The powerful resistance to killing fellow human beings, David Grossman (On Killing) argues, can be overcome through the demands of authority:
The mass needs, and we give it, leaders who have the firmness and decision of command proceeding from habit and an entire faith in their unquestionable right to command as established by tradition, law and society.
— Ardant du PicqIn Milgram’s study the demands of authority were represented by an individual with a clipboard and a white lab coat. This authority figure stood immediately behind the individual inflicting shocks and directed that he increase the voltage each time the victim answered a series of (fake) questions incorrectly. When the authority figure was not personally present but called over a phone, the number of subjects who were willing to inflict the maximum shock dropped sharply. This process can be generalized to combat circumstances and operationalized into the following sub-factors:
Proximity of the authority figure to the subject. Marshall noted many specific World War II incidents in which almost all soldiers would fire their weapons while their leaders observed and encouraged them in a combat situation; when the leaders left, however, the firing rate immediately dropped to 15 to 20 percent.
Killer’s subjective respect for authority figure. To be truly effective, soldiers must bond to their leader just as they must bond to their group. Compared to an established and respected leader, an unknown or discredited leader has much less chance of gaining compliance from soldiers in combat.
Intensity of the authority figure’s demands for killing behavior. The leader’s mere presence is not always sufficient to ensure killing activity. The leader must also communicate a clear expectancy of killing behavior.
Legitimacy of the authority figure’s authority and demands. Leaders with legitimate, societally sanctioned authority have greater influence on their soldiers; and legitimate, lawful demands are more likely to be obeyed than illegal or unanticipated demands. Gang leaders and mercenary commanders have to work carefully around their shortcomings in this area, but military officers (with their trappings of power and the legitimate authority of their nation behind them) have tremendous potential to cause their soldiers to overcome individual resistance and reluctance in combat.
Either Grossman is in the news lately or you’ve got a secret reader.
He doesn’t provide links to the criticisms, but the key ones seem to be:
The Secret Of The Soldiers Who Didn’t Shoot
Why Does the NYT Continue to Cite Historian S.L.A. Marshall After the Paper Discredited Him in a Front-Page Story Years Ago?
My comment at his site awaits moderation:
Greg Cochran of course bristles at such silliness and asks, Who came to similar conclusions, from careful observations? I reply:
Where do those machete-wielding African soldiers going from village to village, door to door fit into all this? They seem to have the time of their life and only miss targets due to a lack of training, not some moral reluctance, same as in the Middle East, they can’t wait to tear shit up.
Grossman makes it quite clear that soldiers — especially cavalry — will happily cut down fleeing enemies. What’s rare is true hand-to-hand combat.
I would highly recommend (if you can find a copy) J. Glenn Gray’s The Warriors. This used to be a highly influential book concerning killing and war and the soldiers that did it. I found this most interesting, and it holds up over time.
Yeah, I was a big fan of Marshall in the late 1980s, and I was upset enough about this string of posts and the comments to do a little digging, but, yeah, it’s undeniable that (a) he faked the ratio of fire, (b) IMO, staked his entire credibility on ratio of fire by swearing up and down that it had been part of his wartime historical surveys, (c) never admitted to the fraud over the remaining 30 years of his life, and (d) everything else he wrote is supported only by his credibility as an author, i.e. none once you know the full story about the ratio of fire. As a former fan, I am completely disappointed.
Definitely not somebody you should be abstracting and reinterpreting as the main source of a new controversial theory.
J. Glenn Gray’s The Warriors isn’t a bad book, but Paul Fussell’s comments in Thank God for the Atom Bomb should be read with it.