Soviet Union, was impressively successful. We can hope that Indians and Pakistanis will draw the appropriate lesson. If this book can help to persuade North Koreans, Iranians, or any others who may contemplate or acquire nuclear weapons to think seriously about deterrence, and how it may accomplish more than pure destruction, both they and we may be the better for it.

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This is not our trash

Thursday, January 22nd, 2026

I Have Known the Eyes Already by Morgan WorthyIn his memoir, I Have Known the Eyes Already, Morgan Worthy mentions a traumatic event from his childhood:

The day was Tuesday, December 2, 1941. I was five years old. The time was between noon and 1p.m. That, I learned later. I want to stick to just what I remember. I came out into our front yard and saw a pint milk bottle that someone had thrown into the shallow ditch that separated our small front yard from the street. I also saw that the little boy next door, Tommy Pearson, was in his front yard. I picked up the milk bottle and said to Tommy something like, “This is not our trash. It must be your trash,” and threw the bottle into their front yard. Tommy said it was not and threw it back into my yard. We kept throwing that milk bottle back and forth. I felt good. I was going to win this battle. Tommy must have been getting more and more frustrated because he said, “I will just get a gun and shoot you.” He went into the house and when he came back, he had what I thought was a toy gun. I was standing at the edge of our yard. He came over to where I was, pointed the pistol at me and said, “Now I am going to kill you.” He tried to pull the trigger. Nothing happened. He moved back toward his house as he continued to manipulate the pistol. I stood in the same spot between our two houses watching him. Suddenly there was an explosion that I will never forget or entirely get over. The bullet went into his face and up through his head. To say that I saw an explosion is the right way to say it. I must have stood looking no more than a split second. My next memory is of running between the two houses and into the back door of my house. I could not find my mother. (She had been inside working at her sewing machine; she had heard the shot and went out the front door to check on me.)

I remember only one other thing. I looked out the back window, or back side window, and saw men coming toward the scene, running on a path that ran to the street behind us. One was my father; he was wearing high top brogans. It is the only time I can ever remember seeing him or a group of workmen run like that. It was terrifying. I have no more memories of that day.

When my mother could not find me outside, she went back in our house and found me sitting on the floor in a back room playing. She assumed that I had come back into the house when Tommy had gone back into his house. I did not tell her or anyone else that I had been there when it happened. It was my secret. My world changed on that day.

Then, a couple years later:

One day when my mother was at the farm, she took my brother and me with her to visit neighbors, the Long family, who lived on a nearby farm. My brother and I went with one of the sons about our age, Henry Long, to his bedroom. He showed us his 410 shot gun. He assured us it was unloaded and started pretending he was hunting. As he swung the gun around, he said, “Yonder goes a rabbit,” and pulled the trigger. Again, I saw and heard an explosion. This time it was only a wall that suffered the damage. Before his mother or our mother could get there my brother and I were out the front door and ran all the way home.

And then:

The third gun accident involved an “unloaded” air rifle, which my cousin aimed at my face and pulled the trigger. The BB came through a windowpane and just missed my left eye. He was more upset than I was. We managed to cover the hole in the window such that it would not be noticed by my aunt and uncle. At least this time I had someone who shared in the guilty secret.

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Genetic markers of stress, resilience and success

Wednesday, January 21st, 2026

To qualify for training as elite U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) soldiers, candidates must complete the extremely stressful 19–20 day Special Forces Assessment and Selection (SFAS) course:

At SFAS, soldiers must excel at stressful cognitive and physical challenges including team problem solving, foreign language testing, land navigation, timed loaded road marches, timed runs, and challenging obstacle courses. Approximately 70% of soldiers who attempt SFAS fail.

To investigate genetic factors associated with cognitive and physiological biomarkers of resilience and success at SFAS, single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs; n = 116) from 47 genes associated with psychological function, resilience, circadian rhythms/sleep, and biomarkers of stress (cortisol and C-reactive protein [CRP]) were examined. Study volunteers were 800 males enrolled in SFAS (age=25±4y; height=178.1 ± 7.5 cm; body mass=82.5 ± 9.2 kg; mean±SD).

Genes associated with resilience and their functions included: tryptophan hydroxylase 2 (TPH2; serotonin synthesis); catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT; catecholamine catabolism); corticotropin-releasing hormone receptor1 gene (CRHR1; resilience to stress); Period3 (PER3; circadian rhythmicity); FK506 binding protein5 (FKBP5; steroid receptor regulation).

In summary, several genetic variants are associated with cognitive function and resilience in healthy volunteers exposed to 19–20 days of severe physical and cognitive stress designed to select the best candidates for several years of training. This study extends findings of research on resilience genetics to a novel population and situation, mentally and physically stressed soldiers competing for the opportunity to be trained for an elite unit. The findings indicate that several genes known to be associated with resilience exert their effects on the resilience phenotype under very difficult circumstances than usually studied.

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Own the night or die

Monday, January 19th, 2026

Own the night or die, John Spencer says:

In three major conflicts involving forces that range from professional to semiprofessional—the 2020 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, and Israel’s campaign against Hamas after October 7, 2021—large-scale night operations have been notably rare. Outside of highly specialized units conducting limited raids, most decisive fighting has occurred during daylight. At night, both sides tend to pause, reorganize, and recover. In effect, the night is ceded rather than dominated.

That reality stands in sharp contrast to what the US military demonstrated in Operation Absolute Resolve. US forces executed a complex, high-risk mission deep inside a dense capital city at night. The operation required joint and interagency integration across air, land, sea, and cyber domains and fusing intelligence, special operations forces, and other capabilities. Power was cut. Targets were overwhelmed. The mission concluded with zero American casualties and zero loss of equipment. It was a near-flawless demonstration of a capability that takes decades to build and years to sustain.

