How Sweden Solved Its Bank Crisis

September 24th, 2008

Carter Dougherty of the New York Times explains How Sweden Solved Its Bank Crisis back in 1992 — by demanding warrants in return for bailing the banks out:

That strategy held banks responsible and turned the government into an owner. When distressed assets were sold, the profits flowed to taxpayers, and the government was able to recoup more money later by selling its shares in the companies as well.

“If I go into a bank,” said Bo Lundgren, who was Sweden’s finance minister at the time, “I’d rather get equity so that there is some upside for the taxpayer.”

Sweden spent 4 percent of its gross domestic product, or 65 billion kronor, the equivalent of $11.7 billion at the time, or $18.3 billion in today’s dollars, to rescue ailing banks. That is slightly less, proportionate to the national economy, than the $700 billion, or roughly 5 percent of gross domestic product, that the Bush administration estimates its own move will cost in the United States.

But the final cost to Sweden ended up being less than 2 percent of its G.D.P. Some officials say they believe it was closer to zero, depending on how certain rates of return are calculated.

The US government demanded warrants from Chrysler too, years ago, but, to my surprise, it’s not demanding equity from banks (yet):

The reason is not quite clear. The government has already swapped its sovereign guarantee for equity in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage finance institutions, and the American International Group, the global insurance giant.

How many dollars are there in the world?

September 24th, 2008

How many dollars are there in the world?:

There is a nice official answer to this question. The figure is known as M0, the monetary base, and its current value is about 825 billion.

So, we know that n, the number of dollars, is 825 billion, M0, right?

Wrong. The problem is that this assignment, n = M0, simply does not make sense. It is not consistent with economic reality. Of course USG can enforce it, as it can enforce anything, but the result will be social and economic disaster. North America will become a burned-out Mad Max wasteland, patrolled by marauding gangs and packs of radioactive mutant wolves.

The US governemtn has a national debt of roughly $10 trillion, not counting unfunded entitlements:

Moreover, this debt is not even discounted. Quite the contrary: it is considered “risk-free.”

Question: how, exactly, in a world that contains only 825 billion dollars, can a debt of $10 trillion be risk-free?

Moreover, USG runs an annual trade deficit of $750 billion. Even if it started each January 1 with all 825 billion of these dollars in the country, which it most certainly didn’t, its subjects should be feeling pretty impoverished by Christmas. But no. They run the same trade deficit, year after year after year. Perhaps the dollars are being lent back to them — but why?

There can only be one answer: this $825 billion number is just plain wrong.

825 billion is the number of formal dollars outstanding. It is not the droid we are looking for, though.

The Two Classes of Airport Contraband

September 24th, 2008

Security expert Bruce Schneier explains The Two Classes of Airport Contraband:

Airport security found a jar of pasta sauce in my luggage last month. It was a 6-ounce jar, above the limit; the official confiscated it, because allowing it on the airplane with me would have been too dangerous. And to demonstrate how dangerous he really thought that jar was, he blithely tossed it in a nearby bin of similar liquid bottles and sent me on my way.

There are two classes of contraband at airport security checkpoints: the class that will get you in trouble if you try to bring it on an airplane, and the class that will cheerily be taken away from you if you try to bring it on an airplane. This difference is important: Making security screeners confiscate anything from that second class is a waste of time. All it does is harm innocents; it doesn’t stop terrorists at all.

Let me explain. If you’re caught at airport security with a bomb or a gun, the screeners aren’t just going to take it away from you. They’re going to call the police, and you’re going to be stuck for a few hours answering a lot of awkward questions. You may be arrested, and you’ll almost certainly miss your flight. At best, you’re going to have a very unpleasant day.

This is why articles about how screeners don’t catch every — or even a majority — of guns and bombs that go through the checkpoints don’t bother me. The screeners don’t have to be perfect; they just have to be good enough. No terrorist is going to base his plot on getting a gun through airport security if there’s decent chance of getting caught, because the consequences of getting caught are too great.

