Victory tended to go to the side that could better execute modern tactics

Monday, November 16th, 2026

Between 1942 and 1944, the world witnessed two simultaneous tactical transformations:

In the Pacific, American carrier groups underwent a dramatic shift. The number of AA guns on flattops and escort vessels more than doubled, while the introduction of proximity fuses and improved fire control made them much more deadly. Air wings were rebalanced to give them an outright majority of fighters, at the expense of dive bombers and torpedo planes, while improved radar direction increased their effectiveness in intercepting enemy attacks.

This shift in favor of the defense completely transformed carrier battles. Instead of resembling “two blindfolded men with knives in a ring”—meaning the first to strike was likely to knock out the enemy’s carriers—American task groups could afford to stand their ground and slug it out with incoming Japanese aircraft. This was just as true against their surface vessels as against land targets: whereas the Pacific Fleet was loath to remain offshore for very long during the tough fighting on Guadalcanal and Tarawa in 1942-43, they pummeled the Marianas and Philippines for extended periods in 1944.

Half a world away in the European theater, other military establishments were undertaking serious efforts to bolster their principal striking arms. During the first three years of fighting, German Panzers often found themselves alone once they penetrated fragile defensive lines, racing ahead of their supporting infantry and artillery. Following their early victories in Poland, France, Russia, and Ukraine, however, they began to struggle as the Soviets got better at implementing their prewar doctrine of defensive depth.

The only answer was to restore the combined-arms balance at the point of the spear. The number of tanks in a Panzer division was slightly reduced, while a greater proportion of their infantry was mounted in half-tracks and they were given additional self-propelled artillery that could keep up with the armor (along with flak guns to serve in both an anti-air and anti-tank role). This made it possible to endure fierce counterattacks when set upon far from friendly lines.

[…]

Well-integrated mobile formations, supported by airpower, would dominate land warfare for the remainder of the 20th century. Although the precise balance changed over the following decades in many particulars, this basic template proved to be a remarkably stable equilibrium: accounting for correlation of forces, victory tended to go to the side that could better execute modern tactics, not necessarily the side that was on the bleeding edge of innovation.

Ease of use alone is not enough to make a weapon playable

Wednesday, November 11th, 2026

A good video game usually introduces a new weapon not by stopping to explain everything it does, but by giving the player the weapon, enough information to make the possibilities legible, and then pointing him toward an opportunity to use it, with the rest of the new mechanic learned through experimentation:

Taken as a metaphor, the familiar fantasy of a teenager unexpectedly finding himself inside a mechsuit works a similar way, and the useful military fiction is what lies underneath: a sophisticated weapon arriving with an interface that allows a new operator to begin using it effectively before either he or the institution around him has completely worked out what it can do. America should try to make that part of the fantasy real.

[…]

Ease of use alone is not enough to make a weapon playable. Far from accelerating time-to-learn, systems made superficially simple by concealing so much of their behavior as to leave operators guessing what’s happening beneath the surface become useless as soon as they depart from the conditions the interface was designed around. A good game, on the other hand, hides an enormous volume of calculations, yet remains very deliberate about revealing the essential and necessary information. A playable military system, which faces the same design problem with higher consequences, should do much the same thing: provide curated legibility by hiding complexity which does not matter to employment while highlighting the essential information, making it visible enough that an operator can build an accurate working model of the machine and its state.

Ukrainian experience with automatic terminal guidance on FPV drones demonstrates the distinction. Experienced drone operators have at times chosen manual control for as long as they had a video link, in order to make better corrections on final attack approach. Other times they’ve preferred automatic guidance using pixel lock for the reason that it proved more than sufficient against targets with regular, recognizable outlines like enemy anti-air or jamming equipment.11 Therefore, the value of automatic or manual guidance is situation-, target-, and mission-dependent. To generalize this example, more than just providing an easily selectable automatic option, an effective, time-to-learn optimized interface will still convey sufficient information for the operator to understand each mode’s function, the limits of their advantages, and adapt to changing circumstances.

The division of work between operator and software changes with the target and the condition of the link. An operator will soon likely cease to “fly” an unmanned aircraft in any conventional sense, and instead tell it where to go, what to observe, and how it should work with other machines. The necessary elements of an aerial weapon’s flight, like navigation, obstacle avoidance, or even parts of terminal guidance can increasingly be submerged, freeing up the operator’s attention for the most important tasks, namely target identification, maintaining situational awareness, and coordinating teaming between the weapon and other systems. Such a configuration would aim to offload work from the operator downward into the machine, ultimately enabling the operator to give more attention to the more consequential work, while preserving interface legibility sufficient for the operator to appreciate when the machine’s behavior or the tactical situation requires intervention.