That success is even more striking when viewed against earlier US experience. Operation Eagle Claw remains a cautionary case of what happens when night operations exceed institutional readiness. The 1980 hostage rescue attempt in Iran required unprecedented joint coordination and depended on a complex, multiphase plan involving long-range infiltration, helicopters, and clandestine ground movement deep inside hostile territory, much of it planned for execution under conditions of limited illumination and degraded visibility. Mechanical failures, severe dust storms, and navigation challenges reduced the assault force below the minimum required to continue the mission. During the withdrawal from Desert One—a staging area where the mission was aborted—a helicopter operating in degraded visibility collided with a transport aircraft, killing eight US servicemembers. Eagle Claw exposed serious deficiencies in joint planning, rehearsal, and integration. Strategically, it revealed the limits of American power projection in denied environments and directly drove sweeping reforms, including the creation of US Special Operations Command.

A decade later, Operation Just Cause marked significant progress but also underscored how darkness magnifies the challenges of identification, control, and coordination. The 1989 invasion of Panama involved approximately twenty-seven thousand US troops and successfully dismantled the Panamanian Defense Forces within days. The operation deliberately began at night, with major assaults initiated around midnight and continuing through hours of darkness, requiring near-simultaneous airborne and ground attacks against multiple objectives across Panama. During the opening night of the operation, including the seizure of Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport and other key sites, fratricide occurred amid limited visibility, compressed timelines, and the rapid convergence of aircraft and ground forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff history of the operation highlights the extraordinary command-and-control demands created by this nighttime tempo, illustrating how darkness, density of friendly forces, and speed of execution strained identification and coordination even within an increasingly capable joint force. Just Cause demonstrated growing US proficiency in large-scale night operations, but it also showed that darkness punishes even small lapses in control, communication, and situational awareness.

The difference between those operations and more recent successes was not technology alone. It was mastery earned through relentless training, professionalization, and a force-wide expectation that fighting at night is not exceptional. It is preferred.

Posted in Technology, War | 5 Comments »

This tactic pairs two tanks with continuous drone support

Tuesday, January 13th, 2026

Recent statements from the Russian Ministry of Defense indicate that Russia is adopting a new tank tactic:

This tactic pairs two tanks with continuous drone support. One tank operates from a standoff position to deliver fire, while the second conducts a rapid forward maneuver toward the line of contact. Drones help coordinate movement and fires by providing target detection, fire correction, and battlefield awareness. The two tanks switch roles frequently to avoid becoming stationary targets, while still laying down a significant amount of fire against adversarial lines. This approach emphasizes desynchronizing enemy sensors and strike systems while pushing forward to achieve immediate, decisive penetration.

[…]

Large movements are quickly detected by reconnaissance drones and subsequently targeted. In the urban terrain where many of these units operate, natural bottlenecks are common, such that a single destroyed tank can block movement and bring an assault to a halt. Once immobilized, the remaining tanks become easy targets, as seen during a tank assault near Pokrovsk in early 2025.

[…]

While dismounted assaults have achieved limited penetration into Ukrainian lines, they generally lack the firepower required to hold captured positions. The new tank deployment tactic has the potential to provide this additional firepower, enabling dismounted troops to penetrate more deeply and retain control of seized terrain.

Posted in War, Weapons | 1 Comment »

Ukrainian tactics are starting to prevail over Russian infantry assaults

Monday, January 12th, 2026

Russian pro-Kremlin blogger Alexei Chadayev concedes that Ukrainian tactics are starting to prevail over Russian infantry assaults:

The enemy is increasingly mastering the ‘playing second fiddle’ strategy — a situation where Russian forces are constantly advancing almost everywhere, and their task is to make our offensive as difficult, bloody, and resource-intensive as possible. And this is not just about the ‘drone line’ anymore.

For example, we are now seeing tactical techniques like this: their artillery is positioned deep in their battle lines, beyond the reach of our main drones, and they keep their own forward positions and key objects on it well-fortified with well-positioned fire.

Accordingly, as soon as our forces start moving, they knock out an enemy stronghold with drones and go to capture it. The enemy then waits for our forces to enter and eliminates them along with the incoming troops.

Their drone operators, in turn, not only habitually scavenge on supply and reinforcement routes, but also catch our forces engaged in any activity near ‘formerly ours’ objects.

Add to this constant mining, including remote detonation, and the active use of ‘ambushers’ on the few (and well-monitored) logistical lines.

If our forces try to quickly deploy a second echelon – for example, drone operators – the enemy immediately launches a local tactical ‘offensive’ and, even at the cost of losing equipment and personnel, achieves its goal: preserving the ‘kill zone’ between our forward positions and the nearest rear areas. In Kupiansk, for example, they successfully applied this tactic several times – which led to the current situation there.

Since this situation repeats itself not once or twice, our forces, at all levels, are increasingly less willing to advance at all, and they can be easily understood – it’s an inevitable trade-off of kilometers covered for lives, and very valuable lives of soldiers: those who actually know and are able to act in this very kill zone (the untrained ones will simply die without any result). Therefore, the problem of ‘map coloring’ is not just about headquarters’ lies.

It’s also about the difficult moral choice that commanders make: if I really go all out in an unprepared offensive now, I’ll lose many people, but if I just send a few teams forward to plant flags and report on the drone footage about the physical presence at the necessary positions – I’ll save lives and equipment.

However, as a result, this leads to situations where it’s impossible to request strikes on already ‘colored’ (i.e., ‘our own’ on the headquarters’ maps) positions — neither by artillery, nor by the Aerospace Forces, nor even by drones. Everything there is already ours! And as a result, we still have to pay with lives.

Posted in War | 2 Comments »

It was Purnell who had first advanced the belief that two bombs would end the war

Thursday, January 8th, 2026

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesAdmiral Purnell and General Groves had often discussed the importance of having the second blow follow the first one quickly, as General Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), so that the Japanese would not have time to recover their balance:

It was Purnell who had first advanced the belief that two bombs would end the war, so I knew that with him and Farrell on the ground at Tinian there would be no unnecessary delay in exploiting our first success.