Contrast that with a terrorist plot that requires a 12-ounce bottle of liquid. There’s no evidence that the London liquid bombers actually had a workable plot, but assume for the moment they did. If some copycat terrorists try to bring their liquid bomb through airport security and the screeners catch them — like they caught me with my bottle of pasta sauce — the terrorists can simply try again. They can try again and again. They can keep trying until they succeed. Because there are no consequences to trying and failing, the screeners have to be 100 percent effective. Even if they slip up one in a hundred times, the plot can succeed.

The same is true for knitting needles, pocketknives, scissors, corkscrews, cigarette lighters and whatever else the airport screeners are confiscating this week. If there’s no consequence to getting caught with it, then confiscating it only hurts innocent people. At best, it mildly annoys the terrorists.

To fix this, airport security has to make a choice. If something is dangerous, treat it as dangerous and treat anyone who tries to bring it on as potentially dangerous. If it’s not dangerous, then stop trying to keep it off airplanes. Trying to have it both ways just distracts the screeners from actually making us safer.

Short-Term Financing Is Not An Accident

September 23rd, 2008

Diamond and Kashyap explain that short-term financing is not an accident:

Lehman’s demise came when it could not even keep borrowing. Lehman was rolling over at least $100 billion a month to finance its investments in real estate, bonds, stocks, and financial assets. When it is hard for lenders to monitor their investments and borrowers can rapidly change the risk on their balance sheets, lenders opt for short-term lending. Compared to legal or other channels, their threat to refuse to roll over funding is the most effective option to keep the borrower in line.

This was especially relevant for Lehman, because as an investment bank, it could transform its risk characteristics very easily by using derivatives and by churning its trading portfolio. So for Lehman (and all investment banks), the short-term financing is not an accident; it is inevitable.

Why did the financing dry up? For months, short-sellers were convinced that Lehman’s real-estate losses were bigger than it had acknowledged. As more bad news about the real estate market emerged, including the losses at Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, this view spread.

Lehman’s costs of borrowing rose and its share price fell. With an impending downgrade to its credit rating looming, legal restrictions were going to prevent certain firms from continuing to lend to Lehman. Other counterparties that might have been able to lend, even if Lehman’s credit rating was impaired, simply decided that the chance of default in the near future was too high, partly because they feared that future credit conditions would get even tighter and force Lehman and others to default at that time.

What’s a paradigm shift in finance?

September 23rd, 2008

I don’t follow n+1“a twice-yearly print journal of politics, literature, and culture” — but they carried an interesting Interview With a Hedge Fund Manager back in January:

I didn’t go to business school. I did not major in economics. I learned the old-fashioned way by apprenticing to a very talented investor, so I wound up getting into the hedge fund business before I think many people knew what a hedge fund was. I’ve been doing it for over ten years. I didn’t even know what a hedge fund was when I first had this opportunity. I’m sure today I would never get hired.

Really?

Yeah, it would be impossible because I had no background, or I had a very exiguous background in finance. The guy who hired me always talked about hiring good intellectual athletes, people who were sort of mentally agile in an all-around way, and that the specifics of finance you could learn, which I think is true. But at the time, I mean, no hedge fund was really flooded with applicants, and that allowed him to let his mind range a little bit and consider different kinds of candidates. Today we have a recruiting group, and what do they do? — they throw resumes at you, and it’s, like, one business school guy, one finance major after another, kids who, from the time they were twelve years old, were watching Jim Cramer and dreaming of working in a hedge fund. And I think in reality that, probably, if anything, they’re less likely to make good investors than people with sort of more interesting backgrounds.

Why?

Because I think that in the end the way that you make a ton of money is calling paradigm shifts, and people who are real finance types, maybe they can work really well within the paradigm of a particular kind of market or a particular set of rules of the game — and you can make money doing that — but the people who make huge money, the George Soroses and Julian Robertsons of the world, they’re the people who can step back and see when the paradigm is going to shift, and I think that comes from having a broader experience, a little bit of a different approach to how you think about things.

What’s a paradigm shift in finance?

Well, a paradigm shift in finance is maybe what we’ve gone through in the sub-prime market and the spillover that’s had in a lot of other markets where there were really basic assumptions that people made that, you know what?, they were wrong.

