Solutions to problems that aren’t problems

Tuesday, November 17th, 2009

Rory Miller notes that many self-defense discussions revolve around solutions to problems that aren’t problems:

Someone grabs your wrists, what do you do? I just say, “I know you’re desperate but I am not going out with you.” I know where his hands are. Where his feet are. What he can do and what he can’t. For most things he needs to let go, for the one he doesn’t, the head butt, I’ll feel his intention. There is no problem here, unless you psych yourself into one.

Same with grabbing the shirt. It’s an aggressive, scary move if you buy into the hype. Put it down on paper and suddenly it’s a gift. “Hi, my name’s Ray and I’ll be your attacker today. I’ve decided to open by tying up both my hands in a way that can’t really hurt you, leaving your hands free and my knees, throat, ears and lots of other good stuff in easy reach.”

Lots of the groundfighting positions on the bottom are good places to rest. There are some holds — kesa gatame and kami shiho gatame to name two, where the person can’t hurt you without changing the hold. The only danger in either is to struggle yourself to exhaustion. There is no problem here, not until the bad guy’s friends show up.

Recognizing a problem is a critical strategic skill. Recognizing when something is not a problem and you can save your resources is a critical tactical skill.

He’s making a “big” point, but he raises a “small” point, about the scarf hold (kesa) and north-south (kami), that I’d like to address.

I’ve long thought that competitive judo could improve its applicability off the mat without losing anything on the sporting side by modifying the rules for pins, so that (a) taking the back would count as a pin, (b) a pin would only ever be worth a half-point, so there would still be an incentive to look for submissions from a dominant position, and (c) a pin wouldn’t count unless the attacker had a hand free, almost rodeo style, to represent the ability to strike.

The Last of the Bluefin Tuna?

Tuesday, November 17th, 2009

Are we seeing the last of the bluefin tuna?

Should bluefin disappear, much of the blame should go to an organization called the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), although Carl Safina of the Blue Ocean Institute gave what some consider a more appropriate name, the International Conspiracy to Catch All Tuna. There are now only about 34,000 tuna swimming in the entire western Atlantic, down 82 percent from 1960s levels when the commission started “managing” the fishery.

ICCAT, which has 48 member countries, has been meeting this week in Porto de Galinhas, Brazil, to go through its annual charade of setting catch limits. They will be unveiled when it adjourns on Sunday.

I telephoned Dr. Susan Lieberman of the Pew Environmental Group, who is attending the session, to see how things were going. She answered just as she was leaving the conference room and heading out to dinner. I’m not sure whether she sounded more frustrated or pessimistic. In an address to the ICCAT delegates earlier in the week, Lieberman couldn’t have been more clear about her group’s catch-limit recommendation for Atlantic bluefins: zero.

“Looking at the science, there’s nothing else that makes any sense,” she said. “The current quota is driving the species to commercial extinction.”

Not that ICCAT ever pays much attention to science. “Last year ICCAT’s scientists said that the quota should be no higher than 15,000 metric tons,” said Lieberman. “So they went with 23,000 tons. In reality, with overfishing and illegal fishing, what they actually took is much higher. You can pretty much figure that it was double the quota. What we’re calling for is to suspend the fishery. Let it recover, and then you can go back to fishing. But there’s tremendous opposition, particularly from the European Union, to cutting anything.”

This appears to be missing the point. If illegal fishing is responsible for 23,000 tons of the current annual take of 46,000 tons, then dropping the legal quota to zero won’t drop the annual take to zero. In fact, it probably won’t even halve the current take, because illegal fishing will pick up some, if not most, of the slack.

If you outlaw fishing, only outlaws will fish.

The problem is policing the quotas — and with 48 countries involved, that does sound like a difficult problem. On the other hand, bluefin biology might make the problem tractable:

Bluefins are amazing animals. They can live for 40 years and attain weights of 1,600 pounds, yet they blast through the water at speeds in excess of 60 miles per hour. In other respects, they have everything going against them. The tuna grow slowly, and young females lay a only fraction the number of eggs that older ones do. They only have two spawning grounds, one in the Gulf of Mexico and one in the Mediterranean Sea, and when they are on them, tuna form tight schools, making them easy to catch.

Is It Time to Retire the Football Helmet?

Monday, November 16th, 2009

Is it time to retire the football helmet?

