Decline of the UK

Monday, March 8th, 2010

Chirol may be rethinking the United States, but that involves examining the decline of the UK:

Parachuting Cats

Monday, March 8th, 2010

Eric the GrimReader has a favorite theme, the idea that every organizational regime contains elements of its own destruction, and that no regime is free of this:

I believe that this is the fundamental fallacy with the technocratic state and is the analytical blind spot for policy wonks. They seem to believe that any imperfection may be corrected with precise policy adjustments. But at every step, they “discover” new problems. In the environmental movement, technocratic arrogance of this sort is known as “parachuting cats” after a real world incident.
As part of anti-malarial campaign in the northern states of the island of Borneo in the late 1950′s, the World Health Organization sprayed DDT and other insecticides to kill the mosquito vector for malaria. During this campaign, DDT was sprayed in large amounts on the inside walls and ceilings of the large “long houses” that housed an entire village in these areas. As a consequence of this effort, the incidence of malaria in the region fell dramatically.

However, there were two unintended consequences of this action. There was an increase in the rate of decay of the thatched roofs covering the long houses because a moth caterpillar that ingests the thatch avoided the DDT but their parasite, the larvae of a small wasp, did not. Also, the domestic cats roaming through the houses were poisoned by the DDT as a consequence of rubbing against the walls and then licking the insecticide off their fur. In some villages, the loss of cats allowed rats to enter, which raised concerns of rodent-related diseases such as typhus and the plague.

To rectify this problem in one remote village, several dozen cats were collected in coastal towns and parachuted by the Royal Air Force in a special container to replace those killed by the insecticides.

Another favorite example of mine concerns a confluence of well-meaning government schemes: First, it was observed that Florida was filled with disease-carrying swamps, so they (the Army Corps of Engineers) drained the swamps and damned the rivers to create productive farmland.

Then people began raising sugar cane, and as they faced stiffer competition from throughout the Carribean, they instituted price controls. But then the cane industry came to be dominated by about 5 families who controlled legislators very tightly. Meanwhile, ADM and the corn farmers achieved control over their legislative concerns and, with the development of High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS), they found themselves in competition with the sugar farmers. Fortunately, they found that by also supporting the sugar price controls, HFCS was both more competitively priced and more profitable. So the price controls were universally favored, leading to the continued overuse of swampland to the detriment of the ecosystem (and to Carribean farmers).

As this was gradually accepted to be counterproductive, the Clinton Administration proposed changes to restore ecological balance. The solution announced by Al Gore? Clearly, to tax sugar and use the revenues to restore the Everglades. Duh, that’s what you thought, too, right? No?! You thought … what? Maybe abandon the sugar price supports, let the farms go fallow, tear down the damns (saving the annual maintenance costs), and let it all go back to nature? Or perhaps it would have been better to let farmers drain their own land in the first place? Heh, you’ll never make it as a bureaucrat.

Each displacement to an equilibrium will cause at least one change in the equilibrium. At least one adjustment needs to be made to restore the equilibrium to efficiency. This is Second Best theory at its simplest. However, few analysts go beyond that and recognize that each of the secondary disturbances, the “corrections”, will also create disequilibria that must be adjusted with 3rd and 4th order corrections. In their analysis, somehow, the original disturbance — the market failure — must be corrected, but the secondary disturbance —regulation — is perfect?

(Hat tip to David Foster’s Photon Courier.)

The IQ of a Team

Monday, March 8th, 2010

What happens when you test the IQ of a team? Robert Gordon’s Everyday Life as an Intelligence Test explains:

Consider an experiment by Laughlin and Johnson (1966) that induced the local equivalent of random pairing. College students were administered the high level Tern-ran Concept Mastery Test (Tern-ran, 1956) and then assigned to low, medium, and high ability groups according to their scores. Students were paired up systematically to represent every combination of the three ability levels and readministered the same test working together, but some members of each level were left to repeat the test alone.