Most of the Russian ships were unregistered and sailed without transponders

Sunday, November 1st, 2026

As recently as the summer of 2026, hundreds of Russian tankers and dry cargo ships plied the Sea of Azov and the adjacent Black Sea:

Most of the Russian ships were unregistered and sailed without transponders, making them a kind of regional adjunct of Moscow’s “shadow fleet” that ships Russian oil and other goods to the global market in defiance of international sanctions.

The Black Sea shadow fleet has, or had, a more limited remit. It helped supply Russian forces in southern Ukraine—in particular, the Crimean Peninsula, which functions as a kind of unsinkable aircraft carrier for Russian air power.

On July 7, Ukraine’s deep strike drone force finally started hunting the Russian ships—starting with the tankers that represented the bulk of the shadow fleet. By day five of the counter-shipping effort, the Ukrainians had hit and damaged no fewer than 76 tankers and even a few tugboats sent to assist the damaged tankers.

“To be clear, 76 tankers comprise a massive fraction of Russia’s shadow fleet” of unregistered ships, RAND analyst Michael Bohnert explained. “At this rate, in two weeks, there will be next to no Russian tankers in the Black Sea,” Bohnert predicted.

In fact, it took a bit longer for Ukrainian drones to effectively erase Russian shipping from the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. But they did do so—mostly with propeller-driven Fire Point FP-1s and FP-2s. After four weeks, the drones had struck more than 200 Russian ships: the majority of the regional shadow fleet.

The basic, $50,000 FP-1 carries a 130-pound warhead 600 miles under satellite, 5G and mesh radio control. Trading range for firepower, the FP-2 carries a 440-pound warhead out to a distance of around 120 miles.

Upgraded versions of both the FP-1 and FP-2 extended the range of each and also added A.I.-assisted targeting that helped the drones strike ships’ bridges and machinery without also penetrating their hulls and risking environmentally damaging oil spills.

Absent a strong Russian response, the Black Sea countershipping campaign could have ended in a decisive victory for Ukraine. The problem for the Ukrainians is that the Russians also have drones—and, equally importantly, a substantial inventory of cruise and ballistic missiles.

There’s no safe place for ammo dumps or command posts

Thursday, October 29th, 2026

Drone-guided artillery strikes have made Ukraine the graveyard of command posts:

On tomorrow’s battlefield, there’s no safe place for ammo dumps or command posts. Drones will buzz constantly overhead, AI-powered algorithms searching for any sign of life — movement, body heat, wireless signals — that they can target for precision strike. So how can commanders and their staffs survive this new threat, when their very function requires communication?

Ditch that smartphone. Hide in a basement. Turn off every radio you can. Use electronic warfare sensors to scan your own troops for detectable transmissions and shut them off. Offload every function you can to higher headquarters further out of range, transmitting only essential data through an encrypted cloud.

Break up big staffs, like the 200-plus personnel in a divisional Main Command Post, into half a dozen smaller “sub-nodes,” each hiding in a different building or hastily dug bunker, communicating with each other not over Wi-Fi or tactical radio but over ruggedized fiber optic cables a quarter-mile (400 meters) long, unspooled by soldiers through the shelling-shattered windows and rubbled streets.

And every few hours, one of the sub-nodes takes its turn to shut down for a few hours and move a few hundred yards — never too far for those fiber cables — so that, within a day, the entire formation has relocated, slithering undetected across the battlefield like an amoeba.

That’s the prescription from the US Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, helmed by Lt. Gen. Milford Beagle, a South Carolinian who’s served everywhere from Afghanistan and Iraq to South Korea.

The core of the original Project Maven was spotting potential terrorist targets in mind-numbing hours of drone surveillance video

Sunday, October 25th, 2026

Pentagon planners and military staffs made unprecedented use of artificial intelligence during the 38-day air war against Iran:

“Operation Epic Fury leveraged Palantir’s Maven Smart System in order to conduct strike missions across the entire battle space, 13,000 targets in 38 days,” the Pentagon’s Chief Digital & AI Officer (CDAO), Cameron Stanley, told the SCSP AI+Expo Thursday, adding that troops have shown an “insatiable appetite” for the tech. “[AI tools] allow us to take all of this data, synthesize the data, and make better decisions, faster, on the battlefield.”

MSS is an AI tool suite that evolved from the original Project Maven experiment to a multi-purpose military planning tool built by contractor Palantir. (A separate offshoot of Maven is run by the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.)

During Epic Fury, MSS saw unclassified usage surge by 38 percent and classified usage by 89 percent, a Pentagon spokesperson told Breaking Defense, measuring month-to-month. Measured by “tokens,” the individual mathematical operations underlying generative AI, peak daily usage rose 4,425 percent.

