General Magic had a right to any IP developed by employees

Monday, June 1st, 2026

Inside the Box by David EpsteinGeneral Magic was already in trouble, David Epstein explains (in Inside the Box), when a tech-support guy named Pierre Omidyar used his free time and personal website to start AuctionWeb:

General Magic had a right to any IP developed by employees, so Omidyar dutifully showed the company’s lawyer that his site was generating traffic, connecting people, and facilitating commerce. Isn’t that what General Magic wanted to do? But they were already too committed to the partners of the gigantic Alliance and to a proprietary e-commerce network to change direction, even though the explosion of the internet should have completely altered their plans. General Magic passed on AuctionWeb. Omidyar, who didn’t have a business bank account and had been collecting checks in a pile at his desk, kept it going. He left General Magic, and changed the name of his site to eBay.

Businesspeople weren’t going to use the Newton unless it included a phone

Saturday, May 30th, 2026

Inside the Box by David EpsteinLarry Tesler, who was leading Apple’s Newton group, hired an anthropologist named Eleanor Wynn, David Epstein explains (in Inside the Box), to test the theory behind their business plan:

Wynn reported back that business­people weren’t going to use the Newton unless it included a phone. But adding a phone at that point (as General Magic was busy learning the hard way) was unreasonable. In that case, Wynn reported, the market will be workers who already carry separate pieces of communication equipment, like police officers and firefighters. In an oral history interview for the Computer History Museum, Tesler recalled Apple CEO John Sculley’s response:

Sculley is deflated, “I thought my market was CEOs, like me. Not firemen.” And “No, no, no, we don’t want that. That answer is not acceptable.”

So they went hunting for another answer, using what Tesler called the “famous fake focus group.” Tesler was told that the supposed focus group would be in Minnesota, because people in the Bay Area were too tech savvy, and neither he nor Wynn were invited, and unfortunately there would be no recording of it they could watch. The focus-group team came back with a message: “We’re building the exact right product.” Apple plowed ahead, and the Newton flopped spectacularly.

For every person who needs more freedom, there are ten people who need more help in finding their way

Tuesday, May 26th, 2026

Inside the Box by David EpsteinBell Labs is often remembered as the epitome of unfettered exploration, David Epstein explains (in Inside the Box), but that framing misses a crucial point:

Eric Gilliam, who studies and writes about innovation history, coined the beautiful phrase “long leash, narrow fence” to describe the ethos at Bell Labs in its heyday. New researchers were given extraordinary latitude in determining what to work on, but were expected to interact with engineers and manufacturing facilities to identify specific problems that needed solving.

[…]

John R. Pierce, a Bell Labs scientist and “father of the communications satellite,” recalled in an oral history: “Too much freedom is horrible. It’s like telling a young child, ‘Do whatever you want to.’… It’s certainly bad to be directed to do things very, very narrowly and with no freedom. It’s my guess that for every person who needs more freedom, there are ten people who need more help in finding their way.” What they had at Bell Labs, as another famous scientist put it, was “circumscribed freedom”—freedom within a framework.

Gilliam shares just an excerpt from an interview with Pierce, from 1979, after he had earned acclaim as the father of the communications satellite:

LYLE: I want to talk about research in the Bell Labs and how that’s done. That is, when you first started there, you were working with vacuum tubes. Who decides what problems will be worked on?

PIERCE: That’s very different then and now. I was told to do research on vacuum tubes. People sort of just left me alone. They did suggest that I go and see Philo Farnsworth, who was working on electron multipliers and television pick-up tubes, but I was left pretty much to myself. This was very, very confusing to me. I didn’t know what to do.

LYLE: Were you doing it alone?

PIERCE: Yes.

LYLE: Did they say, “So-and-so has been doing this and this is where he left off”?

PIERCE: No. I was just supposed to plan something to do and do it. I think that is close to cruel and unusual punishment.

LYLE: And full of anxiety, I’m sure.

