Victory tended to go to the side that could better execute modern tactics

Monday, November 16th, 2026

Between 1942 and 1944, the world witnessed two simultaneous tactical transformations:

In the Pacific, American carrier groups underwent a dramatic shift. The number of AA guns on flattops and escort vessels more than doubled, while the introduction of proximity fuses and improved fire control made them much more deadly. Air wings were rebalanced to give them an outright majority of fighters, at the expense of dive bombers and torpedo planes, while improved radar direction increased their effectiveness in intercepting enemy attacks.

This shift in favor of the defense completely transformed carrier battles. Instead of resembling “two blindfolded men with knives in a ring”—meaning the first to strike was likely to knock out the enemy’s carriers—American task groups could afford to stand their ground and slug it out with incoming Japanese aircraft. This was just as true against their surface vessels as against land targets: whereas the Pacific Fleet was loath to remain offshore for very long during the tough fighting on Guadalcanal and Tarawa in 1942-43, they pummeled the Marianas and Philippines for extended periods in 1944.

Half a world away in the European theater, other military establishments were undertaking serious efforts to bolster their principal striking arms. During the first three years of fighting, German Panzers often found themselves alone once they penetrated fragile defensive lines, racing ahead of their supporting infantry and artillery. Following their early victories in Poland, France, Russia, and Ukraine, however, they began to struggle as the Soviets got better at implementing their prewar doctrine of defensive depth.

The only answer was to restore the combined-arms balance at the point of the spear. The number of tanks in a Panzer division was slightly reduced, while a greater proportion of their infantry was mounted in half-tracks and they were given additional self-propelled artillery that could keep up with the armor (along with flak guns to serve in both an anti-air and anti-tank role). This made it possible to endure fierce counterattacks when set upon far from friendly lines.

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Well-integrated mobile formations, supported by airpower, would dominate land warfare for the remainder of the 20th century. Although the precise balance changed over the following decades in many particulars, this basic template proved to be a remarkably stable equilibrium: accounting for correlation of forces, victory tended to go to the side that could better execute modern tactics, not necessarily the side that was on the bleeding edge of innovation.

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