At one point, the spokesperson told Breaking Defense, daily usage hit approximately 20 billion tokens. For comparison, in civilian contexts, a single question-and-answer with a chatbot can require several hundred tokens, while an individual power user with a high-level paid account — someone using AI to write code, for instance — can burn up to a quarter-million tokens a day.

[…]

The core of the original Project Maven was spotting potential terrorist targets in mind-numbing hours of drone surveillance video, for instance. But over time, the toolkit has expanded into what contractor Palantir calls “a live, synchronized view of the battlespace” that “enables synchronized mission planning and execution” and features “automated object detection” and “centralized target identification and management.”

The tech analyzes complex combinations of video, satellite imagery, and other highly technical sources of intelligence, according to Palantir and published reports. Maven Smart System can also sift through vast libraries of intelligence reports and draft summaries or potential future courses of action, the Pentagon spokesperson told Breaking Defense.

It now costs less than $100k to synthesize a pathogen

Friday, October 23rd, 2026

Biology is becoming programmable:

Two compounding technological trends are rapidly democratizing dual-use biotechnology: the cost of bioengineering is falling, and AI models are getting better at biology.

Together, they’re lowering the barrier to engineering bioweapons. It now costs <$100k to synthesize a pathogen, AI models are able to outperform experts on benchwork troubleshooting evaluations, and tools like AlphaFold and Evo2 are changing our ability to understand and engineer biology at will.

AI scales offense significantly faster than defense: the physical infrastructure to defend against biological threats does not scale by Moore’s law, but AI lab assistance and the quality of AI biological design tools might.

We are transitioning into a new regime, one where highly-resourced state actors, as well as unsophisticated and under-resourced actors, may be able to synthesize a pathogen far more dangerous than a natural virus.

Our current defenses are inadequate for this paradigm, and engineered bioweapons present a significant threat.

[…]

We break down global biosecurity into a stack of defense layers: Delay, Detect, Withstand, and Combat. We have also included two under-discussed enabling layers: Field-building and Policy & Regulatory.

[…]

Bioweapons are also not a new problem, but we have no effective policy in place to stop them.

For example, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was meant to end state bioweapons programs. While its overall effect may have been positive, it has no oversight or enforcement mechanism.

The international unit responsible for supporting the Biological Weapons Convention runs on a $2.2M annual budget with 4 staff. For context, the average U.S. McDonald’s restaurant takes in ~$4M/year.
As they signed the BWC, agreeing not to build bioweapons, the Soviets concurrently expanded their bioweapons program. The Biopreparat program ran for two decades after the treaty, employing tens of thousands of scientists and weaponizing anthrax, plague, and smallpox at industrial scale. They also built stockpiles of vaccines for their own population.

[…]

In a pandemic scenario, costs compound exponentially with the spread of the pathogen. Every day that passes before countermeasure deployment could mean tens of thousands of lives lost. Detection is the layer that gives every other intervention more runway.

The COVID-19 timeline shows the current system’s failure. The first documented cases occurred in Wuhan in early December 2019, but the sequence was not published until January 11th, 2020. When the WHO declared a public health emergency on January 30th, 2020, the virus was already on four continents. Retrospective wastewater analysis later found SARS-CoV-2 in northern Italian samples from December 18th 2019, nine weeks before community transmission was clinically identified at Codogno (La Rosa et al. 2021). This analysis used PCR designed against a published genome, and was therefore able to provide a sensitivity that current metagenomic surveillance for a novel pathogen would not have. However, it is possible that surveillance technology could be developed to achieve something closer to that level of sensitivity, even for novel pathogens.

If there had been wastewater surveillance approaching that level of sensitivity in Wuhan at the time, we could have added ~1 month of time to develop countermeasures and prepare our critical infrastructure for the outbreak, including distributing personal protective equipment (PPE) to critical care workers and ramping up manufacturing capacity.

If the system is unprepared for a pathogen like SARS-CoV-2, it is completely unprepared for an advanced bioweapon.

[…]

Advanced bioweapons enabled by AI could spread with extreme infection rates, often referred to as the “wildfire“ pandemic scenario, or they could spread silently, often referred to as the “stealth” pandemic scenario.

[…]

Pathogens designed to spread asymptomatically with long incubation times will be invisible to the current system, which detects pathogens through clinical surveillance.

The current system is set into motion by some threshold of patients seeking care or clinicians noticing unusual patterns, meaning one or more transmission generations have likely already elapsed. If a patient tests negative for known pathogens, their samples are not sent for metagenomic (agnostic) sequencing by default. In fact, their samples are not sent until a clinician decides to escalate after a prolonged period of ineffective standard treatments, worsening conditions, or unusual deaths, giving bioweapon-class pathogens weeks to spread, especially if designed to do so quietly.