Good weather was predicted for the ninth, with bad weather to follow for the next five days. This increased the urgency of having the first Fat Man ready still another day earlier. When the decision to do so was reached, the scientific staff made it clear that in their opinion the advancement of the date by two full days, from the eleventh to the ninth, would introduce a considerable measure of uncertainty. I decided, however, that we should take the chance; fortunately all went well with the assembly, and the bomb was loaded and fully checked by the evening of August 8.

Six Pumpkin-carrying planes were assigned various targets in Japan for the eighth, but because of weather only two of them reached their primary targets; three of them reached secondary targets, and one aborted and returned to Tinian. In the field order for the second atomic mission there was nothing to indicate the extraordinary nature of the bomb, although anyone reading it would realize that this was by no means a routine assignment.

There were only two targets designated this time: Kokura, primary; and Nagasaki, secondary. Niigata was not made a third target because of its great distance from the other two cities.

[…]

The Kokura arsenal was one of the largest war plants in Japan. It produced many different weapons and pieces of war equipment. It extended over almost two hundred acres and was supported by numerous machine shops, parts factories, electric power plants and the usual utilities.

Nagasaki was one of Japan’s largest shipbuilding and repair centers. It was important also for its production of naval ordnance. It was a major military port. The aiming point was in the city, east of the harbor.

[…]

It was not possible to “safe” the Fat Man by leaving the assembly incomplete prior to take-off, as had been done in the case of the Little Boy. There was considerable discussion among the technical staff about what would happen if the plane crashed, and possibly caught fire, while it was taking off. They realized that there would be a serious chance that a wide area of Tinian would be contaminated if the plutonium were scattered by a minor explosion; some thought that there was even a risk of a high-order nuclear explosion which could do heavy damage throughout the island’s installations. Of course, we had gone into all this at length during our preliminary planning, and on the basis of my own opinion, as well as that of Oppenheimer and my other senior advisers, that the risk was negligible I had decided that the risk would be taken.

As happens so often, however, there was constant interference by various people in matters that lay outside their spheres of responsibility. Throughout the life of the project, vital decisions were reached only after the most careful consideration and discussion with the men I thought were able to offer the soundest advice. Generally, for this operation, they were Oppenheimer, von Neumann, Penney, Parsons and Ramsey. I had also gone over the problems at considerable length with the various groups of senior men at Los Alamos, and had discussed them thoroughly with Conant and Tolman and with Purnell and Farrell and to a lesser degree with Bush. Yet in spite of this, some of the people on Tinian again raised the question of safety at take-off at the last moment. Their fears reached a senior air officer, who asked for a written statement to the effect that it would be entirely safe for the plane to take off with a fully armed bomb. Parsons and Ramsey signed such a statement promptly though with some trepidation, possibly with the thought that if they were proven wrong they would not be there to answer. Ramsey then advised Oppenheimer at once of the various design changes that must be made to ensure that future bombs would in fact be surely safe.

One very serious problem came up just before take-off, which placed Farrell in the difficult position of having to make a decision of vital importance without the benefit of time for thought or consultation. Despite all the care that had been taken with the planes, the carrying plane was found at the last moment to have a defective fuel pump, so that some eight hundred gallons of gasoline could not be pumped to the engines from a bomb bay tank. This meant that not only would the plane have to take off with a short supply of fuel, but it would have to carry the extra weight of those eight hundred gallons all the way from Tinian to Japan and back. The weather was not good, in fact it was far from satisfactory; but it was good enough in LeMay’s opinion, and in view of the importance of dropping the second bomb as quickly as possible, and the prediction that the weather would worsen, Farrell decided that the flight should not be held up. Just before take-off Purnell said to Sweeney, “Young man, do you know how much that bomb cost?” Sweeney replied, “About $ 25 million.” Purnell then cautioned, “See that we get our money’s worth.”

Because of the weather, instead of flying in formation, the planes flew separately. To save fuel, they did not fly over Iwo Jima but went directly to the coast of Japan. Their plan was to rendezvous over the island of Yokushima, but this did not work out. The planes were not in sight of each other during their overwater flight and only one of the observation planes arrived at the rendezvous point. The missing plane apparently circled the entire island instead of one end of it, as it was supposed to do according to Sweeney’s plans. Although Sweeney had identified the one plane that did arrive he did not tell Ashworth. Unfortunately, because it did not come close enough, Ashworth was unable to determine whether it was the instrument-carrying plane, which was essential to the full completion of the mission, or the other, which was not. Sweeney’s orders were to proceed after a short delay of fifteen minutes but he kept waiting hopefully beyond the deadline. The result was a delay of over half an hour before they decided to go on to Kokura, anyway.

At Kokura, they found that visual bombing was not possible, although the weather plane had reported that it should be. Whether this unexpected condition was due to the time lag, or to the difference between an observer looking straight down and a bombardier looking at the target on a slant, was never determined.

After making at least three runs over the city and using up about forty-five minutes, they finally headed for the secondary target, Nagasaki. On the way they computed the gasoline supply very carefully. Ashworth confirmed Sweeney’s determination that it would be possible to make only one bombing run over Nagasaki if they were to reach Okinawa, their alternate landing field. If more than one run had to be made they would have to ditch the plane—they hoped near a rescue submarine.

At Nagasaki, there was a thick overcast and conditions at first seemed no better for visual bombing than at Kokura. Considering the poor visibility and the shortage of gasoline, Ashworth and Sweeney decided that despite their positive orders to the contrary, they had no choice but to attempt radar bombing. Almost the entire bombing run was made by radar; then, at the last moment, a hole in the clouds appeared, permitting visual bombing. Beahan, the bombardier, synchronized on a race track in the valley and released the bomb. Instead of being directed at the original aiming point, however, the bomb was aimed at a point a mile and a half away to the north, up the valley of the Urakami River, where it fell between two large Mitsubishi armament plants and effectively destroyed them both as producers of war materials.

On the way to Okinawa warning ditching orders were announced; but the plane made it with almost no gas left. Sweeney reported there wasn’t enough left to taxi in off the runway.