“Some people have advocated for years to take the helmet off, take the face mask off. That’ll change the game dramatically,” says Fred Mueller, a University of North Carolina professor who studies head injuries. “Maybe that’s better than brain damage.”

The first hard-shell helmets, which became popular in the 1940s, weren’t designed to prevent concussions but to prevent players in that rough-and-tumble era from suffering catastrophic injuries like fractured skulls.

But while these helmets reduced the chances of death on the field, they also created a sense of invulnerability that encouraged players to collide more forcefully and more often. “Almost every single play, you’re going to get hit in the head,” says Miami Dolphins offensive tackle Jake Long.

What nobody knew at the time is that these small collisions may be just as damaging. The growing body of research on former football players suggests that brain damage isn’t necessarily the result of any one trauma, but the accumulation of thousands of seemingly innocuous blows to the head.

The problem is that there’s nothing any helmet could do to stop the brain from taking lots of small hits. To become certified for sale, a football helmet has to earn a “severity index” score of 1200, according to testing done by the National Operating Committee on Standards for Athletic Equipment, or Nocsae. Dr. Robert Cantu, a Nocsae board member and chief of neurosurgery at Emerson Hospital in Concord, Mass., says that to prevent concussions, helmets would have to have a severity index of 300 — about four times better than the standard. “The only way to make that happen, Dr. Cantu says, “is to make the helmet much bigger and the padding much bigger.”

The problem with that approach, he says — other than making players look like Marvin the Martian — is that heavier helmets would be more likely to cause neck injuries.

What would football be like without helmets? Like rugby or Aussie rules:

One of the strongest arguments for banning helmets comes from the Australian Football League. While it’s a similarly rough game, the AFL never added any of the body armor Americans wear. When comparing AFL research studies and official NFL injury reports, AFL players appear to get hurt more often on the whole with things like shoulder injuries and tweaked knees. But when it comes to head injuries, the helmeted NFL players are about 25% more likely to sustain one.

A softer-shelled helmet, with less offensive potential, might offer the best of both worlds.

(Hat tip to Steve Sailer.)

The Faces of Janus

Monday, November 16th, 2009

Bryan Caplan came across his old review of A. James Gregor’s The Faces of Janus: Marxism and Fascism in the Twentieth Century and shares some highlights:

Gregor provides an elegant and thoughtful history of what one might uncharitably term the “Big Lie” of Marxism: That it is diametrically opposed to the theory and practice of fascist dictatorship. In this work, he probably does more than anyone else to show that mutual hostility of fascist and Marxism movements has always primarily been a case of the orthodox hating the heretic more than the infidel.

Gregor begins his account by summarizing his major findings on Mussolini’s apostasy from orthodox Marxism. As Gregor’s earlier work shows, Mussolini’s fascism kept much of the basic Marxist outlook intact, but fiercely rejected its internationalism. It would be “better politics” to unite all social classes within a nation for struggle against rival nations. In response, orthodox Marxists throughout Europe joined together not to critique Mussolini’s arguments, but to impugn the integrity of any socialist wicked enough to buy into them.

The mutual hostility of fascist and Marxism movements has always primarily been a case of the orthodox hating the heretic more than the infidel.

State-Run Stores

Monday, November 16th, 2009

Katherine Mangu-Ward explores the differences between free-market stores and state-run stores:

Ask an immigrant to tell you about her first impressions of America — especially someone who hails from a communist or socialist state — and eventually she’ll get to the part about the grocery store. After a lifetime of empty shelves, poor selection, and unreliable hours, the cornucopia of an American Safeway or Kroger is a revelation. The colors, the music, the lights, the people! Massive stores crammed to the gills with three-dozen brands of cereal and 17 kinds of frozen potato products seem like something out of a dream.

This is how I felt the first time I bought booze outside my home state of Virginia.

Yes, Virginia is finally considering a switch away from state-run liquor stores and toward simple “sin” taxes:

Growing up in Virginia, the only liquor store I knew was the ABC “package store” in the local Bradlee Shopping Center. The linoleum was dingy, the adjustable industrial shelving a grimy grayish off-white. Unlike every other store on the strip there was no music, just the hum of the florescent lighting and the consumptive coughs of the other patrons. The clerks wore smocks over their clothes, a practice that had been abandoned by virtually all other retail establishments by my 1980s childhood. Every shelf was tidy and completely full of liquor — no problem there — but the selection was abysmal, with rows and rows of identical bottles lining the walls.