PIERCE: Yes, but I didn’t know enough to be unhappy. I did crazy things. I did some useful things. I invented an electron multiplier. I was greatly helped at this point, but not so much by the people who were close to such work. I felt a certain secretiveness in the people who were working near to me. They were doing their own thing, and I was doing other things. Heaven knows how I found anything useful to do. I was exposed to things by some of the people who were less secretive. I was very much helped by Bill Shockley, who came to Bell Laboratories about the same time I did. He had been an undergraduate at Caltech but did his graduate work at MIT. He was a very sympathetic person, and taught me a good deal. Somehow I hit on things that were worth working on — electron multipliers and the question of noise in electron multipliers, and later trying to make high transconductance vacuum tubes.

Then, as the war came, I was drawn into microwave tube work, and the outcome of that was a little bit by accident. First, I tried to make klystron amplifiers—I’d heard about klystron. Then I stumbled onto reflex klystrons, which was not a new idea, but I stumbled onto it independently. Gerry [William Gerald] Shepherd, who’s now at the University of Minnesota, and I made some klystrons that were in all American microwave radar receivers. The magnetron was the big thing of the day, but we made these beating oscillators for receivers instead.

Too much freedom is horrible. It’s like telling a young child, “Do whatever you want to.” You’ve heard this story. There are various outcomes. One is, “Do I have to do what I want to?” Complete freedom is not very helpful to a person who is inexperienced in the world. It’s certainly bad to be directed to do things very, very narrowly and with no freedom. It’s my guess that for every person who needs more freedom, there are ten people who need more help in finding their way.

LYLE: So, did they tell you why they wanted the vacuum tubes, when you started off?

PIERCE: Not really. I found out some way, inadvertently. Some people were working on electron multipliers, and I made some improvements on them. It became clear that people needed better vacuum tubes for building negative feedback amplifiers, and I worked on that. I don’t think I was told this formally; I just found out by talking to people. Then, as the war approached and we got into war, it became apparent that microwave radar was very, very important, and I worked on tubes for radar. It was a process of osmosis rather than direction that led me into these things, as I remember it.

LYLE: How was the research tied in with the general business of Bell Telephone? kind of a relationship exists between these two parts of the company?
That is, what kind of a relationship exists between these two parts of the company?

PIERCE: It’s a very important relationship. The Bell System has AT&T, which is sort of a holding company, but it also runs the long lines that provide long distance telephone service. It establishes engineering practices for the Bell System. It owns Western Electric, which is a manufacturing organization, and it also owns, together with Western Electric, the Bell Telephone Laboratories.

I remember that during the war we saw a good deal of people from Western Electric, who were going to manufacture the things that we devised. Because all of these people were engaged in telephony, or during the war because they were all engaged in radar and other military things, you got to talk to people who were engaged in the operation of things, who were engaged in the manufacture of things, and you got a picture of the rest of the world which certainly influenced what research you did.

I can understand a university, which does teaching and research. But the idea of a research institute without ties to either teaching or to manufacturing or operational organization seems a terribly sterile idea. You see that in the Soviet Union; there’s a lot of good activity that never results in anything. When they want to build automobiles, they hire Fiat to build an automobile plant, instead of relying on what they have learned.

Not too much time, not too much money, and not too many people on the team

Sunday, May 24th, 2026

Inside the Box by David EpsteinPrior to his This American Life experience, David Epstein explains (in Inside the Box), he was apt to think of freedom as an absence of editing:

It seems silly to me in retrospect, but it’s the same kind of “no limits” thinking that animated General Magic, and its failure left a powerful impression on those who lived it.

Tony Fadell came away from the General Magic experience obsessed with constraints. “If you don’t have constraints, then make up constraints!” he told me the first time we spoke.

[…]

After General Magic, Fadell joined Philips as a twenty-five-year-old chief technology officer, where initially he “swung the pendulum too far the other way,” he said, and fell into micromanaging.

[…]

He got the initial call from Apple in January 2001. In March, he showed Steve Jobs a Styrofoam model of a music player and got the green light. He wasn’t given a deadline to ship a first version, but Fadell insisted on setting one linked to an external beacon, “so that everybody has an understanding of what it looks like, and it isn’t just the boss cracking the whip.” He chose Christmas. It meant that rather than building the giant from the toes up like at General Magic, the team had to use existing technology resourcefully. Their soon-to-be famous scroll wheel, for instance, was inspired by the wheel on a Danish cordless phone that a team member brought to a meeting. The first iPod shipped that November.

