In a recent Atlantic article, Spies, Lies, and Weapons: What Went Wrong, Kenneth M. Pollack, a CIA and National Security Council veteran, points out that “the U.S. intelligence community’s belief that Saddam was aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction pre-dated Bush’s inauguration, and therefore cannot be attributed to political pressure”:
In congressional testimony in March of 2002 Robert Einhorn, Clinton’s assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, summed up the intelligence community’s conclusions about Iraq at the end of the Clinton Administration:
How close is the peril of Iraqi WMD? Today, or at most within a few months, Iraq could launch missile attacks with chemical or biological weapons against its neighbors (albeit attacks that would be ragged, inaccurate, and limited in size). Within four or five years it could have the capability to threaten most of the Middle East and parts of Europe with missiles armed with nuclear weapons containing fissile material produced indigenously — and to threaten U.S. territory with such weapons delivered by nonconventional means, such as commercial shipping containers. If it managed to get its hands on sufficient quantities of already produced fissile material, these threats could arrive much sooner.