There was a Giant grocery store next door — a convenient place for revelations about the glories of the capitalist system — and a wine shop a few doors down. But neither of them sold booze. Only the state-owned, state-run ABC was authorized to vend hooch.

Virginia is one of 18 states where the government is the monopoly rumrunner. Supermarkets, gourmet shops, and corner stores are all forbidden to sell liquor. But Bob McDonnell, the newly-elected Republican governor, has promised to end the monopoly on liquor sales in the Old Dominion.

This bold gesture isn’t because McDonnell is an especially thoroughgoing libertarian; there are plenty of other areas where he’d like to see more state involvement in the private lives of citizens, not less. This isn’t a 12-step program to help the commonwealth go cold turkey on alcohol money either. McDonnell has no intention of letting Virginia’s bottle-based income fall below its current levels of more than $100 million a year. In fact, part of the reason McDonnell is considering privatization at all is that he is looking for cash to spend on transportation infrastructure. He predicts that selling off the state’s 334 liquor stores to private players and gathering licensing fees from more private sellers will bring in $500 million in the short run, while leaving long-run income intact.

The Orchid Hypothesis

Monday, November 16th, 2009

David Dobbs explains the orchid hypothesis:

Though this hypothesis is new to modern biological psychiatry, it can be found in folk wisdom, as the University of Arizona developmental psychologist Bruce Ellis and the University of British Columbia developmental pediatrician W. Thomas Boyce pointed out last year in the journal Current Directions in Psychological Science. The Swedes, Ellis and Boyce noted in an essay titled “Biological Sensitivity to Context,” have long spoken of “dandelion” children. These dandelion children — equivalent to our “normal” or “healthy” children, with “resilient” genes — do pretty well almost anywhere, whether raised in the equivalent of a sidewalk crack or a well-tended garden. Ellis and Boyce offer that there are also “orchid” children, who will wilt if ignored or maltreated but bloom spectacularly with greenhouse care.

Bakermans-Kranenburg and her colleague Marinus van Ijzendoorn began to study the genetic makeup of the children in their experiment on problem children exhibiting “externalizing” behaviors — whining, screaming, throwing tantrums, etc.:

Specifically, they focused on one particular “risk allele” associated with ADHD and externalizing behavior. (An allele is any of the variants of a gene that takes more than one form; such genes are known as polymorphisms. A risk allele, then, is simply a gene variant that increases your likelihood of developing a problem.)

Bakermans-Kranenburg and van Ijzendoorn wanted to see whether kids with a risk allele for ADHD and externalizing behaviors (a variant of a dopamine-processing gene known as DRD4) would respond as much to positive environments as to negative. A third of the kids in the study had this risk allele; the other two-thirds had a version considered a “protective allele,” meaning it made them less vulnerable to bad environments. The control group, who did not receive the intervention, had a similar distribution.

Both the vulnerability hypothesis and the orchid hypothesis predict that in the control group the kids with a risk allele should do worse than those with a protective one. And so they did—though only slightly. Over the course of 18 months, the genetically “protected” kids reduced their externalizing scores by 11 percent, while the “at-risk” kids cut theirs by 7 percent. Both gains were modest ones that the researchers expected would come with increasing age. Although statistically significant, the difference between the two groups was probably unnoticeable otherwise.

The real test, of course, came in the group that got the intervention. How would the kids with the risk allele respond? According to the vulnerability model, they should improve less than their counterparts with the protective allele; the modest upgrade that the video intervention created in their environment wouldn’t offset their general vulnerability.

As it turned out, the toddlers with the risk allele blew right by their counterparts. They cut their externalizing scores by almost 27 percent, while the protective-allele kids cut theirs by just 12 percent (improving only slightly on the 11 percent managed by the protective-allele population in the control group). The upside effect in the intervention group, in other words, was far larger than the downside effect in the control group. Risk alleles, the Leiden team concluded, really can create not just risk but possibility.

(Hat tip to Steve Sailer, who asks, Was Genghis Khan a dandelion or an orchid?)

So You Want to Do Good

Monday, November 16th, 2009

I enjoyed Arnold Kling’s response to this question from a reader:

I teach an introduction to ag econ class, and today a young student came to chat with me about economic development. She is sincerely and passionately interested in helping developing countries reach our prosperity. She is eager for information about why some countries grow and others do not, and plans to join the Peace Corps after graduating.