The Nagasaki bomb was dropped from an altitude of 29,000 feet. Because of the configuration of the terrain around ground zero, the crew felt five distinct shock waves.

The missing observation plane, which fortunately was the one without the instruments, saw the smoke column from a point about a hundred miles away and flew over within observing distance after the explosion. Because of the bad weather conditions at the target, we could not get good photo reconnaissance pictures until almost a week later. They showed 44 per cent of the city destroyed. The difference between the results obtained there and at Hiroshima was due to the unfavorable terrain at Nagasaki, where the ridges and valleys limited the area of greatest destruction to 2.3 miles (north-south axis) by 1.9 miles (east-west axis). The United States Strategic Bombing Survey later estimated the casualties at 35,000 killed and 60,000 injured.

While the blast and the resulting fire inflicted heavy destruction on Nagasaki and its population, the damage was not nearly so heavy as it would have been if the correct aiming point had been used. I was considerably relieved when I got the bombing report, which indicated a smaller number of casualties than we had expected, for by that time I was certain that Japan was through and that the war could not continue for more than a few days.

To exploit the psychological effect of the bombs on the Japanese, we had belatedly arranged for leaflets to be dropped on Japan proclaiming the power of our new weapon and warning that further resistance was useless. The first delivery was made on the ninth, the day of the Nagasaki bombing. The following day General Farrell canceled the drops, when the surrender efforts of the Japanese made any further such missions seem ill-advised.

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This was the real feeling of every experienced officer

Tuesday, January 6th, 2026

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesGeneral Marshall expressed his feeling that we should guard against too much gratification over our success, as General Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), because it undoubtedly involved a large number of Japanese casualties:

I replied that I was not thinking so much about those casualties as I was about the men who had made the Bataan death march. When we got into the hall, Arnold slapped me on the back and said, “I am glad you said that — it’s just the way I feel.” I have always thought that this was the real feeling of every experienced officer, particularly those who occupied positions of great responsibility, including General Marshall himself.

Posted in War | 1 Comment »

Directed Infrared Counter Measures use a sophisticated laser to disrupt the incoming missile’s infrared “heat-seeking” sensor

Monday, January 5th, 2026

Early MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defence Systems) would lock onto the exhaust plumes of aircraft and were countered by deploying flares. Modern Directed Infrared Counter Measures (DIRCM) use a sophisticated laser to disrupt the incoming missile’s infrared “heat-seeking” sensor:

With a laser energy source embedded in a highly agile enclosed turret system, a DIRCM can be infinite in duration and provide protection for the whole mission, keeping aircrews safe even in dense threat engagement environments.

[…]

Whereas flares are omnidirectional, a DIRCM focusses a beam of light directly at an incoming missile. However, that beam of light needs to:

  • Be able to have line of sight to the missile — a DIRCM with a twin or triple turret system allows for multiple threats to be countered simultaneously, no matter how the aircraft may be manoeuvring
  • Be able to track and engage in a very short space of time — MANPADS can be supersonic in less than a second after firing
  • Emit significant laser energy power to disrupt the missile seeker for long enough so the missile is unable to acquire, re-acquire or track the aircraft

Posted in Technology, War, Weapons | 1 Comment »

Not so blinding as New Mexico test because of bright sunlight

Sunday, January 4th, 2026

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. Groves At about 4:30 a.m. the Duty Officer delivered General Groves the detailed hoped-for cable from Farrell, as Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), which had been dispatched after the bomber returned to Tinian. It read:

Following additional information furnished by Parsons, crews, and observers on return to Tinian at 060500Z. Report delayed until information could be assembled at interrogation of crews and observers. Present at interrogation were Spaatz, Giles, Twining, and Davies.

Confirmed neither fighter or flak attack and one tenth cloud cover with large open hole directly over target. High speed camera reports excellent record obtained. Other observing aircraft also anticipates good records although films not yet processed. Reconnaissance aircraft taking post-strike photographs have not yet returned.

Sound—None appreciable observed.

Flash—Not so blinding as New Mexico test because of bright sunlight. First there was a ball of fire changing in a few seconds to purple clouds and flames boiling and swirling upward. Flash observed just after airplane rolled out of turn. All agreed light was intensely bright and white cloud rose faster than New Mexico test, reaching thirty thousand feet in minutes it was one-third greater diameter.

It mushroomed at the top, broke away from column and the column mushroomed again. Cloud was most turbulent. It went at least to forty thousand feet. Flattening across its top at this level. It was observed from combat airplane three hundred sixty-three nautical miles away with airplane at twenty-five thousand feet. Observation was then limited by haze and not curvature of the earth.

Blast—There were two distinct shocks felt in combat airplane similar in intensity to close flak bursts. Entire city except outermost ends of dock areas was covered with a dark grey dust layer which joined the cloud column. It was extremely turbulent with flashes of fire visible in the dust. Estimated diameter of this dust layer is at least three miles. One observer stated it looked as though whole town was being torn apart with columns of dust rising out of valleys approaching the town. Due to dust visual observation of structural damage could not be made.

Posted in Science, Technology, War, Weapons | No Comments »

The Trump administration has long accused Maduro of running a criminal narco-trafficking organization called Cartel de los Soles

Saturday, January 3rd, 2026

The U.S. is one of many Western countries who see Maduro’s government as illegitimate, citing widespread fraud in the 2024 election:

The Trump administration has long accused Maduro of running a criminal narco-trafficking organization called Cartel de los Soles, which experts say is shorthand for a system of corruption rather than a single hierarchical group. The U.S. declared it a foreign terrorist organization in November.

On Saturday, U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi said Maduro, Flores, and senior Venezuelan face charges related to alleged “drug trafficking and narco-terrorism conspiracies,” according to an unsealed indictment Bondi posted on X.

The indictment alleges that, starting in 1999, Maduro and others partnered with international drug trafficking organizations to transport thousands of tons of cocaine into the United States.

