A Portable Cash Register

Tuesday, February 9th, 2010

The iPad, like the Kindle, is a portable cash register, Arnold Kling says:

With a Kindle, wherever you are, you are in a bookstore, with your credit card handy. There’s nothing wrong with that. I own a Kindle, and I’m happy with it. But it’s really not necessary to have to pay for one. I’ve shelled out much more for books on my Kindle than I did for the Kindle itself. The only reason not to give the Kindle away for free is that you would wind up putting it in the hands of consumers who are not all that interested in books.

Regardless of the price at which the iPad is sold, it is going to generate plenty of revenue. For Steve Jobs, getting people to pay for it is a bit like Tom Sawyer getting his friends to pay for the privilege of doing his whitewashing work for him.

Except that Apple and Amazon don’t make much profit off of media sales — yet.

Ayn Rand’s Disagreeable Niche

Sunday, January 24th, 2010

Arnold Kling describes Ayn Rand’s niche:

  1. In terms of the psychological factor known as Agreeableness, I speculate that people who tend to lean libertarian tend to be low relative to the average person. We place relatively low value on going along to get along.
  2. Those of us who are low on Agreeableness really resent situations in which Agreeableness confers high status. When we think that guys are winning approval, status, and girls by expressing nice-sounding political opinions, we get ticked off.
  3. Rand makes a virtue out of being low on Agreeableness. This is almost unique in literature. Few other writers, if any, use their writing to express and advocate for low Agreeableness. Instead, most writers either are dispassionate or are strongly Agreeable. When people who are low on Agreeableness encounter Rand, they feel that they have found a rare soulmate.
  4. In my own life, I have had to work very hard to overcome my low Agreeableness. I can think of many situations in which I failed to do so, at some cost to my position on the career ladder. To this day, people with very high status trigger my disagreeableness in ways that I cannot really control (see my posts on Jonathan Gruber).
  5. I encountered Rand’s work relatively late in life. My reactions were mixed.
  6. One could argue that my own writing is aimed at the same niche. Perhaps it is all an elaborate justification for low agreeableness.

The Entrepreneurial Personality vs. the Bureacratic Personality

Friday, January 22nd, 2010

Arnold Kling looks at the entrepreneurial personality vs. the bureacratic personality:

The entrepreneur wants to test ideas empirically. The bureaucrat wants to say “no” a priori. Large organizations need bureaucrats, because otherwise they would waste too much organizational capital (human as well as financial) trying out bad ideas. Entrepreneurs start with less organizational capital to lose, so they are the ones that you want to try out risky ideas.

Only in desperate situations will organizations turn to entrepreneurs (I am thinking of wars, when the military will dismiss some of its bureaucratic leaders and elevate some entrepreneurial ones.) Haiti looks like a desperate situation.

The Protocol Society

Monday, January 4th, 2010

In the 19th and 20th centuries, we made stuff, David Brooks says — corn and steel and trucks. Now, we make protocols — sets of instructions:

A software program is a protocol for organizing information. A new drug is a protocol for organizing chemicals. Wal-Mart produces protocols for moving and marketing consumer goods. Even when you are buying a car, you are mostly paying for the knowledge embedded in its design, not the metal and glass.

A protocol economy has very different properties than a physical stuff economy. For example, you and I can’t use the same piece of metal at the same time. But you and I can use the same software program at the same time. Physical stuff is subject to the laws of scarcity: you can use up your timber. But it’s hard to use up a good idea. Prices for material goods tend toward equilibrium, depending on supply and demand. Equilibrium doesn’t really apply to the market for new ideas.

The shift from stuff to protocols is the subject of From Poverty to Prosperity, by Arnold Kling and Nick Schulz:

“From Poverty to Prosperity” includes interviews with major economists, and it is striking how they are moving away from mathematical modeling and toward fields like sociology and anthropology.

What really matters, Edmund S. Phelps of Columbia argues, is economic culture — attitudes toward uncertainty, the willingness to exert leadership, the willingness to follow orders. A strong economy needs daring consumers (Phelps says China lacks this) and young researchers with money to play with (Romer notes that N.I.H. grants used to go to 35-year-olds but now they go to 50-year-olds).