To detect advanced bioweapons, a pathogen-agnostic surveillance system must be built.

A drone war is won by the side that can build more

Monday, October 19th, 2026

China is running the most systematic effort by any outside power to convert the Ukraine war’s lessons into military advantage:

The first offensive lesson is economic. In March 2025, the PLA Daily treated as settled fact the claim that a single reconnaissance-strike drone costs less than 1 percent of a modern fighter while achieving more than 90 percent of its battlefield coverage. While these are rough figures, the Central Military Commission’s newspaper states them without qualification. The professional literature provides supporting evidence. More than one million small drones were purchased by Ukraine and Russia in 2024 alone, which a Chinese naval academy analyst depicted as an average of two drones hanging over every frontline soldier’s head. For Chinese planners, mass is not an ad hoc wartime improvisation, but the economic structure of drone war itself.

The second lesson is speed. According to the National Defense University’s Joint Operations College, Russian forces can strike a detected target within three to five minutes—compared to hours in earlier wars. A survey by researchers at a PLA unit attributes this to Russia’s reconnaissance-strike complex, in which a low-cost reconnaissance drone pushed deep into the enemy rear serves as the observer and guides another drone’s strike, with Orlan-10s cueing Kub and Lancet loitering munitions. The copying target is not any single platform but rather the connection between them: drones wired directly into artillery and command networks.

The third lesson is overcommunication and connectivity. Chinese analysts treat electronic warfare as the deciding factor of the drone war, recording heavy losses on both sides to jamming and countermeasures. They registered Russia’s answer—the fiber-optic first-person-view (FPV) drone steered through a thin cable that jamming cannot touch—almost immediately. The PLA Daily flagged the shift in May 2024 within weeks of the technique’s operational debut, and by April 2025, state media were weighing its trade-offs in detail.

[…]

The analytical corpus runs deepest on defense, organizing lessons around two Ukrainian methods that Chinese analysts consider previews of potential attacks on China. The first is the sea drone. In the journal of the state shipbuilder’s underwater-warfare institute, a team from the Naval University of Engineering tallied repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian ships, ports, and the Kerch Bridge and found more than 10 large naval vessels damaged. They concluded that a systematized sea drone offensive must be met by counter–sea drone equipment that also fights as a system. A researcher at a sister combat-systems institute proposed countering suicide boats with interceptor swarms, in skirmishes devoid of humans entirely.

The second preview is the airfield raid. After Ukraine’s Operation Spider’s Web reached Russian bomber bases on June 1, 2025, the Chinese foreign ministry’s magazine estimated Russian losses at 11 strategic bombers and identified the raid’s novelty in being launched from inside Russia, at close range. The PLA’s training system answered within four and a half months. In an October 2025 exercise, a brigade defended against a drone attack team of more than 20 operators, using detection gear that locates drones by their radio emissions and matches them against a catalog of more than 800 commercial models, paving a path for Chinese response to a Spider’s Web–style drone infiltration.

The economics of defense received the same treatment as the economics of attack. According to a Global Times analysis of Ukraine’s interceptor drones, “the cost of procuring one man-portable air-defense missile buys several hundred air-defense FPV drones.” Every missile the defender fires costs more than the drone cost the attacker, so the conclusion in the Chinese press is that the best weapon against a drone is another drone. Chinese analysts draw a second conclusion from the same numbers: Any enemy China fights will have cheap drones in mass, so China must learn to shoot them down.

[…]

For Chinese analysts, a drone war is won by the side that can build more, and no country builds more drones than China.

[…]

The fullest Chinese study of Starlink’s battlefield role—written jointly by the state rocket academy, a satellite launch center, and a PLA unit in 2022—traced how Ukrainian firing units depended on intelligence moving through the constellation and concluded that China must develop and build its own low-orbit constellation.

The Dan-T is reportedly based on the Dan-M aerial target

Tuesday, October 13th, 2026

Russia’s new Dan-T loitering munition is effectively a small cruise missile:

It has a slender cylindrical fuselage with swept wings and a conventional tail, rather than the broad delta-wing shape characteristic of the Geran family. Released images of the aircraft make it appear to be over 3 m long with a wingspan of approximately 2 m. It has a launch weight of 268 kg, making it significantly smaller and lighter than conventional cruise missiles. The Dan-T is reportedly powered by a domestically produced Russian MD-120 turbojet engine. The system is also being outfitted with upgraded electronics intended to improve its resilience against Ukrainian electronic warfare systems.