The thing is that nobody has enough brain power to question every assumption, to think about every single facet of an investment. There are certain things you need to take for granted. And people would take for granted the idea that, “OK, something that Moody’s rates triple-A must be money-good, so I’m going to worry about the other things I’m investing in, but when it comes time to say, ‘Where am I going to put my cash?,’ I’ll just leave it in triple-A commercial paper, I don’t have time to think about everything.” It could be the case that, yeah, the power’s going to fail in my office, and maybe the water supply is going to fail, and I should plan for that, but you only have so much brain power, so you think about what you think are the relevant factors, the factors that are likely to change. But often some of those assumptions that you make are wrong.

He has a few things to say about statistical arbitrage:

People actually call it “black box trading,” because sometimes you don’t even know why the black box is doing what it’s doing, because the whole idea is that if you could, you should be doing it yourself. But it’s something that’s done on such a big scale, a universe of several thousand stocks, that a human brain can’t do it in real time. The problem is that the DNA of a lot of these models is very, very similar, it’s like an ecosystem with no biodiversity because most of the people who do stat-arb can trace their lineage, their intellectual lineage, back to four or five guys who really started the whole black box trading discipline in the ’70s and ’80s. And what happened is, in August, a few of these funds that have big black box trading books suffered losses in other businesses and they decided to reduce risk, so they basically dialed down the black box system. So the black box system started unwinding its positions, and every black box is so similar that everybody was kind of long the same stocks and short the same stocks. So when one fund starts selling off its longs and buying back its shorts, that causes losses for the next black box and the people who run that black box say, “Oh gosh! I’m losing a lot more money than I thought I could. My risk model is no longer relevant; let me turn down my black box.” And basically what you had was an avalanche where everybody’s black box is being shut off, causing incredibly bizarre behavior in the market.

He also explains how CDOs work:

They buy mortgages, and then they package them and they tranche the pools of mortgages up into various tranches from senior to equity. So, basically you have a number of tranches of paper that get issued that are backed by the mortgage pools and there’s a cash flow waterfall, the cash comes in from those mortgages, a certain tranche has the first priority. And then you have descending order of priority, and the hedge fund would usually keep the last piece, which is known as the equity, or the residual, as opposed to the stuff that was triple-A, that’s the most senior paper. So if you had a pool of half a billion dollars of mortgages, maybe there would be 300 million dollars of triple A paper you would sell to fund that, and then there would be smaller tranches of more junior paper. And the buyers of that paper, particularly the very senior paper, the triple-A paper, were not experts, they’re not mortgage experts, they say, “It’s triple-A? I’ll buy it.” This is money market funds, accounts that are not set up to do hardcore analysis, they tend to just rely on the rating agencies. And again the spread that they’re getting paid is very small, so they don’t really have a lot of spread to play with to hire a lot of analysts to go and dig in the mortgage pools and really understand them, they kind of rely on the rating agencies, and that’s their downfall. It’s kind of an interesting interaction in the sense that a lot of this mortgage project was almost created by the bid for the CDO paper rather than the reverse. I mean, the traditional way to think about financing is “OK, I find an investment opportunity, that on its face, I think, is a good opportunity. I want to deploy capital on that opportunity. Now I go look for funding. So I think that making mortgage loans is a good investment, so I will make mortgage loans. Then I will seek to fund those, to fund that activity, by perhaps issuing CDO paper, issuing the triple-A, double-A, A, and down the chain.” But what happened is, you had the creation of so many vehicles designed to buy that paper, the triple-A, the double-A, all the CDO paper… that the dynamic flipped around. It was almost as if the demand for that paper created the mortgages.
[...]
What tends to happen in financial markets, is bad things happen when you really divorce the people who take the risk from the people who understand the risk. What happened is that that distance in the sub-prime market just increased and increased and increased. I mean, it started out that you had mortgage companies that would keep some of the stuff on their own books. Sub-prime lenders, it wasn’t a big business, it was a small business, and it was specialty lenders, and they made risky loans, and they would keep a lot of it on their books.

But then these guys were like, “Well, you know, there are hedge fund buyers for pools that we put together,” and then the hedge fund buyers say, “You know what? We need to fund, we need to leverage this, so how can we leverage this? Oh, I have an idea, let’s create a CDO and issue paper against it to fund ourselves,” and then you get buyers of that paper. The buyers of that paper, they’re more ratings-sensitive than fundamentals-sensitive, so they’re quite divorced from the details. Then it got even more extended in the sense that vehicles were set up that had a mandate to kind of robotically buy that paper and fund themselves through issuing paper in the market.

