Six out of 50

Monday, October 17th, 2011

The link-sharing site Reddit has evolved into its own community with the values you might expect of modern university students and recent grads.

So we regularly see what (Professor) Ilkka likes to call “Oh, if the leader only knew!” posts, like I am a TA at a university. My professor and I are currently in an unusual and very awkward situation, and we could use some advice…:

The course in question is an introduction to writing for first-year undergraduates at a Canadian university. They submitted their first full-length papers of the term a week ago, and we’ve been dutifully marking them with the intention of handing them back next week.

We’ve been extra-rigorous when it comes to checking these papers for plagiarism, both because it’s the first real work they’ve submitted and because of a memo sent out to our department back in late August urging every instructor to take greater measures. We’ve been cross-checking passages (especially suspicious ones, but also some that have been randomly chosen) using Google all along the line. We have been finding plagiarists.

Specifically, we have found six plagiarists (out of a class of 50).

All of them are black. And there are no other black students in the class.

My prof and I are both pretty sure that other students have probably plagiarized (it happens so, so much), but these are the only ones we can definitively prove. It’s not even circumstantial or flimsy proof, either; complete, shitty, largely unaltered papers taken directly from sites like this. Anyone with a search engine could find them.

It would seem to be an open and shut case, but the fact that every last one of the students is black is making us hesitate. I don’t know what it’s like in other countries, but in Canada we have a well-established Human Rights Commission that would be all too happy to accommodate some or all of these students bringing both my professor and me up on charges of racial discrimination. It wouldn’t even matter if we were to be eventually vindicated; the process is really expensive and time-consuming, and many people who have to deal with it end up settling even though they maintain their innocence. This, anyway, is quite apart from anything the university itself might do to us, which is another story entirely.

It’s possible that our worries are unfounded, but we still have them — these things have happened before. How on earth should we proceed? The idealist in me insists that we give these students the failing grades they deserve and maintain some spirit of academic integrity, but neither I nor the prof wish to have our careers ruined over something like this.

Homogeneous, Self-Contained, Self-Sufficing Units

Monday, October 17th, 2011

In previous wars, each nation had been a homogeneous, self-contained, self-sufficing unit, but that was no longer true by the Great War, Ivan Bloch noted:

Consider for one moment what nations were a hundred years ago and what they are to-day. In those days before railways, telegraphs, steamships, &c, were invented, each nation was more or less a homogeneous, self-contained, selfsufficing unit. Europe was built in a series of water-tight compartments. Each country sufficed for its own needs, grew its own wheat, fattened its own cattle, supplied itself for its own needs within its own frontiers. All that is changed; with the exception of Russia and Austria there is not one country in Europe which is not absolutely dependent for its beef and its bread supplies from beyond the frontiers. You, of course, in England are absolutely dependent upon supplies from over sea. But you are only one degree worse off than Germany in that respect. In 1895, if the Germans had been unable to obtain any wheat except that which was grown in the Fatherland, they would have lacked bread for one hundred and two days out of the three hundred and sixty-five. Every year the interdependence of nations upon each other for the necessaries of life is greater than it ever was before. Germany at present is dependent upon Russia for two and a half months’ supply of wheat in every year. That supply would, of course, be immediately cut off if Russia and Germany went to war; and a similar state of things prevails between other nations in relation to other commodities. Hence the first thing that war would do would be to deprive the Powers that made it of all opportunity of benefiting by the products of the nations against whom they were fighting.”

“Yes,” I objected, “but the world is wide, and would it not be possible to obtain food and to spare from neutral nations?”

“That assumes,” said M. Bloch, “first that the machinery of supply and distribution remains unaffected by war. Secondly, that the capacity for paying for supplies remains unimpaired. Neither of those things is true. For you, of course, it is an absolute necessity that you should be able to bring in food from beyond the seas ; and possibly with the aid of your fleet you may be able to do it, although I fear the rate of war premium will materially enhance the cost of the cargoes. The other nations are not so fortunate. It was proposed some time ago, I know, in Germany, that in case of war they should endeavour to replace the loss of Russian wheat by importing Indian wheat through the Suez Canal—an operation which in the face of the French and Russian cruisers might not be very easy of execution. But even supposing that it was possible to import food, who is to pay for it? And that is the final crux of the whole question.”

“But,” again I objected, ” has the lack of money ever prevented nations going to war? I remember well when Lord Derby, in 1876, was quite confident that Russia would never go to war on behalf of Bulgaria because of the state of the Russian finances; but the Russo-Turkish war took place all the same, and there have been many great wars waged by nations which were bankrupt, and victories won by conquerors who had not a coin in their treasury.”

