Influence by Adroit Adulation

Wednesday, March 3rd, 2010

If a young man wishes to become politically powerful, Socrates argues, his best plan is to resemble the despot or democracy as much as possible, in order to acquire influence by adroit adulation — but giving the people what they want is not giving them what’s best for them:

If Pericles had been the good statesman his admirers called him, he must of necessity have made the Athenians better men than they were when he first began to govern them. But Socrates contends that the result proved that he failed in this first requisite of a good statesman, inasmuch as he left them more unjust and more ferocious than he received them. “A superintendent of asses,” says Socrates, ” or of horses or oxen, would be thought a very bad one, if the animals did not kick, and start, and bite when they were intrusted to him, but did all this when they quitted his charge.”

And he says such politicians bear the same relation to good statesmen as authors of cookery-books and tavern-keepers to good gymnasts or superintendents of the body. As cooks and tavern-keepers cram the body and bring on repletion and disease, and are nevertheless eulogized by the ignorant, in like manner, says Socrates, are eulogized “the men who, having feasted the Athenians and crammed them with what they desire, are said to have made them a great nation: because it is not perceived that the commonwealth is swollen and hollow, through those men of antiquity; for, without making us just or temperate, they have crammed us with ports, and docks, and fortifications, and revenues, and such trumpery.”

Socrates predicts his own fate:

“I shall be judged,” he says, “as a physician would, if tried before children on the accusation of a cook, who would say, ‘See what evils this man has inflicted upon you, cutting, and burning, and emaciating you, giving you bitter draughts, and forcing you to fast! not like me, who have feasted you with everything that is delightful.’ What could the physician say to all this? If he said the truth, ‘I did all these things for your health,’ would not such judges hoot him down?

I well know that I myself should be treated in a similar manner, if I were brought before a court of justice. For I shall not be able to remind the judges of any pleasures that I have procured for them, which are what they understand by benefits. And if any one should say that I corrupt the youth by unsettling their minds, or libel the older men by bitter speeches, either in private or in public, I shall neither be able to say the truth, namely, ‘I say and do all these things justly, and therefore for your good;’ nor shall I have any other defence; so that I must be content to undergo my fate.”

How Can Syria Get Away With Murder?

Wednesday, March 3rd, 2010

Lee Harris reviews Barry Rubin’s The Truth About Syria, which explains how Syria gets away with murder:

Rubin’s fascinating and often mordant book aims to overcome the cognitive asymmetry between West and anti-West by presenting an objective analysis of the very different rules by which our geopolitical opponents are operating, and to make it clear to the Western reader why they have different rules from us. It is not because they are ignorant of our rules, and need only to be enlightened about them. They are perfectly aware how our rules work, as Rubin insists. Indeed, it is through their intimate familiarity with our rules that they have been able repeatedly to predict how we will react to their moves — an ability that has allowed them to outwit and outfox us over and over again.

Such a situation might be dubbed cognitively asymmetrical, on the analogy of asymmetrical warfare. [...] This advantage will be especially great if the master player has the virtue that the Arabs call sumud — steadfastness: the patience to wait as long as it takes to wear down his opponent until he is ready to abandon the game. Sumud yields policymaking in terms of generations and even centuries, whereas Western foreign policy, like Western culture in general, is always looking for a quick fix. We want to make a deal now, and we will settle for less; they want exactly what they want, and they are willing to wait the time it takes to get it, which turns out to be exactly the amount of time it takes for their opponents to throw up their hands in despair.

Taken together, sumud and the cognitive asymmetry between Syria and the West explain one of the central paradoxes of Rubin’s book: How can an economically stagnant and militarily weak nation like Syria get away with murder, both figuratively and literally?

In February 2005, Syria masterminded the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, former Prime Minister of neighboring Lebanon — not just the murder of a single individual, but, in effect, an attack on a sovereign nation. In 2006, Syria provided rockets and other arms to Hezbollah to aid it in its war with Israel. After the American and allied invasion of Iraq in 2003, Rubin writes that “from the U.S. standpoint, Syria took the enemy side by smuggling military equipment into Iraq (including night-vision goggles) and letting wanted Iraqi officials, millions of dollars of Saddam’s money, and possibly some equipment for the production of weapons of mass destruction cross the border into safe haven in Syria. In addition, after the defeat of the Saddam regime, an insurgency began that depended largely on Syria as a rear area. Pro-Saddam officials there used smuggled money to finance and direct a war against coalition forces as well as the Shia-Kurdish majority. Terrorists from abroad or Syrians themselves were trained, armed, and dispatched into Iraq.”