To help her, I purchased a copy of your new book From Poverty To Prosperity today, but thought that you might be able to help also. She is eager to help poor people, but is very concerned that what she does has a real, positive impact. She is altruistic, but careful and prudent about her altruism.

Kling’s response:

Because I have a daughter with the same, er, problem, I have thought about this question a lot. My suggestions.
  1. For other reading, try Lant Pritchett’s Let My People Come.
  2. Also, become a regular reader of Bill Easterly’s blog. One of his posts happened to link to an article set in Arusha, Tanzania, where my daughter worked last summer. It’s an article that ends without any real point, but my daughter says that it aptly gets at some of the feelings she experienced.
  3. I sent my daughter this story about a young woman who started a school in Ecuador.
  4. I advise networking. Michael Strong of FLOW, who gave a talk that I recently recommended, combines good sense, idealism, and a lot of connections both here and in underdeveloped countries. So does Michael Fairbanks, of Seven Fund. Try to get in touch with them.
  5. Finally, ask yourself what is your comparative advantage. If you are good at research and analysis, then perhaps givewell or SevenFund would be organizations for which to work. If you are an effective hands-on entrepreneur, then perhaps you should try to emulate the young woman who founded the school in Ecuador. However, it is always possible that your comparative advantage is earning a good living in the U.S. and donating money effectively. Bill Gates has the potential to do more good than many people who have put much more of their time and effort into development.
  6. My own personal inclination is to see global poverty as a problem of people being “off the grid.” If people in remote villages could connect to the U.S. economy, through trade, communication, and sharing of knowledge, then I doubt that they would remain poor. For my daughter, this raises larger questions about whether such connections would make villagers happier or less happy. Those larger questions I cannot pretend to answer.

The Igon Value Problem

Monday, November 16th, 2009

Steven Pinker explains the Igon Value Problem:

An eclectic essayist is necessarily a dilettante, which is not in itself a bad thing. But [Malcolm] Gladwell frequently holds forth about statistics and psychology, and his lack of technical grounding in these subjects can be jarring. He provides misleading definitions of “homology,” “saggital plane” and “power law” and quotes an expert speaking about an “igon value” (that’s eigenvalue, a basic concept in linear algebra). In the spirit of Gladwell, who likes to give portentous names to his aperçus, I will call this the Igon Value Problem: when a writer’s education on a topic consists in interviewing an expert, he is apt to offer generalizations that are banal, obtuse or flat wrong.

The banalities come from a gimmick that can be called the Straw We. First Gladwell disarmingly includes himself and the reader in a dubious consensus — for example, that “we” believe that jailing an executive will end corporate malfeasance, or that geniuses are invariably self-made prodigies or that eliminating a risk can make a system 100 percent safe. He then knocks it down with an ambiguous observation, such as that “risks are not easily manageable, accidents are not easily preventable.” As a generic statement, this is true but trite: of course many things can go wrong in a complex system, and of course people sometimes trade off safety for cost and convenience (we don’t drive to work wearing crash helmets in Mack trucks at 10 miles per hour). But as a more substantive claim that accident investigations are meaningless “rituals of reassurance” with no effect on safety, or that people have a “fundamental tendency to compensate for lower risks in one area by taking greater risks in another,” it is demonstrably false.

The problem with Gladwell’s generalizations about prediction is that he never zeroes in on the essence of a statistical problem and instead overinterprets some of its trappings. For example, in many cases of uncertainty, a decision maker has to act on an observation that may be either a signal from a target or noise from a distractor (a blip on a screen may be a missile or static; a blob on an X-ray may be a tumor or a harmless thickening). Improving the ability of your detection technology to discriminate signals from noise is always a good thing, because it lowers the chance you’ll mistake a target for a distractor or vice versa. But given the technology you have, there is an optimal threshold for a decision, which depends on the relative costs of missing a target and issuing a false alarm. By failing to identify this trade-off, Gladwell bamboozles his readers with pseudoparadoxes about the limitations of pictures and the downside of precise information.

