The militant drone threat is no longer new, so why does it still feel novel?
In a now ubiquitous quote, as he spoke of the challenges faced by US and coalition forces in 2016, Gen. Raymond A. Thomas, commander of US Special Operations Command, stated that the “most daunting problem was an adaptive enemy who, for a time, enjoyed tactical superiority in the airspace under our conventional air superiority in the form of commercially available drones and [field]-expedient weapons systems.” In 2021, the military’s assessment carried the same tone. Just last year, US Gen. Kenneth McKenzie referred to the proliferation of small drones as the “most concerning tactical development” within US Central Command’s area of responsibility.
At this point, the militant drone threat is not “new” so much as it is persistent. Yet the threat still feels novel. This dissonance is partly due to the slow rate of progress made toward developing an effective and sustainable counterdrone infrastructure. Put another way, the threat feels new because it is unresolved.
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Most of the deployed counterdrone systems are based on air defense systems, which are designed to identify and shoot down large and fast-moving objects. Drones, especially makeshift or COTS drones, are typically small, slow, low flying, and able to sustain erratic flight patterns—a tactical mismatch. Given the number of specialized tasks required of the kill chain, the variety of drone types faced by US military forces, and the likelihood of continued innovation by militant actors, a single-system solution is unlikely to be effective and sustainable in the short and intermediate term.
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In a now-infamous case, in 2017, an unidentified ally of the United States shot down a small quadcopter drone with a $3.4 million Patriot missile. That cost-benefit ratio is unique but illustrates an important point. To be viable and sustainable, a counterdrone approach must be cost effective, rather than exacerbate the asymmetric nature of state-militant conflict.
According to a recent report, among counterdrone products for which pricing information is available, over 60 percent cost more than $100,000. That’s troubling. Most COTS drone systems cost well under $1,000.
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Most innovations will be small in scale, but carry potential for outsized tactical and strategic effects. For instance, in campaigns in Iraq and Syria, Islamic State fighters reportedly wrapped tape around parts of their drones to avoid detection by masking the radar signature. If kinetic, weapons-based options are used to intercept drones, then militants may switch to using them in more populous areas to discourage government forces from harming civilian bystanders. Radio frequency and radar systems are best at detecting incoming drones when they have a clear line of sight, and the physical complexity of urban spaces offers militants a means of avoiding detection. The possibilities for innovation and avoidance are sufficiently large that it will be wise to avoid placing all eggs in a single basket.
There’s no shortage of inexpensive counter drone weapons we’ve been testing them since 2014. We don’t field them because no body who matters like Raytheon makes them and they haven’t kicked our ass yet.
https://www.droneshield.com/dronegun-tactical
https://www.d-fendsolutions.com/
It’s a long list, but not fielded. No money for Austin and the Big Boys.
Mind you the exercises are not encouraging.
Here’s the 25th not doing very well at all against drones, they figured out the best thing they could do was use artillery and air strikes against the ground stations.
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2021/Scott-Counter-UAS/
A simple extension of existing architectures would be smoothbore automatic cannons; birdshot for flocks of little drones, and tube fired guided munitions for big, fast, and or long distance targets.
Another area where existing architectures can be extended to other use-cases is high energy radio frequency ISR equipment. Radars used for early warning, for example, tend to be designed to both radiate a great deal of power, and operate at lower frequencies in the decimetric regime, which is on the upper end of the atmospheric radio window – qualities which are also useful for a all-weather energy weapon to fry enemy equipment (like swarms of drones or guided sub-munitions).
The third obvious step is, of course, drones desired for knocking out other drones.
Pseudo-Chrysostom,
VXXC has innovation, tells COL “and it doesn’t cost any money, we have enough equipment.”
COL [angry that I wasted his time] “If it doesn’t make any money no General Officer will talk to you.”
COL “Write a book and hope a General reads it.”
I won’t be writing a book.
But yes Pseudo-Chrysostom those are all good ideas. Now monetize them and sell them to a General so he can get an RFC issued to Raytheon…
And BTW General my @ss. It’s the DOD civilians in the Pentagon aka the SES [like Fauci] who decide. Our Generals are really glorified Doormen.