How did America respond to Syria’s sponsorship of terrorists who killed hundreds of American soldiers and thousand of Iraqis? In 2003, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell was sent to confront Syrian President Bashar Assad. Assad had already lied to Powell once, in 2001, telling him that Syria had cut off the Iraqi oil pipeline. Powell later saw that he had been hoodwinked. On the airplane taking him to his 2003 visit, the secretary of state “insisted… that he… would not be fooled again. Shortly after he landed, however, Bashar again sold him the same old swampland by falsely telling Powell that the terrorist offices in Damascus had already been closed down, good news that the secretary of state announced to the American reporters accompanying him. Unfortunately, it quickly became apparent, in the most humiliating way for Powell, that he had been taken in once more. Reporters simply telephoned the offices of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and found that they were still open for business as usual.” In short, as Rubin trenchantly puts it, “Syria was making a fool out of the U.S. government and the Bush administration was helping it to do so.”

Rubin offers another striking example of this cognitive asymmetry. In September 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker made a trip to Syria to visit its president (and Bashar’s father), Hafiz al-Assad. Baker had prepared his case well. He presented detailed evidence that Syria had been sponsoring quite an impressive list of terrorist activities by means of surrogate agencies. Syria had denied all involvement with terrorism, and Baker was, in effect, calling Hafiz’ bluff. By Baker’s own standards it was a tough act, like that of a criminal investigator who spreads out on a table the hard and irrefutable evidence he has gathered against a suspect, and says: Deny that! Yet his confrontation with Assad had no effect. Or, rather, it had an effect, but one that Baker did not see coming. After the meeting, Rubin writes, “Hafiz did take action: He had the three Jordanian agents who supplied the information tracked down and killed.” The upshot was that “Syria kept on fomenting terrorism; and the United States did very little in retaliation.” Baker had thought he and Hafiz Assad were playing by the same rule book. They weren’t. But Hafiz had the immense advantage of knowing this, which Baker did not.

“But it gets even better,” Rubin says. “Precisely sixteen years later, after his betrayal by Hafiz, the White House asked Baker to recommend what policy the United States should take on Iraq and the Middle East in general. In explaining why he favored dialogue with Syria, Baker recalled the ‘success’ of his 1990 talks with Hafiz in supposedly getting Syria to stop sponsoring terrorism, ignoring the fact that it had continued to do so during that entire period.” In short, the recommendations to engage Syria offered by the Iraq Study Group were not made by men who lacked experience with Syria; they were made by men who simply had not learned from the experience they had. Their inability to acknowledge the rules by which Syria plays has led them repeatedly to believe that Syria is playing by their rules. Unable to put themselves into the position of the Syrian regime, they fail to see the logic and cogency of its behavior — behavior that in Western eyes so often seems infantile, counterproductive, or just plain irrational.

Why Alternative Power Is and Will Remain Useless

Tuesday, March 2nd, 2010

There’s no alternative energy source that can replace the old, faithful, coal-fired electric plant built with 1930s-era technology, Shannon Love reminds us, which is why alternative power is and will remain useless:

An obsolete coal plant using 80-year-old technology can provide power where and when you need it. It can be positioned almost anywhere from the equator to the tundra. (It will even work aboard ships.) It can be positioned immediately adjacent to the point of consumption. It works around the clock and in all types of weather. It can easily store weeks or months of coal reserves in a big pile outside. 99% of its offline time is scheduled and it is trivial to build in redundancy to compensate for both scheduled and unscheduled offline time. For the last 80 years, this type of technology has chugged out the electricity all over the world without pause.

“Alternative” energy sources have none of these attributes. They can only be built in specific locations, and those locations are wholly unrelated to the points of consumption. They can only operate under specific weather/environmental conditions, so they cannot fulfill the when of the point of consumption need.

They operate on nature’s schedule not ours. If we could easily operate on mother nature’s schedule, we wouldn’t need the energy in the first place, because we primarily use the energy to alter natural environmental conditions to keep ourselves alive.

“Alternative” energy is really Weather-Dependent Energy and it has all of the hazards posed by being exposed to the vagaries of weather. Wind turbines only generate power in certain locations, within certain wind speed ranges and only when the wind blows in the specified speed range. Solar panels only generates significant power in certain locations, in certain latitudes, in certain environmental conditions (deserts mostly). It only generates significant power in the daytime, only during certain hours in the day, and random weather conditions like thunderstorms, ice storms or sandstorms can knock it offline completely. (Even hydroelectric power is weather dependent and can be seriously crippled by drought or flood.)

To even begin to replace the 80-year-old coal plant with weather dependent technology, you have to invest resources on a massive scale.

If he had simply argued that alternative energy is useless — or even that it is and will remain useless until we have better transmission and storage — I’d have largely agreed, but I felt he went too far. New technologies can improve exponentially, and their early glacial pace of improvement “suddenly” turns into another Moore’s Law.

And, more importantly, an alternative energy source does not have to replace a coal plant to be useful:

We currently rely on a portfolio of energy sources, not just coal plants, and something like cheap solar power could clearly play a role, even without cheap storage to make it reliable around the clock, because we really, really need electricity on hot sunny days, and spending over $1,000 per additional kilowatt of coal-plant capacity isn’t necessarily justified.