“You are always appealing to precedents which do not apply. Modern society, which is organised on a credit basis, and modern war, which cannot be waged excepting at a ruinous expenditure, offer no points of analogy compared with those times of which you speak. Have you calculated for one moment what it costs to maintain a soldier as an efficient fighting man in the field of battle? The estimate of the best authorities is that you cannot feed him and keep him going under ten francs a day—say, eight shillings a day. Supposing that the Triple and Dual Alliance mobilise their armies, we should have at once confronting us an expenditure for the mere maintenance of troops under arms of £4,000,000 a day falling upon the five nations. That is to say, that in one year of war under modern conditions the Powers would spend £1,460,000,000 sterling merely in feeding their soldiers, without reckoning all the other expenses that must be incurred in the course of the campaign. This figure is interesting as enabling us to compare the cost of modern wars with the cost of previous wars. Take all the wars that have been waged in Europe from the battle of Waterloo down to the end of the Russo-Turkish war, and the total expenditure does not amount to more than £ 1,2 50,000,000 sterling, a colossal burden no doubt, but one which is nearly ^’200,000,000 less than that which would be entailed by the mere victualling of the armies that would be set on foot in the war which we are supposed to be discussing. Could any of the five nations, even the richest, stand that strain?”

“But could they not borrow and issue paper money?”

“Very well,” said M. Bloch, “they would try to do so, no doubt, but the immediate consequence of war would be to send securities all round down from 25 to 50 per cent., and in such a tumbling market it would be difficult to float loans. Recourse would therefore have to be had to forced loans and unconvertible paper money. We should be back to the days of the assignats, a temporary expedient which would aggravate the difficulties with which we have to deal. Prices, for instance, would go up enormously, and so the cost, 8s. a day, would be nearer 20s. if all food had to be paid for in depreciated currency. But, apart from the question of paying for the necessary supplies, it is a grave question whether such supplies could be produced, and if they could be produced, whether they could be distributed.”

“What do you mean by ‘ distributed ‘?” I asked.

“Distributed?” said M. Bloch. “Why, how are you to get the food into the mouths of the people who want it if you had (as you would have at the beginning of the war) taken over all the railways for military purposes? Even within the limits of Germany or of Russia there would be considerable difficulty in securing the transit of food-stuffs in war time, not merely to the camps, but to the great industrial centres. You do not seem to realise the extent to which the world has been changed by the modern industrial system. Down to the end of the last century the enormous majority of the population lived in their own fields, grew their own food, and each farm was a little granary. It was with individuals as it was with nations, and each homestead was a self-contained, selfproviding unit. But nowadays all is changed. You have great industrial centres which produce absolutely nothing which human beings can eat. How much, for instance, do you grow in the metropolitan area for the feeding of London? Everything has to be brought by rail or by water to your markets. So it is more or less all over the Continent, especially in Germany and France. Now it so happens (and in this I am touching upon the political side of the question) that those districts which produce least food yield more Socialists to the acre than any other part of the country. It is those districts, rife with all elements of political discontent, which would be the first to feel the pinch of high prices and of lack of food. But this is a matter on which we will speak later on.”
“But do you think,” I said, “that the railways would be so monopolised by the military authorities that they could not distribute provisions throughout the country?”

“No,” said M. Bloch. “It is not merely that they would be monopolised by their military authorities, but that they would be disorganised by the mobilisation of troops. You forget that the whole machinery of distribution and of production would be thrown out of gear by mobilisation; and this brings me to the second point upon which I insist—viz., the impossibility of producing the food. At the present moment Germany, for instance, just manages to produce sufficient food to feed her own population, with the aid of imports from abroad, for which she is able to pay by the proceeds of her own industry. But in the case of war with Russia she would not be able to buy two and a half months’ supply of wheat from Russia, and therefore would have to pay much more for a similar supply of food in the neutral markets, providing she could obtain it. But she would have to buy much more than two and a half months’ from Russia, because the nine months’ corn which she produces at present is the product of the whole labour of all her able-bodied agricultural population; and how they work you in England do not quite realise. Do you know, for instance, that after the ‘ Busstag,’ or day of penitence and prayer, at the beginning of what we call the farmers’ year or summer season, the whole German agricultural population in some districts work unremittingly fifteen hours a day seven days a week, without any cessation, without Sundays or holidays, until the harvest is gathered in; and even with all that unremitting toil they are only able to produce nine months’ supply of grain. When you have mobilised the whole German army, you will diminish at least by half the strong hands available for labour in the field. In Russia we should not, of course, be in any such difficulty, and in the scrupulous observance of Sunday we have a reserve which would enable us to recoup ourselves for the loss of agricultural labour. We should lose, for instance, 17 per cent, of our peasants; but if those who were left worked on Sunday, in addition to weekdays, we should just be able to make up for the loss of the men who were taken to war. Germany has no such reserves, nor France ; and hence it is that, speaking as a political economist, I feel extremely doubtful as to whether it would be possible for either Germany or France to feed their own population, to say nothing of their own soldiers, when once the whole machine of agricultural production had been broken up by the mobilisation en masse of the whole population.”