Clogged Plumbing Theory

September 23rd, 2008

The Paulson plan, Arnold Kling notes, is based on the clogged plumbing theory:

The mortgage assets are stopping up the plumbing of the financial system, so the government has to buy up those assets to unclog the system.

Why worry about the clog in the first place? Because banks have some of these securities, they are marking these securities to market value, which means marking them way down. As a result, their balance sheets show a shortage of capital. To come back into compliance with regulations, they either have to sell new shares of stock (good luck with that) or curb lending. As they curb lending, the economy suffers.

That is why some people say that the solution is to get rid of mark-to-market accounting. Let the banks estimate the “intrinsic” values of their mortgage securities. These values are higher than market values, so that using this alternative accounting the banks’ balance sheets won’t looks so bad. That way, they can keep lending. My problem with that is that phony accounting has a history of keeping failed institutions in business, raising the cost of the subsequent cleanup.

My alternative is to encourage new lending by lowering capital requirements at the margin. Tell banks that loans issued after September 1, 2008, require half the capital of similar loans issued before September 1. Some banks are in such bad shape that even with those lower capital standards they will not be able to make new loans. Fine. You don’t want those banks to grow. But other banks have room to grow, and you want them to grow more than they would under the existing regulations.

Henry Paulson is not the first strong Treasury Secretary to appear in a crisis

September 23rd, 2008

Henry Paulson is not the first strong Treasury Secretary to appear in a crisis, Arnold Kling notes:

John Connally held that job in the Nixon Administration, In response to a run on the dollar, he abandoned the Bretton Woods agreement and introduced wage and price controls. In the short term, this was well received, and it allowed the economy to rebound in time for Nixon’s re-election. In the long run, it was a disaster, ultimately unleashing virulent inflation and, as oil prices rose, leading to the painful disorder of rationing and lines at gasoline stations.

Connally’s cure was worse than the disease. I strongly suspect that Paulson’s cure will prove similarly harmful.

Look Who’s Irrational Now

September 23rd, 2008

Look Who's Irrational Now:

“What Americans Really Believe,” a comprehensive new study released by Baylor University yesterday, shows that traditional Christian religion greatly decreases belief in everything from the efficacy of palm readers to the usefulness of astrology. It also shows that the irreligious and the members of more liberal Protestant denominations, far from being resistant to superstition, tend to be much more likely to believe in the paranormal and in pseudoscience than evangelical Christians.

The Gallup Organization, under contract to Baylor’s Institute for Studies of Religion, asked American adults a series of questions to gauge credulity. Do dreams foretell the future? Did ancient advanced civilizations such as Atlantis exist? Can places be haunted? Is it possible to communicate with the dead? Will creatures like Bigfoot and the Loch Ness Monster someday be discovered by science?

The answers were added up to create an index of belief in occult and the paranormal. While 31% of people who never worship expressed strong belief in these things, only 8% of people who attend a house of worship more than once a week did.

Even among Christians, there were disparities. While 36% of those belonging to the United Church of Christ, Sen. Barack Obama’s former denomination, expressed strong beliefs in the paranormal, only 14% of those belonging to the Assemblies of God, Sarah Palin’s former denomination, did. In fact, the more traditional and evangelical the respondent, the less likely he was to believe in, for instance, the possibility of communicating with people who are dead.

This is not a new finding. In his 1983 book “The Whys of a Philosophical Scrivener,” skeptic and science writer Martin Gardner cited the decline of traditional religious belief among the better educated as one of the causes for an increase in pseudoscience, cults and superstition. He referenced a 1980 study published in the magazine Skeptical Inquirer that showed irreligious college students to be by far the most likely to embrace paranormal beliefs, while born-again Christian college students were the least likely.

Surprisingly, while increased church attendance and membership in a conservative denomination has a powerful negative effect on paranormal beliefs, higher education doesn’t. Two years ago two professors published another study in Skeptical Inquirer showing that, while less than one-quarter of college freshmen surveyed expressed a general belief in such superstitions as ghosts, psychic healing, haunted houses, demonic possession, clairvoyance and witches, the figure jumped to 31% of college seniors and 34% of graduate students.