A solar-thermal plant in Arizona or Southern California could presumably provide power during peak demand. (California ISO reports peak loads from 1998 through 2009 in the 41–50 gigawatt range, from occurring from 2:30 to 4:52 PM, from late June to early September.) Even a photovoltaic system with enough distributed nodes and a wee bit of storage could conceivably provide reliable enough power during peak demand.

We’re definitely not there yet, but such a system could make economic sense, even with a price-per-kWh way higher than coal, as long as its price-per-kWp came in just under a coal plant’s.

Or, alternatively, if photovoltaic power gets cheap — really cheap — the cost of capital (per kWh) for a solar site might drop below the cost of coal (per kWh), in which case we would want to use solar whenever possible, with coal and natural gas filling in the gaps.

We’re definitely not there, but such a future is hardly inconceivable.

Anyway, I made the mistake of poking the beehive, and I got denounced as just another left-wing nutjob — which reminds us of the nature of the Net.

The Book of Journeymen

Tuesday, March 2nd, 2010

There is little one can do to review Albert Jay Nock’s The Book of Journeymen, Foseti says, except to quote his wonderfully quotable work:

The Russians are the best off of almost any people in the world in one respect, which is that their laws are not made for them by lawyers. Hence they have very few laws, and those few are easily intelligible. I was reading the translation of one the other day, and remarked its simplicity and ease. One could not read any clause of it without knowing not only what it meant, but the only thing it could mean….

Russia has a healthy tradition towards lawyers, dating from Peter the Great. On a visit to England, he was dumfounded at seeing so many of them about, and said, “Why, there are only two lawyers in my whole kingdom, and I intend to hang one of them the minute I get back.” A proportionate mortality among American lawyers — whether brought about in the same way or not — would be a great benefit to the country; and this mortality should include all lawyers — legislators and lawyer-judges. Then the idea of justice might begin to pervade our courts.

It is quite an education in Americanism to follow our court-reports a while, and notice how seldom any one goes to a court for justice. I think I never heard of one who sought a court save for gain or revenge; and obviously, justice is the last thing considered under our legal system.

What Operational Research Is Not

Tuesday, March 2nd, 2010

For many years, Operational Research, as the Brits call it, had no formal definition:

At a conference held in Dundee under the auspices of the British Association in 1947, the innovator of radar, Sir Robert Watson-Watt, stated that although he had been directly involved in the inauguration of operational research in the period to 1940, he had no recollection of any generally accepted definition emerging then or subsequently. The exception was his own ‘negative thesis,’ maintained with ‘damned iteration,’ that ‘Operational Research is not doing arithmetic for Air Staff.’

Chaotic Enough to Be Interesting

Tuesday, March 2nd, 2010

Movies are much pinker today than in the past — not in tint, but in the way the cuts resemble pink noise:

According to the new report, the basic shot structure of the movies, the way film segments of different lengths are bundled together from scene to scene, act to act, has evolved over the years to resemble a rough but recognizably wave-like pattern called 1/f, or one over frequency — or the more Hollywood-friendly metaphor, pink noise. Pink noise is a characteristic signal profile seated somewhere between random and rigid, and for utterly mysterious reasons, our world is ablush with it. Start with a picture of Penélope Cruz, say, or a flamingo on a lawn, and decompose the picture into a collection of sine waves of various humps, dives and frequencies. However distinctive the original images, if you look at the distribution of their underlying frequencies, said Jeremy M. Wolfe, a vision researcher at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, “they turn out to have a one over f characteristic to them.”

So, too, for many features of our natural and artifactual surroundings. Track the pulsings of a quasar, the beatings of a heart, the flow of the tides, the bunchings and thinnings of traffic, or the gyrations of the stock market, and the data points will graph out as pink noise. Much recent evidence from reaction-time experiments suggests that we think, focus and refocus our minds, all at the speed of pink. If you’re sitting at a task, Dr. Cutting said, “sometimes you’re good at it, sometimes your mind wanders, sometimes you’re fast, sometimes you’re slow, and the oscillating patterns that occur are generally one over f.”

White noise is uncorrelated data — like static. Brown noise is a random walk — each step is based on the one before. Pink noise is correlated enough to create a pattern, but chaotic enough to be interesting — like your heart rate.

Economics and Evolutionary Psychology

Tuesday, March 2nd, 2010

Every time I read a popular account of how economics assumes an unrealistic, perfectly rational Homo economicus, my little simian brain makes me want to reach out and… explain economics and evolutionary psychology to the writer:

Economics is built on a simple assumption — that individual behavior can best be predicted by assuming that each individual will take the actions that best achieve his objectives. The justification for that assumption, somewhat misleadingly labeled “rationality,” is that we have no good theory of mistakes, no way of predicting what particular irrational action an individual will take. That leaves the rational element as the best — although imperfect — way of predicting behavior.