[…]

The Trump administration claims that Venezuela “stole” oil and assets from the U.S., after its government nationalized them in the late 1990s, which Maduro’s government denies.

Last month, Trump ordered a blockade against Venezuelan oil and sanctioned tankers. And on Saturday morning, Vice President JD Vance tweeted that Trump had been clear to Maduro: “the drug trafficking must stop, and the stolen oil must be returned to the United States.”

[…]

“We’re going to have our very large United States oil companies, the biggest anywhere in the world, go in, spend billions of dollars, fix the badly broken infrastructure, the oil infrastructure, and start making money for the country,” Trump said. “The biggest beneficiary are going to be the people of Venezuela.”

Despite Trump’s announcement that Vice President Rodríguez has been sworn in, it’s unclear who will take over Maduro’s duties long term.

“I’m not sure there’s going to be a power vacuum, because so many of his cronies apparently were left behind,” Todd Robinson, former acting U.S. ambassador to Venezuela during President Trump’s first term, told NPR.

“There are a lot of questions about what exactly is left behind now, and what more the United States is willing to do to ensure that a potential legitimate person takes over,” Robinson added.

Trump on Saturday did not outline a clear plan on next steps but said that the U.S. will run Venezuela until a “proper transition can take place.”

“We’re going to run the country right. It’s going to be run very judiciously, very fairly,” he said during Saturday’s press conference after Maduro was captured.

Posted in Policy, War | 4 Comments »

Visible effects greater than New Mexico tests

Friday, January 2nd, 2026

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesAugust 1, 1945 came and passed, General Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), and the weather was not favorable over Japan. General LeMay did not think that it would be wise to undertake the mission under those conditions:

The six crews that might be used were given special instructions on the procedures they were to follow, and at another briefing on August 4, Parsons explained the effects they could expect when the bomb exploded. Most of them knew by now that they were dealing with a special type of bomb, but Parsons’ statement that the force of the explosion would be equivalent to that of twenty thousand tons of TNT came as a complete surprise.

During the period of waiting, the special air-sea rescue plans were settled. They emphasized that no other aircraft would be permitted within fifty miles of the target during a period of from four hours before until six hours after strike time. Not even for rescue operations would this restriction be lifted. Special air-sea rescue facilities were to be provided by both Army and Navy planes and by submarines, and in spite of the necessary restrictions we had placed upon it, rescue coverage in this operation would be far better than average.

[…]

Other air attacks on Japan were to be carried out on the same day as our mission, to divert any Japanese defense actions that might endanger our operation. Hiroshima would be the primary target, with Kokura Arsenal and Kokura the secondary targets, and Nagasaki the tertiary target. The aiming point for Hiroshima was close to the Japanese Army Headquarters.

Hiroshima was a highly important military objective. The Army Headquarters was located in a castle. Some 25,000 troops were in its garrison. It was the port through which all supplies and communications passed from Honshu to Kyushu. It was the largest city, excepting Kyoto, that was still undamaged by American air raids. Its population was believed to be over 300,000, and it was a beehive of war industry, carried on in moderate-sized plants and in small shops as well as in almost every home.

We would use a total of seven planes. One would be sent to Iwo Jima to serve as a spare in case the bomb-carrying plane developed mechanical troubles on the flight from Tinian. Three planes would go ahead, one to each target area, to appraise the local weather and to relay the information back to the bomb-carrying plane, which would be accompanied by two observer planes to the general vicinity of the target. One of these carried special measuring and recording instruments, including some that would be dropped near the target to radio back their readings.

Radar was to be used as an aid but the actual bombing was to be accomplished visually. If this proved to be impossible, the bomb was to be brought back, probably to Iwo Jima, as the plane’s gas supply might not permit the return to Tinian. We were anxious to avoid having it come down at other air bases, for in case of a landing accident we wanted personnel on the ground who would be aware of the special precautions that would have to be taken.

[…]

Provisions were also made for the strike photographs to be taken by the 3rd Photo Reconnaissance Squadron and two photo crews were briefed on their assignment by the 509th’s intelligence officers.

[…]

Parsons had decided with Farrell’s approval to complete the final assembly of the bomb after takeoff. His purpose was to minimize the hazards of a crash on Tinian. I had previously said that I was opposed to this as unwise, because it was unnecessary and because it would be very difficult to do it in cramped conditions in the plane. I was not informed of the plan until it was too late to interfere.

[…]

The original scheduled time was 0915. Thus, in a flight of some seventeen hundred miles taking six hours and a half, Colonel Tibbets had arrived on target only one-half of a minute off schedule.

The 20th Air Force order covering the operation prescribed a turn of 150° after the bomb was released in order to gain a maximum distance from the point of explosion; such a turn, our studies indicated, could be made without undue risk to the plane and its crew.

Immediately after the bomb was dropped from 31,600 feet, the plane began its getaway maneuver. The flash was seen during this turn and fifty seconds after the drop, the shock waves hit the plane. There were two of these, the first the direct shock wave and the second the reflected wave from the ground. By that time the plane was fifteen miles away from the burst.

[…]

The crews of the strike and the two observation aircraft reported that five minutes after release a dark gray cloud of some three miles in diameter hung over the center of Hiroshima. Out of the center of this grew a column of white smoke which rose to a height of 35,000 feet, with the top of the cloud being considerably enlarged.

Four hours after the strike, the photo reconnaissance planes found that most of the city of Hiroshima was still obscured by the smoke cloud, although fires could be seen around its edges.

[…]

Pictures taken the following day showed that 60 per cent of the city was destroyed.

The area devastated at Hiroshima was 1.7 square miles, extending out a mile from ground zero. The Japanese authorities estimated the casualties at 71,000 dead and missing and 68,000 injured.

The most important result achieved by the Hiroshima bombing was not the physical damage, although over 50 per cent of the buildings were totally destroyed, nor was it the fifteen to twenty thousand Japanese soldiers who were killed or severely wounded, nor was it the thousands of other people killed and injured. The important result, and the one that we sought, was that it brought home to the Japanese leaders the utter hopelessness of their position. When this fact was re-emphasized by the Nagasaki bombing, they were convinced that they must surrender at once.