We can’t even count on self-described atheists to be strict rationalists. According to the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life’s monumental “U.S. Religious Landscape Survey” that was issued in June, 21% of self-proclaimed atheists believe in either a personal God or an impersonal force. Ten percent of atheists pray at least weekly and 12% believe in heaven.

Crows make monkeys out of chimps in mental test

September 23rd, 2008

Crows make monkeys out of chimps in mental test:

Crows seem to be able to use causal reasoning to solve a problem, a feat previously undocumented in any other non-human animal, including chimps.

Alex Taylor at the University of Auckland, New Zealand, and his team presented six New Caledonian crows with a series of “trap-tube” tests.

A choice morsel of food was placed in a horizontal Perspex tube, which also featured two round holes in the underside, with Perspex traps below.

For most of the tests, one of the holes was sealed, so the food could be dragged across it with a stick and out of the tube to be eaten. The other hole was left open, trapping the food if the crows moved it the wrong way.

Three of the crows solved the task consistently, even after the team modified the appearance of the equipment. This suggested that these crows weren’t using arbitrary features — such as the colour of the rim of a hole — to guide their behaviour. Instead they seemed to understand that if they dragged food across a hole, they would lose it.

To investigate further, the team presented the crows with a wooden table, divided into two compartments. A treat was at the end of each compartment, but in one, it was positioned behind a rectangular trap hole. To get the snack, the crow had to consistently choose to retrieve food from the compartment without the hole.

A recent study of great apes found they could not transfer success at the trap-tube to success at the trap-table. The three crows could, however.

“They seem to have some kind of concept of a hole that isn’t tied to purely visual features, and they can use this concept to figure out the novel problem,” Taylor says. “This is the most conclusive evidence to date for causal reasoning in an animal.”

Cesarean section linked to allergy in children

September 23rd, 2008

Cesarean section linked to allergy in children:

The study involved 432 children who were followed from birth to 9 years of age. One or both parents had a history of allergies or asthma. Physician-diagnosed asthma and allergic rhinitis in the children was assessed using caregiver interviews conducted at least twice a year. Allergy skin testing was performed in 271 children at an average age of 7.4 years.

Children born by cesarean section were 2.1-times more likely to develop atopy than their peers born by vaginal delivery, the report indicates.

Similarly, the authors found that cesarean section increased the risk of allergic rhinitis 1.8-fold. As noted, however, cesarean section did not increase the risk of asthma or wheeze.

Allergic rhinitis, sometimes called “hay fever,” refers to a group of symptoms that mimic a common cold such as nasal congestion, sneezing, itching and tearing eyes. Atopy is the innate tendency to develop the classic allergic diseases, such as allergic rhinitis and asthma. It involves the overstimulation of the immune system in response to common environmental proteins such as house dust mite, grass pollen, and food allergens.

A clean-slate accounting of the dollar

September 23rd, 2008

Mencius Moldbug attempts to offer up a clean-slate accounting of the dollar “with no assumptions about economics, finance, or accounting”:

Think of it as rather like analyzing a Soviet nickel company in 1991. Does the company even exist? Does it even produce nickel? Does it own any mineral rights of any sort? If we buy it, do we really own it? Etc.

He shares a short history of money:

Perhaps you think of the dollar as “money” or “currency,” and you are very confused by all this. “Money” and “currency” are nice words, but they have no precise accounting definition. They just refer to a good or security commonly held for the purpose of savings and/or exchange. Historically, we can identify four classes of currency:

(1) Direct goods, such as coins of a standardized weight of precious metal.
(2) Titles or warehouse receipts to (1).
(3) Obligations to pay (1) or (2), or redeemable currency.
(4) Mere equity, or fiat currency.

These are (excluding the common 4-to-1 transition) in order of historical evolution. Explaining the evolution is not of direct assistance in analyzing the dollar, but it helps us get our bearings — and it defines terms which will be useful later on.

Class 1 currency (standardized metal) evolves into class 2 currency (titles) because titles are more portable, secure and convenient. Digital gold is a modern class 2 currency.