Another example of an inherent trade-off in decision-making is the one that pits the accuracy of predictive information against the cost and complexity of acquiring it. Gladwell notes that I.Q. scores, teaching certificates and performance in college athletics are imperfect predictors of professional success. This sets up a “we” who is “used to dealing with prediction problems by going back and looking for better predictors.” Instead, Gladwell argues, “teaching should be open to anyone with a pulse and a college degree — and teachers should be judged after they have started their jobs, not before.”

But this “solution” misses the whole point of assessment, which is not clairvoyance but cost-effectiveness. To hire teachers indiscriminately and judge them on the job is an example of “going back and looking for better predictors”: the first year of a career is being used to predict the remainder. It’s simply the predictor that’s most expensive (in dollars and poorly taught students) along the accuracy-cost trade-off. Nor does the absurdity of this solution for professional athletics (should every college quarterback play in the N.F.L.?) give Gladwell doubts about his misleading analogy between hiring teachers (where the goal is to weed out the bottom 15 percent) and drafting quarterbacks (where the goal is to discover the sliver of a percentage point at the top).

The common thread in Gladwell’s writing is a kind of populism, which seeks to undermine the ideals of talent, intelligence and analytical prowess in favor of luck, opportunity, experience and intuition. For an apolitical writer like Gladwell, this has the advantage of appealing both to the Horatio Alger right and to the egalitarian left. Unfortunately he wildly overstates his empirical case. It is simply not true that a quarter back’s rank in the draft is uncorrelated with his success in the pros, that cognitive skills don’t predict a teacher’s effectiveness, that intelligence scores are poorly related to job performance or (the major claim in “Outliers”) that above a minimum I.Q. of 120, higher intelligence does not bring greater intellectual achievements.

Pathogens and Strokes

Sunday, November 15th, 2009

A new study links five pathogens to strokes:

The infections in order of significance are Chlamydia pneumoniae, Helicobacter pylori, cytomegalovirus and herpes simplex viruses 1 and 2, according to the study, published online on Nov. 9 in The Archives of Neurology. “Each of these common pathogens may persist after an acute infection and contribute to perpetuating a state of chronic low-level infection,” said the paper’s lead author, Dr. Mitchell S. V. Elkind, an associate professor of neurology at Columbia University Medical Center.

This is more evidence for the Cochran-Ewald theory that germs play an underestimated role in illness, Steve Sailer adds.

Survival of the Most Pious?

Sunday, November 15th, 2009

Darwin noted that a belief in “all-pervading spiritual agencies” is well-nigh universal among human populations. There are two current theories to explain the origins and persistence of religious belief, John Derbyshire reminds us:

One says that religion is an accidental by-product of our extremely complicated cognitive equipment. Being able to tell when an object is possessed of volitional agency (tigers, enemies) is so vital to individual survival that the ability “slops over,” attributing agency where there is none. A tree, the sun, or a statue can then be believed to have volition and power. Yale psychologist Paul Bloom popularized this point of view in a 2005 Atlantic Monthly article (“Is God an Accident?”). Anthropologists Scott Atran and Pascal Boyer have presented it at book length.

The other theory is that religion is adaptive. That is, on net, human beings who have religious instincts propagate their genes more successfully than those who don’t. The best-known exponent of this point of view is biologist David Sloan Wilson, whose 2002 book Darwin’s Cathedral laid out the adaptionist case for a general reader.

In The Faith Instinct, Nicholas Wade explores the adaptive approach — survival of the most pious:

The first task here is to try tracing developments through long history — through, that is, the 50 or 60 millennia since Homo sap. emerged from East Africa to populate the world. With lactose tolerance, the tracing is easy: Before cattle herding came up, there was none; afterwards, it soon appeared in the relevant populations, the culture at work to change the genetics.

With religion, things are much more complicated. There have been distinctive styles of worship in different periods of long history. Before the agricultural revolution of 8000 B.C., all human beings lived in small hunter-gatherer groups. Fragments of this lifestyle survived late enough that we can say confident things about it. It was very egalitarian — “fiercely” so, says Wade. (“Primitive communism,” was Karl Marx’s term.) This is a puzzle by itself, as our closest relatives, the chimps, live in hierarchical societies. Since chimp genes are known to have changed much less than ours, presumably the common chimp-human ancestor was hierarchically inclined.