Working with lower ability partners led generally to score improvements, but the more able the partner the greater was the gain. For present purposes, the most telling finding was that medium and high ability individuals improved slightly more working alone the second time than working with low ability partners. As these were college students, and the test was a difficult one, the low group would have scored well above many persons in the general population.

Medium and high ability individuals improved slightly more working alone the second time than working with low ability partners.

Our own Greek tragedy

Monday, March 8th, 2010

Mark Steyn argues that we’re facing our own Greek tragedy; we’re just a few steps behind Greece:

The 20th century Bismarckian welfare state has run out of people to stick it to. In America, the feckless insatiable boobs in Washington, Sacramento, Albany and elsewhere are screwing over our kids and grandkids. In Europe, they’ve reached the next stage in social democratic evolution: There are no kids or grandkids to screw over. The United States has a fertility rate of around 2.1, or just over two kids per couple. Greece has a fertility rate of about 1.3: 10 grandparents have six kids have four grandkids — i.e., the family tree is upside down. Demographers call 1.3 “lowest-low” fertility — the point from which no society has ever recovered. And compared to Spain and Italy, Greece has the least worst fertility rate in Mediterranean Europe.

So you can’t borrow against the future because, in the most basic sense, you don’t have one. Greeks in the public sector retire at 58, which sounds great. But, when 10 grandparents have four grandchildren, who pays for you to spend the last third of your adult life loafing around?

By the way, you don’t have to go to Greece to experience Greek-style retirement: The Athenian “public service” of California has been metaphorically face-down in the ouzo for a generation. Still, America as a whole is not yet Greece. A couple of years ago, when I wrote my book “America Alone,” I put the Social Security debate in a bit of perspective: On 2005 figures, projected public pensions liabilities were expected to rise by 2040 to about 6.8 percent of GDP. In Greece, the figure was 25 percent. In other words, head for the hills, Armageddon, outta here, The End. Since then, the situation has worsened in both countries. And really the comparison is academic: Whereas America still has a choice, Greece isn’t going to have a 2040 – not without a massive shot of Reality Juice.

Is that likely to happen? At such moments, I like to modify Gerald Ford. When seeking to ingratiate himself with conservative audiences, President Ford liked to say: “A government big enough to give you everything you want is big enough to take away everything you have.” Which is true enough. But there’s an intermediate stage: A government big enough to give you everything you want isn’t big enough to get you to give any of it back. That’s the point Greece is at. Its socialist government has been forced into supporting a package of austerity measures. The Greek people’s response is: Nuts to that. Public sector workers have succeeded in redefining time itself: Every year, they receive 14 monthly payments. You do the math. And for about seven months’ work – for many of them the workday ends at 2:30 p.m. When they retire, they get 14 monthly pension payments. In other words: Economic reality is not my problem. I want my benefits. And, if it bankrupts the entire state a generation from now, who cares as long as they keep the checks coming until I croak?

We hard-hearted, small-government guys are often damned as selfish types who care nothing for the general welfare. But, as the Greek protests make plain, nothing makes an individual more selfish than the socially equitable communitarianism of big government. Once a chap’s enjoying the fruits of government health care, government-paid vacation, government-funded early retirement, and all the rest, he couldn’t give a hoot about the general societal interest. He’s got his, and to hell with everyone else. People’s sense of entitlement endures long after the entitlement has ceased to make sense.

The perfect spokesman for the entitlement mentality is the deputy prime minister of Greece. The European Union has concluded that the Greek government’s austerity measures are insufficient and, as a condition of bailout, has demanded something more robust. Greece is no longer a sovereign state: It’s General Motors, and the EU is Washington, and the Greek electorate is happy to play the part of the United Auto Workers – everything’s on the table except anything that would actually make a difference. In practice, because Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland are also on the brink of the abyss, a “European” bailout will be paid for by Germany. So the aforementioned Greek deputy prime minister, Theodoros Pangalos, has denounced the conditions of the EU deal on the grounds that the Germans stole all the bullion from the Bank of Greece during the Second World War. Welfare always breeds contempt, in nations as much as inner-city housing projects. How dare you tell us how to live! Just give us your money and push off.