Bloch was a financier turned political-economist, in case that wasn’t clear.

Democracy’s Contradictions

Monday, October 17th, 2011

William S. Lind likes to pretend to serve Kaiser Wilhelm II, and here he pretends to call his master, who’s chuckling over America’s Presidential elections:

“The flea circus? That’s part of it,” said the Kaiser. “It nicely illustrates one of democracy’s contradictions, namely that no one who is willing to crawl and grub for votes can be worthy of the office to which he aspires. There’s no place for the nolo episcopari in democratic politics, it seems, nor for anyone with the slightest shred of character. Your Giulianis and McCains, Clintons and Obamas are happy to eat every toad in the public garden.”

“I think the American public is no happier with their options this year than is Your Majesty,” I replied.

“Thereby illustrating another funny aspect of democracy,” the Kaiser shot back. “Who do they think is responsible? They are, of course. No candidate who told them the truth could get above 10% in the polls. They want nostrums, bromides, comforting lies, and they won’t tolerate anything else. America speaks of citizens, but all it has are consumers whose heads are as fat as their bottoms. That too is where democracy leads, to an ever-declining lowest common denominator. It cannot do anything else.”

“The funniest aspect of the whole business,” His Majesty continued, “is that the lower America sinks, the more determined its politicians are to force democracy on everyone else. All but one of your Presidential candidates has pledged to continue crusading for democracy, despite the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. By comparison, even the late Spanish Hapsburgs were models of realism.”

“The democracy advocates — and I trust Your Majesty knows I am not one — would reply that democracy is necessary to freedom,” I suggested.

“Another contradiction,” said the Kaiser. “Prussia in my day was far more free than America is today, because Prussians understood what freedom is. Freedom is not doing whatever you feel like. Freedom is replacing imposed discipline with self-discipline. No democratic office-seeker would dare say that, because the voters would not like it. They want to be told that they can do whatever they please — spend without saving, live immoral lives without degenerating, vote without thinking — and suffer no unfortunate consequences. If the public wants to square the circle, Presto!, a hundred politicians promise to do it.”

“I trust that Your Majesty’s preferred alternative to democracy is monarchy, as is mine,” I said.

“Yours, mine and Heaven’s,” the Kaiser replied. “As I have said before, Heaven is not a republic. Though there are, I think, two countries God intends should be republics.”

“And those are?”, I asked.

“Switzerland, to show that it can be made to work, and America, to serve as a warning to everyone else.”

“Were America to wake up to the virtues of monarchy — and God knows our current election campaign should wake us up — who would you recommend for the American throne?”, I inquired.

“An Austrian Hapsburg, I should think,” said the Kaiser. “They are accustomed to ruling over ramshackle, polygot, decaying empires. My old friend Emperor Franz Josef did so remarkably well.”

McDonald’s Beating

Sunday, October 16th, 2011

At a McDonald’s in New York’s Greenwich Village, two women yelled at the cashier, slapped him, jumped over the counter, and then received a severe beating when he stopped retreating and fought back — with a metal rod.

I don’t know if a reasonable man would reach for a metal rod in that situation, but continuing the beating after they were on the ground almost certainly went beyond reasonable force.

He has been charged with felony assault and criminal possession of a weapon, and the women with menacing, trespassing, and disorderly conduct.

So, slapping someone and jumping over the counter to continue the attack does not qualify as assault, but picking up the nearest object that might work as a weapon is criminal possession. Interesting.

Sickness and Exhaustion

Sunday, October 16th, 2011

In analyzing the coming great war, Ivan Bloch noted that the strain of marching is very heavy:

Remember that it is not mere marching, but marching under heavy loads. No infantry soldier should carry more than one-third of his own weight; but instead of the average burden of the fully accoutred private being 52 lb. it is nearer 80 lb., with the result that the mere carrying of weight probably kills more than fall in battle.

The proportion of those who die from disease and those who lose their lives as the consequence of wounds received in fighting is usually two or three to one. In the Franco-German war there were four times as many died from sickness and exhaustion as those who lost their lives in battle. In the Russo-Turkish war the proportion was as 16 to 44. In the recent Spanish war in Cuba the proportion was still greater. There were ten who died from disease for one who fell in action.

The average mortality from sickness tends to increase with the prolongation of the campaign. Men can stand a short campaign, but when it is long it demoralises them, destroys the spirit of self-sacrifice which sustained them at the first in the opening weeks, and produces a thoroughly bad spirit which reacts upon their physical health.

Mahan or Corbett?

Sunday, October 16th, 2011

We face no credible blue-water naval challenger, William S. Lind notes. What we need to establish is brown-water naval supremacy:

People today think of land uniting and water dividing, but that became true only recently, with the rise of the state and the development of railways (which can only function in the safety and order created by states). From the dawn of river and sea-faring until the mid-19th century, water united and land divided. It was easier, safer, cheaper and faster to move goods and people by water than by land.

