A picket is just a metaphorical fence

Sunday, October 29th, 2017

I just got the first volume of Shelby Foote’s Civil War, at Audible’s latest 2-for-1 sale, and it reminded me of a word that comes up all the time in Civil War writings — picket. When I first came across the Civil-War use of picket years ago, I was confused. They obviously didn’t mean a white picket fence. Did they mean a metaphorical fence? Or did the men carry stakes, like medieval archers, to build up anti-cavalry defenses?

Reading military history can be frustrating this way, because it’s almost always written for an audience that already knows quite a bit about the subject, rather than for curious boys. Anyway, it turns out a picket is just a metaphorical fence, with no stakes involved. It also turns out that the word was really, really popular during the Civil War, and not before:

Picket Use Over Time

Give him all the freedom that physics, engineering, and economics will allow

Sunday, October 29th, 2017

Techniques of Systems Analysis briefly considers unconventional tactics:

There are two parts to this, the enemy’s and your own. For the enemy, you are very interested in examining whether in plugging up one hole you have forced him to another hold which may be equally disastrous to you. That is, you have to examine the recommended system and ask, “What can the enemy do to circumvent it?” In doing this examination one must give him all the freedom that physics, engineering and economics will allow.

(We have deliberately left out social and political restraints. In the first pass at a problem one looks at capabilities and not intentions. While one may wish or need to modify his results to take account of such constraints on the enemy’s behavior, it is often very hard to do this in a reasonable fashion. Usually, trying to exploit such constraints mean dealing in Low Confidence measures. These of course can be useful. It is, however usually much more important to consider possible social and political restraints on one’s own behavior than on the enemy’s. Unless he explicitly and carefully considers such limitations, the analyst may find again that he is really dealing in Low Confidence measures even though from the viewpoint of technical capabilities it may look like a High Confidence measure.)

All too often one finds studies which are designed against a specific enemy tactic rather than against the enemy himself.

There are strong psychological reasons for this. As long as a system has obvious holes, there is no reason for the enemy or us to consider subtle tactics. However, by eliminating these holes one has, in effect, forced the enemy to try to be clever. Under these circumstances he may consider tactics which once seemed far-fetched and improbable. Unfortunately, one may have to overcome a great deal of mental inertia (one’s own as well as others) before one can take unaccustomed threats seriously, early enough to take effective action.

For our own side, as we mentioned before, the major objective of the Systems Analyst is not to analyze a given system but to design a system which will fulfill certain objectives satisfactorily. In doing this, he may also have to consider unorthodox or unconventional tactics in addition to recommending the development or procurement of new types of equipment.

It is desirable that this limiting be done intelligently and not arbitrarily

Saturday, October 28th, 2017

The toy problem presented in Techniques of Systems Analysis couldn’t carefully examine mixed forces:

One of the most serious and common errors is that of arbitrarily concentrating the study on only one kind of bomb, one kind of plane, one kind of airfield, etc. Actually, of course, very few large organizations ever use only one type of equipment for all of their purposes. There is always a tendency to use specialized equipment for specialized problems. For the military too, it turns out that only by using a large number of different types of equipment and tactics can one really have the flexibility to meet effectively the many different objectives and circumstances. It is also very important either to consider a large variety of measures simultaneously or not to try to make one single measure handle all cases. While it is almost always necessary to limit the parts of the study that receive detailed treatment, it is desirable that this limiting be done intelligently and not arbitrarily.

He must be aware of the need to make it adequate

Friday, October 27th, 2017

The toy problem presented in Techniques of Systems Analysis is obviously limited in terms of scale and detail:

We talked about 20 planes, 2 airfields, etc. Actually, for some questions, one must talk about thousands of planes and hundreds of airfields. One may have to put in all the relevant asymmetries that were discussed in the early portion of Part IV including, for example, details of different capabilities, different targets, geography, etc. This is so obvious that it probably does not pay to dwell on it here. Unfortunately, it is often also not dwelt on where it should be. That is, not only must one be aware of the possibility that his model is inadequate to answer the questions he is asking but he must be aware of the need to make it adequate and not just to make some face saving apologies.

It is always a mistake to procure something which is not developed

Thursday, October 26th, 2017

Techniques of Systems Analysis revisits some important topics in its concluding chapter:

Research? Development? Procurement? Operation?