Dan-T Loitering Munition

Unlike many Russian loitering munitions, the Dan-T is designed to be air-launched from either fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters, including the Su-34, Su-57, and Mi-28, and can also be integrated with foreign aircraft. A ground-based launching system has also been developed, increasing the tactical utility of the weapon. After release, the Dan-T operates as a fire-and-forget weapon, autonomously navigating to a pre-programmed target using a combination of inertial navigation and satellite guidance. It reportedly flies at low altitude while following the terrain and avoiding obstacles. As it approaches its target, the Dan-T abruptly gains altitude before diving vertically onto the target from above.

The Dan-T has a reported range of 450 km and a maximum speed of 500 km/h. This makes it considerably faster than the propeller-driven Geran-2, while the jet-powered Geran-3 provides a closer comparison in speed and the newer Geran-5 can reach approximately 600 km/h. However, all three Geran variants have greater ranges than the Dan-T, with the Geran-5 capable of traveling nearly twice as far. The Dan-T makes up for its shorter range with a 130 kg warhead, which is larger than those typically carried by the Geran series. Its range, speed, and payload remain significantly below those of Russia’s conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles, but the Dan-T is considerably less expensive and requires fewer resources to produce.

The Dan-T is reportedly based on the Dan-M aerial target, a jet-powered drone used to train Russian air-defense units by replicating incoming aircraft and cruise missiles. […] As an aerial target, the Dan-M was designed to be relatively inexpensive and has an established supply chain capable of supporting mass production.

These were live-action exercises involving thousands of participants, not just tabletop discussions

Monday, October 12th, 2026

Biological War by Annie JacobsenBack in the mid-to late 1990s, Annie Jacobsen explains (in Biological War), Congress and the White House launched a series of domestic preparedness programs requiring the federal government to regularly sponsor full-scale biological-attack exercises — so America’s federal, state, and local law enforcement and first responders would be aware of how to deal with a catastrophe of this magnitude, “in advance of an actual incident”:

These were live-action exercises involving thousands of participants, not just tabletop discussions.

[…]

One of the first unclassified exercises was called TOPOFF 2000, a full-scale, multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional simulation (TOPOFF stands for Top Officials). One part of the scenario involved an attack by terrorists who covertly deployed pneumonic plague inside the Denver Performing Arts Center, in downtown Denver, Colorado.

The scenario’s authors based their infection rates on pneumonic plague’s natural contagiousness of R0 2.4 on average.

[…]

The exercise abruptly ends after the fourth generation of infected. What you don’t learn, unless you really dig into the details, is that the reason the exercise stops is because the Denver healthcare system essentially collapses. In the after-action summary, TOPOFF’s coauthor, Dr. Thomas V. Inglesby and his colleagues, write, “Health department officials became exhausted and a feeling of hopelessness quickly overwhelmed a number of [those] participating.”

[…]

Supplies ran out.

First responders could not triage victims fast enough.

Hospitals were overrun.

There was widespread confusion about who was in charge at the federal level. Inglesby found jurisdictional overlaps between the Department of Justice (the law enforcement lead), FEMA (in charge of consequence management), Health and Human Services and CDC (in charge of co-managing public health), and the Defense Department (providing military support).

The CDC collects biosurveillance information on Americans from 7,200 healthcare facilities

Saturday, October 10th, 2026

Biological War by Annie Jacobsen Back in 2003, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Annie Jacobsen explains (in Biological War), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention established a multibillion-dollar national syndromic surveillance system called BioSense:

Under the BioSense platform, the CDC collects biosurveillance information on Americans from 7,200 healthcare facilities across fifty states, Washington, D.C., and Guam. This includes near-real-time data from emergency departments, urgent care clinics, ambulatory care centers, and other registered facilities, all of which feeds into centralized servers at the CDC for rapid analysis.

[…]

But the program does not include any data from any of the nation’s homeless shelters or clinics. None. This means that the entirety of America’s ~800,000-person homeless population is left out of the CDC’s national syndromic surveillance program.

[…]

Across America, the phenomenon of mass overdose in homeless camps has gone from rare to commonplace. In July 2025, police in Baltimore responded to a “mass casualty” incident in an open-air drug market, after twenty-seven people overdosed on fentanyl mixed with what was reported to be some kind of powerful sedative. Thirteen medical units and four fire trucks were sent to triage people on-site, with dozens of officers trying to locate more potential victims.

[…]

More than twenty years ago, the U.S. Army’s Edgewood Chemical Biological Center wrote a handbook for police officers describing what to expect in a biological incident or attack. It acknowledges a merciless truth. Unlike U.S. military personnel, who are trained and equipped to enter contaminated battlespaces in protective gear and gas masks, local law enforcement officers and first responders will face biological threats unprotected.

