Isegoria

Nicotine is largely harmless, but cigarettes are lethal. It’s not surprising that Britain’s Royal College of Physicians wants to curb — kerb? — smoking, but it is surprising that they’re willing to promote safer forms of tobacco:

This week, the Marlboro cigarette empire Altria bought the USA’s biggest maker of chewing tobacco, UST, for $10.4bn (£5.8bn). The deal confirms the tobacco industry’s interest in diversifying out of cigarettes into “smokeless” products. UST makes Skoal — tea bag-like pouches of tobacco that are held between the cheek and gum, allowing nicotine to be absorbed.

British American Tobacco is also investing heavily in the search for safer ways to deliver nicotine. BAT paid £2bn to take control of the Swedish company ST, which makes Snus — also pouches of tobacco for sucking.

Evidence suggests that sucking a pouch of tobacco is 90 per cent less harmful than inhaling cigarette smoke. But the products are banned in the EU on the grounds that they are, er, carcinogenic, and that to replace one carcinogen with another, albeit one less lethal, is unwise.

“Nicotine is the closest we are likely to get to the perfect drug”:

Its effects are diverse; it stimulates, calms and enhances feelings of pleasure, but has few side effects. Its great advantage over other drugs is that its effects are mild. It is pleasurable only within a narrow range of concentrations in the blood. That is what makes it safe.

Only the instrument of its delivery — the cigarette — is lethal. A device that delivers nicotine quickly, efficiently and safely could earn a fortune. But regulations on the sale of medicinal nicotine are so tight that they keep prices high — seven days’ worth of nicotine patches costs £17 — and the development of innovative products low.

Professor John Britton, consultant respiratory physician and chief author of the RCP report, said: “The ideal product would be a nicotine inhaler like an asthma inhaler, that delivered a hit of nicotine as close as possible to the experience of smoking a cigarette.

“But the companies [makers of nicotine gum and patches] don’t want to do it and the regulatory restrictions make it difficult to get it on to the market. There is no competition. That is why we need a Nicotine Regulatory Authority.”

The anomaly in the existing law is glaring. Tobacco companies are permitted to sell nicotine to the public in the form of (lethal) cigarettes, yet it is illegal to sell alternative nicotine products without a licence.

Jonathan Haidt, Associate Professor of Psychology at the University of Virginia, admits that the psychological community is quite liberal, and that psychologists see conservative moral views as narrow-minded, racist, and dumb — in large part because they have very different notions of what morality encompasses.

Berkeley psychologist Elliot Turiel, for instance, claims that morality refers to “prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other,” but ancient moral texts, like Leviticus, dwell on something entirely different, namely, sorting things into two categories — which Haidt refers to as disgusts me (gay male sex, menstruation, pigs, swarming insects) and disgusts me less (gay female sex, urination, cows, grasshoppers ) — not on justice, rights, and welfare at all.

This plays out in his own research into moral psychology:

For my dissertation research, I made up stories about people who did things that were disgusting or disrespectful yet perfectly harmless. For example, what do you think about a woman who can’t find any rags in her house so she cuts up an old American flag and uses the pieces to clean her toilet, in private? Or how about a family whose dog is killed by a car, so they dismember the body and cook it for dinner? I read these stories to 180 young adults and 180 eleven-year-old children, half from higher social classes and half from lower, in the USA and in Brazil. I found that most of the people I interviewed said that the actions in these stories were morally wrong, even when nobody was harmed. Only one group — college students at Penn — consistently exemplified Turiel’s definition of morality and overrode their own feelings of disgust to say that harmless acts were not wrong. (A few even praised the efficiency of recycling the flag and the dog).

This research led me to two conclusions. First, when gut feelings are present, dispassionate reasoning is rare. In fact, many people struggled to fabricate harmful consequences that could justify their gut-based condemnation. I often had to correct people when they said things like “it’s wrong because… um…eating dog meat would make you sick” or “it’s wrong to use the flag because… um… the rags might clog the toilet.” These obviously post-hoc rationalizations illustrate the philosopher David Hume’s dictum that reason is “the slave of the passions, and can pretend to no other office than to serve and obey them.” This is the first rule of moral psychology: feelings come first and tilt the mental playing field on which reasons and arguments compete. If people want to reach a conclusion, they can usually find a way to do so. The Democrats have historically failed to grasp this rule, choosing uninspiring and aloof candidates who thought that policy arguments were forms of persuasion.

The second conclusion was that the moral domain varies across cultures. Turiel’s description of morality as being about justice, rights, and human welfare worked perfectly for the college students I interviewed at Penn, but it simply did not capture the moral concerns of the less elite groups — the working-class people in both countries who were more likely to justify their judgments with talk about respect, duty, and family roles. (“Your dog is family, and you just don’t eat family.”) From this study I concluded that the anthropologist Richard Shweder was probably right in a 1987 critique of Turiel in which he claimed that the moral domain (not just specific rules) varies by culture. Drawing on Shweder’s ideas, I would say that the second rule of moral psychology is that morality is not just about how we treat each other (as most liberals think); it is also about binding groups together, supporting essential institutions, and living in a sanctified and noble way.

This, he claims, is What Makes People Vote Republican?