So how did we get egalitarian? Wade suggests the invention of weapons (recall one meaning of the word “equalizer”), together with increased intelligence: “the cognitive ability of the weak to form coalitions against tyrannical leaders.” But then, without the authority of alpha males, how was order to be kept in the egalitarian hunter-gatherer band? How were deviants and freeloaders to be deterred? Religious belief, Wade argues, offered an answer. Supernatural agents, perhaps first suggested by dreams, could punish and reward.

The style of worship among hunter-gatherers was likewise egalitarian, with communal dancing and chanting a major component. These ceremonies sometimes lasted for weeks. Participants worked themselves up into trance states, interpreted as communication with, or possession by, supernatural agents. Some cultures used hallucinogens as a shortcut, since, as Wade notes, “dancing for hours on end was an arduous way to gain access to the supernatural.”

When settled agricultural life began, around 8000 B.C., religion changed to match the new circumstances. Ceremonies were pegged to key agricultural events — planting, harvesting — and the need for social hierarchy threw up specialist classes of priests, probably in cultural line of descent from the shamans of some hunter-gatherer societies — individuals with special talent at attaining the trance state. Religion was still tribal and polytheistic, though, and remained so through the rise of urban living and literacy.

Big polyglot empires needed universal religions, decoupled from particular tribes or places. Monotheism served the purpose best, and the genius of the Jews in establishing the first literate monotheism, around the middle of the first millennium B.C., was a key event. Judaism was tribal, not universal; but when supercharged with the modifications introduced by — mostly, probably, says Wade — Saint Paul, it was universal enough to vanquish the rather tacky Roman pantheon, and to be the foundation for medieval European civilization.

The evolution of religion was very uneven, though, with many vestigial features refusing to fall away entirely. Judaism has retained its tribal flavor; and the major feasts of modern religions are still pegged to the agricultural calendar — Passover, for example, according to Wade, once heralded the beginning of the barley festival. The priest-king principle of the earliest urban societies persists in the British monarch’s claim to be Defender of the Faith. The ecstatic dancing of hunter-gatherer observances was disapproved of by urban priesthoods of the agricultural age, but survives none the less in the Whirling Dervishes of Sufism, and in the rhythmic swaying of African choirs. (See also 2 Samuel, 2.xiv, where King David “danced before the Lord with all his might.”) Religion is very conservative, as one would expect of a belief system laying claim to eternal truth.

Drug ‘shrinks lung cancer tumour’

Saturday, November 14th, 2009

Scientists have identified a drug that eliminated small cell lung cancer tumours in 50% of mice and blocked the cells’ ability to resist standard chemotherapy treatment:

A growth hormone called FGF-2 appears to speed division of the cancer cells, and to trigger a survival mechanism which makes them resistant to chemotherapy.

PD173074 blocks FGF-2 from attaching to tumour cells. The researchers say it could potentially be taken as a pill, rather than fed into the body via a drip.

It was originally developed in 1998 to stop blood vessels from forming around tumours.

Fiction is Fiction

Saturday, November 14th, 2009

Eric Falkenstain watched Tyler Cowen’s recent TED talk, which argues that fiction is fiction:

We instinctively try to fit everything into such narratives: the health care debate, our career trajectory, our lives. Tyler notes that this may be too much. Life isn’t a story. Often it just keeps going, is messy, and has no point.

I found this a very refreshing point. My 10 year old son had to write a story, and his first draft was basically a narrative with stuff happening but no arc, no Exposition/Rising Action/Climax/Falling Action/Denouement: he went there, and Clay said X and so we did this and Connor said Y and yada yada yda. I tried to get him to appreciate the essence of a story, but it was suprisingly (for me!) not obvious to him, and his intuition was based on his experience with life, which is, there is no story.

I suppose that my view, that stories should have an arc, is more educated, and his 10-year old intuition is unstructured, incomplete. Yet his innocence betrays some naive wisdom, that life is in some sense ‘one damned thing after another’. It’s good to know the strengths and limitations of both views: without facts, everything is bullshit; without theory, everything is trivia.

It’s comforting to believe there’s a bigger purpose, yet we flatter ourselves that unlike the Coelacanth or starfish our finite lives have some transcendence, which in our secular age means some small yet permanent benefit to justice and equality (synonymous for many). Instead, I think today’s giants are all like great harpists of the past. They may have been fortunate to play an instrument well, but no matter how good, their skill is now an anachronism, and not valued in itself. Over time, it will be totally unappreciated, as future generations prefer different melodies and instruments. To think every drama in our lives is part of a story, written by fate, is alluring, but fanciful.