Evolutionary psychology offers, among other things, a theory of mistakes — an alternative to the rationality assumption.

That’s David Friedman, by the way. (Hat tip to Peter Taylor.)

Sycophancy

Tuesday, March 2nd, 2010

In modern English, sycophancy primarily refers to obsequious flattery, but in Cleon‘s time it meant something quite different:

The death of Pericles from the plague in 429 BC left the field clear for new leadership in Athens. Hitherto Cleon had only been a vigorous opposition speaker, a trenchant critic and accuser of state officials, but he now came forward as the professed champion and leader of the democracy and, as a result, dominated Athenian politics. Although rough and unpolished, he was charismatic, being gifted with natural eloquence and a powerful voice, and he knew how to work upon the emotions of the Athenian populace. He strengthened his support amongst the poorer citizens of Athens by increasing the pay of the jurymen, which provided many of the poorer Athenians with a means of livelihood.

The fondness of the Athenians for litigation increased his power; and the practice of “sycophancy” (raking up material for false charges), enabled him to remove those who were likely to endanger his ascendancy.

Betting on the Blind Side

Tuesday, March 2nd, 2010

Michael Lewis tells the tale of hedge-fund manager Michael Burry:

On May 19, 2005, Mike Burry did his first subprime-mortgage deals. He bought $60 million of credit-default swaps from Deutsche Bank — $10 million each on six different bonds. “The reference securities,” these were called. You didn’t buy insurance on the entire subprime-mortgage-bond market but on a particular bond, and Burry had devoted himself to finding exactly the right ones to bet against. He likely became the only investor to do the sort of old-fashioned bank credit analysis on the home loans that should have been done before they were made.

He was the opposite of an old-fashioned banker, however. He was looking not for the best loans to make but the worst loans — so that he could bet against them. He analyzed the relative importance of the loan-to-value ratios of the home loans, of second liens on the homes, of the location of the homes, of the absence of loan documentation and proof of income of the borrower, and a dozen or so other factors to determine the likelihood that a home loan made in America circa 2005 would go bad. Then he went looking for the bonds backed by the worst of the loans.

It surprised him that Deutsche Bank didn’t seem to care which bonds he picked to bet against. From their point of view, so far as he could tell, all subprime-mortgage bonds were the same. The price of insurance was driven not by any independent analysis but by the ratings placed on the bond by Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s. If he wanted to buy insurance on the supposedly riskless triple-A-rated tranche, he might pay 20 basis points (0.20 percent); on the riskier, A-rated tranches, he might pay 50 basis points (0.50 percent); and on the even less safe, triple-B-rated tranches, 200 basis points — that is, 2 percent. (A basis point is one-hundredth of one percentage point.) The triple-B-rated tranches — the ones that would be worth zero if the underlying mortgage pool experienced a loss of just 7 percent — were what he was after. He felt this to be a very conservative bet, which he was able, through analysis, to turn into even more of a sure thing. Anyone who even glanced at the prospectuses could see that there were many critical differences between one triple-B bond and the next — the percentage of interest-only loans contained in their underlying pool of mortgages, for example. He set out to cherry-pick the absolute worst ones and was a bit worried that the investment banks would catch on to just how much he knew about specific mortgage bonds, and adjust their prices.

Once again they shocked and delighted him: Goldman Sachs e-mailed him a great long list of crappy mortgage bonds to choose from. “This was shocking to me, actually,” he says. “They were all priced according to the lowest rating from one of the big-three ratings agencies.” He could pick from the list without alerting them to the depth of his knowledge. It was as if you could buy flood insurance on the house in the valley for the same price as flood insurance on the house on the mountaintop.

The market made no sense, but that didn’t stop other Wall Street firms from jumping into it, in part because Mike Burry was pestering them. For weeks he hounded Bank of America until they agreed to sell him $5 million in credit-default swaps. Twenty minutes after they sent their e-mail confirming the trade, they received another back from Burry: “So can we do another?” In a few weeks Mike Burry bought several hundred million dollars in credit-default swaps from half a dozen banks, in chunks of $5 million. None of the sellers appeared to care very much which bonds they were insuring. He found one mortgage pool that was 100 percent floating-rate negative-amortizing mortgages — where the borrowers could choose the option of not paying any interest at all and simply accumulate a bigger and bigger debt until, presumably, they defaulted on it. Goldman Sachs not only sold him insurance on the pool but sent him a little note congratulating him on being the first person, on Wall Street or off, ever to buy insurance on that particular item. “I’m educating the experts here,” Burry crowed in an e-mail.

He wasn’t wasting a lot of time worrying about why these supposedly shrewd investment bankers were willing to sell him insurance so cheaply. He was worried that others would catch on and the opportunity would vanish. “I would play dumb quite a bit,” he said, “making it seem to them like I don’t really know what I’m doing. ‘How do you do this again?’ ‘Oh, where can I find that information?’ or ‘Really?’ — when they tell me something really obvious.” It was one of the fringe benefits of living for so many years essentially alienated from the world around him: he could easily believe that he was right and the world was wrong.