The first question to ask is: what kind of recommendation is one trying to make; why are we doing the study? Occasionally a study is done solely for self-education. One simply wanted to know more about the subject. It is probably not right to think of such studies as Systems Analysis, though they can be very valuable. (In our lexicon Systems Analysis means System Design. People who are interested only in analysis will have to find their own word.) Usually though, a study should be sharply affected by whether the question being treated is associated with Research, Development, Procurement or Operation.

Popular and semi-popular opinions to the contrary, the ability to do basic or semi-basic research in this country is not (in an absolute sense) in short supply. In addition, if we compare the cost of most kinds of basic or semi-basic research to other costs of the total defense system, we see that on the whole it is extraordinarily cheap. Ordinarily one can legitimately recommend doing it on very flimsy evidence. That is, one shouldn’t have to show that the research being recommended is likely to be useful, but only that there is a chance that it may be useful. Generally this kind of research should have only the loosest sort of guidance, except for monitoring to see that the people involved are professionally competent and that there are no glaring holes in the overall program.

Development is somewhat more expensive. But once again, one should not have to justify a development program by proving that the item being developed should be procured. One simply tries to carry through, but in more detail, the kind of study that is done before recommending a basic research program. Here one might justify the program on the grounds that there are reasonable (in the case of expensive programs — not improbable) conditions under which this development could be useful. When the issue is crucial, we should only have to indicate that the nature of the problem is such that it is hard to show that the development won’t be useful. In particular, we should do a great deal of development simply to cut down lead time and provide insurance against uncertainty. One wants to be in a position so that if certain events (technical, political, or military) occur, we will be able either to guard against or exploit them. We should be willing to do this, even if the events are rather improbably, if they are important or if the cost of hedging is, relatively speaking, small. Much of the cost of development programs should be put down to giving this kind of flexibility.

To quote a remark made earlier, “It may or may not be a mistake to develop something which is not procured, but it is always a mistake to procure something which is not developed.”

Or referring again to the Time magazine article, it was only because the Navaho cruise missile was being pushed that we had the rocket engines for the ICBM. Actually, many people would have been willing to have a development program for big rocket engines which was not necessarily tied to any system at all. It just seemed very clear that large rocket engines are one of the commodities in which military systems of the future are likely to be interested.

In general, “state-of-the-art” development programs are good things. It turns out to be amazingly easy, ordinarily, to modify and we already developed components. A naive individual might think that if there were two independent programs which had not heard of each other and if at a later date one wanted to combine them into a single overall program, it might be impossible to do this. Sometimes it is, but more often it is not. The important thing is that if one insists on doing only complete system development programs, he will find himself having a much smaller number of marriages of convenience to arrange. Historically, exactly this type of amalgamation oftens turns out to be important. Even if on knows that he wants a complete system he should be cautious in freezing the component design too early. There are a lot of errors made in predicting performance of components and one often achieves his goal faster by first doing bread-board work to answer state-of-the-art questions than by trying to do final design immediately.

The procurement problem is, of course, quite different. Procurement is expensive but has the virtue of involving much shorter time scales. When on has come to the step of being ready to procure something, the environment and context are relatively firm. There may be a lot of uncertainty left, but hopefully both the alternatives and the contingencies are reasonably limited. One should then be able to make just about the kind of study we have indicated in the example. Presumably the analysis should probably be pretty numerical all the way through, i.e., contain practically no qualitative arguments and conjectures except those that involve the kinds of fundamental questions that we necessarily relegate to the sphere of policy and intuitive judgment.

An operational study, of course, is almost completely concerned with detail, but there one has the saving grace of being restricted to current or immediately procurable hardware. For this reason, even though the amount of detail has gone up enormously, the number of alternatives has been correspondingly decreased. However, it is a typical weakness of current operational studies that they do not consider enough alternatives.

The most important functions of Systems Analysis

Wednesday, October 25th, 2017

Even a relatively simple model of two forces attacking and counterattacking presents a large number of alternatives to be studied, Techniques of Systems Analysis notes:

Investigating each one of these and processing them is a major task. It is also a rather useless one because doing things in this way does not lend itself to performing the most important functions of Systems Analysis, such as taking account of uncertainty, doing contingency planning, considering the sensitivity to the model, and most important of all, training one’s own intuition so that one can do a good design job. If these were not enough, there is the final consideration that in anything but a toy problem, this systematic approach would be quite impossible as the number of alternatives is just prohibitive.