Men of Energy

Monday, March 8th, 2010

Turkey remained a succesful military despotism as long as the Sultans remained men of energy:

The principal causes assigned for the decline of the Turkish power were the habit contracted by Suleiman I., towards the end of his days (he died in 1566), of no longer presiding in person at the divan, the promotion of his favourites to the first dignities of the State, the influence of the harem in public affairs, and the immense power and wealth of the grand vizirs.

More than a century after this, however, the Turks threatened all Europe; but they never altogether recovered from the defeats they received, first, from John Sobieski, under the walls of Vienna, in 1683, and thirty-three years later, from Eugene, at Peterwardein. The strength of their position still protected them from total destruction; and in their case the world was enabled to see of what quality are the dregs of a military despotism suffered to run out its full course.

For a time the head of a military despotism must possess some of the qualities, such as courage, hardihood, and sagacity, which raised the first man — of whom he is the representative — to his post. But when conquest has procured wealth and the means of luxury, and time has given a certain degree of stability to the dominion at first conquered and held by valour, unremitted toil, and peril, the head of a military despotism no longer possesses either the qualities of a general or a statesman, of a hardy soldier or a constitutional king. He becomes an effeminate sensualist, who rules his empire and commands his armies through the ministers of his pleasures, and the whole machine of his government becomes one mass of imbecility, rottenness, and corruption.

Thus the strength of the Turks lasted as long as the Sultan was a man of energy, who devoted his time to labour and not to pleasure, and while, as a consequence of this devotion to the duties of his place, he gave all the highest posts under him to the greatest military merit. But even when Montecuculi wrote, this mortal disease had commenced in the Turkish government. After speaking of the valour of the Turkish troops and of the experience and military qualities of their officers, he adds that corruption has already appeared among them: men totally unfit being raised at once to the command of armies. The source of this abuse, he continues, is that the Sultan, plunged in sensuality, and neglecting the observance of the Mahometan laws, never goes to war in person.

The history of Rome under the empire, and the whole history of Asia, exhibit the same result, and demonstrate by unmistakeable signs the goal to which all military monarchies are drifting; though the history of the Turks shows that they may take ages to reach that goal. This explains why the Turks of the present day, though they may be as stalwart men and as good horsemen as the Spahis, who were once so formidable, make so poor a military figure; all their officers above the rank of captain being appointed, not for their military qualities, but for having been “a Pasha’s pipe-bearer or something worse.” The men have no confidence in them; and if they had, their confidence would be much misplaced.

Trapping Sunlight with Silicon Nanowires

Sunday, March 7th, 2010

Some solar cells, or photovoltaics, can now convert sunlight into electricity at 20-percent efficiency, but silicon nanowires promise a more important kind of efficiency — cost efficiency:

“Since the fabrication technique behind this extraordinary light-trapping enhancement is a relatively simple and scalable aqueous chemistry process, we believe our approach represents an economically viable path toward high-efficiency, low-cost thin-film solar cells.”

Yang holds joint appointments with Berkeley Lab’s Materials Sciences Division, and the University of California Berkeley’s Chemistry Department. He is a leading authority on semiconductor nanowires – one-dimensional strips of materials whose width measures only one-thousandth that of a human hair but whose length may stretch several microns.

“Typical solar cells are made from very expensive ultrapure single crystal silicon wafers that require about 100 micrometers of thickness to absorb most of the solar light, whereas our radial geometry enables us to effectively trap light with nanowire arrays fabricated from silicon films that are only about eight micrometers thick,” he says. “Furthermore, our approach should in principle allow us to use metallurgical grade or “dirty” silicon rather than the ultrapure silicon crystals now required, which should cut costs even further.”