Fadell eventually moved on to the iPhone, where the team set internal deadlines for experimental prototypes. Fadell refers to those deadlines as “heartbeats,” because they determine the rhythm of work from the inside. They gave themselves just ten weeks to make a first basic version of an iPod-plus-phone, during which time they learned that the wheel would take up too much space. They allotted five months for a second version, and learned that more of their assumptions were wrong; an antenna and speaker couldn’t be as close together as they’d wanted. The third version worked, enough. The internal deadlines (or heartbeats) weren’t for finishing the entire project; they were signals for everyone to pause, collect lessons, and regroup.

Fadell later wrote: “We would have never reached that third design if we hadn’t given ourselves hard deadlines with the first two — if we hadn’t cut ourselves off after a few months, reset, and moved on. We forced as many constraints on ourselves as possible: not too much time, not too much money, and not too many people on the team.”

The costs only explode once a film moves into production

Wednesday, May 20th, 2026

Inside the Box by David EpsteinAfter Toy Story fulfilled Ed Catmull’s twenty-year dream, David Epstein explains (in Inside the Box), he turned his attention to creating a place that could do it repeatedly:

The “Three Pitches Rule” required directors to pitch not one but three film ideas, so that they wouldn’t get stuck on one and fixate too early. Pixar directors were then allowed to spend years with a tiny team in the development phase of a film, probing ideas, trying out script drafts, and creating and re-creating storyboards while they hunted for and simplified the core of a story.

[…]

The costs only explode once a film moves into production, at which point experimenting and learning become slow and expensive.

[…]

Once in production, Catmull and his colleagues used the schedule to enforce regular feedback and learning. There were “dailies” every single morning, in which animators shared incomplete work with colleagues; “Braintrust” meetings, in which a small group watched a version of a film and highlighted aspects that weren’t working, without mandating solutions (Steve Jobs was barred, lest his powerful persona carry undue weight); and, after a film was done, postmortems, the main benefit of which was the pre-postmortem—the fact that the looming postmortem forced team members to collect and reflect on their lessons. Boundaries

[…]

Creativity, Inc. by by Ed Catmull

In his memoir, Creativity, Inc., Catmull recounts how the director of The Incredibles became obsessed with getting the fish in an aquarium in the background of a scene to flicker like flames, so animators worked on the inconsequential detail for months. Meanwhile, major characters still needed work. Eventually, a producer and department manager created a system in which popsicle sticks — each one representing the amount of work a single animator could complete in a week — were Velcroed to a wall and arranged next to characters that needed to be animated. If the director wanted to keep obsessing over the fish, he’d have to start taking sticks away from some other character and moving them to the fish. As it turned out, crafting visible constraints did the trick.

The “think slow” part of Pixar planning started before Pixar even existed.

Monday, May 18th, 2026

Inside the Box by David EpsteinThe “think slow” part of Pixar planning, David Epstein explains (in Inside the Box), started before Pixar even existed:

Catmull was surprised then, in 1980, when a Lucasfilm competitor spent $10 million on a Cray-1 super­computer. He and his colleagues wondered if they should chase that competitor, so they sat down and made specific estimates for the computing power it would take to animate an entire film. Their estimate: It would take one hundred Cray-1 computers, which would cost $1 billion. Totally out of the question. “It was like, OK, they’ve just done something unwise economically,” Catmull told me. “So we decided we’re not going to worry about them, and there are a whole bunch of other things we have to solve first.”

[…]

At one point, they calculated the exact number of pixels (five million) and “micropolygons” (eighty million) that they figured software would need to render in order to make a Star Wars quality sequence, down to the realistic blur of speeding objects. Like the summaries in By Space Ship to the Moon, the estimates were guiding lights that helped them keep track of the distance between their current work and their goal.

[…]

In 1988, Pixar released its RenderMan software, and changed filmmaking forever. It was used to seamlessly integrate computer graphics into live-action films like Terminator 2 and Jurassic Park. And then, in 1995, to create an entire film: Toy Story. After twenty years of small steps, Catmull finally achieved his personal moonshot.