We prefer not to correct that kind of misbehavior after it happens

Tuesday, October 24th, 2017

Deterrence is more than just deterring a direct attack on ourselves, Techniques of Systems Analysis admits:

We are equally, or almost equally, interested in deterring the enemy from various kinds of provocative actions. For example, we don’t want him to attack Iran or Korea or to make ultimatums against our friends in NATO or, in general, to misbehave. We shall call this kind of deterrence a Type II Deterrence as opposed to the previous kind which we shall label a Type I Deterrence.

Type II Deterrence is important. It is after all true that both the first and second world wars were started by the Allies’ presenting the other side with ultimatums after the other side had put the Allies in an intolerable position. That is, in the first World War the British declared war on the Germans and not vice versa. Similarly, in the second World War the British and French declared war on the Germans after their invasion of Poland.

In the present very tight situation, we prefer not to correct that kind of misbehavior after it happens. We want to deter it from happening. To some extent this can be done by making the potential aggressor apprehensive that, if he pushes too far, we just might take a drastic action of some sort. For example, we might try to convince him that there is a least a small chance that we are will and able to declare war or that we are at least capable of putting ourselves into a position where we would be willing to declare war.

We can both afford to sit and think about it

Monday, October 23rd, 2017

Real deterrence comes from your ability to survive the enemy’s first strike and then strike back, Techniques of Systems Analysis reminds us:

Assume, for example, that you are trying to choose between two forces, one which we will call Force A, and the other Force B. A is such that if you strike first, you will be able to get 90% of the enemy, but if he strikes first, you will be able to get only 20% when you strike back. B is a different kind of force. It gets 40% of the enemy whether you or he strikes first. It is indifferent to how the war starts.

It is clear that if there is a tense situation and he is trying to decide whether or not to launch a surprise attack on you, then Force A will not deter him from launching such an attack. Quite the contrary, it will induce him to do it. He will argue that not only is there a tremendous payoff to him if he gets the first strike but that in fact he had better hurry up and get it. He feels that you must also realize the importance of going first, and if he does not move right away it may be too late. In fact, if the situation is as pictured, you could conceivably feel force to take action yourself.

In other words, the A type of force might be called an “invitational force.” The invitation is so strong that it practically commands you and the enemy to get in your blows early. Force A is a very unstable influence.

Force B, on the contrary, is a stabilizing force. The enemy looks at it and says, “I had better not start a war because if I do he will destroy 40% of me and that will hurt. Also, I get no advantage by moving first, because this thing will perform just as well regardless of who makes the first move. For the same reasons, he is in no hurry either, and we can both afford to sit and think about it.”

Let us now look at a third force, Force C, also on the chart. At first sight it seems to combine the best virtues of Forces A and B. It gets 90% if you go first, and 40% if he goes first. It is clear, however, that Force C is not as good a deterrent, at least in the sense in which we have been using the word, as Force B. Even though it does the same damage as Force B when the enemy strikes first, the enemy is still (relatively speaking) anxious to start the war. If he waits, you may start it and then he will really be badly off.

Therefore, if you are thinking only of deterring the enemy from a direct attack, you would probably prefer Force B to Force C. Furthermore, if you want to improve your offensive capability, it probably behooves you at the same time to improve your defensive ability, as illustrated by Force D. The extra strain on your deterrence is then matched by your extra strength.

Just better in the imponderables

Sunday, October 22nd, 2017

Techniques of Systems Analysis considers some of the potential asymmetries between the US and USSR:

Technological Skill
We can try to have better equipment than he has. On the whole, we think we are from one to five years ahead of the Russians. It is clear, however, that we cannot rely on this kind of superiority in all fields. Furthermore, we must really hop to keep ahead, if we are ahead. It cannot be done passively. However, where there is good evidence of a lead, it is probably a mistake not to exploit it. The thing works in reverse, too. We have to allow for it when there is a chance that he is ahead.

Military Skill
This is one of the things which, on the whole, Systems Analysts are forced to ignore, but on which police makers often (and sometimes correctly) place much reliance. For an example of how important it can be, consider the Germans and the French in World War II. It seems to be true that the French had more and better tanks than the Germans, about as many planes, and, given their fortification systems, seemingly at least as good an army. The Germans were just better in the imponderables. Probably nobody could have predicted the German break-through and the completeness of their victory, unless he had given the Germans a great deal of credit for being better militarily. Of necessity, the analyst who is working for a High Confidence system should refuse to rely on the enemy’s being incompetent militarily, unless there is very strong evidence to support such an assumption. Not only is it just too easy to indulge in wishful thinking but the Systems Analyst is looking to the future.