The more Wall Street firms jumped into the new business, the easier it became for him to place his bets. For the first few months, he was able to short, at most, $10 million at a time. Then, in late June 2005, he had a call from someone at Goldman Sachs asking him if he’d like to increase his trade size to $100 million a pop. “What needs to be remembered here,” he wrote the next day, after he’d done it, “is that this is $100 million. That’s an insane amount of money. And it just gets thrown around like it’s three digits instead of nine.”

By the end of July he owned credit-default swaps on $750 million in subprime-mortgage bonds and was privately bragging about it. “I believe no other hedge fund on the planet has this sort of investment, nowhere near to this degree, relative to the size of the portfolio,” he wrote to one of his investors, who had caught wind that his hedge-fund manager had some newfangled strategy. Now he couldn’t help but wonder who exactly was on the other side of his trades — what madman would be selling him so much insurance on bonds he had handpicked to explode? The credit-default swap was a zero-sum game. If Mike Burry made $100 million when the subprime-mortgage bonds he had handpicked defaulted, someone else must have lost $100 million. Goldman Sachs made it clear that the ultimate seller wasn’t Goldman Sachs. Goldman Sachs was simply standing between insurance buyer and insurance seller and taking a cut.

The willingness of whoever this person was to sell him such vast amounts of cheap insurance gave Mike Burry another idea: to start a fund that did nothing but buy insurance on subprime-mortgage bonds. In a $600 million fund that was meant to be picking stocks, his bet was already gargantuan, but if he could raise the money explicitly for this new purpose, he could do many billions more. In August he wrote a proposal for a fund he called Milton’s Opus and sent it out to his investors. (“The first question was always ‘What’s Milton’s Opus?’” He’d say, “Paradise Lost,” but that usually just raised another question.) Most of them still had no idea that their champion stock picker had become so diverted by these esoteric insurance contracts called credit-default swaps. Many wanted nothing to do with it; a few wondered if this meant that he was already doing this sort of thing with their money.

Instead of raising more money to buy credit-default swaps on subprime-mortgage bonds, he wound up making it more difficult to keep the ones he already owned. His investors were happy to let him pick stocks on their behalf, but they almost universally doubted his ability to foresee big macro-economic trends. And they certainly didn’t see why he should have any special insight into the multi-trillion-dollar subprime-mortgage-bond market. Milton’s Opus died a quick death.

In October 2005, in his letter to investors, Burry finally came completely clean and let them know that they owned at least a billion dollars in credit-default swaps on subprime-mortgage bonds. “Sometimes markets err big time,” he wrote. “Markets erred when they gave America Online the currency to buy Time Warner. They erred when they bet against George Soros and for the British pound. And they are erring right now by continuing to float along as if the most significant credit bubble history has ever seen does not exist. Opportunities are rare, and large opportunities on which one can put nearly unlimited capital to work at tremendous potential returns are even more rare. Selectively shorting the most problematic mortgage-backed securities in history today amounts to just such an opportunity.”

Fantasy Ideology

Tuesday, March 2nd, 2010

Clausewitz famously declared that war was simply a continuation of politics carried out by other means — but many people pursue a fantasy ideology, Lee Harris reminds us, rather than rational policy goals:

My first encounter with this particular kind of fantasy occurred when I was in college in the late sixties. A friend of mine and I got into a heated argument. Although we were both opposed to the Vietnam War, we discovered that we differed considerably on what counted as permissible forms of anti-war protest. To me the point of such protest was simple — to turn people against the war. Hence anything that was counterproductive to this purpose was politically irresponsible and should be severely censured. My friend thought otherwise; in fact, he was planning to join what by all accounts was to be a massively disruptive demonstration in Washington, and which in fact became one.

My friend did not disagree with me as to the likely counterproductive effects of such a demonstration. Instead, he argued that this simply did not matter. His answer was that even if it was counterproductive, even if it turned people against war protesters, indeed even if it made them more likely to support the continuation of the war, he would still participate in the demonstration and he would do so for one simple reason — because it was, in his words, good for his soul.

What I saw as a political act was not, for my friend, any such thing. It was not aimed at altering the minds of other people or persuading them to act differently. Its whole point was what it did for him.

And what it did for him was to provide him with a fantasy — a fantasy, namely, of taking part in the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed against their oppressors. By participating in a violent anti-war demonstration, he was in no sense aiming at coercing conformity with his view — for that would still have been a political objective. Instead, he took his part in order to confirm his ideological fantasy of marching on the right side of history, of feeling himself among the elect few who stood with the angels of historical inevitability. Thus, when he lay down in front of hapless commuters on the bridges over the Potomac, he had no interest in changing the minds of these commuters, no concern over whether they became angry at the protesters or not. They were there merely as props, as so many supernumeraries in his private psychodrama. The protest for him was not politics, but theater; and the significance of his role lay not in the political ends his actions might achieve, but rather in their symbolic value as ritual. In short, he was acting out a fantasy.