So it will be again in a 21st century dominated by Fourth Generation war and declining or disappearing states. Already, in places such as the Congo, the only way to move is on the rivers. A country that can control waterways anywhere in the world will have a great strategic advantage. Given our maritime geography and our long and proud naval tradition, that country should be the United States.

Unfortunately, we are not developing the naval capabilities we need to do that. The reason shows once again the importance of military theory. The U.S. Navy has to choose between two naval theorists, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, and it has chosen wrongly.
[...]
Mahan in essence wrote naval theory for children; I was much impressed by The Influence of Sea Power on History when I was fifteen. Corbett in contrast writes for adults, focusing not on great naval battles but on the use of sea power in a larger context. That larger context is strategy suited to a maritime power, which expresses itself in amphibious warfare directed at a continental enemy’s vulnerable peripheries. Corbett’s two-volume history,England in the Seven Year’s War, is probably the deepest study of amphibious warfare ever written.
[...]
Were the U.S. Navy really to turn to Corbett, it would build lots of ships designed for operations in coastal waters and on rivers, often with troops on board. But such ships are small ships, and the U.S. Navy hates small ships. Some thirty years ago, when the Senator I worked for was trying to push the Navy into buying some small, fast missile boats, the PHMs, the then-Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Holloway, said contemptuously in testimony, “The U.S. Navy has no place for little ships.”

A Great War of Entrenchments

Saturday, October 15th, 2011

In the late 1800s, Ivan Bloch saw that the next great war would be a great war of entrenchments:

“Certainly, everybody will be entrenched in the next war. It will be a great war of entrenchments. The spade will be as indispensable to a soldier as his rifle. The first thing every man will have to do, if he cares for his life at all, will be to dig a hole in the ground, and throw up as strong an earthen rampart as he can to shield him from the hail of bullets which will fill the air.”
[...]
“The distance is 6000 metres from the enemy. The artillery is in position, and the command has been passed along the batteries to ‘give fire.’ The enemy’s artillery replies. Shells tear up the soil and burst; in a short time the crew of every gun has ascertained the distance of the enemy. Then every projectile discharged bursts in the air over the heads of the enemy, raining down hundreds of fragments and bullets on his position. Men and horses are overwhelmed by this rain of lead and iron. Guns destroy one another, batteries are mutually annihilated, ammunition cases are emptied. Success will be with those whose fire does not slacken. In the midst of this fire the battalions will advance.

“Now they are but 2000 metres away. Already the rifle-bullets whistle round and kill, each not only finding a victim, but penetrating files, ricocheting, and striking again. Volley succeeds volley, bullets in great handfuls, constant as hail and swift as lightning, deluge the field of battle.

“The artillery having silenced the enemy is now free to deal with the enemy’s battalions. On his infantry, however loosely it may be formed, the guns direct thick iron rain, and soon in the position of the enemy the earth is reddened with blood.

“The firing lines will advance one after the other, battalions will march after battalions; finally the reserves will follow. Yet with all this movement in the two armies there will be a belt a thousand paces wide, separating them as by neutral territory, swept by the fire of both sides, a belt which no living being can stand for a moment. The ammunition will be almost exhausted, millions of cartridges, thousands of shells will cover the soil. But the fire will continue until the empty ammunition cases are replaced with full.

“Melinite bombs will turn to dust farmhouses, villages, and hamlets, destroying everything that might be used as cover, obstacle, or refuge.

“The moment will approach when half the combatants will be mowed down, dead and wounded will lie in parallel rows, separated one from the other by that belt of a thousand paces which will be swept by a cross fire of shells which no living being can pass.

“The battle will continue with ferocity. But still that thousand paces unchangingly separate the foes.

“Who shall have gained the victory? Neither.

“This picture serves to illustrate a thought which, since the perfection of weapons, has occupied the minds of all thinking people. What will take place in a future war? Such are constrained to admit that between the combatants will always be an impassable zone of fire deadly in an equal degree to both the foes.

“With such conditions, in its application to the battles of the future, the saying of Napoleon seems very questionable: ‘The fate of battle is the result of one minute, of one thought, the enemies approach with different plans, the battle becomes furious; the decisive moment arrives, and a happy thought sudden as lightning decides the contest, the most insignificant reserve sometimes being the instrument of a splendid victory.’

“It is much more probable that in the future both sides will claim the victory.”

America’s Last Good Mideast War

Saturday, October 15th, 2011

William S. Lind describes America’s last good Mideast war, our war with Algiers in 1815:

The most surprising aspect of this splendid little war — there were such things, once — is that the United States was able to wage it. In l815 we had just gotten our pants pretty well kicked by the Brits, Washington was in ruins and the Treasury was empty. Nonetheless, in response to the seizure of one small trading vessel by Algiers, we declared war and dispatched not one but two powerful naval squadrons to the Mediterranean.