A protocol economy tends toward inequality because some societies and subcultures have norms, attitudes and customs that increase the velocity of new recipes while other subcultures retard it. Some nations are blessed with self-reliant families, social trust and fairly enforced regulations, while others are cursed by distrust, corruption and fatalistic attitudes about the future. It is very hard to transfer the protocols of one culture onto those of another.

That Old College Lie

Monday, December 21st, 2009

Claiborne Pell — of Pell Grant fame — died at age 90 earlier this year:

What the encomiums to Pell failed to mention is that his grants have been, in all the ways that matter most, a failure. As any parent can tell you, colleges are increasingly unaffordable. Students are borrowing at record levels and loan default rates are rising. More and more low-income students are getting priced out of higher education altogether. The numbers are stark: When Pell grants were named for the senator in 1980, a typical public four-year university cost $2,551 annually. Pell Grants provided $1,750, almost 70 percent of the total. Even private colleges cost only about $5,600 back then. Low-income students could matriculate with little fear of financial hardship, as Pell intended. Over the next three decades, Congress poured vast sums into the program, increasing annual funding from $2 billion to nearly $20 billion. Yet today, Pell Grants cover only 33 percent of the cost of attending a public university. Why? Because prices have increased nearly 500 percent since 1980. Average private college costs, meanwhile, rose to over $34,000 per year.

It’s all part of that old college lie, Kevin Carey says:

The average graduation rate at four-year colleges in the bottom half of the Barron’s taxonomy of admissions selectivity is only 45 percent. And that’s just the average–at scores of colleges, graduation rates are below 30 percent, and wide disparities persist for students of color. Along with community colleges, where only one in three students earns a degree, these low-performing institutions educate the large majority of Pell Grant recipients. Less than 40 percent of low-income students who start college get a degree of any kind within six years.

Are colleges just enforcing high academic standards? Hardly:

A 2006 study from the American Institutes for Research found that only 31 percent of adults with bachelor’s degrees are proficient in “prose literacy” — being able to compare and contrast two newspaper editorials, for example. More than a quarter have math skills so feeble that they can’t calculate the cost of ordering supplies from a catalogue.

America’s higher education has a reputation for being the best in the world, but this is driven by the high quality of a few prestigious institutions and their students. No one really knows how good most colleges are — how well they teach and how much their students learn:

The information deficit turns college into what economists call a “reputational good.” If you go to the store and buy a shirt, you can learn pretty much everything you need to know before you buy it: the material, where it was made, how to clean it, and so on. College is different. You’re paying up-front for professors you’ve never met and degree programs you probably haven’t even chosen yet. Instead, you rely on what other people think of the college. Of course, some students simply have to go the college that’s nearest to them or least expensive. But if you have the luxury of choosing, in all likelihood, you choose based on reputation.

If college reputations were based on objective, publicly available measures of student learning, that would be okay. But they’re not, because no such measurements exist. Instead, reputations are largely based on wealth, admissions selectivity, price, and a generalized sense of fame that is highly influenced by who’s been around the longest and who produces the most research. Not coincidentally, these are the factors that drive the influential U.S. News & World Report rankings that always rate old, wealthy, renowned institutions like Harvard and Princeton as America’s best colleges.

The influence of reputation is exacerbated by the fact that most colleges are non-profit. For-profit institutions succeed by maximizing the difference between revenues and expenditures. While they have strong incentives to get more money, they also have strong incentives to spend less money, by operating in the most efficient manner possible. Non-profit colleges aren’t profit-maximizing; they are reputation-maximizing. And reputations are expensive to buy.

The economist Howard Bowen wrote the classic treatise on how reputation-seeking influences university behavior. He called it the “revenue-to-cost” phenomenon. Essentially, colleges don’t figure out how much money they need to spend and then go get it. Instead, they get as much money as they can and then spend it. Since reputations are relational — the goal is to be better than the other guy — there is no practical limit on how much colleges can spend in pursuit of self-glorification. As former Harvard President Derek Bok wrote, “Universities share one characteristic with compulsive gamblers and exiled royalty: There is never enough money to satisfy their desires.” Inevitably, much of that money comes from students.