Parsons reported (in special one-time code, of course):

Results clearcut, successful in all respects. Visible effects greater than New Mexico tests. Conditions normal in airplane following delivery.

Received at the same time was this message relayed from the plane:

Target at Hiroshima attacked visually. One-tenth cloud at 052315Z. 3 No fighters and no flak.

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Most professional soldiers will go to almost any length to avoid piecemealing away their resources

Wednesday, December 31st, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesThe Alamogordo test, General Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), had not set aside all doubts about the bomb:

It proved merely that one implosion-type, plutonium bomb had worked; it did not prove that another would or that a uranium bomb of the gun type would. We had made every possible component test we could think of. We were reasonably sure of each one. We knew we could bring the U-235 portions of the bomb together in such a way that, if the theories of atomic energy were correct and U-235 behaved as plutonium had, the bomb should go off. But still no test had been made of the complete bomb. Nevertheless, the indications for success were strong enough so that no one urged us to change our plans of dropping the first gun-type bomb in combat without prior test. In any case, we simply had to take the chance, because the production of U-235 was so slow, even compared to plutonium, that we could not afford to use it in a test.

[…]

Early in the morning of July 16, the bomb — minus the last necessary bit of U-235 — was put aboard the cruiser Indianapolis, which sailed almost immediately. The Indianapolis had a fast but uneventful trip through Hawaii to Tinian.

[…]

The Indianapolis arrived at Tinian on July 26 and discharged her cargo that same day. She then put out to sea, headed for the Philippines, but her voyage came to a sudden and tragic end on July 30 when she was attacked by a Japanese submarine and went down with some nine hundred of her crew.

[…]

I had arranged with Lieutenant General H. L. George, the head of Air Transport, for the final parts, including some U-235, of the Hiroshima bomb to be flown from Albuquerque to Tinian. Because I did not want to risk having the plane disappear in flight with an extremely valuable though small piece of U-235, I asked for two large cargo planes in perfect condition, and the best possible crews. I told George that the cargo would be almost infinitesimal and that the second plane was wanted just in case of need, to tell us where the first one crashed — if it did. George had had his orders from Arnold and he simply said, “Whatever you want, you get.”

[…]

The flight to San Francisco was uneventful but when they were about forty-five minutes out over the Pacific, de Silva’s plane had to return to the mainland because of engine trouble. Contrary to what I had counted on, Taylor’s plane, instead of returning too, continued directly to Hawaii and arrived there several hours before de Silva’s plane came in. Despite our desire to keep the flight inconspicuous, a radio tip — probably sent unofficially — alerted Hawaii to a very important flight, and Taylor was met at the airfield by a group of senior officers who expected at least one high-ranking general with entourage instead of a single second lieutenant. Taylor had no written orders with him, since they were in de Silva’s hands, and soon found the local personnel determined, in accordance with custom, to load the empty plane to capacity. Fortunately, the plane crew had been convinced before departure from California that the trip was most unusual and with their support he was able to keep the ship unloaded until de Silva arrived. From then on the trip was uneventful.

[…]

One of our big problems had been whether to use each bomb as it became available or to store up a sufficient number to permit their employment in quantity. Most professional soldiers will go to almost any length to avoid piecemealing away their resources. However, in this case, we felt that the considerations of time and expected power justified our using the weapons as they became available. If our assessment of these factors had been erroneous, our position might very well have been extremely embarrassing, for our projected production rates called for one Fat Man of the type we had tested at Alamogordo (but not by an air drop) to be delivered at Tinian on about August 6, with a second one to be ready about August 24, and additional ones arriving in increasing numbers from there on.

As I have said, we had no assurance that a uranium bomb, the Thin Man, would work at all. Yet, that was the weapon that we employed against Hiroshima, since we had used up our entire immediate supply of plutonium in the test bomb.

[…]

General Marshall was also furnished with the probable readiness dates of the implosion bomb, and I explained that there would have to be a gap of at least three days between successive bombs, no matter what type was used. I did not give him the reason for this: we needed the time to assemble the bomb, and nothing should be hurried. Judging by the Alamogordo test, I said, we now expected this bomb to have an explosive force exceeding the equivalent of ten thousand tons of TNT and possibly reaching as high as thirty thousand tons.

[…]

Many small problems arose as the date of the first bombing approached. Two years before, the War Department had issued orders prohibiting persons with knowledge of future military operations from flying over enemy-held territory. The reason for this order was sound — to prevent leakage of information through possible prisoners of war — but it created an impossible situation for us. We had to have Parsons and Ashworth and their two technical assistants aboard the bombing planes. We also needed Tibbets and his best pilots on these flights, and we wanted to have certain scientists in the observation planes. We simply could not operate under such a restriction.

When this problem was brought to my attention in Washington, I immediately secured War Department authority to disregard the prohibition for both civilian and military personnel concerned with Centerboard, as our overseas operation had been named, provided their flights were essential.

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The island is not merely symbolic but pivotal terrain

Tuesday, December 30th, 2025

At the heart of China’s fixation on Taiwan lies a convergence of ideological, military, and geostrategic imperatives:

Beijing’s leadership views the island not merely as a breakaway province, but as the unfinished business of China’s “national rejuvenation” and a core element of CCP legitimacy. Beijing sees Taiwan’s continued de facto independence as a symbol of national weakness and foreign interference, and as a threat to the Chinese Communist Party’s domestic narrative if left unresolved. This drives a sense of urgency within the PLA to develop credible warfighting options capable of securing control of the island if political efforts fail.

Militarily, Taiwan is a strategic keystone in the Western Pacific. Its position within the first island chain gives it outsized importance in controlling access to the East and South China Seas. If Beijing were to seize Taiwan, the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) would be able to displace U.S. influence deeper into the Pacific and threaten critical sea lines of communication linking North America to Southeast Asia. Taiwan’s airfields, ports, and undersea infrastructure would become forward platforms for China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) networks, narrowing the tactical margin for U.S. and allied forces to project power. From this military perspective, the island is not merely symbolic but a pivotal terrain that could reshape regional balances.