Class 2 currency (titles) evolves into class 3 currency (redeemable notes), because the change is generally profitable for the currency issuer, and the marks are too dumb to know the difference. A title or warehouse receipt is a title because the issuer holds goods that match it; otherwise, he is a thief. A redeemable note is a mere debt, and does not default until redemption fails. And even then, the issuer is only bankrupt, not in jail.

Suppose I have 100 ounces of gold, and issue 100 titles against it, each title stating that the bearer owns one ounce of gold. This makes me a respectable issuer of class 2 currency.

Suppose I have 100 ounces of gold, and issue 200 redeemable notes against it, each note stating that I will issue the bearer one ounce of gold on demand. This makes me a scoundrel.

However, it also makes me wealthier than I was before, at least until more than 100 bearers show up to claim their gold at the same time. Will my notes trade at par? Ie: will people accept them as equivalent to the class 2 titles? Well, every time someone starts to get suspicious and tries to redeem one, it works. So I don’t see why they shouldn’t. We have just reinvented the wildcat bank — a staple of early American finance.

There is a cure for wildcat banking: those who accept class 3 notes should ensure that the issuer is solvent. A financial institution is solvent if and only if the sum of all the payments it is obligated to make equals or exceeds the total price of all the assets it holds. So our Scoundrel Bank above is not solvent, because it is obligated to pay 200 ounces and it only has 100 ounces.

One way to see a redeemable note is to see it as a very short-term loan from the noteholder to the bank, which is automatically renewed or “rolled over” when the noteholder does not redeem. If the term of the loan is an hour, a minute or even a second, the effect is redeemability. And note that when making a loan, what you want to know is whether the loan will be paid back. And collectively, what all loanholders want to know is that they all can be paid back. First come, first served, is not solvency.

Scoundrel Bank can redeem for some of its noteholders. But not all of them. Therefore, all unfortunate holders of its notes can agree on a fair — or “equitable” — bankruptcy restructuring: every holder of a Scoundrel ounce note should receive half an ounce of gold. As for the scoundrel himself, trees abound, and perhaps the noteholders can pitch in for a rope.

But there is a tricky intermediate case — call it Questionable Bank — between Respectable Warehouse and Scoundrel Bank. Respectable Warehouse issued 100 one-ounce titles. It has 100 ounces. Verifying the quality of the titles is as easy as verifying these facts. Scoundrel Bank issued 200 one-ounce notes. It does not have 200 ounces. Verifying its insolvency is just as easy.

Questionable Bank also issued 200 ounce notes. It also has only 100 ounces. But it also has 100 old pianos. Each piano, it asserts, is worth an ounce of gold. “Easily. Easily. No sweat, man. These are fine pianos. Here, play this one. Hear that sound? That’s a sweet tone. Check out the action on the keys. Totally smooth. You could move this piano for an ounce fifty, no problem.”)

Suddenly our noteholder, or at least the accountant he hires, is required to be a piano appraiser. Should you trade a Respectable title to one ounce, for a Questionable note paying one ounce? It depends on the quality of the pianos. Obviously, every piano is different. You can’t just play the one up front in Questionable’s office. You need to go into the back room and tinkle away.

Moreover, even if each piano could be sold on the piano market for an ounce or more, it is hard to know that all the pianos could be sold at once. Since price is set by supply and demand, the appearance of a large splodge of pianos, even fine pianos, on the market all at once, is liable to depress the piano price. And “at once,” let’s not forget, is the term of the Questionable notes.

In real life, of course, the good in question is typically not pianos but loans. Usually long-term loans. Pricing a piano is difficult, but it is nothing on pricing a loan. And the result of dropping a glut of loans on the market all at once is even more astonishing and disastrous.

The Fourth Quadrant

September 22nd, 2008

Nassim Nicholas Taleb (The Black Swan, Fooled by Randomness) maps decisions onto four quadrants — much like any MBA, really. In his case, the two criteria are whether the decision itself is simple (binary) or complex, and whether the probability distribution is known and thin-tailed (Mediocristan) or unknown and/or fat-tailed (Extremistan).