It was not your garden-variety fantasy of life as a sexual athlete or a racecar driver, but in it, he nonetheless made himself out as a hero — a hero of the revolutionary struggle. The components of his fantasy — and that of many young intellectuals at that time — were compounded purely of ideological ingredients, smatterings of Marx and Mao, a little Fanon and perhaps a dash of Herbert Marcuse.

For want of a better term, call the phenomenon in question a fantasy ideology — by which I mean, political and ideological symbols and tropes used not for political purposes, but entirely for the benefit of furthering a specific personal or collective fantasy. It is, to be frank, something like “Dungeons and Dragons” carried out not with the trappings of medieval romances — old castles and maidens in distress — but entirely in terms of ideological symbols and emblems. The difference between them is that one is an innocent pastime while the other has proven to be one of the most terrible scourges to afflict the human race.

That’s from Harris’s “breakthrough hit” essay, Al Qaeda’s Fantasy Ideology, from before I started blogging. Harris is a fascinating fellow:

Lee Harris entered Emory University at age fourteen and graduated summa cum laude. After years spent pursuing diverse interests, including a stint at divinity school, several years writing mystery novels, and a career as a glazier, he began writing philosophical articles that captured the imagination of readers all over the world. The author of three of the most controversial and widely shared pieces in the history of Policy Review, Harris has emerged as one of the most talked-about writers of recent times. He lives in Stone Mountain, Georgia.

I’m not sure exactly which three of his four Policy Review pieces are the most controversial and widely shared:

Cicero over Plato and Socrates

Tuesday, March 2nd, 2010

Andrew Bisset, writing in 1859, decries the emphasis on Cicero over Plato and Socrates in “modern” education:

Cicero was as inferior to Socrates in real courage as in true philosophy. His idea of the highest type of human nature is what he calls a perfect orator, that is, a man who carries this pursuit, which Plato in the Gorgias proves to be so base and pernicious an employment of the intellectual faculties, to its utmost height. In doing this, instead of enforcing by example and precept, simplicity, compactness, and perspicuity in language by the use of the fewest and most apt and simple words, arranged in their most natural order, he has introduced into language verbosity, complication, confusion, and what is falsely called “fine” writing. And the tendency of modern education being to make pedants, not practical men of business, or great statesmen and great warriors, he is admired and imitated, while the true view of the question, as developed by Socrates and Plato, is unknown or kept out of sight.

Spencer Repeating Rifle

Monday, March 1st, 2010

Christopher Spencer received a patent for his Spencer Repeating Rifle in 1860, just before the Civil War broke out:

Cheney arranged an interview in June, 1861, for Spencer with the Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, who was a friend and neighbor of Cheney. Spencer claimed his rifle could shoot fifteen times a minute, which was unheard of in that day. He shot an average of 21 shots a minute in this casual meeting.

Commander John Dahlgren, the inventor of the Dahlgren naval cannon, was so impressed that Captain Andrew Harwood as Chief of Naval Ordnance ordered 700 Spencers. Not a large order.

A test was also arranged in August, 1861, with the Army under Captain Dyer (later the Army’s Chief of Ordnance) at Fortress Monroe, Virginia. Although Fortress Monroe was safe from Confederates, such a test was rather close to the enemy. Capt. Dyer reported he “fired it some 80 times” and gave the sample gun nasty tests with sand and covered it with salt water for 24 hours. “The rifle was then loaded and fired without difficulty…” (an amazing feat) “…I regard it as one of the very best breech-loading arms that I have ever seen.”

But the Army stalled in ordering any:

Spencer was interviewed by President Lincoln, who is reported at some time in 1861 to have fired a Spencer at short range using his own front sight whittled from a piece of wood. The President instructed the Army Chief of Ordnance, General Ripley, to order 10,000. Spencer (perhaps Cheney) accepted this first large order on the last day of 1861.

But the Army (and the Navy) balked at placing further substantial orders for another year and a half. Spencer roamed the western fighting front south from Indiana and Illinois trying to sell guns to individual commanders. Colonel John Wilder facing the Confederates in Tennessee ordered Spencers; the Army rejected the order; the brigade voted to buy them anyway, and did, at $35 each. That’s when a private earned $15 a month — which was about the cost of the traditional muzzle loading musket.

Spencer had another meeting with President Lincoln on August 18th, 1863, when the President hit a 6″ wide pine board at about 40 yards with at least six shots.