Tactically, seizing Taiwan would require overcoming a heavily fortified defense posture, challenging geography, and a technologically sophisticated defender. Taiwan possesses advanced air defenses (including Patriot PAC-3 and indigenous systems), a modernized fighter fleet, and well-trained marine and special operations units capable of mobile defense and anti-ship missile deployments. Any amphibious assault would have to cross approximately 160 kilometers of open sea under surveillance by U.S. and allied satellites and sensors, suppress Taiwan’s anti-access systems, and secure key ports and landing zones under fire. It would be a complex and high-risk operation.

China has taken key tactical lessons from the Ukraine war. Russian failures to secure air superiority, underestimating resistance, and struggling with logistics in urban warfare have made clear to Beijing that a Taiwan operation will demand overwhelming joint coordination. The PLA is accelerating its ability to conduct complex amphibious operations supported by air, cyber, space, and electronic warfare forces. Tactical units are being trained to operate autonomously in contested environments, utilizing UAVs, loitering munitions, and hardened satellite communications to maintain operational tempo.

Posted in Policy, War | 2 Comments »

At no time was there any idea of testing the gun-type bomb

Monday, December 29th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. Groves In late June, as the forces under General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz approached within bombing range of the Japanese homeland, General Groves realized that they had not been told about the ban on certain cities, as he explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), for at the time it was imposed they had been too far away to make it necessary:

This concern was soon removed, however, for when we brought the matter to the attention of the Joint Chiefs, they hastily reserved our targets from all air attack.

We were fairly sure by now that we would be able to test the Fat Man, the implosion-type bomb, sometime around the middle of July. (At no time was there any idea of testing the gun-type bomb.) Planning for this operation, which carried the code name of Trinity, had begun back in the spring of 1944 when Oppenheimer and I decided that a test might be necessary to make certain that the complex theories behind the implosion bomb were correct, and that it was soundly designed, engineered, manufactured and assembled—in short, that it would work.

We thought then that we might want to explode the first bomb inside a container, so that if a nuclear explosion did not take place or if it was a very small one, we might be able to recover all or much of the precious plutonium. Also, we wanted to prevent its being scattered over a wide area and creating a health hazard that would make it necessary to guard the area against trespassers for many years.

Consequently we ordered from Babcock and Wilcox a heavy steel container, which because of its great size, weight and strength was promptly christened Jumbo. To move it from the manufacturing plant in the East to New Mexico, it had to be loaded onto specially reinforced cars and carefully routed over the railroads. At the nearest railroad stop to the test site it was unloaded onto a specially built trailer with some thirty-six large wheels, and then driven overland about thirty miles to Alamogordo.

But by the time of the test we had decided we would not need to use Jumbo, for we had learned enough to be reasonably certain of a fair-sized nuclear explosion. Even if it were as low as 250 tons, as many of our scientists were predicting, the container would only create additional dangers.

It is interesting to speculate about what would have happened, with the actual explosion of almost twenty thousand tons, if we had used Jumbo. That the heat would have completely evaporated the entire steel casing is doubtful. If it did not, pieces of jagged steel would probably have been hurled for great distances.

The scientist in charge of the test was Dr. K. T. Bainbridge, who had the unusual qualification of being a physicist with undergraduate training in electrical engineering.

[…]

I had ruled out using Los Alamos for the test on grounds of security and also because I doubted if the area could be expanded sufficiently. Later, we decided that we would need a site measuring approximately seventeen by twenty-four miles, that it should be in a generally non-populated area, and that it should be no further from Los Alamos than necessary. I added one special prohibition: that it should have no Indian population at all, for I wanted to avoid the impossible problems that would have been created by Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes, who had jurisdiction over the Bureau of Indian Affairs. His curiosity and insatiable desire to have his own way in every detail would have caused difficulties and we already had too many.

[…]

Air travel has improved considerably since those days. The field we used at Pasadena was very small, and our approach to it was impeded by some high-tension lines at the end of the strip. As he came in, our pilot found himself lined up on the taxiway and quite low. Instead of circling the field, he came in over the wires and then side-slipped, landing with a terrific bounce—both horizontal and vertical. Our landing brought everyone out of the small operations office, including one of my security officers who had missed the plane in San Francisco, and who was waiting to rejoin us in Pasadena. He remarked afterward that, if not the first, at least the second thought that flashed through his mind was: “How am I going to explain the accidental death of Bush, Conant and Groves, without publicity to the project and resulting breaches of security?”

We left the next morning from March Field in Riverside in order to be sure that the predicted Los Angeles fog would not interfere with our taking off.

[…]

The main problem was the weather. We had obtained the very best men that the armed forces had on long-range weather forecasting, and, for a considerable period, they had been making accurate long-range weather predictions for the test site. The only time they were not right was on the one day that counted. The weather that evening was quite blustery and misty, with some rain. Fortunately, the wind seemed to be in the right direction.

We were interested in the weather for a number of reasons: First and foremost, we wanted to avoid as much radioactive fallout2 as possible, particularly over populated areas. This was a matter that had not received any attention until about six months earlier, when one of the Los Alamos scientists, Joseph Hirschfelder, had brought up the possibility that it might be a real problem. For this reason, we felt it would be desirable to explode the bomb when rain was unlikely, since rain would bring down excessive fallout over a small area instead of permitting it to be widely distributed and therefore of little or no consequence. In reaching this decision we could not ignore the old reports that heavy battle cannonading had sometime brought on rain, even though no scientific basis was known for a such phenomenon.

Second, it was extremely important that the wind direction be satisfactory, because we did not want the cloud, if one developed, to pass over any populated areas until its radioactive contents were thoroughly dissipated. It was essential that it not pass over any town too large to be evacuated. The city about which we were most concerned was Amarillo, some three hundred miles away, but there were others large enough to cause us worry. The wind direction had to be correct to within a few degrees.

