The Russian army has the combat power to capture the objectives envisioned in a fait accompli scenario, Alex Vershinin notes — in November 2021 — but it does not have the logistic forces to do it in a single push without a logistical pause to reset its sustainment infrastructure:
NATO planners should develop plans focusing on exploiting Russian logistic challenges rather than trying to address the disparity in combat power. This involves drawing the Russian army deep into NATO territory and stretching Russian supply lines to the maximum while targeting logistics and transportation infrastructure such as trucks, railroad bridges, and pipelines. Committing to a decisive battle at the frontier would play directly into Russian hands, allowing a shorter supply to compensate for their logistic shortfalls.
This sounds a lot like the proper strategy for the Soviet Union to use against Nazi Germany in the 1940s.
Russian army logistics forces are not designed for a large-scale ground offensive far from their railroads:
Inside maneuver units, Russian sustainment units are a size lower than their Western counterparts. Only brigades have an equivalent logistics capability, but it’s not an exact comparison. Russian formations have only three-quarters the number of combat vehicles as their U.S. counterparts but almost three times as much artillery. On paper (not all brigades have a full number of battalions), Russian brigades have two artillery battalions, a rocket battalion, and two air defense battalions per brigade as opposed to one artillery battalion and an attached air defense company per U.S. brigade. As a result of extra artillery and air defense battalions, the Russian logistics requirements are much larger than their U.S. counterparts.
[…]
The reason Russia is unique in having railroad brigades is that logistically, Russian forces are tied to railroad from factory to army depot and to combined arms army and, where possible, to the division/brigade level. No other European nation uses railroads to the extent that the Russian army does. Part of the reason is that Russia is so vast — over 6,000 miles from one end to the other. The rub is that Russian railroads are a wider gauge than the rest of Europe. Only former Soviet nations and Finland still use the Russian standard — this includes the Baltic states.
[…]
If an army has just enough trucks to sustain itself at a 45-mile distance, then at 90 miles, the throughput will be 33 percent lower. At 180 miles, it will be down by 66 percent. The further you push from supply dumps, the fewer supplies you can replace in a single day.
The Russian army does not have enough trucks to meet its logistic requirement more than 90 miles beyond supply dumps. To reach a 180-mile range, the Russian army would have to double truck allocation to 400 trucks for each of the material-technical support brigades.
[…]
Historically, urban combat consumes massive amounts of ammunition and takes months to conclude. During the two most prominent examples, the battles of Grozny in the Chechen wars and the Battle of Mosul in 2016, defenders tied down four to 10 times their numbers for up to four months. At Grozny, Russians were firing up to 4,000 shells a day — that’s 50 trucks a day.
[…]
The logistics are also useful to assess a Ukrainian conflict as Russian forces are again massing on the border. The best means of interpreting the seriousness of Russian intentions is to track the buildup of logistic forces and supply dumps rather than count battalion tactical groups that have moved to the border. The size and scale of logistic preparation tell us exactly how far and deep is Russian army planning to go.
This doesn’t add up. There are railroads in Ukraine, a former Soviet Republic. Presumably the same gauge.
Yes, tracks can be sabotaged. They can also be repaired.
I’ve read that article already and find it a bit flippant.
Here’s a more in-depth look at the Russian military. I wouldn’t doubt their force projections or logistical sustainment within Russia or its near abroad. For that matter, Syria seems to indicate force projection, while not as [creakily] robust as the Naval Power America, this argument is overrated.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/portals/7/hot%20spots/documents/russia/2017-07-the-russian-way-of-war-grau-bartles.pdf
Oh, and bombing railways in Russia is a bad idea.
BY the way, can we have a look at NATO’s logistics for this thought experiment?
Finally, if you think on land the American army isn’t also to a great extent “railbound” you are incorrect, as is the logistics to Naval Ports in America.