A subpar student who wore his religious views on his sleeve

Friday, November 13th, 2009

Doctors who crossed paths with Hasan in medical programs paint a picture of a subpar student who wore his religious views on his sleeve, CNN reports:

Hasan, an Army psychiatrist who faces 13 counts of premeditated murder, “was clearly espousing Islamist ideology” during his time as a medical student at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences in Bethesda, Maryland, one of his former classmates told CNN.
[...]
His presentations for school were often laced with extremist Muslim views, one source said.

“Is your allegiance to Sharia law or the United States?” students once challenged Hasan, the source said.

“Sharia law,” Hasan responded, according to the source.

The incident was corroborated by another doctor who was present.

The source recalled another instance in which Hasan was asked if the U.S. Constitution was a brilliant document. Hasan replied, “No, not particularly,” according to the source.

The former classmate told CNN that he voiced concerns about Hasan to supervisors at the school.

A second former medical school colleague of Hasan said several people raised concerns about Hasan’s overall competence.

Even though Hasan earned his medical degree and residency, some of his fellow students believed Hasan “didn’t have the intellect” to be in the program and was not academically rigorous in his coursework.

Hasan “was not fit to be in the military, let alone in the mental health profession,” this classmate told CNN. “No one in class would ever have referred a patient to him or trusted him with anything.”
The first classmate echoed this sentiment.

Hasan was “coddled, accommodated and pushed through that masters of public health despite substandard performance,” the classmate said. He was “put in the fellowship program because they didn’t know what to do with him.”

The second classmate said he witnessed at least two of Hasan’s PowerPoint discussions that included what he described as extremist views.

In these presentations, which were supposed to be about health, Hasan justified suicide bombings and spoke about the persecution of Muslims in the Middle East, in the United States and in the U.S. military, the source said.

Some in the crowd rolled their eyes or muttered under their breath, he said, and others were clearly uncomfortable.

Those in the audience, which included program supervisors, did not loudly object to Hasan’s presentations, but did complain to their higher-ups afterward.

The supervisors expressed “appreciation, understanding and agreement” that the complaints would be discussed, but it was unclear what action, if any, came, the source said.

(Hat tip to Steve Sailer, who says, Affirmative action strikes again.)

Limits to Libertarianism

Friday, November 13th, 2009

Donald Pittenger asks about the limits to libertarianism, given the nature of ideological movements:

I tend to agree with a concept encountered years ago while reading Crane Brinton’s account of the French Revolution. It has to do with tipping points of ideology-driven political movements. In particular, the point where a drive to ideological purity forces out real-world practicality. Where movement members judged not pure enough are ejected or otherwise eliminated. And the movement spirals away to irrelevance or even self-destruction.
[...]
Libertarianism appeals to me in its quest for limited government. But it seems less persuasive otherwise because its doctrine (as I understand it) of radical individualism has within it the seeds of the situation described by Brinton. In other words, doctrinal purity can be the enemy of attaining and exercising political power. This is a risk for any party that is strongly idea-based.

Can there be “big tent” libertarianism? Yes and no, I’d say:

Libertarianism definitely has a Romantic strain that is clearly Liberal in origin — classically liberal — steeped in the Truth of universal human Rights.

In this sense, it should go hand in hand with Rand’s Objectivism, but Rand despised the modern Left and the “nihilistic” hippie subculture that was also drawn to libertarian ideals.

There’s another much less liberal strain of libertarianism in American conservatism, which says that our Founding Fathers established a largely libertarian set of ground rules that worked, and we’re fixing something that ain’t broke as we slouch towards socialism.

Related to this conservative strain is an economically informed strain that emphasizes allocating property rights to maximize social welfare. Where costs and benefits are internalized, the decision-maker should be the (one, clear) owner of the resource — but the real world is full of externalities, and we aren’t all atomistic individuals who interact purely through efficient markets. So we need avoid the pitfalls of political decision making, but we still sometimes need to make group decisions — and we’ve inherited a decent, if imperfect, system for that, but there are ways to improve it.

AMC’s The Prisoner

Friday, November 13th, 2009

Somehow I just learned that AMC has remade The Prisoner, and the miniseries begins this Sunday. (Pardon me while I run to the DVR.)

Further, AMC has put full episodes of the original 1960s show online.