It turned out that the first squadron of three frigates, one sloop of war, four brigs and two schooners, under the command of one of America’s most brilliant naval commanders of all time, Stephen Decatur, was enough to do the job. Despite their fearsome reputation, the Algerine warships proved to be sitting ducks. Decatur quickly took two of them, including the best of the lot, the frigate Meshuda, whose crew fled below and hid in the hold after two broadsides. In a preview of Arab state militaries of today, one U.S. officer “expressed amazement that the Algerine navy was ‘a mere burlesque’ with ‘miserably contrived’ equipment, poor gunnery and poorly disciplined crews.” (In fairness, it should be noted that the shore defenses of Algiers were formidable and well-manned.) After its initial defeats at sea, Algiers quickly came to terms.

Beyond the doubtful quality of Arab navies, does our last successful Mideast war offer any lessons for our own time? In the face of our all-too-often wretched generalship in today’s Mideast wars — perhaps now improving in Iraq, still rock-bottom in Afghanistan — Decatur’s example certainly recommends itself. But behind what Decatur did stands something more: the selection of Decatur as commander of the first squadron.

Then as now, seniority played a great role in selecting men for top commands. Decatur was 36 years old in 1815. We had, of course, a young navy, but five captains were senior to Decatur. The Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin W. Crowninshield, and President Madison, should, had they played the game as the system intended, have chosen someone more senior. They might have selected, for example, the most senior officer in the Navy, Alexander Murray.

The Matrix Is A Remix

Friday, October 14th, 2011

When The Matrix first came out, I remember it being simultaneously praised and panned as creative-yet-shallow eye candy, when it was neither original nor mindless. The Matrix is a remix of genre films and fiction, with an emphasis on Hong Kong cinema:

0:27 – Fist of Legend (1994)
0:38 – Tai-Chi Master (Twin Dragons) (1993)
0:44 – Fist of Legend (1994)
0:48 – Tai-Chi Master (Twin Dragons) (1993)
0:53 – Drunken Master (1978)
1:02 – Fist of Legend (1994)
1:09 – The Killer (1989)
1:19 – Fist of Legend (1994)
1:21 – Iron Monkey (1993)
1:31 – Once Upon A Time In China (1991)
1:36 – Fist of Legend (1994)
1:41 – Tai-Chi Master (Twin Dragons) (1993)
1:45 – Philip K. Dick Speech (1977)
2:18 – Strange Days (1995)
2:24 – Akira (1988)
2:30 – Total Recall (1990)
3:24 – Alice In Wonderland (1951)
3:42 – The Killer (1989)
3:53 – A Better Tomorrow (1986)
4:05 – Ghost In The Shell (1995)
4:32 – Akira (1998)
4:39 – Koyannisqatsi (1982)
4:49 – Dr. Who: The Deadly Assassin (1976)
5:10 – Ghost In The Shell (1995)

One hundred and sixteen times more deadly

Friday, October 14th, 2011

By the dawn of the 20th century, Ivan Bloch had deemed war impossible because of the increased lethality of small-arms and artillery:

“Is the improvement in the deadliness of weapons confined to small-arms? Does it equally extend to artillery firing?”

“There,” said M. Bloch, “you touch upon a subject which I have dealt with at much length in my book. The fact is that if the rifle has improved, artillery has much more improved. Even before the quick-firing gun was introduced into the field batteries an enormous improvement had been made. So, indeed, you can form some estimate of the evolution of the cannon when I say that the French artillery to-day is held by competent authorities to be at least one hundred and sixteen times more deadly than the batteries which went into action in 1870.”

“How can that be ?” I asked. “They do not fire one hundred and sixteen times as fast, I presume?”

“No; the increased improvement has been obtained in many ways. By the use of range-finders it is possible now to avoid much firing into space which formerly prevailed. An instrument weighing about 60 lb. will in three minutes give the range of any distance up to four miles, and even more rapid range-finders are being constructed. Then, remember, higher explosives are used; the range has been increased, and even before quick-firing guns were introduced it was possible to fire two and a half times as fast as they did previously. The effect of artillery-fire to-day is at least five times as deadly as it was, and being two or three times as fast, you may reckon that a battery of artillery is from twelve to fifteen times as potent an instrument of destruction as it was thirty years ago. Even in 1870 the German artillerists held that one battery was able absolutely to annihilate any force advancing along a line of fire estimated at fifteen paces in breadth for a distance of over four miles.