When Republicans say that Democrats “just don’t get it,” this is the “it” to which they refer. Conservative positions on gays, guns, god, and immigration must be understood as means to achieve one kind of morally ordered society. When Democrats try to explain away these positions using pop psychology they err, they alienate, and they earn the label “elitist.” But how can Democrats learn to see — let alone respect — a moral order they regard as narrow-minded, racist, and dumb?

At this point in the essay he still sounds quite condescending toward conservatives.

He goes on to describe how his feelings changed when, as a 29-year-old liberal atheist, he spent some time with a family in Bhubaneswar, India, and his basic empathy kicked in:

Rather than automatically rejecting the men as sexist oppressors and pitying the women, children, and servants as helpless victims, I was able to see a moral world in which families, not individuals, are the basic unit of society, and the members of each extended family (including its servants) are intensely interdependent. In this world, equality and personal autonomy were not sacred values. Honoring elders, gods, and guests, and fulfilling one’s role-based duties, were more important.

This changed his views of the American religious right:

They want more prayer and spanking in schools, and less sex education and access to abortion? I didn’t think those steps would reduce AIDS and teen pregnancy, but I could see why the religious right wanted to “thicken up” the moral climate of schools and discourage the view that children should be as free as possible to act on their desires. Conservatives think that welfare programs and feminism increase rates of single motherhood and weaken the traditional social structures that compel men to support their own children? Hmm, that may be true, even if there are also many good effects of liberating women from dependence on men. I had escaped from my prior partisan mindset (reject first, ask rhetorical questions later), and began to think about liberal and conservative policies as manifestations of deeply conflicting but equally heartfelt visions of the good society.

So he rejects Turiel’s narrow definition of morality (“justice, rights, and welfare”):

Here’s my alternative definition: morality is any system of interlocking values, practices, institutions, and psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life possible. It turns out that human societies have found several radically different approaches to suppressing selfishness, two of which are most relevant for understanding what Democrats don’t understand about morality.

One approach is the libertarian notion of a contractual society, as proposed by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, where “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”

(Haidt seems to think this notion applies to modern, progressive liberalism, by the way.)

Anyway, moral psychology offers some support for such a society:

Psychologists have done extensive research on the moral mechanisms that are presupposed in a Millian society, and there are two that appear to be partly innate. First, people in all cultures are emotionally responsive to suffering and harm, particularly violent harm, and so nearly all cultures have norms or laws to protect individuals and to encourage care for the most vulnerable. Second, people in all cultures are emotionally responsive to issues of fairness and reciprocity, which often expand into notions of rights and justice. Philosophical efforts to justify liberal democracies and egalitarian social contracts invariably rely heavily on intuitions about fairness and reciprocity.

But now imagine another social contract, a conservative one:

But now imagine society not as an agreement among individuals but as something that emerged organically over time as people found ways of living together, binding themselves to each other, suppressing each other’s selfishness, and punishing the deviants and free-riders who eternally threaten to undermine cooperative groups. The basic social unit is not the individual, it is the hierarchically structured family, which serves as a model for other institutions. Individuals in such societies are born into strong and constraining relationships that profoundly limit their autonomy. The patron saint of this more binding moral system is the sociologist Emile Durkheim, who warned of the dangers of anomie (normlessness), and wrote, in 1897, that “Man cannot become attached to higher aims and submit to a rule if he sees nothing above him to which he belongs. To free himself from all social pressure is to abandon himself and demoralize him.” A Durkheimian society at its best would be a stable network composed of many nested and overlapping groups that socialize, reshape, and care for individuals who, if left to their own devices, would pursue shallow, carnal, and selfish pleasures. A Durkheimian society would value self-control over self-expression, duty over rights, and loyalty to one’s groups over concerns for outgroups.

A Durkheimian ethos can’t be supported by the two moral foundations that hold up a Millian society (harm/care and fairness/reciprocity). My recent research shows that social conservatives do indeed rely upon those two foundations, but they also value virtues related to three additional psychological systems: ingroup/loyalty (involving mechanisms that evolved during the long human history of tribalism), authority/respect (involving ancient primate mechanisms for managing social rank, tempered by the obligation of superiors to protect and provide for subordinates), and purity/sanctity (a relatively new part of the moral mind, related to the evolution of disgust, that makes us see carnality as degrading and renunciation as noble). These three systems support moralities that bind people into intensely interdependent groups that work together to reach common goals. Such moralities make it easier for individuals to forget themselves and coalesce temporarily into hives, a process that is thrilling, as anyone who has ever “lost” him or herself in a choir, protest march, or religious ritual can attest.

Haidt has found, via Internet surveys, that people who call themselves strongly liberal endorse statements related to the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations, and they largely reject statements related to ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity:

We think of the moral mind as being like an audio equalizer, with five slider switches for different parts of the moral spectrum. Democrats generally use a much smaller part of the spectrum than do Republicans. The resulting music may sound beautiful to other Democrats, but it sounds thin and incomplete to many of the swing voters that left the party in the 1980s, and whom the Democrats must recapture if they want to produce a lasting political realignment.

By that analogy, which sliders are the libertarians playing with again? Because libertarians, or classical liberals like Mill, have very, very different ideas on fairness/reciprocity than modern, progressive liberals.

Read the whole thing. (Think about it. Think, think about it.)