We must Americanize ourselves

Sunday, March 7th, 2010

Heinrich Hauser wrote The German Talks Back to explain postwar Germany to Americans — not, Mencius Moldbug explains, from the point of view of a German liberal but from that of a German national-conservative. An excerpt:

The crucial test to which the American government in Germany ought to subject all claimants and lobbyists is, of course, “Just how many followers do you have? How many hale and hearty democrats can you deliver?” An honest question, to which in honesty the non-Nazified functionaries of the old Weimar Republic can only answer: “None. Unfortunately, the people have become estranged from us. The young generation has forgotten us and doesn’t care about democracy. After thirteen years of Hitler, what can you expect?”

This is perfectly true, except that for once it is not Hitler who must take all the blame if American ideas don’t work out in occupied Germany. That blame must be shared by German gullibility and American gullibility alike. The truth is that the fathers of the present generation ate sour grapes from America, and now the children’s teeth are set on edge.

I will spare you the well-worn argument about Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and how the Germans felt let down when they got the Treaty of Versailles instead. No: what you have forgotten, or never became conscious of, is that for ten years after the First World War Germany’s most popular slogan was “Wir amerikaniseieren uns!” (“We must Americanize ourselves.”) Rarely, perhaps never in history, was there a defeated nation so completely enamored of the victor’s efficiency as the Germans after 1919. “American matériel has won the war? So then everything American must be superior. Let’s imitate them, let’s Americanize ourselves.” Such was German logic.

Every American who visited Berlin during those reconstruction years will remember to what ridiculous lengths that German logic went: American bars and American-style nightclubs, American jazz bands, if possible with one “real imported” Negro at the saxophone. American cafeteries and American movie houses were ubiquitous. The neatly dressed German wore “shimmy” shoes and a suit of American cut. American cars rolled on the streets with a new and surprising noiselessness, and in if an American asked his way in German he got an English answer. The dollar was the Elite-Valuta — the elite-professionals of the Kurfuerstendamm demanded it from even their German customers. And the first skyscrapers begain to raise their steel skeletons over the trees of the Tiergarten.

We imitated everything. The National Assembly imitated your Constitution, and the Reichswehr your Sam Browne belt. Industrialists copied your production systems, workers adapted themselves to your speed-up systems, and poets sang in praise of the assembly line. We introduced your weekend and your bookkeeping. We blossomed out in Rotary Clubs and poured sugar into our perfectly good wine to ape the sweet tooth of America.

We really meant it all. Sure, the people were disappointed that their Wilsonian dream hadn’t come true after all, but then they still clung to their dream of America. What kind of dream?

“If you will only be good democrats and work like hell and be modern and progressive as we are, then you can live like Americans.” That was the siren song which in a thousand variations sounded from across the ocean, and the people listened as starry-eyed as ever Hitler listened to a Wagner opera. They dreamed of the electric refrigerator that would one day be theirs, and of the vacuum cleaner, and, above all, of that cheap little car.
[...]
For a time the carrot worked; the ugly 19th-century brick-and-plaster houses of Germany’s Main Streets put on pants: facades of concrete reaching to the second floor and framing modern stores with neon lights. Cities built new municipal buildings and parks and hospitals for themselves. Yes, it was done with American loans — to a large degree, at least. Industry modernized itself and installed new machinery. Yes, American money helped do that, too. It looked almost like prosperity on the face of it, and a typical German crowd looked almost like a normal American crowd.
[...]
It must not be forgotten that private enterprise in Germany had suffered a major blow a few years before the Nazis came to power. In 1930, the great depression hit the economic body of Germany, which owing to malnutrition had a low resistance anyway. And the most significant thing about it was that “Wir amerikanisieren uns,” the slogan of the ‘twenties, backfired on us with a vengeance.

When the United States retracted her private loans, the first establishments to topple were the ones that had taken the loans. These included the municipalities that had gone farthest along the American way of modernity, and the industries that had gone the limit with American production methods, thereby accumulating an unduly high overhead. The workers on the American-style assembly lines were the first to be thrown on the dole. The most progressive farmers, who had invested heavily in modern American implements, were the first to surrender to the sheriff’s sale.
[...]
The cheapest kind of amusement, which even those on the dole could afford once a week, which indeed was thrown in as part of the dole, was a ticket to the movies. People thronged the movie houses, partly for the warmth, partly to snatch an hour of sleep in half-comfort, partly to forget their misery, and partly for the show. And the show always included a newsreel and some slapstick comedy from the U.S.A.