The Last Starfighter came out in 1984, well before then:

Computer graphics for the film were rendered by Digital Productions (DP) on a Cray X-MP supercomputer. The company created 27 minutes of effects for the film. This was considered an enormous amount of computer generated imagery at the time.[6] For the 300 scenes containing computer graphics in the film, each frame of the animation contained an average of 250,000 polygons and had a resolution of 3000 × 5000 36-bit pixels. Digital Productions estimated that using computer animation required only half the time and between a third to half of the cost of traditional special effects. The result was a cost of $14 million for a film that made close to $29 million at the box office.

The computer graphics are quaint:

Even literal Moon shots aren’t “moonshots”

Saturday, May 16th, 2026

Inside the Box by David EpsteinEd Catmull, the cofounder and longtime president of Pixar, was watching the General Magic documentary with David Epstein when he headed to the bookshelf, Epstein explains (in Inside the Box):

When Catmull returns from the shelf, he’s holding a laptop-size book with giant red letters splashed across the cover: By Space Ship to the Moon, published in 1952.

By Space Ship to the Moon by Fletcher Pratt and Jack Coggins Medium

The text is clearly targeted at adolescents, but it gives meticulous summaries of the state of 1952 technology — everything from space fuel to space food — and the distance between the current state of the art and how far it needs to go for a trip to the Moon.

[…]

Nearly two decades before the actual Moon landing, scientists and engineers were thinking slow, breaking a giant challenge into tiny pieces. “It goes through chapter by chapter the things that have to be solved,” Catmull explains. “The supplies; the fuel; how do you get up into space; what’s it like to actually be there; landing; food; the process of getting back. It’s a step-by-step of what it takes to get to the Moon.” His point is that even literal Moon shots aren’t “moonshots” in the way they’re often mythologized — just give bright people an inspiring vision and tons of money and the rest will fall into place. General Magic, he suggests, went the mythical moonshot route.

Returning to the documentary:

“The greatest people are self-managing,” the man says. “They don’t need to be managed. What they need is a common vision. Once they know what to do, they’ll go figure out how to do it.”

Catmull looks like he just opened a carton of sour milk. The man on screen was his longtime Pixar business partner, Steve Jobs. It doesn’t sound like the person Catmull knew, the one who obsessed over the number and placement of bathrooms in the Pixar office such that people would be forced to bump into one another and talk. “That is not how Steve ended up working,” he tells me. He concludes that Jobs was either just very young in that clip, or in “mythmaking” mode, providing inspirational soundbites for the media.

I managed to find some scanned pages from the book:

By Space Ship to the Moon 1 Medium

Crewman wheels fuel tank from cave, as moon-to-earth missile is readied for firing.

The station on the moon would be pretty safe against any kind of attack from earth…and guided missiles fired from the moon against a target on earth would be almost impossible to stop. So the first trip to the moon will be made to explore for a place where a military base can be set up.

By Space Ship to the Moon 2 Medium

Base ship will be dismantled to build moon-base. Observatory will be re-erected on mountain top,

By Space Ship to the Moon 3 Medium

Battery-powered, tractor-mounted drill at work. Gravity one-sixth that of earth makes handling of heavy equipment easy

There is nobody on earth rich enough to pay for a rocket that would go to the moon. The big business corporations might possibly find the money, but they would want to see some way of getting it back. At present, it is believed that many valuable minerals are to be found on the moon, but nobody knows for sure. It is not very likely that the big corporations will risk their money. So it appears that the moon rocket will have to be a government project

By Space Ship to the Moon 4 Medium

Sun’s rays are focused by large reflector on mercury boiler. Vapor will drive engines to furnish electric power.

Think slow, act fast

Thursday, May 14th, 2026

Inside the Box by David EpsteinIn Inside the Box, David Epstein explains how, since the 1990s, researcher Bent Flyvbjerg has kept a database that tracks giant undertakings:

Only 8.5 percent of projects finished on time and on budget; 0.5 percent did that and delivered the prophesied benefits. Almost every major infrastructure project goes over budget, but at least not by as much as IT projects, which have a greater tendency to go hundreds of percent over budget. The pattern of disaster that Flyvbjerg has documented is relatively simple: With few constraints, exciting projects get too large too fast, going from big idea to giant endeavor extremely quickly. Flyvbjerg’s conclusion could fairly be called the General Magic problem: Rather than accelerating like a plane speeding up and gradually ascending, it’s more like a harrier, lifting straight into the air. He calls the disaster pattern “think fast, act slow.”

