Foseti reviews France: The Tragic Years by Sisley Huddleston:
Diplomats — including Huddleston — knew that the Soviets were negotiating a peace pact with the Germans as early as 1939. As one Russian diplomat said, “The USSR was born out of the first war, and a second would end in the Soveitization of Europe.” If Germany went to war with Britain and France, all potential outcomes were good for the Soviets.
Anyway, interesting diplomatic factoids aside, our story really starts at Dunkirk. Dunkirk is usually considered a miracle for the British. Huddleston’s take is quite different.
At Dunkirk, the French and the Belgians basically fell on their collective swords so that England could live to fight another day. To eliminate any additional miraculousness, Huddleston also notes that Germany chose to let the Brits escape, in hopes that they would make peace.
France thus plays a sacrificial role, which too few in England (and France) seemed to understand or appreciate. From this point on, the general outline of Huddleston’s tale emerges. The most noble people are those that stay with their country through the terrible conditions that followed. More precisely, the most noble actors are those who stuck with their country, acted to minimize the suffering of their countrymen while walking the fine line between not provoking the Germans into totally destroying France and yet not actively assisting the Germans.
These people were later condemned as collaborators by others that fled their countries for more comfortable conditions.
Leopold III, who chose to stay in Belgium, is an example of the more noble sort. But, Huddleston’s favorite is Petain, who chose to stay in, and lead — what was left of — France. The politicians, whose silly choices had led to this point, fled to live in the relative comfort of unoccupied countries. From afar, the politicians could take pot shots at their countrymen.
It’s worth pausing to think briefly about the armistice terms between Germany and France. The French-German armistice terms were harsh, but were far more lenient than unconditional surrender. The Germans praised the valor and courage of the French. The French were allowed to keep a government (headed by Petain) in the south (Vichy), and were allowed to keep their ships and their colonies. The French knew that they had to defend North Africa if they didn’t want the Germans to impose new terms.
Petain’s strategy is perhaps best summarized by the following quote, “If our allies come with two or three divisions, I will fire on them; if they come with twenty I will receive them with open arms.” This is the fine line that Petain walked during the remainder of the German occupation. He also walked this line to ensure that French citizens who remained in France were as comfortable as possible. For his efforts, he died in jail after De Gaulle returned from England. Such are often the costs of doing the right thing.
Much of the book then details Petain’s efforts to avoid helping the Germans while also retaining the ability to fight the Germans when the time came. For example, Petain could — at any time — have obtained more generous terms for the French people by handing over the French fleet to the Germans. He never did so.
Despite the fact that (via diplomatic channels) the Allies knew of Petain’s intentions, the Allies repeatedly antagonized the French. For example, see here.
More broadly, Petain’s goal was to get the Germans to trust the French enough to turn as much of their arms against Russia as possible. (As we’ll see in a moment, much of the hatred against “collaborators” was led by the Communists — though, perhaps this is only a coincidence).
Huddleston believed that Russia goaded Hitler into declaring war, as the war in the west slowed. Huddleston also believed that as soon as Germany and Russia started fighting, Churchill should have withdrawn so that Germany and Russia could concentrate on destroying each other. Petain may have been a collaborator, but Petain’s aims — if Huddleston is right about them — appear to have been much sounder than Churchill’s or Roosevelt’s.
I’ve covered this view of the end of WWII before, but Huddleston provides additional evidence that Russia won WWII and that American and British policy was incredibly inept at the end of the war. Fighting Japan (to the point of total ruin) removed the last barrier to Bolshevism in the East. And, as Huddleston puts it, “The world was made safe for Bolshevism at Teheran.”