Never shall we forget — we, the unemployed of the depression years in Germany — those nauseating scenes that Hollywood projected for us on the silver screen as ostensibly representing the American way of life. Never shall I forget the incredulous stare at first, and then the tightening of lips, and then the gleam of hatred in the people’s eyes…

“So that’s the way those fellows live over there in America… did you see those brats throwing pie at each other’s faces, and all besmeared, and the whipped cream dripping all over?… And the girls in the sexy bathing suits, swimming in a pond full of apples and banging them around… Don’t forget the ones who got their buttocks measured by a bunch of fellows — a beauty contest, they called it… And that other hussy in the beauty parlor; got her hair all plastered with yolk of egg. I’ve seen it. Real eggs, at least a dozen….
[...]
In that other thing, College Fun or whatever it was, did you see how they wrecked the place, smashed up the furniture and all? Did you think that was funny? No, I call that beastly, and I could have taken a stick and smashed their skulls, and never be sorry I did it.”

Pre-war Germany and the modern Middle East suddenly seem eerily similar.

Machiavelli’s Present of Wine

Sunday, March 7th, 2010

I had not heard the story of Machiavelli’s present of wine:

There is a law observable in the life of nations, that the great crimes committed by them, though they may seem for a time to be very pleasant and profitable, recoil at last upon the heads of their authors, and become their own punishment; their plunder acting in a way somewhat similar to that in which Machiavelli’s present of wine acted on his butcher.

Machiavelli’s servant complained to him one day that his butcher had been very insolent, adding that he had not confined his abusive language to him (the servant), but had also spoken very disrespectfully of his master. Machiavelli made no remark, but ordered the servant to look out half a dozen of the best and choicest wine in his cellar, to take it to the butcher, and beg his acceptance of it as a small present from his master. The servant was surprised, but did as he was ordered.

A short time after, he came and informed Machiavelli that the butcher had been stabbed and killed on the spot by a man whom he had insulted. Machiavelli smiled, and said: ” You see that present of mine acted like poison upon him. Instead of repressing his violent temper, and correcting his ill manners, as he might have done if I had resented his insolence at the time, he has gone on from bad to worse, till he has at last met with the proper punishment.”

Impeccably Multicultural

Saturday, March 6th, 2010

Mark Steyn, in America Alone, argues not for more war, but for more will:

In a culturally confident age, the British in India were faced with the practice of “suttee” — the tradition of burning widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands. General Sir Charles Napier was impeccably multicultural: “You say that it is your custom to burn widows. Very well. We also have a custom: when men burn a woman alive, we tie a rope around their necks and we hang them. Build your funeral pyre; beside it, my carpenters will build a gallows. You may follow your custom. And then we will follow ours.”

Hat tip to Peter Taylor, who sees multi-culturalism as a variation on reverse jingoism, a way to paint one’s political opponents as bigots.

Gun Accidents

Saturday, March 6th, 2010

Gun accidents happen to the kind of people who have accidents:

While gun accidents contribute only about 5% of the deaths linked with guns, they play an important rhetorical role in the gun control debate. They are used in attempts to persuade people that keeping guns in their homes for protection is foolish because the risks of a gun accident exceed any defensive benefits. Gun accidents play a different rhetorical role in the debate from homicides or suicides because most people can accurately tell themselves that there is no one in their household likely to assault another person or attempt suicide, but it is harder to confidently state that no one will be involved in an accident. Since anybody can have an accident, every household with a gun is at risk of suffering a gun accident.