“Think fast” means that the period when a project was small enough for frequent experimentation, and for defining constraints, is essentially skipped. On the back of an intoxicating idea, resources pile into the project. It grows without clear boundaries. Lessons that early on could have helped define the project will now come slowly, and painfully, because the undertaking is large and changing its momentum is difficult. Inevitably, regular surprises will now lead to major delays, and—as was the case at General Magic—the project team can work furiously but will effectively still “act slow” as deadlines whiz by.

Flyvbjerg has also documented the (comparatively rare) pattern of big projects that succeed. They take the opposite course: “Think slow, act fast.” They take time to work out boundaries that make the scope of a project clear. Then, when it’s time to hit the gas, work can proceed quickly. Flyvbjerg has a term that he uses to refer to the successful pattern: “Pixar planning.”

How Big Things Get Done by Bent Flyvbjerg and Dan GardnerIn his own writing, Flyvbjerg refers to these as megaprojects:

Mega­projects are large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost a billion dollars or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people.

Economist Albert Hirschman called such projects “privileged particles of the development process” and pointed out that often they are “trait making.” That is, they are designed to ambitiously change the structure of society, as opposed to smaller and more conventional projects that are “trait taking,” i.e., they fit into pre-existing structures and do not attempt to modify these.

Megaprojects, therefore, are not just magnified versions of smaller projects. Megaprojects are a completely different species in terms of their level of aspiration, lead times, complexity, and stakeholder involvement.

[…]

To illustrate just how big megaprojects are, consider one of the largest dollar figures from public economic debate, the size of US debt to China. This debt is around one trillion US dollars and is considered so large it may destabilize the world economy if the debt is not managed prudently. With this supersize yardstick, now consider the fact that the combined cost of just two of the world’s largest megaprojects — the Joint Strike Fighter aircraft program and China’s high-speed rail project — is also approximately a trillion dollars. The cost of just a couple of the largest megaprojects in the world will dwarf almost any other economic figure, and certainly any investment figure.

We have a deep-seated compulsion always to add

Tuesday, May 12th, 2026

Inside the Box by David EpsteinIn Inside the Box, David Epstein explains how General Magic exemplified the adage that more startups die of indigestion than starvation.

“Overflowing with resources and talent,” he says “they were bereft of helpful constraints.”

Another telling scene [in the General Magic documentary] features a young Darin Adler, who had already led a team that built a Mac operating system before coming to General Magic. Engineers are sitting on the floor in a circle listening to Adler as he tells them that there are “moments where somebody has to start doing something, and what we’ve decided is that for each of those important moments we want to make sure that there’s real responsibility for someone to say, ‘I’m at this important moment, start doing your work.’”

The response, Adler recalled: “They said, ‘Oh, we don’t need a manager. We don’t want you because we don’t need a manager. Our leaders are Andy and Bill. That’s what makes this place great is we don’t have managers.’”

Boundaries can be helpful, because we have a deep-seated compulsion always to add:

Mythical Man-Month by Frederick Brooks Jr.

In the 1960s, computer scientist Fred Brooks led the development of the IBM computers that NASA used to send humans to the Moon. He later founded the computer science department at the University of North Carolina. But he is most widely remembered for his popular writing on design and project management, including what became known as Brooks’s Law, the idea that adding people to a software project that is already late will make it even more late. We underestimate how adding stuff, including team members, also adds complexity.

[…]

Subtract by Leidy Klotz

Leidy Klotz, an engineering and architecture professor at the University of Virginia, has shown that humans reflexively add in order to solve problems — more people, more money, more features, etc. — even when subtracting is better. In the simplest demonstration in Klotz’s research, adults were given a Lego structure that needed to be strengthened in order to hold a masonry brick over the head of a Star Wars stormtrooper action figure. Each problem solver could earn money by completing the task, but there was a catch: Every Lego piece they added reduced their reward. And yet, most added multiple pieces even though removing just a single, obviously precarious piece would have solved the problem instantly.

Subtract by Leidy Klotz Lego Puzzle

[…]

Long before their work documented it scientifically, product designers had come up with various names for this tendency, like “featuritis” or “the Christmas tree effect.”