The information deficit rewards and sustains these inclinations. In the absence of independent information about quality, consumers assume that price and quality are the same thing. At the trend-setting high end of the market, higher education has become a luxury good, the educational equivalent of a Prada shoe. These are unusually nice shoes, of course, just as Harvard is an unusually good university. But in both cases consumers aren’t paying for quality alone — they’re also paying extra for scarcity and a prominent brand name, the primary value of which is to signal to the rest of the world that they’re rich and connected enough to pay the price.

While most colleges aren’t in Harvard’s league and never will be, they pay attention to industry leaders. Luxury schools set standards for faculty salaries, student amenities, and other expensive things that ripple through the higher education sector as a whole. The status-seeking mindset is infectious. Colleges all want to become more important, and they all know how to get there — spend and charge more.

Indeed, they have little choice. Ten percent of the U.S. News rankings are based on spending per student, with additional points for high faculty salaries and other costly items. If an innovative college found a way to become more efficient and charge less while maintaining academic quality, its U.S. News ranking would actually go down.

Carey argues that publishing more data on college outcomes would result in a better market, but Arnold Kling notes that this presumes that the problem is on the supply side — that colleges want to hold back information:

The Masonomics view is that the problem is more on the demand side — the role that signaling plays in creating perceptions of value.

A point that I keep making about higher education is that it is, like the Harvard-Goldman filter, a form of recursive credentialism. To get certain jobs, you need certain credentials. And the most important credential of all is that you must signal your support for credentialism.

A commenter by the name of agnostic adds that supply and demand are both at work in the higher ed bubble:

The big problem on the supply side is that, just as with the recent finance bubble, managers of assets (the college officials who admit and oversee students) are paid according to volume of assets managed — more students means more tuition and more donations (and maybe more grants if those new students are from “disadvantaged” groups).

They are not paid according to ROI or anything like that. So it wouldn’t matter if we did what Carey says and publish more data like probability of flunking out, probability of graduating in 4 years, loss given flunking out, etc.

These incentives push sub-elite colleges to take in as many students as possible, just as banks took in whatever garbage they could get their hands on.

And as Charles Calomiris pointed out in the context of finance, the true demanders of grade inflation, re-centering of the SAT, etc., is the buy side. If it were the sell side — students, their teachers, parents, etc. — every buyer (college) would know it was a joke and adjust the grades and scores they received accordingly.

Rather, the buy side wants students with inflated grades and test scores because sub-elite colleges need to pass similar regulatory hurdles to admit students — maybe not as formalized as financial reg rules, but still, you can’t admit a bunch of students whose average GPA and SAT is 1.0 and 900. Inflate them to 2.0 and 1000, and would-be regulators or castigators of college admissions boards now have less of a basis to complain.

Hell, the colleges even cherry-pick the best score you got on each sub-test of the SAT. If you take it more than once, only your best math score shows up and only your best verbal, even if on different tests. That’s a smoking gun that the buy side is driving grade inflation, not the demand side.

Trial and Error

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009

Atul Gawande says something that Arnold Kling believes to be true — that transforming healthcare will require trial and error — and something he believes to be false — that we have no choice but to rely on government:

Gawande has no concept of the relative ability of government and markets to deal with ambiguity. He thinks that markets are unable to adopt new processes without government pressure. He thinks that government is well equipped to experiment.

There indeed are examples of markets that do not evolve effectively. There are examples of government-led experiments that pay off. But mostly it is the other way around. The incentives work much better in markets. In markets, the tendency is to reward success and to punish failure. In government, failed programs persist, and success receives no special reward.

The Public Purpose of Banking

Thursday, December 3rd, 2009

The difference between a bank and a non-bank is that a bank has a reserve account at the Fed:

Ultimately, the Govt creates all reserves, so why not just have the Govt make loans directly? Because we do not want the Government to make credit decisions, they are too likely to dole out money to politically connected constituencies, while starving worthwhile, but unconnected borrowers. You can see this today, as banks and unions get Billions, while shop keepers, dry cleaners, manufacturers, and restauranteurs shutter their businesses and go on the dole. An institution that makes loans it knows will not be paid back is not making loans at all, it is making gifts, and the operational bankruptcy of the FHA is a great example of this in action. Many adjectives come to mind: corrupt, wasteful, abominable, unfair, fraudulent, etc. This is the opposite of Responsible Governance. Barry, we really expected more.

