Gregory Clark, the economic historian behind A Farewell to Alms and The Son Also Rises, has released the final installment of his trilogy on economic development and social mobility, To Have and Have Not:
Unlike its predecessors, To Have and Have Not did not come out through Princeton University Press—nor through any academic book publisher, for that matter. The peer reviewers just aren’t having it. Some won’t even read it.
Clark’s manuscript instead appears online in PDF form, free of charge but with the occasional typo still intact, via Econ Journal Watch, a publication focused on debates within economics.
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The book advances a provocative argument, drawing together several of Clark’s recent academic papers—and several enormous datasets—to claim that social status not only persists strongly within families but does so specifically through genetic inheritance, to a far greater degree than virtually anyone has claimed.
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To Have and Have Not is built on an incredible trove of historical information, including centuries’ worth of English genealogies and marriage records, as well as the population registers of modern Sweden and Denmark. The sheer scale of these data allows Clark to see how social status runs in families—across many links in the tree, both horizontal (from siblings to distant cousins) and vertical (from parents to kids to grandkids)—and to measure status in several ways, including occupational prestige, education, and housing quality.
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To take a typical example, in Clark’s data on Britons born from 1910 to 1996, siblings’ home values correlated at about 0.33. In other words, if someone has an extremely expensive house, three standard deviations above the mean, our best guess would be for their sibling to have a merely nice house, one standard deviation above the mean—closer to the overall average than to the sibling.
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When one moves from siblings all the way to cousins in that same housing-value analysis, the correlation drops only modestly, to 0.21. The general rule he discovers—across many different status measures, and across several centuries notwithstanding massive changes to society and technology—is that these correlations, despite starting out at a modest level, drop by only about one-fifth with each extra degree of relatedness. (Cousins are two steps more distant than siblings in this sense.)
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When variables are measured poorly, or when they fail to capture important details of an underlying concept, the resulting correlations will appear artificially weak.
Thus, our focus shouldn’t linger on the modest correlations among immediate family members. Those aren’t a beautiful testament to the randomness of life and the possibility of change; they’re just misleading. Rather, the very slow decay of the correlations as we move through family trees is where the action is. It reveals a “latent” status that is extremely persistent. Clark finds measurable links in status even among fourth cousins, whose shared ancestors are five generations back.
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Clark’s answer is assortative mating. If people marry others who are similar in their “latent” genetic social status—presumably by matching on a mix of education, intelligence, social graces, work ethic, family connections, and so on—each link in the family tree doesn’t simply add genetic randomness but rather springs from a careful romantic match of like with like. Using a formula that goes back to the pioneering British statistician and geneticist Ronald Fisher, Clark is even able to calculate how strong matching on this latent status must be: to explain the slow decay of social status across degrees of relatedness through genes alone, spouses must be correlated on their genetic status at 0.57. If someone has genetic social status one standard deviation above the mean, he’ll marry someone of status 0.57 standard deviations above it, on average.
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Clark’s own takeaways from his analysis include that “England is, and has been, close to a meritocracy for many generations,” that “much of the 10 percent of national income typically spent on education by high income economies is largely a social waste,” that genetic transmission of status implies “an incentive to select high status immigrants, and reject low status ones,” and that the “relative fecundity of people at the top and the bottom of social abilities” will affect future social outcomes.