Third, we wanted suitable flying weather so that we could have observation planes flying over the near-by areas; and finally, we wanted to avoid prior heavy rain or continuous dampness, which might ruin our electrical connections, both for firing the bomb, and for the various instruments.

[…]

I was extremely anxious to have the test carried off on schedule. One reason for this was that I knew the effect that a successful test would have on the issuance and wording of the Potsdam ultimatum. I knew also that every day’s delay in the test might well mean the delay of a day in ending the war; not because we would not be ready with the bombs, for the production of fissionable material would continue at full tilt anyway, but because a delay in issuing the Potsdam ultimatum could result in a delay in the Japanese reaction, with a further delay to the atomic attack on Japan. Obviously, a reasonable time had to be allowed for the Japanese to consider the ultimatum.

From a purely technical point of view, also, it was desirable to avoid a postponement, for the chances of short circuits and a misfire would increase appreciably with every hour that our connections were subjected to excessive moisture.

[…]

It had originally been scheduled for 4 a.m. on July 16. This hour had been fixed with the thought that an explosion at that time would attract the least attention from casual observers in the surrounding area, since almost everyone would be asleep. We expected there would be a tremendous flash of light, but thought it would not be great enough to waken many people who were well removed from the burst. Then, too, we wanted the darkness for our photography.

[…]

As the hour approached, we had to postpone the test—first for an hour and then later for thirty minutes more—so that the explosion was actually three and one half hours behind the original schedule. While the weather did not improve appreciably, neither did it worsen. It was cloudy with light rain and high humidity; very few stars were visible. Every five or ten minutes, Oppenheimer and I would leave the dugout and go outside and discuss the weather. I was devoting myself during this period to shielding Oppenheimer from the excitement swirling about us, so that he could consider the situation as calmly as possible, for the decisions to be taken had to be governed largely by his appraisal of the technical factors involved.

[…]

Everyone was told to lie face down on the ground, with his feet toward the blast, to close his eyes, and to cover his eyes with his hands as the countdown approached zero. As soon as they became aware of the flash they could turn over and sit or stand up, covering their eyes with the smoked glass with which each had been supplied.

[…]

As I lay there, in the final seconds, I thought only of what I would do if, when the countdown got to zero, nothing happened. I was spared this embarrassment, for the blast came promptly with the zero count, at 5: 30 A.M., on July 16, 1945.

My first impression was one of tremendous light, and then as I turned, I saw the now familiar fireball. As Bush, Conant and I sat on the ground looking at this phenomenon, the first reactions of the three of us were expressed in a silent exchange of handclasps. We all arose so that by the time the shock wave arrived we were standing.

I was surprised by its comparative gentleness when it reached us almost fifty seconds later. As I look back on it now, I realize that the shock was very impressive, but the light had been so much greater than any human had previously experienced or even than we had anticipated that we did not shake off the experience quickly.

Unknown to me and I think to everyone, Fermi was prepared to measure the blast by a very simple device. He had a handful of torn paper scraps and, as it came time for the shock wave to approach, I saw him dribbling them from his hand toward the ground. There was no ground wind, so that when the shock wave hit it knocked some of the scraps several feet away. Since he dropped them from a fixed elevation from near his body which he had previously measured, the only measurement he now needed was the horizontal distance that they had traveled. He had already calculated in advance the force of the blast for various distances. So, after measuring the distance on the ground, he promptly announced the strength of the explosion. He was remarkably close to the calculations that were made later from the data accumulated by our complicated instruments.

I had become a bit annoyed with Fermi the evening before, when he suddenly offered to take wagers from his fellow scientists on whether or not the bomb would ignite the atmosphere, and if so, whether it would merely destroy New Mexico or destroy the world. He had also said that after all it wouldn’t make any difference whether the bomb went off or not because it would still have been a well worth-while scientific experiment. For if it did fail to go off, we would have proved that an atomic explosion was not possible. Afterward, I realized that his talk had served to smooth down the frayed nerves and ease the tension of the people at the base camp, and I have always thought that this was his conscious purpose. Certainly, he himself showed no signs of tension that I could see.

[…]

These plans proved utterly impracticable, for no one who had witnessed the test was in a frame of mind to discuss anything. The reaction to success was simply too great. It was not only that we had achieved success with the bomb; but that everyone—scientists, military officers and engineers—realized that we had been personal participants in, and eyewitnesses to, a major milestone in the world’s history and had a sobering appreciation of what the results of our work would be. While the phenomenon that we had just witnessed had been seriously discussed for years, it had always been thought of as a remote possibility—not as an actuality.

[…]

Several days after I got back to Washington, Dr. R. M. Evans, of the du Pont Company, came to see me about some of the operating problems at Hanford. After we had finished and as he was leaving, he turned, his hand on the doorknob, and said, “Oh, by the way, General, everybody in du Pont sends you their congratulations.” I quickly replied, “What are you talking about?” He answered, “It’s the first time we ever heard of the Army’s storing high explosives, pyrotechnics and chemicals in one magazine.” He went on to add that the radio announcement on the Pacific Coast had been teletyped in to Wilmington from Hanford. My only response was: “That was a strange thing for the Army to do, wasn’t it?”

[…]

Mr. Stimson’s diary for Sunday, July 22, 1945, is most enlightening:

Churchill read Groves’ report in full. He told me that he had noticed at the meeting of the Three yesterday that Truman was much fortified by something that had happened, that he had stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner, telling them as to certain demands that they could not have and that the United States was entirely against them. He said, “Now I know what happened to Truman yesterday. I couldn’t understand it. When he got to the meeting after having read this report, he was a changed man. He told the Russians just where they got on and off and generally bossed the whole meeting.” Churchill said he now understood how this pepping up had taken place and he felt the same way.

Posted in Science, Technology, War, Weapons | No Comments »

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