Since the publication of the U.S. Army’s guide, hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent on what the government calls BioDefense.

[…]

Biological attacks are invisible. Silent and odorless, they won’t be detected until people start dying and contagion levels are already out of control.

An aerosolized pathogen is the ultimate nightmare scenario. Humans must breathe air to stay alive; with an airborne pathogen incident or attack, breathing becomes the primary dispersal mechanism of death.

Law enforcement, first responders, doctors, and nurses will be exposed. The people best equipped to respond and help will become sick and die, leaving few professionals left to care for the sick and the dying.

Mass panic will likely collapse the medical system. The sudden onset of dying people will lead to a crushing wave of infected people and not infected people (“ the worried well”), overwhelming local emergency medical systems before diagnoses can be made. The noninfected will become infected while waiting for aid.

[…]

The system is flawed to the point of breaking. A 2022 after-action report following a terrorist-attack exercise in Los Angeles found that L.A. County’s Emergency Operations Center was “unable to coordinate the dissemination of emergency public information” effectively, and that it “did not take any corrective action to establish an alternate method” after it was clear the system had failed.

[…]

The Los Angeles County Department of Public Health is “[ a] corrupt, bloated, inefficient bureaucracy,” the Los Angeles–based AIDS Healthcare Foundation insists, and it is not alone in its assessment. A 2025 audit of the agency dedicated to Los Angeles public health found that hundreds of millions of dollars of Los Angeles’s $ 875-million-a-year budget for the homeless (which has since been raised to $ 953 million for fiscal year 2025–2026) had been spent recklessly and without transparency. “It’s now been verified by two audits that [the city] cannot produce an account for the work that they are funded to do,” City Council member Monica Rodriguez told the Associated Press, “and that, to me, is an egregious breach of taxpayer trust.”

The United States used to have a plague vaccine

Thursday, October 8th, 2026

Biological War by Annie JacobsenThe United States does not have a vaccine for plague, Annie Jacobsen explains (in Biological War), for reasons that are complicated:

Russia’s vaccine, called Live Plague Vaccine, or LPV, is understood to have been created from an attenuated, or weakened, strain of plague. “For the past almost eight decades of usage,” writes Russian vaccine expert Valentina A. Feodorova, “millions of [Russian] people have been immunized with this LPV.”

Russia has a long history of plague epidemics. The Russian Ministry of Health lists Y. pestis bacteria as an “Extremely Dangerous to Human Populations” pathogen on its version of the CDC’s Tier 1 Select Agent list. Because of this, Russians generally embrace anti-plague-vaccine campaigns. There are “no recorded live vaccine-related deaths or serious post-vaccination complications,” Feodorova adds, which may or may not be true. “Reactions are generally mild and of short duration,” she says.

Plague epidemics tend to occur in remote regions of Siberia, in border areas with Mongolia and China. Large plague outbreaks in Russian cities are uncommon. During the Cold War, there were at least five research institutes dedicated to what Russia calls anti-plague work. As we know from Igor Domaradskij’s writings, many of these institutions performed dual-use biological weapons work.

The United States used to have a plague vaccine, but not anymore. During the Vietnam War, soldiers were given the EV76 Y. pestis vaccine, but some of them got sick and it was discontinued.

[…]

In 1999, the FDA renewed plague vaccine efforts but discontinued use after EV76 caused severe reactions in nonhuman primates. Some of the apes being used as medical test subjects contracted fatal plague and died.

“There’s another great vaccine that’s been in development at USAMRIID for a while,” Dr. Heine tells us; he worked on this program for the army, fifteen years ago. “But this vaccine is lost in bureaucracy and is nowhere near being ready for human trials—that I’m aware of,” he says, a fact that remains largely unknown outside defense medicine circles.

In Virginia, an NRO intelligence officer uploads the images of the Russian truck convoy into the classified JWICS and SIPRNet (Secret Internet Protocol Router Network) for the intelligence community to see, and analyze.

Biological war can begin with an accident

Tuesday, October 6th, 2026

Biological War by Annie JacobsenBiological war can begin with an accident, Annie Jacobsen explains (in Biological War):

A large-scale attack with a biological weapon can set off a pandemic, but so can a lab leak.

“The risk of a pandemic from a lab escape is not hypothetical,” Andy Weber tells us. He’s one of a small number of U.S. officials to have ever visited the Vector Institute, which he did in the 1990s. Weber has firsthand knowledge of the germs stored inside the freezers at Vector, many of which have been weaponized to kill population sets in the most diabolical of ways.

[…]

“We have eyes on all critical facilities,” retired colonel Julian Chesnutt, a former Defense Intelligence Agency officer, tells us, “near continuous coverage of all ‘facilities of interest’ across the globe.”