“If that was so then, you can imagine how much more deadly it is now, when the range is increased and the explosive power of the shell has been enormously developed. It is estimated that if a body of 10,000 men, advancing to the attack, had to traverse a distance of a mile and a half under the fire of a single battery, they would be exposed to 1450 rounds before they crossed the zone of fire, and the bursting of the shells fired by that battery would scatter 275,000 bullets in fragments over the mile and a half across which they would have to march. In 1870 an ordinary shell when it burst broke into from nineteen to thirty pieces. To-day it bursts into 240. Shrapnel fire in 1870 only scattered thirty-seven deathdealing missiles. Now it scatters 340. A bomb weighing about 70 lb. thirty years ago would have burst into fortytwo fragments. To-day, when it is charged with peroxilene, it breaks up into 1200 pieces, each of which is hurled with much greater velocity than the larger lumps which were scattered by a gunpowder explosion. It is estimated that such a bomb would effectively destroy all life within a range of 200 metres of the point of explosion. The artillery also benefits by the smokeless powder, although, as you can easily imagine, it is not without its drawbacks.”

“What drawbacks?”

“The fact that the artillerymen can be much more easily picked off, when they are serving their guns, by sharp-shooters than was possible when they were enveloped in a cloud of smoke of their own creation. It is calculated that one hundred sharp-shooters, who would be quite invisible at a range of five hundred yards, would put a battery out of action in four minutes if they could get within range of one thousand yards. At a mile’s range it might take one hundred men half an hour’s shooting to put a battery out of action. The most effective range for the sharp-shooter is about eight hundred paces. At this range, while concealed behind a bush or improvised earthwork, a good shot could pick off the men of any battery, or the officers, who could not avail themselves of the cover to which their men resort.”

“How will your modern battle begin, M. Bloch?”

“Probably with attempts on outposts made by sharpshooters to feel and get into touch with each other. Cavalry will not be of much use for that purpose. A mounted man offers too good a mark to a sharp-shooter. Then when the outposts have felt each other sufficiently to give the opposing armies knowledge of the whereabouts of their antagonists, the artillery duel will commence at a range of from four to five miles. As long as the artillery is in action it will be quite sufficient to render the nearer approach of the opposing forces impossible. If they are evenly matched, they will mutually destroy each other, after inflicting immense losses before they are put out of action. Then the turn of the rifle will come. But the power of rifle-fire is so great that it will be absolutely impossible for the combatants to get to close quarters with each other. As for any advance in force, even in the loosest of formations, on a front that is swept by the enemies’ fire, that is absolutely out of the question. Flank movements may be attempted, but the increased power which a magazine rifle gives to the defence will render it impossible for such movements to have the success that they formerly had. A small company can hold its own against a superior attacking force long enough to permit of the bringing up of reinforcements. To attack any position successfully, it is estimated that the attacking force ought to outnumber the assailants at least by 8 to i. It is calculated that 100 men in a trench would be able to put out of action 336 out of 400 who attacked them, while they were crossing a fire-zone only 300 yards wide.”

Closer to God

Friday, October 14th, 2011

Cary Grant was born Archibald Leach, the son of an insane mother and an alcoholic, philandering father. Dyan Cannon pressured him to marry her even after he pressured her to take LSD:

Of course, Hollywood gossip had put a different spin on Cary’s inability to commit to women, calling into question his sexuality. And, ironically, it was on the day after we first slept together that he introduced me to his old friend Noel Coward who was, of course, openly gay.

Over lunch, when Cary had excused himself to go to the men’s room, Noel reached across the table, put his hand over mine, and said: ‘You know, my dear, I am wildly in love with that man.’

‘That makes two of us,’ I said laughing.

‘Alas, there are so many who ardently hoped he’d come over to play on our team, but I think it’s safe to say he’s solidly set in his ways,’ replied Noel, giving me a reassuring wink.

I needed no convincing about Cary’s heterosexuality but there were other, very fundamental, problems with our relationship. While I knew that I wanted to get married one day and have children, Cary was adamant that he’d never wed again.

‘I don’t know what it is but something happens to love when you formalise it,’ he told me. ‘It cuts off the oxygen.’

I was equally unsettled by his enthusiasm for taking LSD, the mind-bending drug to which he had been introduced by his third wife, actress Betsy Drake.

Cary claimed LSD offered a path to truth and enlightenment, and his tactics to persuade me to try it were rather underhand.

On a trip to London in 1963, we had an unexpected visitor. Cary had apparently decided that the time was right for my first ‘cosmic exploration’ and I came into the sitting room of our rented house to find that his acid guru, Dr Mortimer Hartman, had been flown over from LA to guide me through it.

‘It’s like leaping off the high dive,’ Cary told me when I complained about being ambushed in this way. ‘If you take too much time to think about it, you’ll back out.’

Sensing I wasn’t convinced, he leaned forward and took my hand. ‘Dear girl,’ he said. ‘If you had found the key to ultimate peace of mind, wouldn’t you do anything to share it with me?’

Eventually I gave in, even though everything told me to run for my life, and Dr Hartman gave me a tiny blue pill to dissolve under my tongue.

Seconds later, or maybe it was hours, I looked at Cary, who was turning into an old man in front of my eyes. His skin sagged, his eyelids drooped, his neck hung like tangled bedsheets.