[…]

Journalists have the macabre phrase “drown your kittens” to refer to getting rid of lines the writer has fallen in love with but that don’t serve the reader.

He called it the Pocket Crystal

Sunday, May 10th, 2026

Inside the Box by David EpsteinAs I mentioned recently, I quite enjoyed David Epstein’s The Sports Gene and Range, so I went ahead and got Inside the Box the day it came out.

He opens with the famous story of Dmitri Mendeleev seeing the periodic table in a dream and contrasts that myth with the reality that Mendeleev had a deadline approaching for the second volume of his textbook, and he needed a way to discuss dozens of elements more sensibly and efficiently.

His primary example though — or counter-example, since it demonstrates what a lack of constraints does — is General Magic, founded by two Apple legends and the guy who coined the term Information Economy, Marc Porat:

One day, Porat took a Sharp Wizard — a new electronic organizer with a calendar and phone book — and duct-taped it to a Motorola analog cell phone. He had his concept.

[…]

He called it the Pocket Crystal.

[…]

The Pocket Crystal schematic depicted a thin glass rectangle with no protruding buttons—just a touch screen. It would be a computer that combined a phone and fax machine; you would use it to send text messages, watch movies, play video games, buy plane tickets, and download new apps. It would fit in your pocket, and it would be beautiful. Following the sketch, Porat wrote in his red book: “It must offer the kind of personal satisfaction that a fine piece of jewelry brings. It will have a perceived value even when it’s not being used. It should offer the comfort of a touchstone, the tactile satisfaction of a seashell, the enchantment of a crystal.”

In 1989, only 15 percent of American households even had a computer, which didn’t fit in anyone’s pocket; zero percent were browsing the web, because it didn’t exist. And yet, there was Marc Porat, essentially sketching the iPhone.

Apple took a board seat, Sculley introduced them to Sony, and soon “General Magic’s partners controlled so much of the world’s communications industry that Alliance meetings had to begin with an antitrust lawyer listing all the topics they were prohibited from discussing.”

Porat raised so much money so quickly to create “heaven for engineers.”

“They were free to imagine and play and invent and write,” he said. “They were inventing one thing after another, after another, after another and for an engineer, what more can you ask for?”

The answer, it turned out: a little less freedom.

The General Magic documentary explains:

They stopped asking Bill to fill out the form

Friday, April 10th, 2026

I somehow missed Andy Hertzfeld’s –2,000 Lines Of Code back in the day:

In early 1982, the Lisa software team was trying to buckle down for the big push to ship the software within the next six months. Some of the managers decided that it would be a good idea to track the progress of each individual engineer in terms of the amount of code that they wrote from week to week. They devised a form that each engineer was required to submit every Friday, which included a field for the number of lines of code that were written that week.

Bill Atkinson, the author of Quickdraw and the main user interface designer, who was by far the most important Lisa implementer, thought that lines of code was a silly measure of software productivity. He thought his goal was to write as small and fast a program as possible, and that the lines of code metric only encouraged writing sloppy, bloated, broken code.

He recently was working on optimizing Quickdraw’s region calculation machinery, and had completely rewritten the region engine using a simpler, more general algorithm which, after some tweaking, made region operations almost six times faster. As a by-product, the rewrite also saved around 2,000 lines of code.

He was just putting the finishing touches on the optimization when it was time to fill out the management form for the first time. When he got to the lines of code part, he thought about it for a second, and then wrote in the number: -2000.

I’m not sure how the managers reacted to that, but I do know that after a couple more weeks, they stopped asking Bill to fill out the form, and he gladly complied.

(Hat tip to Gaikokumaniakku.)

People who understand complex systems also understand the importance of minimising that complexity wherever possible

Saturday, April 4th, 2026

Explaining tech debt is, the evidence would suggest, impossible:

Like many I’ve seen archaic systems where something that should take an hour might take a week. The trouble, as anyone who’s ever been in this situation can attest to, is that non-technical managers invariably fail to understand the problem.

Of course the standard claim at this point is that engineers are just bad at communicating. They simply need to re-express their ideas around refactoring etc. in terms of ‘value to the business’ or some such. But I’ve never seen this work. Instead I’ve seen the same thing over and over: people who understand complex systems also understand the importance of minimising that complexity wherever possible; people who have never understood a complex system in their life never ever grasp this and cannot be convinced.