[…]

Airborne killers like plague, smallpox, and genetically modified flu will have a high transmission rate, high fear factor, and potential global impact. Fluid-contact killers like Ebola, Marburg, and Lassa fever will have a lower rate of spread, but similarly high lethality and panic components. Environmentally persistent spores like anthrax will mean limited, person-to-person spread, but long-term contamination and psychological issues.

[…]

“If you can deal with a lab leak in the first twelve to twenty-four hours, the outcome can be drastically different,” Dr. Robert Kadlec tells us. Kadlec, a retired air force physician, is a long-serving presidential advisor on bioterrorism. During the Covid pandemic, he was a primary driver of Operation Warp Speed, the government-led effort that developed, manufactured, and distributed 977 million doses of the Covid-19 vaccine across the United States.

[…]

If a deadly pathogen has been accidently released, sharing information—or even asking for help—makes containment far more likely. Containment of an infected population through quarantine, contact tracing, and other measures allows public health officials to stop a pandemic in its tracks. “Koltsovo is not Beijing,” Dr. Cameron says of this [fictional] scenario, meaning quarantining Koltsovo’s 20,000 residents would be possible, whereas quarantining a city like Beijing, with a population of 22 million, would never work. But Dr. Cameron’s comments also allude to a much greater existential threat. One that hangs like a sword of Damocles over all of us. Many of today’s BSL-4 labs have been built in or near cities with millions of people.

[…]

Because all biological weapons programs are illegal, all biological weapons programs are clandestine, or disguised as vaccine or other kinds of research.

Gain-of-function research quickly became normalized within government-funded science

Sunday, October 4th, 2026

Biological War by Annie JacobsenAfter the anthrax scare in 2001, Annie Jacobsen explains (in Biological War), gain-of-function research quickly became normalized within government-funded science:

Agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases funded this kind of experimental research with gusto, not just in labs across America, but also in BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs overseas, including in places like Wuhan, China.

“The benefits of such [gain-of-function] experiments and the resulting knowledge outweigh the risks,” argued Dr. Anthony Fauci in a 2012 paper. Fauci served as the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases at the time. During the Covid pandemic, he served as chief medical advisor to Presidents Donald Trump and Joe Biden.

Critics of gain-of-function cried foul, citing the Australian mousepox experiment of 2001 and the H5N1 ferret flu experiments conducted in the Netherlands and the United States in 2011–2012 as examples of all that could go wrong. In the mousepox experiment, a relatively simple genetic tweak inadvertently turned a mild virus into a weapon that killed previously vaccinated host mice, proving the nightmare reality that gain-of-function can easily erase existing immunity. In the H5N1 ferret flu experiments, scientists took one of the deadliest influenza viruses ever observed in humans and taught it to spread through the air, demonstrating how a pandemic-causing airborne pathogen can be easily engineered in a lab.

[…]

In 2014, the Obama administration imposed a temporary federal pause on certain gain-of-function studies.

[…]

Gain-of-function was reclassified under a new term known as “Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight,” or P3CO, shifting the debate from prohibition to risk management.

[…]

And then came the Covid pandemic, thrusting gain-of-function experiments into the global spotlight. As facts emerged, millions of people began to question whether Covid’s SARS-CoV-2 virus arose naturally, from bats, or had been genetically engineered in Wuhan’s secretive BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs.

[…]

Governments around the world continue to fund this kind of high-risk research today, almost always with the same central argument in play. That worst-case-scenario pathogen experiments conducted inside a BSL-3 or BSL-4 lab are essential to preventing a worst-case-scenario incident or attack from happening in the real world.

[…]

A 2025 global survey identified 110 BSL-4 labs in thirty-four countries and 3,515 BSL-3 labs across 149 countries, possibly more.

A biodefense industrial complex emerged

Friday, October 2nd, 2026

Biological War by Annie JacobsenAs if what had happened on 9/11 wasn’t terrorizing enough, Annie Jacobsen explains (in Biological War), just days later, a biological weapons attack unfurled across the East Coast and in the state of Florida:

Envelopes laced with weaponized anthrax bacteria were sent through the U.S. mail to two U.S. senators and the offices of several national news organizations, including ABC, CBS, and NBC. When one of these anthrax-filled letters, addressed to Senate majority leader Tom Daschle, was opened inside the mailroom of the Hart Senate Office Building (part of the U.S. Capitol complex), the country suddenly realized it was under biological attack.

The Capitol was shut down. Thousands of congressional staff were tested. Major U.S. postal facilities closed. Twenty-two people in four states contracted anthrax disease. Five died. Horrific, yes, but a mass-casualty attack it was not. Unlike the 9/11 attacks, which were quickly attributed to Al Qaeda, responsibility for the anthrax letters, still contentiously debated, has never formally been solved.

