The Puzzle of New War

Saturday, August 19th, 2006

Dr. Michael Vlahos examines The Puzzle of New War — irregular war, asymmetrical war, unconventional war, guerilla war, 4th generation war, anti-terrorism, counter-insurgency — by looking at how the ancient Romans handled war against unrecognized, armed communities:

What the Romans always tried to do was simple and straightforward, and well within the accepted standards of Greco-Roman civilization. They would try to negotiate with these groups, but if they became a problem, a Roman army would march off to wipe them out.

The track record for this approach spanned at least five centuries. For example, in 102 BC a big Germanic community entered Italy — the Ambrones and the Teutones — and was essentially wiped off the face of the earth by the legions of the Consul Marius. In 405 AD, an equally large nation of Germans under Radagaisus entered Italy and was similarly exterminated by the Magister Militum, Aetius.

This was a no-prisoners approach. If the victory was complete, then presumably thousands would be slaughtered. Those remaining fighters would be taken prisoner, and ritualistically crucified — also often, in the thousands. Women and children would be profitably sold into slavery.

The community that survived these events would have them literally seared into their collective memory. So Aetius dealt with the Burgundians in 436 AD, bringing savage Hunnic cohorts into Southern France to flay the offending nation. From the horror of that experience, where two-third of their people were slaughtered, comes the Nibelungenlied. Yet forever after, as long as there were Romans, the Burgundians remained good Roman allies. There are plenty of voices today — just look around the Internet — who would celebrate this as a model win by the good guys against the terrorists.

But sometimes things did not go as planned for the Romans. The Goths, desperate for sanctuary from savage Huns, were accepted into the Empire almost as despised refugees, treated like indentured guest workers-to-be, a new Roman underclass. But soon they rebelled and actually destroyed the legionary army sent against them: slaying even the emperor himself.

Likewise the Romans barely contained fractious Jewish communities. In 79 AD Jewish insurgents triggered a strategic crisis of empire, which was concluded only by the punitive sack of Jerusalem itself. Yet even here a Roman scorched-earth policy only led, three generations later, to an even greater Jewish revolt: whose outcome was the utter destruction of the Jewish Nation.

We should remember these long-ago events because unrecognized armed communities — “non-state actors” — are not easy military propositions. Quite to the contrary, a great nation state that has for generations focused its military efforts against brother nation states is sure to be less prepared for military operations against non-state threats.

Neither the Americans nor the Israelis are Roman enough to wipe out a threatening community. Not yet.

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