There are several problems with this argument. First, gun accidents are quite rare relative to the numbers of people exposed to them. The rate of accidental death per 100,000 guns or per 100,000 gun-owning households is less than 4–6% of the corresponding rates for automobiles, and has also been sharply declining for over 20 years, despite rapid increases in the size of the gun stock. Second, the risk of a gun accident is not randomly distributed across the gun-owning population and is not a significant risk for more than a small fraction of owners. Gun accidents are apparently largely confined to an unusually reckless subset of the population, with gun accidents disproportionately occurring to people with long records of motor vehicle accidents, traffic tickets, drunk driving arrests, and arrests for violent offenses. Accidents are most common among alcoholics and people with personality traits related to recklessness, impulsiveness, impatience, and emotional immaturity. The circumstances of gun accidents commonly involve acts of unusual recklessness, such as “playing” with loaded guns, pulling the trigger to see if a gun is loaded, and playing Russian roulette with a revolver. Gun accidents are largely confined to defensive gun owners — less than one sixth of accidental deaths are connected with hunting. Consequently, gun accidents are quite rare for ordinary gun owners, especially when compared with the frequency of defensive uses.

Contrary to impressions left by the news media, gun accidents rarely involve small children. There are probably fewer than 100 fatal handgun accidents involving preadolescent children in the entire nation each year. Instead, gun accidents are largely concentrated in the same age groups where assaultive violence is concentrated, among adolescent and young adult males.

Rethinking the United States

Saturday, March 6th, 2010

Chirol has been contributing to Coming Anarchy for years, but now he’s Rethinking the United States on his own:

Specifically, does the current political configuration of this country serve the purpose it was intended to by its creators. I aim to uncover through my own writings and discussions with readers how the future of our country could and should look.

This blog is not about politics per se, but examining the changes that have taken place in the United States since its founding and overall changes in the structure of our and other societies. Ongoing developments in technology are creating exciting new possibilities for small groups and individuals and pushing power back down to the local level from the vast centralization and accumulation of power in the hands of a few.

Americans and people around the world now have the means at their disposal to live a modern, “Western” lifestyle without the unsustainable and highly vulnerable reliance on the modern complex systems of today. Moreover, these highly centralized and brittle configurations are unsustainable in the long run, inflexible, and subject to catastrophic failure with little to buffer or lessen the effects. The superempowerment of small groups and individuals will radically change the structure of the United States as we know it, politically, socially and economically.

Day Two Opened Some Eyes

Friday, March 5th, 2010

Paul Howe teaches an Advanced Patrol Officer Combat Tactics Instructor Course:

It was day two that opened some eyes. I began with a demonstration where I tape an IPSC target forward of the drivers door, half exposed. I then began to ricochet bullets into the kill zone of the target off the hood and off the windshield. Jaws dropped. Comments were made that this is where we have been trained to fight from for years.

Crowding cover can have deadly consequences:

I suggest not crowding cover and allowing the take off angle of the bullet to work in your favor. We found that three good steps to the rear gave enough angle to protect you in the kneeling position.

Defensive Use of Guns by Crime Victims

Friday, March 5th, 2010

Gary Kleck looks at the defensive use of guns by crime victims:

Each year about 1500–2800 criminals are lawfully killed by gun-wielding American civilians in justifiable or excusable homicides, far more than are killed by police officers. There are perhaps 600,000–1 million defensive uses of guns each year, about the same as the number of crimes committed with guns. These astounding totals may be less surprising in light of the following facts. About a third of U.S. households keep a gun at least partially for defensive reasons; at any one time nearly a third of gun owners have a firearm in their home (usually a handgun) which is loaded; about a quarter of retail businesses have a gun on the premises; and perhaps 5% of U.S. adults regularly carry a gun for self-defense.

Keeping a gun for home defense makes most defensive gun owners feel safer, and most also believe they are safer because they have a gun. The belief is not necessarily a delusion. People who use guns for self-protection in robberies and assaults are less likely to have the crime completed against them (in a robbery, this means losing their property), and, contrary to widespread belief, are less likely to be injured, compared to either victims who use other forms of resistance or to victims who do nothing to resist. (Criminals take the gun away from the victim in less than 1% of these incidents.) The evidence does not support the idea that nonresistance is safer than resisting with a gun.