Inside the federal government, the anthrax attacks weren’t just a wake-up call; they became a call to arms. A biological agent could easily be used as a weapon—this kind of an attack was cheap to mount, difficult to attribute, and capable of producing massive impact.

[…]

In 2004, Congress launched Project BioShield—a federal program designed to accelerate the research and development of vaccines and other medical countermeasures—pouring billions of dollars into biodefense.

[…]

This influx of investments fueled innovative vaccine platforms, antiviral drugs, and state-of-the-art diagnostic tools, fundamentally reshaping the nation’s scientific landscape. Across Washington, D.C., and beyond, the power center shifted toward secretive biodefense research, much of it classified. Transparency all but disappeared.

A biodefense industrial complex emerged. And with it, a vast expansion of high- and maximum-containment Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) and Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories across the United States, and around the world.

[…]

Before September 2001, the U.S. government operated just two BSL-4 laboratories, one military, at Fort Detrick in Maryland, and one civilian, at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. After 9/11, the number of BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs surged. Over the next five years, dozens, then hundreds, then more than 1,000 of these new, high- and maximum-containment biosecurity labs were built. A congressional audit in 2007 found there were at least fifteen BSL-4 labs and 1,356 BSL-3 labs in the United States alone. Even more alarming, no one was monitoring any of it.

[…]

“‘Gain-of-function’ is a euphemism,” insists the former presidential advisor Andy Weber. “‘Gain-of-function research’ is another way of saying ‘biological weapons engineering,’” he warns.

Dr. Thomas Ehrhard, former special assistant to the deputy secretary of defense, has even harsher words for gain-of-function, almost certainly because of the knowledge he has acquired running classified biological war games at the Pentagon.

“Gain-of-function is evil,” says Ehrhard. No nuance there.

In retrospect, it was one of the greatest intelligence failures of the Cold War

Wednesday, September 30th, 2026

Biological War by Annie JacobsenIn 1989, one of the the Russian biological weapons program’s highest-ranking scientists defected to the West, Annie Jacobsen explains (in Biological War):

His name was Vladimir Pasechnik. The information he revealed, first to the British intelligence officer Dr. Christopher Davis, and later to counterproliferation officers at the CIA, changed everything about the biological sciences going forward.

[…]

“In retrospect, it was one of the greatest intelligence failures of the Cold War,” says the CIA’s James Lawler, the former head of its Counterproliferation Division, Special Activities Unit.

[…]

Before his defection to England, Vladimir Pasechnik had been working in Leningrad as the director of an organization called the Institute of Ultra Pure Biochemical Preparations when he experienced a crisis of conscience. “He realized he could no longer live with himself,” doing illegal biological weapons work, says Davis. Pasechnik decided that on his next trip outside the Soviet Union, he would turn himself over to Western authorities, reveal the inner workings of the Russian program, and confess his sins.

During a somewhat rare trip to France, to sign contracts with an equipment company, Pasechnik made his move. In Paris, he located the address for the Canadian embassy in the phone book and knocked on the front door. Inside, he told a diplomat that he was a Soviet scientist who worked at a highly classified weapons laboratory and that he needed to speak with someone urgently. That he wanted to defect to the West. The Canadians didn’t believe him and made him leave. Desperate but determined, Pasechnik called the British embassy from a pay phone. The British Secret Intelligence Service took him seriously. He was picked up in a car, then secreted away to the United Kingdom. A week later, he was in an unnamed building in London, sitting across the table from Dr. Davis, the top biological weapons expert with the British Defence Intelligence Staff at the time.

Pasechnik told Dr. Davis everything he knew. Among the revelations, Davis learned Pasechnik oversaw some 3,000 scientists and weapons engineers. That he had access to an unlimited budget, which allowed him to purchase equipment in the West and to recruit the best science staff he could find. That he and his various teams had made biological superweapons, and the means to deploy them. That they’d figured out how to modify cruise missiles to fly beneath U.S. radar systems, to disperse aerosolized clouds of plague and other pathogens over large populations, in a strategic biological weapons attack. That Pasechnik had personally figured out how to stabilize plague microbes for exactly this kind of radical, widespread dissemination.

“As he talked about plague, I became incredibly alarmed,” Davis tells us. He realized the stunning ramifications of what Pasechnik was telling him. “You do not choose plague as a battlefield weapon,” says Davis. “You chose plague because you’re going to take out the other person’s country. It’s a nuclear equivalent, except it’s cleaner. It leaves all the infrastructure intact. Full stop. That’s what it is about.”

Mass extermination.