Looking back, we know that repeating rifles are the future of small arms, but the Union did not rapidly adopt them. Why not? Largely because they were expensive, and they used a lot of expensive ammo, which had to be carted around:

For a very long time, like about the year 1700 to today, soldiers going into battle carried only a few pounds of ammunition on their person. In the Civil War, the goal was for muzzle loading infantry to go into battle with about 40 rounds apiece (at 11 to 12 shots per pound for 4 pounds). The Confederates could shoot that off in about a dozen minutes or so. In World War Two, the soldiers carrying the M1 Garand carried 96 shots (12 eight round clips) at 20 shots per pound and could shoot that off in about four minutes. In Vietnam, the soldiers carrying the M16 could carry 200 to 300 rounds for about 6 pounds, and could shoot that off in about three minutes. When General Phil Sheridan headed south from Winchester, Virginia, on February 28th, 1865, on a sustained cavalry ride that carried his 10,000 troopers (Sharps and Spencer armed) all the way to the end of the War, each trooper started off with 40 rounds each carried on the horse. Muzzle loader firing for 12 minutes or Spencer firing for 3 minutes, 40 rounds was the Civil War standard allotment of ammunition per man.

Taking all this in, General Ripley of Army Ordnance may not have been as wrong as frequently portrayed. The money, the transport, the speed the soldiers would shoot off everything they had before the battle was over, and the lack of more horses to pull more wagons laden with heavy ammunition, all of this says the repeating Spencer, as wonderful as it was, may not have been the big issue.

This seems like a job for Operations Research — which did not exist until WWII, even though it could have and probably should have been applied to earlier “modern” wars.

Obviously the Union’s resources are constrained. Arming every soldier with a repeating rifle, at twice the cost, and more ammo, that is also more expensive per round, is not an option. But what are the trade-offs?

If trained soldiers can shoot 20 rounds per minute from a repeating rifle versus three rounds per minute from a muzzle-loader, this seems like an overwhelming advantage for the repeaters — seven times the firepower. We now know, for instance, that bayonet-charging men with repeating rifles is suicide, because they get so many shots at short range against a target without cover. A soldier with seven times the firepower is not quite seven times as effective — see Lanchester’s Square Law — but he’s more than twice as effective.

On the other hand, if two forces take up positions across from one another and take potshots throughout the day, the limiting factor is not rounds per minute but total rounds available. If you only have 40 rounds, you only have 40 rounds. Blowing through all 40 in two minutes doesn’t help. In this scenario, the advantage goes to whichever side has more ammo — because it is cheaper or lighter — or to the side that causes more casualties per round — whether from more accurate weapons or more accurate shooters. Those expensive brass cartridges start looking worse, and those $50 Whitworth sharpshooter rifles start looking better, under such conditions.

In either case, fewer men with better weapons could conceivably form a more effective force — with much fewer logistical demands for food, water, medicine, etc.

Frank’s Paradox

Monday, March 1st, 2010

Peter Taylor describes Frank’s Paradox:

There was a book by an economist, Robert Frank, called Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status, that looked at the economic implications of the competition for social status. Frank was mostly interested in how it messes up standard economic theory when people buy products not because of the products’ absolute qualities but because of their qualities relative to what the Joneses down the street are buying. But he also mentioned a paradox that, among other things, makes it hard to get meaningful information about people’s motivations with regard to social status. I’m calling this “Frank’s Paradox.”

Suppose that I am a young, single man, wanting to improve my social status, perhaps to make myself more attractive to the young ladies in my neighborhood. I decide to buy a large, new, obviously expensive car to show off the fact that I have a good enough job that I can afford it. Furthermore, I do this despite the fact that I actually prefer a smaller, more maneuverable car that is easier to park, more comfortably within my means, less likely to get stolen, etc. Now suppose that several of these ladies strike up conversations with me and ask me how I like my new car. Shall I tell them the truth? “No, I don’t really like it and can barely afford it. I only bought it in order to show off my wealth and try to attract women.” The probable consequence of telling the bald truth in this situation is that I will come across as being insecure, which will have the exact opposite effect on my social status from what I intended.

Taylor uses Frank’s Paradox to explain the Space Race, which was largely about national prestige:

It seems that the more important social status is as a motivation, the more important it is to deny its importance. I recall reading a news article shortly before the cancellation of the Mir space station program in which a prominent Russian supporter of Mir argued with great heat that the motive for preserving Mir was not just national prestige, but that there were also compelling scientific reasons for preserving it in addition to ISS. My reaction to this statement was, “Methinks the gentleman doth protest too much.”

The problem is that people judge us on our apparent motives as well as on our accomplishments. In so far as our Real Reason is social status, if this is not also an Acceptable Reason, we have to bundle our Real Reason with something else that is a credible Acceptable Reason or we will lower our status rather than raise it.

For example, President Kennedy’s “because they are hard” argument drew precisely the right amount of attention to the prestige associated with a Moon landing, yet it was implicitly bundled with the development of missile technology for the Cold War. Without that context, saying that we choose to land on the Moon because it is hard would not have made sense. In contrast, in the movie, The Mosquito Coast, the main character, Allie Fox, builds refrigeration equipment and tries to deliver ice to tropical aborigines. If there were a compelling reason why the aborigines needed a little bit of ice, Fox would have struck the viewer as heroic, but in the movie, he came across as an egotistical fool who put his family through needless hardship. The prestigious “because they are hard” argument has to be bundled with something else, and it matters what that “something else” is.