The Fourth Quadrant, naturally, is where all hell breaks loose:

In response, Taleb has developed a list of Phronetic RulesWhat Is Wise To Do (Or Not Do) In The Fourth Quadrant:

1) Avoid Optimization, Learn to Love Redundancy. Psychologists tell us that getting rich does not bring happiness — if you spend it. But if you hide it under the mattress, you are less vulnerable to a black swan. Only fools (such as Banks) optimize, not realizing that a simple model error can blow through their capital (as it just did). In one day in August 2007, Goldman Sachs experienced 24 x the average daily transaction volume — would 29 times have blown up the system? The only weak point I know of financial markets is their ability to drive people & companies to “efficiency” (to please a stock analyst’s earnings target) against risks of extreme events.

Indeed some systems tend to optimize — therefore become more fragile. Electricity grids for example optimize to the point of not coping with unexpected surges — Albert-Lazlo Barabasi warned us of the possibility of a NYC blackout like the one we had in August 2003. Quite prophetic, the fellow. Yet energy supply kept getting more and more efficient since. Commodity prices can double on a short burst in demand (oil, copper, wheat) — we no longer have any slack. Almost everyone who talks about “flat earth” does not realize that it is overoptimized to the point of maximal vulnerability.

Biological systems — those that survived millions of years — include huge redundancies. Just consider why we like sexual encounters (so redundant to do it so often!). Historically populations tended to produced around 4-12 children to get to the historical average of ~2 survivors to adulthood.

Option-theoretic analysis: redundancy is like long an option. You certainly pay for it, but it may be necessary for survival.

2) Avoid prediction of remote payoffs — though not necessarily ordinary ones. Payoffs from remote parts of the distribution are more difficult to predict than closer parts.

A general principle is that, while in the first three quadrants you can use the best model you can find, this is dangerous in the fourth quadrant: no model should be better than just any model.

3) Beware the “atypicality” of remote events. There is a sucker’s method called “scenario analysis” and “stress testing” — usually based on the past (or some “make sense” theory). Yet I show in the appendix how past shortfalls that do not predict subsequent shortfalls. Likewise, “prediction markets” are for fools. They might work for a binary election, but not in the Fourth Quadrant. Recall the very definition of events is complicated: success might mean one million in the bank …or five billions!

4) Time. It takes much, much longer for a times series in the Fourth Quadrant to reveal its property. At the worst, we don’t know how long. Yet compensation for bank executives is done on a short term window, causing a mismatch between observation window and necessary window. They get rich in spite of negative returns. But we can have a pretty clear idea if the “Black Swan” can hit on the left (losses) or on the right (profits).

The point can be used in climatic analysis. Things that have worked for a long time are preferable — they are more likely to have reached their ergodic states.

5) Beware Moral Hazard. Is optimal to make series of bonuses betting on hidden risks in the Fourth Quadrant, then blow up and write a thank you letter. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Chairmen will in all likelihood keep their previous bonuses (as in all previous cases) and even get close to 15 million of severance pay each.

6) Metrics. Conventional metrics based on type 1 randomness don’t work. Words like “standard deviation” are not stable and does not measure anything in the Fourth Quadrant. So does “linear regression” (the errors are in the fourth quadrant), “Sharpe ratio”, Markowitz optimal portfolio, ANOVA shmnamova, Least square, etc. Literally anything mechanistically pulled out of a statistical textbook.

My problem is that people can both accept the role of rare events, agree with me, and still use these metrics, which is leading me to test if this is a psychological disorder.

The technical appendix shows why these metrics fail: they are based on “variance”/”standard deviation” and terms invented years ago when we had no computers. One way I can prove that anything linked to standard deviation is a facade of knowledge: There is a measure called Kurtosis that indicates departure from “Normality”. It is very, very unstable and marred with huge sampling error: 70-90% of the Kurtosis in Oil, SP500, Silver, UK interest rates, Nikkei, US deposit rates, sugar, and the dollar/yet currency rate come from 1 day in the past 40 years, reminiscent of figure 3. This means that no sample will ever deliver the true variance. It also tells us anyone using “variance” or “standard deviation” (or worse making models that make us take decisions based on it) in the fourth quadrant is incompetent.