So, to keep responsible lending, we put private capital infront of public capital and ask that private capital take the first loss on loans it makes which turn out to be bad. Ultimately, taxpayer money is there as backup, but it should not be directing investment. We call this institutional arrangement a “bank”.

This simple sensible construct is utterly lost on policy makers and the commentariat alike. For banking to do the job it is meant to do (ie. make loans that will be paid back), a bank should be required to keep all loans it makes on its books until maturity.

(Hat tip to Arnold Kling.)

Douglass North on Afghanistan

Wednesday, December 2nd, 2009

In his speech last night, the President pledged to fight corruption in Afghanistan. Douglass North hasn’t offered up his opinion, but Arnold Kling takes a stab at it:

Think of Afghan leader Karzai as like Don Corleone in The Godfather. He controls some enterprises within a territory. Corleone obtains obedience in part because people fear him and in part because of his ability to dispense favors. One of the most important levers of power for Corleone is the fact that key judges and police officers are on his payroll.

Now, our President goes to Corleone with an offer to supply muscle to fight some of Corleone’s rivals. But the President says that Corleone has to stop dispensing favors and stop corrupting judges. Of course, if Corleone complies, his power base will unravel.

Corleone operates in what North calls a “limited-access order,” in which brute force and personal ties are the main source of order. In contrast, the President operates in a country that is an “open-access order,” where property rights and the rule of law tend to dominate.

The change from a limited-access order to an open-access order is like a phase change in chemistry — like going from liquid to gas. Afghanistan is nowhere close to the point of changing from liquid to water vapor. In that metaphor, it’s about 2 degrees centigrade in Afghanistan, when the boiling point is 100 degrees, and you need even more energy when you reach that temperature.

Scaling up Failure

Tuesday, November 17th, 2009

What is frustrating to Arnold Kling is that the Massachusetts health experiment failed, yet that is the experiment being used as the model for the current national bill:

The original promise in Massachusetts was that by eliminating the “free-riding” of the uninsured and by setting up an efficient government insurance exchange, insurance costs would go down. Instead, insurance costs there soared.

So You Want to Do Good

Monday, November 16th, 2009

I enjoyed Arnold Kling’s response to this question from a reader:

I teach an introduction to ag econ class, and today a young student came to chat with me about economic development. She is sincerely and passionately interested in helping developing countries reach our prosperity. She is eager for information about why some countries grow and others do not, and plans to join the Peace Corps after graduating.

To help her, I purchased a copy of your new book From Poverty To Prosperity today, but thought that you might be able to help also. She is eager to help poor people, but is very concerned that what she does has a real, positive impact. She is altruistic, but careful and prudent about her altruism.

Kling’s response:

Because I have a daughter with the same, er, problem, I have thought about this question a lot. My suggestions.
  1. For other reading, try Lant Pritchett’s Let My People Come.
  2. Also, become a regular reader of Bill Easterly’s blog. One of his posts happened to link to an article set in Arusha, Tanzania, where my daughter worked last summer. It’s an article that ends without any real point, but my daughter says that it aptly gets at some of the feelings she experienced.
  3. I sent my daughter this story about a young woman who started a school in Ecuador.
  4. I advise networking. Michael Strong of FLOW, who gave a talk that I recently recommended, combines good sense, idealism, and a lot of connections both here and in underdeveloped countries. So does Michael Fairbanks, of Seven Fund. Try to get in touch with them.
  5. Finally, ask yourself what is your comparative advantage. If you are good at research and analysis, then perhaps givewell or SevenFund would be organizations for which to work. If you are an effective hands-on entrepreneur, then perhaps you should try to emulate the young woman who founded the school in Ecuador. However, it is always possible that your comparative advantage is earning a good living in the U.S. and donating money effectively. Bill Gates has the potential to do more good than many people who have put much more of their time and effort into development.
  6. My own personal inclination is to see global poverty as a problem of people being “off the grid.” If people in remote villages could connect to the U.S. economy, through trade, communication, and sharing of knowledge, then I doubt that they would remain poor. For my daughter, this raises larger questions about whether such connections would make villagers happier or less happy. Those larger questions I cannot pretend to answer.