Killing by the Book

Monday, March 1st, 2010

Targeted killings used to be so simple:

What is certain is that as soon as the PLO official stepped out of the passenger side of the car, two athletic men in track suits came walking down the street, fast. One of them had what looked like a gym bag. When the friend of the PLO official got out of the car to say goodbye, he noticed the two but didn’t think much of it. They looked French, but other than that it was too dark to see more.

One of the men abruptly lunged at the PLO official, pinning him down on the hood of the car. According to the PLO official’s friend, one of the men put his gym bag against the head of the PLO official and fired two quick rounds into the base of his neck, killing him instantly. There was a silencer on the weapon. The two fled down the street and disappeared into an underground garage, never to be seen again.

Things have changed since 1992:

Fast forward 18 years to the assassination of Hamas military leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh on Jan. 20, and it is a graphic reminder of just how much the world has changed. Nearly the entire hit was recorded on closed-circuit TV cameras, from the time the team arrived at Dubai’s airport to the time the assassins entered Mr. Mabhouh’s room. The cameras even caught team members before and after they donned their disguises. The only thing the Dubai authorities have been unable to discover is the true names of the team. But having identified the assassins, or at least the borrowed identities they traveled on, Dubai felt confident enough to point a finger at Israel. (Oddly enough several of the identities were stolen from people living in Israel.)

The killing was performed by the book — by the old book:

At least 25 people are needed to carry off something like this. You need “eyes on” the target 24 hours a day to ensure that when the time comes he is alone. You need coverage of the police — assassinations go very wrong when the police stumble into the middle of one. You need coverage of the hotel security staff, the maids, the outside of the hotel. You even need people in back-up accommodations in the event the team needs a place to hide.

I can only speculate about where exactly the hit went wrong. But I would guess the assassins failed to account for the marked advance in technology. Not only were there closed-circuit TV cameras in the hotel where Mr. Mabhouh was assassinated and at the airport, but Dubai has at its fingertips the best security consultants in the world. The consultants merely had to run advanced software through all of Dubai’s digital data before, during and after the assassination to connect the assassins in time and place. For instance, a search of all cellular phone calls made in and around the hotel where Mr. Mabhouh was assassinated would show who had called the same number — reportedly a command post in Vienna. It would only be a matter then of tracking when and where calls were made from these phones, tying them to hotels where the team was operating or staying.

Not completely understanding advances in technology may be one explanation for the assassins nonchalantly exposing their faces to the closed-circuit TV cameras, one female assassin even smiling at one. They mistook Dubai 2010 for Paris 1992, and never thought it would all be tied together in a neat bow. But there is no good explanation why Israel, if indeed it was behind the assassination, underestimated the technology. The other explanation — the assassins didn’t care whether their faces were identified — doesn’t seem plausible at all.

The Only Thing Macroeconomists Have Learned

Monday, March 1st, 2010

Russ Roberts interviews Nobel prize-winning macroeconomists Edmund Phelps in the latest EconTalk podcast, and Phelps states that macro has been very productive over the last generation. Eric Falkenstein disagrees:

Phelps thinks we know a lot more about the economy, and by this he means, I think, that several theoretical innovations — the Phillips curve, the steady growth of money ensuring steady growth — have been proven wrong. So, some ideas have been rejected, and in that sense we know more. But there have been many innovations — overlapping generations models, dynamic programming, Hansen’s generalized method of moments — have shown themselves to not really focus our efforts, but rather allows everyone to add rigor showing that some things could be true. That’s hardly helpful, in that theories that explain everything explain nothing, and bad ideas are a dime a dozen (ie, developing an enthusiasm for the Phillips curve, and proving it wrong, is hardly progress).

So, we currently have debates about the value of the multiplier, where values over 1 suggest government spending is good, less than 1 means counterproductive (assuming that government and private consumption and investment have the same value, ie, the cost is the value created). Robert J. Barro — a well respected economist — suggests a value of –1.1. Joseph Stiglitz — a well respected economist — argues that the multiplier is around 2.0 (1.5 in the short run). Monetary policy currently targets a nominal GDP via the Taylor rule, an ad hoc policy that is indifferent to how much of GDP is inflation or real growth, so it reflects nothing that macro theorists have figured out, but rather, a reasonable rule of thumb. There is no consensus on why poor countries are poor (Easterly: too much top-down control; Stiglitz: too much markets, too little government spending).

I think the only thing macroeconomists have learned, is that Soviet style socialism does not generate higher growth than non-Soviet style socialism, and this fact wasn’t predicted by any economic consensus, but rather, the obvious failure of the Soviet Union, and the comparison of countries like East and West Germany, or North and South Korea.