Imagine you’re a dumb non-technical manager. You think coding is basically magic. Sometimes when you ask the engineers to add a feature (which is like casting a spell), they give some weird story about how they could cast the spell quickly, but it’s better to do so slowly to prevent their magic becoming impotent and making future spells take longer. This is obviously unconvincing; it sounds like something slackers would say. So why are we surprised when managers who think like this fail to grasp the importance of controlling tech debt?

The entire economy becomes centered around making decisions that are financially safe rather than those that can lead to major payoffs

Thursday, March 5th, 2026

Labor laws are a large part of the explanation as to why the US is so much wealthier than Europe:

Americans do much better than Europeans, but the US is not clearly economically freer in most areas. For example, Heritage’s 2025 index of economic freedom puts it behind eleven European countries. The US is ranked 27th in the world in overall economic freedom, but 3rd in labor freedom. Given the degree to which the US has surpassed other major nations, perhaps indexes like this are underweighting the importance of this one particular category. America is far from a capitalist paradise; particularly in housing and allowing people to build, we do a pretty poor job.

[…]

Imagine if the entire force of government policy was put toward enforcing a status quo bias in other contexts: government created every possible financial incentive to keep people in the same homes; made sure they continually drive the same cars or buy vehicles from the same companies; or put up an endless number of barriers in the way of them switching grocery stores or banks. Everyone would realize that such policies represent the height of economic illiteracy and would be bound to have all kinds of unintended consequences. Yet we treat labor as different, even though the underlying economic principles are exactly the same.

[…]

In Germany, they not only tell you if you can fire people, but you can’t even decide who to keep! Paying employees indefinitely to leave is the optimistic scenario when they are no longer needed. The worse outcome is that you’re forced to hold on to them indefinitely.

Basically, what this system amounts to is a welfare state, while placing the burden on those who create jobs in the first place. To make another analogy, imagine we wanted to provide healthcare for the poor. But instead of paying for it through general taxation, we said anyone who provides any amount of charity to someone living in poverty must be the one to pick up the tab for their health insurance. How would such a system make sense? And this isn’t simply a matter of finding ways to provide welfare, but something much more extreme, involving locking employers in relationships they can’t get out of. You’re also misallocating labor, since having workers in places where they’re not needed prevents them from making a contribution elsewhere.

[…]

European workers don’t simply go to waste. Rather, the entire economy becomes centered around making decisions that are financially safe rather than those that can lead to major payoffs. The unemployment rate doesn’t look so bad, but you still get society-wide stagnation.

Most managers optimize for being informed

Tuesday, March 3rd, 2026

Anish Moonka summarizes the key points of Elon Musk’s interview with Dwarkesh Patel and notes that Elon’s methodology is always asking, what is the limiting factor right now, and how do I remove it?

Chip output is growing exponentially. Electricity production outside China is flat. By the end of this year, Elon predicts AI chips will be piling up faster than anyone can turn them on. The companies that win are the ones that can plug their chips in, not the ones that buy the most.

[…]

Solar panels produce 5x more power in orbit because there is no atmosphere, no day/night cycle, no weather, and no clouds. And you need zero batteries. Combined, that is roughly 10x the economics of ground-based solar. Space solar cells are also cheaper to manufacture because they require no glass or heavy framing.

[…]

Within five years, Elon predicts SpaceX will launch hundreds of gigawatts of AI compute into orbit annually, exceeding the cumulative total on Earth. That is 10,000 Starship launches a year. One launch per hour. 20 to 30 reusable ships rotating on 30-hour cycles.

[…]

Only three casting companies in the world make the specialized vanes and blades for gas turbines. They are backlogged through 2030. Everything else in a power plant can be sourced in 12 to 18 months. But without those blades, you have no turbine and no electricity.

[…]

Digital human emulation means an AI that can do everything a human worker can do at a computer: read screens, click buttons, type, think, and decide. NVIDIA’s output is “FTPing files to Taiwan.” Apple sends files to China. Microsoft, Meta, and Google produce nothing physical. If you can perfectly emulate a human at a computer, you can replicate the output of every one of these companies. Customer service alone is a trillion-dollar market with zero integration barriers.