The Dead Zone

Thursday, November 12th, 2009

Clifford Thies explores The Dead Zone where the implicit marginal tax rate crests over 100 percent:

To say that antipoverty programs in the United States are perverted may be an understatement. When you take into account the loss of means-tested benefits (e.g., cash assistance, food stamps, housing subsidies, and health insurance), and the taxes that people pay on earned income, the return to working is essentially zero for those in the lower two quintiles of the income distribution.

For many of the working poor, the implicit marginal tax rate is greater than 100 percent. The long-run consequence of undermining the positive incentive to work is, of course, the creation of an underclass acclimated to not working; the supplement of cash and noncash benefits with income from crime and the underground economy; and the government resorting to negative incentives such as mandatory work programs.

Below, I show the relationship between earned income and after-tax income plus subsidies for a hypothetical Virginia family of three, consisting of one adult and two minor children. As you can see, the relationship is essentially flat from $0 to about $40,000 in earned income.

Income Less Taxes Plus Subsidies

To see exactly what is happening, I developed the following chart. It shows the implicit tax paid on the last $10,000 of earned income (initially by comparison to the welfare grant and then by comparison to income less taxes plus subsidies).

Implicit Marginal Tax Rate

At A, the marginal tax rate is quite high, essentially because of the generosity of the package of cash and noncash benefits provided to those on welfare. At B, the marginal tax rate is relatively low (!) because of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). From B to D, we (or, rather, the working poor) are in the Dead Zone, with implicit marginal tax rates mostly exceeding 100 percent.

How stupid and evil must our elected representatives be to do this to the working poor! Actually, this being a democracy, there is nobody to blame but the electorate. Especially the left-liberal do-gooders. Since Milton Friedman developed the negative income tax, waaay back in the 1950s, there can be no excuse for any educated person to not be aware of the fact that taxes and means-tested benefits destroy the lower classes’ positive incentive to work.

Arnold Kling adds that Greg Mankiw shows that health care reform will make this worse.

The Great War

Thursday, November 12th, 2009

Arnold Kling looks back at the tragedy of the Great War:

I really think that if more people focused on leadership during that war, the concerns over “market failure” and the faith in political leadership would decline. I challenge anyone to come up with a group of business villains who caused as much death and suffering as the “legitimate” political leaders of 1914.

My proposal for Veterans’ Day observances is that they should include a re-telling of the history of World War I along the lines of the Passover re-telling of the Exodus. My goal would be to help inoculate people from believing in the wisdom of the ruling class.

I have to agree with this comment though:

I venture that re-telling the horrors of World War One would merely further support for a stronger UN or similar international body. A decline in petty nationalism would be replaced by a desire for internationalism or by a desire for universally weaker governments across the board, guess which one is more likely?

The major state to leave the World War One battlefield was of course Russia under Communist revolution, so it’s certainly not instinctively obvious to walk away with a Market Solves Everything solution. I’m sure Kling has a sophisticated argument in mind, but a mere retelling is unlikely to suggest such an argument.

Likewise, war resistors and pacifists during WWI were overwhelmingly drawn from the left and extreme left, not the right.

As far as the US is concerned, libertarian and free-market claims to be anti-war and pro-civil-rights have very little popular credibility because when the chips are down prominent libertarians then decide otherwise. The view that there is a military-industrial complex that needs to be dismantled by a heroic politician has much sympathy; the view that selfish myopic leaders provoke war over the heroic protests of the private sector, not so much. Right or wrong I think this a fair assessment of the popular view.

Selecting Talent

Tuesday, October 27th, 2009

Bob Sutton quotes a meta-analysis by Frank Schmidt and John Hunter published in 1998 on the factors found to affect job performance:

  1. GMA tests (“General mental ability”)
  2. Work sample tests
  3. Integrity tests: surveys design to assess honesty … I don’t like them but they do appear to work.
  4. Conscientiousness tests: essentially do people follow-through on their promises, do what they say, and work doggedly and reliably to finish their work.
  5. Employment interviews (structured)
  6. Employment interviews (unstructured)
  7. Job knowledge tests: To assess how much employees know about specific aspects of the job.
  8. Job tryout procedure: Where employees go through a trial period of doing the entire job.
  9. Peer ratings
  10. T & E behavioral consistency method: “Based on the principle that past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior. In practice, the method involves describing previous accomplishments gained through work, training, or other experience (e.g., school, community service, hobbies) and matching those accomplishments to the competencies required by the job. a method were past achievements that are thought to be important to behavior on the job are weighted and scored.”
  11. Reference checks
  12. Job experience (years)
  13. Biographical data measures
  14. Assessment centers
  15. T & E point method
  16. Years of education
  17. Interests
  18. Graphology (e.g., handwriting analysis)
  19. Age

Arnold Kling loves that years of education just barely beats out handwriting analysis.