There is an important difference here between the current-policy maker and the planner. Conceivably the former, looking at the current situation, may wish to base his defense on the belief that the enemy is unskilled. The latter, making plans for systems with long lead times, simply cannot rely on the enemy remaining unskilled or stupid.

Allies
One of the important assets which we have is that, on the whole, the technically competent part of the non-Russian world is very closely associated with us. The Russian, of course, have the satellite nations on their side. Exactly what degree of dependence should be placed on allies is always a very touchy question. Presumably one tends not to rely on them for the High Confidence measures except in certain special cases; e.g., Canadian defense lines. One should, however, design his system to get advantages from their existence and conversely to contribute to their objectives.

Geography
One of the major asymmetries between us and the Russians is geography. The Russians have many millions of square miles more land than we have. This gives them certain advantages of depth. Against this must be balanced the fact that we have reasonable control of the sea, militarily valuable allies, overseas bases, distant early warning lines, etc.

Resources
We have a very much larger gross national product than the Russians, but they have a greater willingness to make the sacrifices necessary to keep a modern military mechanism in existence. They have not hesitated at any time to make huge expenditures when they felt it desirable. While we also have made large expenditures we seem to be much less willing to allocate money or manpower to military purposes. We are also much more swayed by the pressure of outside events. For example, in the postwar period our military budgets have been as low as 13 billion a year and as high as 50 billion. Most of the fluctuation came as a reaction to Russian moves.

Intelligence
It is plainly easier for the Russians to get good intelligence about us than for us about them. This is probably true in all phases of intelligence activity. However, from the view point of the High Confidence systems, it might easily be true that even the Russians could not rely on keeping things secure from us.

They might not, for example, go to large expenses to move their air bases around continually because the money would be wasted if they had only one properly placed defector.

We promised to stick to a definite model

Saturday, October 21st, 2017

Techniques of Systems Analysis looks at how its toy-model defense system will perform if the enemy happens to develop tactics outside its 1950s-era model — for example, an air-ground missile:

At this point the reader may cry foul. He probably feels that we have no right to introduce an extraneous tactic. After all, we promised to stick to a definite model. We did, but we want to show that it may be disastrous when the enemy doesn’t.

The air-ground missile is such that it can be launched from a point beyond our local defenses. The effect of this is that our local defenses no longer play a role. This can be serious. It means, in fact, that the money spent for local defenses has been thrown away. However, this new tactic is not entirely free to the enemy because his CEP (aiming error) goes up when he uses it.

Protecting the Soft Spot

The last question is what should we do? Well, a lot depends on the pattern of information that we think exists. Let us assume that the enemy knows everything that we are doing. In this case, he is practically certain to choose what is best for him. Our alternative must be to design a defense system which is indifferent between the two attacks so that we don’t care which he uses. This is the old problem of dividing a cake.

Supercavitating ammunition won’t skip

Friday, October 20th, 2017

DSG Technology has a new line of supercavitating ammunition, Cav-X, which won’t skip off the surface when shot into water — and which will penetrate another 60 meters, in the case of its .50-caliber round:

Make the decision problem less agonizing

Friday, October 20th, 2017

Chart 53 of Techniques of Systems Analysis shows how not to do contingency planning:

It does, we admit look at three different contingencies, a small, medium, and large attack. It shows how best to allocate the defense budget if any of these attacks occurs and what the performance will be with any allocation and its corresponding attack. The first time we saw a chart like this, it was called contingency planning, but this is definitely a misnomer.

Non-Contingency Planning

The reason is shown on Chart 54, which give the contingency analysis of the planning of Chart 53. It shows, for example, that, if one plans for a heavy attack and a small one actually materializes, he could have done 35% better if he had planned correctly. Similarly, if one plans for the small attack and the large one materializes, he could have done 67% better.

Contingency Analysis

While looking at a chart like this is a step in the right direction, it is not enough. It is very common in discussion of Systems Analysis to have people come up with such a chart and then ask, “What do you do? How do you choose between these systems?” This attitude is more than a little wrong.

