Stefan Possony, Jerry Pournelle, and Francis Kane wrote the original draft of The Strategy of Technology from 1968 to 1970 — “a time when the Cold War was real and the outcome still very much in doubt” — and then updated it over the years.
It argues that the US should have a clear strategy for winning the Technological War, and in the process it makes some points about project management:
ApolloThe Apollo program of manned exploration of the Moon was certainly the outstanding achievement of this Century. It is a landmark of what the U.S. could achieve given a challenge to the scientific and engineering community.
The Apollo program was also the most complex action ever undertaken by the human race. It is interesting to note that the second most complex activity in history was Overlord, the Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944. Although Apollo was accomplished outside the Department of Defense, it was no accident that many of the key leaders, such as General Sam Phillips, were highly experienced managers of advanced military technology programs.
The Apollo program was mission oriented. Its management structure closely resembled a military organization. Instead of micro-management from the top, there was delegation of authority. Tasks were narrowly defined, and responsibility for achieving them was spelled out in detail. As with the ICBM program, parallel processes were set up to investigate alternate ways of achieving critical tasks.
The result was that technology was produced on demand and on schedule. Setbacks and even tragedies such as the capsule fire did not halt the program. On 20 July, 1969, the Eagle landed on the Moon, a little more than eight years after President Kennedy began a task which much of the scientific community said could not be accomplished in two decades.
Military Aircraft
In 1962 Project Forecast identified a requirement for new military aircraft. Systems designs began shortly thereafter.
Unlike the Apollo program, both the fighter and bomber programs were micromanaged from the top. There were endless reviews and appeals.
As a result, the first of the new generation of fighter aircraft was not rolled out until the mid-70′s, and were not in the operational inventory in numbers until considerably later; and both the Navy and Air Force are now flying aircraft whose basic designs are twenty years old.
The B-1 fared even worse. Not only was there micromanagement, review, and appeal, but the program itself was cancelled by political authorities. The first operational B-1 was delivered in 1983; we now have a full inventory of 100 B-1 bombers.
The B-1 bomber and the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18 fighters are probably the most advanced aircraft of their kind in the world; but the contrast between the 8 years from conception to operation of Apollo, and the 16 and more years from design to operation of these aircraft, is worth noting; particularly when contrasted with the rapid development and deployment of the P-51 and P-47 aircraft during World War II. Recall that the P-51, then the world’s most advanced fighter, went from drawing board to combat operation in under a year.
Note also that the reviews and delays characterizing the development and procurement of the B-1 and the new fighters did not save money. The total program costs were considerably higher than they would have been had we set up a management structure similiar to Apollo; indeed, the total costs of these programs exceeded that of Apollo, which was brought in on time and under budget.