The walls had turned crimson and were breathing, in-out, in-out. Then came the dancing bears, who were scowling and singing nursery rhymes in German.

‘Make it stop,’ I screamed and Dr Hartman handed me another pill to knock me out. Eighteen hours later, I woke up feeling like I’d been run over by a truck.

‘How in the hell can giant bears singing in German bring you closer to God?’ I asked Cary, vowing that I would never repeat the experience.

I had hoped that taking LSD would bring us closer together but as 1964 arrived and we entered the third year of our courtship, it was clear that Cary still had no intention of marrying me.

They did get married — she was his third wife — and she did take LSD again. Then they got divorced.

“Cary Grant, born Archie Leach, was a poor boy who could barely spell posh. That’s acting for you — or maybe Hollywood.”
— Melvin Maddocks

The Folly of Maximalist Objectives

Friday, October 14th, 2011

William S. Lind discusses the folly of maximalist objectives:

As Clausewitz wrote, the goals or objectives of states at war tend to change over time. In 18th Century cabinet wars, princes who were losing wisely reduced their objectives to what was attainable, while those who were winning were usually sufficiently prudent not to want too much. Wise statesmen such as Prince Bismarck kept their governments’ objectives in check even during successful wars in the 19th Century.

But the advent of total wars between peoples, first in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon and then the World Wars of the 20th Century, let loose the folly of maximalist objectives. Worse, leaders and states that were losing tended to inflate rather than trim their objectives, largely as sops to public opinion. This led to ruinous wars and equally ruinous peace treaties. As Napoleon’s fortunes waned, he was repeatedly offered relatively generous peace terms by the Allies, all of which he rejected, hoping a last throw of the iron dice would recoup his losses. As World War I dragged on, both sides’ war objectives expanded, preventing the compromise, reconstructive peace Europe needed and ending in the catastrophic Diktat of Versailles. The ultimate extension of maximalist objectives, the Allies’ demand for unconditional surrender in World War II, turned half of Europe over to Communism for half a century.

Bringing democracy to the Middle East goes beyond maximalism into pure fantasy, he says.

Is war now impossible?

Thursday, October 13th, 2011

Ivan Bloch was one of the prophets of the Great War — he saw that the new technology of warfare would lead to an economically draining stalemate — but he didn’t understand his Cassandra-like situation and declared that war would now be impossible:

“But how impossible, M. Bloch? Do you mean morally impossible?”

“No such thing,” he replied. “I am dealing not with moral considerations, which cannot be measured, but with hard, matter-of-fact, material things, which can be estimated and measured with some approximation to absolute accuracy. I maintain that war has become impossible alike from a military, economic, and political point of view. The very development that has taken place in the mechanism of war has rendered war an impracticable operation. The dimensions of modern armaments and the organisation of society have rendered its prosecution an economic impossibility, and, finally, if any attempt were made to demonstrate the inaccuracy of my assertions by putting the matter to a test on a great scale, we should find the inevitable result in a catastrophe which would destroy all existing political organisations. Thus, the great war cannot be made, and any attempt to make it would result in suicide. Such, I believe, is the simple demonstrable fact.”

“But where is the demonstration?” I asked.

M. Bloch turned and pointed to his encyclopaedic work upon “The Future of War,” six solid volumes, each containing I do not know how many quarto pages, which stood piled one above the other.

“Read that,” he said. “In that book you will find the facts upon which my demonstration rests.”

He makes the mistake of assuming that his thorough analysis will influence heads of state, but his tactical analysis does provide a solid first-order approximation of how a war would play out with modern technology, like magazine rifles:

“It is very simple,” said M. Bloch. “The outward and visible sign of the end of war was the introduction of the magazine rifle. For several hundred years after the discovery of gunpowder the construction of firearms made little progress. The cannon with which you fought at Trafalgar differed comparatively little from those which you used against the Armada. For two centuries you were content to clap some powder behind a round ball in an iron tube, and fire it at your enemy.

“The introduction of the needle gun and of breechloading cannon may be said to mark the dawn of the new era, which, however, was not definitely established amongst us until the invention of the magazine rifle of very small calibre. The magazine gun may also be mentioned as an illustration of the improved deadliness of firearms; but, as your experience at Obdurman showed, the deciding factor was not the Maxim, but the magazine rifle.”

“Yes,” I said; “as Lord Wolseley said, it was the magazine rifle which played like a deadly hose spouting leaden bullets upon the advancing enemy.”

“Yes,” said M. Bloch, “and the possibility of firing half a dozen bullets without having to stop to reload has transformed the conditions of modern war.”

“Do you not exaggerate the importance of mere rapidity of fire?” I asked.

“No,” said M. Bloch; “rapidity of fire does not stand alone. The modern rifle is not only a much more rapid firer than its predecessors, but it has also an immensely wider range and far greater precision of fire. To these three qualities must be added yet a fourth, which completes the revolutionary nature of the new firearm, and that is the introduction of smokeless powder.”