It implies that one has a rather small range of choices and that the big job is somehow to decide among these choices. This is essentially impossible to do satisfactorily in this extreme case because people have different estimates of what the circumstances are likely to be. The main job of a good Systems Analyst is to design a system that will be satisfactory in all reasonable contingencies. He should spend most of his time trying to make the decision problem less agonizing rather than on the decision problem itself. In fact, it is fair to say that a good way to measure success in designing a system is on how unagonizing one has made this choice problem.

The single most effective gimmick in doing Contingency Planning

Thursday, October 19th, 2017

The single most effective gimmick in doing Contingency Planning, according to Techniques of Systems Analysis, is to consider a range of enemy attacks:

For example, the degradation of our performance looks analytically like a larger enemy attack. Similarly, the variation of the enemy’s performance looks like a variable enemy attack and, lastly, enemy good luck can be simulated by giving him extra forces, bad luck by making his forces weaker.

Even quite competent engineers can be very unreliable

Tuesday, October 17th, 2017

While discussing how development programs can go awry, Techniques of Systems Analysis paraphrases the cover story from Time magazine’s January 30, 1956 issue:

The ICBM program suffered from a lack of support because the guidance problems were so severe that the rest of the program was not pushed. The unexpected development of the H-bomb suddenly made even very inaccurate ICBM’s useful. We were unfortunately at that time in no position to benefit immediately from this development. We would have been in an even worse position but, luckily, an entirely different program — the rocket booster for the Navaho cruise type missile — had been pushed so far that we could use it as a basis for the ICBM engine.

Time Magazine 1956-01-30 The Missile

Techniques of Systems Analysis continues:

It is also important to realize that even quite competent engineers and technical people can be very unreliable when it comes to estimating either the short or long range performance of systems undergoing Research and Development. This seems to be particularly true in the fields of electronics, aeronautics, and nuclear engineering. In the past 20 years there has been an exponential increase in the state of the art of all of those fields. Both as a cause and an effect of this exponential increase, these same fields play a central role in current military technology. For this reason military technology is much more unstable than most civilian technology and as a result the two very common mistakes mentioned occur. (Even first rate engineers will overestimate their ability to apply the new ideas in the immediate future and at the same time underestimate the rate at which long term development is proceeding.) To give a recent unclassified example form the electronics industry, let us consider the high-speed computer.

In 1945, 1946, and 1947, a large number of very competent engineers were going around promising to have wonderful electronic computers available in a year or two. In spite of these promises, by 1949, only computers of very modest attainments (as compared to the promises) had been built an the slippage of the more ambitious machines had become a joke. For example some of the engineers were saying “We are really very reliable. No matter when you ask us we will always reply that the computer will be ready in 18 months.” However, by 1950, a number of these better machines had achieved semi-reliable operation and, by 1951, they were almost all working well. Today, only 5 years later, there are machines on the shelf whose performance exceeds even the wilder and most futuristic extrapolations made in 1946. Furthermore, computers which will soon be available are an order of magnitude better than the current ones.

Successful games yield “a-ha moments”

Monday, October 16th, 2017

A national security game designer at RAND describes how games can help America take advantage of different potential futures:

[A] recent RAND project designed a game-theoretic model of conflict in space to identify conditions that support deterrence. The research team developed an initial model of possible decisions an actor could make to escalate or de-escalate a budding conflict in space, but given the costs of building and running a program that could examine thousands of cases, they wanted to make sure that the model accurately reflected human behavior before they began programing. The team designed a short manual game where subject-matter experts were asked to manage a conflict that could easily escalate into war in space. We watched the players to see if they would behave the same way as the model predicted. For example, we hypothesized that players would be more aggressive when they felt themselves at a disadvantage. Over and over players acted out of a concern that they needed to “appear strong” — escalating the conflict exactly as the model predicted.

[...]

Game designers and participants in successful games often describe an “a-ha moment” — an unexpected game event or a statement made in the game that offered new insight on a familiar problem. For example, in the space game, participants took actions not for their operational effect, but rather to signal intentions. While the game designers had not previously included signaling actions in the design of the model, as soon as we heard it we knew it must be included. Similarly, in the RAND Baltic Games, players realized again and again that the short distance between the Russian border and Baltic capitals required forces to be prepositioned in order the have a fighting chance.