And then there’s the deterrence effect. (From Kleck’s 1991 Point Blank.)

A Waste of Time

Friday, March 5th, 2010

In The Book of the Journeyman, Albert Jay Nock mocks the New York public school system:

One count against the book [that was being removed from the school curriculum] according to this report, was that the description of Calvin as the “political boss” of Geneva was likely to offend the Presbyterians. It does not appear that the description was regarded as inaccurate; indeed, there is the clearest and most abundant evidence that no other description of Calvin’s civil relations with Geneva is admissible. The question therefore arises, whether in the mind of New York’s school-authorities the chief end and aim of teaching history is to please Presbyterians or to inculcate a competent understanding of some very important and significant social phenomena that appeared in Europe in the first half of the sixteenth century, and that quite distinctly colored European history for three hundred years…. Not to mince words, the fact of the matter is that under our educational system, the study of history, like other formative studies, does not even rise to the dignity of being a waste of time.

The Best and Worst of Oligarchy and Democracy

Friday, March 5th, 2010

The Romans, like the Greeks, were quite attentive to athletic exercises:

Plutarch relates what pains Cato the Censor took in training his son in throwing the javelin, in riding, in swimming rapid rivers, in enduring heat and cold; how Marius, throwing off his old age and his infirmities, went daily to the Campus Martius, where he took his exercises with the young men; and how Julius Caesar did not make his feeble health an excuse for indulgence, but by unwearied exercise and frugal diet, by constantly keeping in the open air and enduring fatigue, struggled with his malady, and kept his body proof against its attacks.

The effect of the Roman system of athletic exercises in strengthening and hardening their bodies, appears from the fact that a Roman soldier usually carried a load of sixty pounds weight, besides his arms; that under this load the soldier commonly marched twenty miles a day, sometimes more, usually completing the day’s march in five hours, that is, marching twenty miles in five hours, sometimes twenty-four miles in that time.

National strength is not just about fortitude though:

But the Roman system of training, while, like the Spartan, it cultivated the physical qualities of bodily strength, activity, and endurance, with the moral qualities of fortitude and patriotism, did not cultivate in the least degree, like the Spartan also, the moral qualities of justice and humanity. Their leading principle, to which all others gave way, was the extension of the empire; in other words, universal dominion and universal plunder.

Nevertheless, the Roman constitution, or system of government, possessed elements of duration which did not belong either to the Spartan or Athenian system. The Spartan government was, as we have seen, an almost pure oligarchy, the Athenian an almost pure democracy; each of which worked out rapidly its own destruction, without check or counterpoise. On the other hand, the Roman system of government had in it the two elements of oligarchy and democracy, which acted as checks on one another; for a time at least. It is true that they mostly acted in such a way that now the one predominated, and now the other. At last, however, after great struggles, the government of Rome was brought to a just equilibrium, under which there was no insurmountable obstruction to merit. The republic was thus managed for several ages without internal discord.

But as wealth and luxury increased, especially after the destruction of Carthage, the more wealthy piebeians united with the patricians, and the two parties of rich men, the old and the new, engrossed between them all the honours and emoluments of the State. The body of the people were impoverished and oppressed, and at the same time brutalized by the gladiatorial shows, while they were also thoroughly corrupted by idleness and by dependence for food upon those public men who intended to use them for their own purposes.

We thus see that while, for a time, the government of Rome enjoyed the advantages of a combination of the oligarchical government of Sparta and the democratical government of Athens, it afterwards suffered at once from the evils of both kinds of government. In this state of things the Roman plebeians became the ready instruments, first, in the hands of Marius, and afterwards in those of Julius Caesar, for the complete destruction of the Roman constitution. Then came to pass in Rome what, as we have seen, had before come to pass in Sparta and Athens — the total destruction of the military spirit of the people, and of their ability to defend themselves from foreign aggression; and those who had conquered and oppressed nearly all the world were conquered and oppressed in their turn.

The cause of the disease, in this as in all similar cases, was bad government.