[…]

Elon argues that programming AI to be politically correct, meaning to say things it does not believe, creates contradictory axioms that could make it “go insane.”

When humans represent less than 1% of total intelligence, it would be “foolish to assume there’s any way to maintain control.” The best case is AI with values that find humanity more interesting alive than converted to raw materials. Elon compares the ideal future to Iain Banks’ Culture novels, where superintelligent AI coexists with humans because it finds them interesting.

[…]

Elon runs weekly (sometimes twice-weekly) engineering reviews with skip-level meetings where individual engineers present without advance prep. He mentally plots progress points across weeks to determine if a team is converging on a solution. Time is allocated not to what is going well, but to whatever the current bottleneck is. If something is working great, he stays away.

Most managers optimize for being informed. Elon optimizes for being useful at the point of highest leverage.

Last Call for Mass Market Paperbacks

Saturday, January 31st, 2026

Once Upon a Time in Hollywood by Quentin TarantinoPublishers Weekly’s Last Call for Mass Market Paperbacks didn’t surprise me terribly — until I saw the timeline:

The format credited with making books more accessible via low prices and widespread availability will all but vanish from the publishing scene in a few weeks.

The decision made this winter by ReaderLink to stop distributing mass market paperback books at the end of 2025 was the latest blow to a format that has seen its popularity decline for years. According to Circana BookScan, mass market unit sales plunged from 131 million in 2004 to 21 million in 2024, a drop of about 84%, and sales this year through October were about 15 million units. But for many years, the mass market paperback was “the most popular reading format,” notes Stuart Applebaum, former Penguin Random House EVP of corporate communications. Applebaum was also once a publicist at Bantam Books, one of the publishers credited with turning mass market paperbacks into what he calls “a well-respected format.”

[…]

According to Book Industry Study Group’s Book Industry Trends 1980, mass market paperback sales jumped from $656.5 million in 1975 to nearly $811 million in 1979, easily outselling hardcovers, which had sales of $676.5 million, and the new, upcoming format, trade paperback, which had sales of about $227 million. And with its much lower price points, mass market paperback unit sales easily dwarfed those of the other two formats, at 387 million in 1979, compared to 82 million for hardcover and about 59 million for trade paperback.

[…]

Jacqueline Susann’s megahit Valley of the Dolls sold 300,000 hardcovers in 1966, while the Bantam paperback sold four million in its first week on sale in 1967, and more than eight million in its first year, Margolis notes. One of the biggest mass market bestsellers of all time was the 1975 tie-in edition to the movie Jaws. According to Applebaum, the edition, whose cover art closely resembled the movie poster, sold 11 million copies in its first six months.

While hardcover reprints were a staple for mass market paperback publishers, some also released mass market originals. One author who thrived using that strategy was the western writer Louis L’Amour. Applebaum, who served as L’Amour’s publicist, says that Bantam has more than 150 million copies of his books in mass market print, and all but four of his more than 130 titles were paperback originals.

Mass market paperback was also the format of choice for publishing instant books. Bantam published its first instant book in 1964 when it released The Report of the Warren Commission in the format.

[…]

A 1988 article in PW pointed to the vibrancy of the format at that time. The year before, 112 mass market titles sold more than one million copies, led by Danielle Steel, whose Family Album, Wanderlust, and Secrets combined to sell almost 12 million copies. Trailing Steel on the PW mass market list for that year was Sidney Sheldon, with Windmill of the Gods and If Tomorrow Comes combining to sell 8.6 million copies. Other authors whose mass market paperbacks racked up more than one million copies in 1987 included such well-known writers as Stephen King and Judith Krantz.

Though mass market paperback sales were over $1 billion in 1996, there were warning signs that interest in the format was cooling. According to BISG, mass market sales fell 3.3% in 1996 compared to the previous year, to $1.35 billion, and unit sales dropped 6.2%.

[…]

According to the 2012 StatShot report (produced that year by AAP and BISG), mass market paperback sales were running neck and neck with e-book sales in 2011 at about $1.1 billion, but the two formats were on markedly different trajectories: from the prior year, mass market paperback sales tumbled by about $500 million and e-book sale soared by roughly $1 billion.