Pro-Business, Not Pro-Market

Monday, October 26th, 2009

True capitalism lacks a strong lobby, Luigi Zingales says, because lobbying seeks to tilt the playing field in one direction or another, not to level it:

Most lobbying is pro-business, in the sense that it promotes the interests of existing businesses, not pro-market in the sense of fostering truly free and open competition.

We stand at a crossroads for American capitalism, Zingales says:

One path would channel popular rage into political support for some genuinely pro-market reforms, even if they do not serve the interests of large financial firms. By appealing to the best of the populist tradition, we can introduce limits to the power of the financial industry — or any business, for that matter — and restore those fundamental principles that give an ethical dimension to capitalism: freedom, meritocracy, a direct link between reward and effort, and a sense of responsibility that ensures that those who reap the gains also bear the losses. This would mean abandoning the notion that any firm is too big to fail, and putting rules in place that keep large financial firms from manipulating government connections to the detriment of markets. It would mean adopting a pro-market, rather than pro-business, approach to the economy.

The alternative path is to soothe the popular rage with measures like limits on executive bonuses while shoring up the position of the largest financial players, making them dependent on government and making the larger economy dependent on them. Such measures play to the crowd in the moment, but threaten the financial system and the public standing of American capitalism in the long run. They also reinforce the very practices that caused the crisis. This is the path to big-business capitalism: a path that blurs the distinction between pro-market and pro-business policies, and so imperils the unique faith the American people have long displayed in the legitimacy of democratic capitalism.

I agree with Arnold Kling; read the whole thing.

Sacrificing Cunning

Tuesday, October 20th, 2009

Arnold Kling cites Dan Klein’s Resorting to Statism to Find Meaning, which tries to explain three different political dispositions — progressive, conservative, and libertarian — and summarizes the conservative view:

The role of the state, in the conservative view, is to enforce norms and laws that have a prior origin. For religious conservatives, that origin is divine. In theory, a secular conservative could find the roots of those norms in tradition, or cultural evolution.

Tradition is usually the best guide, because, while clever innovations can improve on tradition, they generally don’t. That’s what makes open-minded intellectuals into Bruce Charlton’s clever sillies:

[A]n increasing relative level of IQ brings with it a tendency differentially to over-use general intelligence in problem-solving, and to over-ride those instinctive and spontaneous forms of evolved behaviour which could be termed common sense. Preferential use of abstract analysis is often useful when dealing with the many evolutionary novelties to be found in modernizing societies; but is not usually useful for dealing with social and psychological problems for which humans have evolved ‘domain-specific’ adaptive behaviours. And since evolved common sense usually produces the right answers in the social domain; this implies that, when it comes to solving social problems, the most intelligent people are more likely than those of average intelligence to have novel but silly ideas, and therefore to believe and behave maladaptively.

One commenter added his thoughts — which Kling saw as a proposal for Robin Hanson to do fieldwork:

The real reason people with high IQs lack common sense is neurological. You can’t be cerebral without sacrificing cunning. It takes real live brain matter to support each. Unless you’ve got a second brain hidden somewhere, you can’t get around this tradeoff. The extreme form of this can be seen in the autistic brain. While autism is just a behavioral profile at present, the brains of high-functioning autistic people have been studied enough to reveal a pattern of early abnormal overgrowth in areas implicated in the things autistic people do well: art, music, mathematics, etc. The price they pay is a corresponding undergrowth of the white matter linking the neocortex to the rest of the brain. (There are other abnormalities as well.) The neocortex is responsible for executive function, working memory, and generalization, among other things. Generalization is how we acquire biases. Autistic people are bad at this. That means they lack prejudice, which is what we call the biases we don’t like. The ones we like, we call common sense. If you want to get some idea of what the world would look like if we overcame bias, go to a group home for autistic adults.