7) Where is the skewness? Clearly the Fourth Quadrant can present left or right skewness. If we suspect right-skewness, the true mean is more likely to be underestimated by measurement of past realizations, and the total potential is likewise poorly gauged. A biotech company (usually) faces positive uncertainty, a bank faces almost exclusively negative shocks. I call that in my new project “concave” or “convex” to model error.

8) Do not confuse absence of volatility with absence of risks. Recall how conventional metrics of using volatility as an indicator of stability has fooled Bernanke — as well as the banking system.

9) Beware presentations of risk numbers. Not only we have mathematical problems, but risk perception is subjected to framing issues that are acute in the Fourth Quadrant. Dan Goldstein and I are running a program of experiments in the psychology of uncertainty and finding that the perception of rare events is subjected to severe framing distortions: people are aggressive with risks that hit them “once every thirty years” but not if they are told that the risk happens with a “3% a year” occurrence. Furthermore it appears that risk representations are not neutral: they cause risk taking even when they are known to be unreliable.

I didn’t realize he also has a seminar DVD out, Nassim Nicholas Taleb: The Future Has Always Been Crazier Than We Thought.

Jonathan Haidt on the moral roots of liberals and conservatives

September 22nd, 2008

I recently cited Jonathan Haidt’s piece on the differences between liberals and conservatives. I also recommend watching his TED Talk:

Haidt focuses on his various facets of “moral” psychology, when a big part of the difference, especially between libertarian conservatives and progressive liberals, comes from seeing fairness in equity versus equality.

Intel’s secret weapon: Fresh air

September 22nd, 2008

I wouldn’t call it Intel's secret weapon, since they’re publicizing it, but fresh air seems to work just fine for cooling servers — something I’ve wondered about for a long time:

Fresh air could save millions in datacenter cooling costs, Intel has claimed, after a successful experiment in the New Mexico desert.

Replacing air conditioning by piping in outside air saved power costs with no appreciable increase in server failure rates, the company concluded in a research paper. Despite a lot of dust and major temperature changes–both long considered undesirable in datacenters–the equipment wasn’t affected, said Intel.

“Servers… were subjected to considerable variation in temperature and humidity, as well as poor air quality; however, there was no significant increase in server failures,” said the paper. “If subsequent investigation confirms these promising results, we anticipate using this approach in future, high-density datacenters.”

Intel estimated an annual cost reduction of approximately $143,000 (£79,000) for a small, 500kW datacenter, based on electricity costs of eight cents per kWh. In a larger 10MW datacenter, the estimated annual cost reduction was $2.87 million.

Intel used a normal air filter that took larger particles out of the air but not fine dust. While the 32 servers and racks became coated in dust, and humidity was monitored but not controlled, the failure rate was 4.46 percent, compared with a 3.83 percent failure rate in Intel’s main datacenter over the same period.

The experiment was run for 10 months, between October 2007 and August 2008. Server units with over 900 blades, used for production design, were split into two compartments. One of the compartments was air cooled, with temperatures ranging from 18 to 32°C. The other compartment was cooled using air conditioning, and used as a control.

Frankly, I think more homes could use fresh air for cooling.

College Panel Calls for Less Focus on SATs

September 22nd, 2008

Unsurprisingly, a college panel calls for less focus on SATs — and more focus on, well, I think you can guess:

Mr. Fitzsimmons’s group, which was convened by the National Association for College Admission Counseling, also expresses concerns “that test scores appear to calcify differences based on class, race/ethnicity and parental educational attainment.” The report calls on admissions officials to be aware of such differences and to ensure that differences not related to a student’s ability to succeed academically be “mitigated in the admission process.”

“Society likes to think that the SAT measures people’s ability or merit,” Mr. Fitzsimmons said. “But no one in college admissions who visits the range of secondary schools we visit, and goes to the communities we visit — where you see the contrast between opportunities and fancy suburbs and some of the high schools that aren’t so fancy — can come away thinking that standardized tests can be a measure of someone’s true worth or ability.”

What’s amusing is that they attack the SAT, because students spend so much time “gaming” it, and recommend using the so-called achievement tests, which aren’t gamed as much, as a substitute — ignoring the fact that any alternative will start getting gamed as soon as it replaces the SAT.