Printed after V-E Day, but before V-J Day, Combat Lessons, No. 9 explains some hard-won lessons on tank-infantry teamwork:
Says the Battalion Commander of the 175th Infantry: “To make him realize the limited vision and field of fire and the closed-off feeling of the tankers, every infantryman should be given a ride in a buttoned-up tank. One such ride does a lot to counteract the infantryman’s dread of a tank attack and to increase his faith in his own ability to resist tanks.”
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From a 36th Infantry Division training memorandum: “When infantry and tanks are used together, the tanks’ primary targets are enemy machine guns and riflemen. Tanks will also make paths through wire and anti- personnel mines and break up any counterattack . . .“If infantry does not come up with tanks within a reasonable time, a section or more of tanks should be sent back to investigate. The delay will usually have been caused by enemy MG’s previously overlooked by the tanks.”
From the XXIV Corps on Leyte: “Infantrymen must protect the tanks by fire to prevent the enemy from ambushing the tanks. Ground distance between tanks and infantry is dependent upon the ability of the infantry to cover the tanks by effective fire.”
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From the 774th Tank Battalion: “We gained surprise in using our light tanks with infantry in woods by having the tanks follow the infantry from phase line to phase line. When resistance was met, the tanks would go up quickly (with guides) and spray enemy positions with canister and .30-caliber machine-gun fire. One section of tanks was assigned to each assault rifle company. Mine removers moved just behind the infantry and cleared routes for the tanks. The infantrymen checked all clearings for antitank positions.“When possible, the tanks moved off the trails and covered one another. On each tank the bow gunner covered the area to the left, and the coaxial gunner covered the area to the right.
“Two infantrymen rode each tank; one was an automatic rifleman and the other manned the tank anti-aircraft gun. Both carried grenades and used the turret for protection. It was found best to assign a definite field of fire to each.
“Four mines and fuzes to be used by the infantry for local protection were carried in each tank.”
A report from Headquarters XIV Corps includes these comments on target designation: “Jap pillboxes are usually extremely well hidden and tanks are almost blind in thick vegetation or undergrowth. For these reasons, prime consideration should be given to target designation. Tank obstacles as well as targets should be designated to the tank commander by the infantry squad leader whenever possible.
“Tracer fire proved unsatisfactory for designating targets to the tanks. The best method was the use of red or violet smoke grenades. The full-charge grenade produces too much smoke and obscures the target. However, if the fuze is unscrewed from the grenade and half the charge removed, an adequate amount of smoke will be produced.”
“Rifle projection of the grenade is desirable for longer ranges. Best results are obtained by arming the grenade before firing as this will then give a trail of smoke to the target.”
A G-2 on Okinawa comments as follows: “Infantry must be trained to work with the tank so that the Jap is killed before he reaches the tank. The Jap has a nasty habit of running up to tanks with satchel charges, bangalore torpedoes, or antitank mines and attempting to stay with the tank until both tank and Jap are destroyed. If he is not killed before he gets to a halted tank, the damage to the tank is usually assured. This is especially true when tanks are employed in villages and towns.”
The tank may have a big gun, but its crew needs extra eyes on the outside.