“The Spanish-American campaign,” I said, “illustrated the importance of smokeless powder; but how do you think the smokelessness of the new explosives will affect warfare in the future?”

“In the first case,” said M. Bloch, ” it demolishes the screen behind which for the last 400 years human beings have fought and died. All the last great battles have been fought more or less in the dark. After the battle is joined, friends and foes have been more or less lost to sight in the clouds of dense smoke which hung heavy over the whole battlefield. Now armies will no longer fight in the dark. Every soldier in the fighting line will see with frightful distinctness the havoc which is being made in the ranks by the shot and shell of the enemy. The veil which gunpowder spread over the worst horrors of the battlefield has been withdrawn for ever. But that is not the only change. It is difficult to over-estimate the increased strain upon the nerve and morale of an army under action by the fact that men will fall killed and wounded without any visible or audible cause. In the old days the soldier saw the puff of smoke, heard the roar of the gun, and when the shell or shot ploughed its way through the ranks, he associated cause and effect, and was to a certain extent prepared for it. In the warfare of the future men will simply fall and die without either seeing or hearing anything.”

“Without hearing anything, M. Bloch?”

“Without hearing anything, for although the smokeless powder is not noiseless, experience has proved that the report of a rifle will not carry more than nine hundred yards, and volley-firing cannot be heard beyond a mile. But that brings us to the question of the increased range of the new projectiles. An army on march will suddenly become aware of the comparative proximity of the foe by seeing men drop killed and wounded, without any visible cause; and only after some time will they be able to discover that the invisible shafts of death were sped from a line of sharp-shooters lying invisible at a distance of a mile or more. There will be nothing along the whole line of the horizon to show from whence the deathdealing missiles have sped. It will simply be as if the bolt had come from the blue. Can you conceive of anything more trying to human nerves?”

“But what is the range of the modern rifle?”

“The modern rifle,” said M. Bloch, “has a range of 3000 or 4000 metres—that is to say, from two to three miles. Of course, I do not mean to say that it will be used at such great distances. For action at long range, artillery is much more effective. But of that I will speak shortly. But you can fairly say that for one mile or a mile and a half the magazine rifle is safe to kill anything that stands between the muzzle and its mark; and therein,” continued M. Bloch, “lies one of the greatest changes that have been effected in modern firearms. Just look at this diagram” (see page i). “It will explain better than anything I can say the change that has been brought about in the last dozen years.

“In the last great war, if you wished to hit a distant mark, you had to sight your rifle so as to fire high up into the air, and the ball executing a curve descended at the range at which you calculated your target stood. Between the muzzle and the target your bullet did no execution. It was soaring in the air, first rising until it reached the maximum height, and then descending it struck the target or the earth at one definite point some thousand yards distant. Contrast this with the modern weapon. There is now no need for sighting your gun so as to drop your bullet at a particular range. You aim straight at your man, and the bullet goes, as is shown in the diagram, direct to its mark. There is no climbing into the air to fall again. It simply speeds, say, five feet from the earth until it meets its mark. Anything that stands between its object and the muzzle of the rifle it passes through. Hence whereas in the old gun you hit your man only if you could drop your bullet upon the square yard of ground upon which he was standing, you now hit him so long as you train your rifle correctly on every square yard of the thousand or two thousand which may intervene between the muzzle of your gun and the end of the course of the shot. That circumstance alone, even without any increase in the rapidity of the fire, must enormously add to the deadliness of the modern firearms.”

He obviously overestimates the importance of a rifle-bullet’s ballistics in its effective accuracy. Even trained snipers with high-power optics have trouble hitting a man-sized target at 1000 meters.

“Could you give me any exact statistics as to the increased rapidity of fire?”

“Certainly,” said M. Bloch. “That is to say, I can give you particulars up to a comparatively recent time, but the progress of the science of firearms is so rapid that no one can say but that my statistics may be old before you print your report of this talk. The ordinary soldier will fire twelve times as many shots per minute as he was able to do in 1870, and even this is likely to be rapidly improved upon. But you may take it that what with increased rapidity of fire, greater penetrative power, and the greater precision that the gun which the soldier will carry into the battle will possess, the rifle of to-morrow will be forty times as effective as the chassepot was in the Franco-Prussian war. Even the present gun is five times as deadly.”

“But do not you think that with this rapid firing a soldier will spend all his ammunition and have none left?”

“There, again,” said M. Bloch, “the improvement in firearms has enormously increased the number of cartridges which each man can carry into action. In 1877, when we went to war with Turkey, our soldiers could only carry 84 cartridges into action. When the calibre of the rifle was reduced to 5 mm. the number which each soldier was furnished with rose to 270. With a bullet of 4 mm. he will carry 380, and when we have a rifle of 3 mm. calibre he will be able to take 57s into action, and not have to carry any more weight than that which burdened him when he carried 84, twenty years ago. At present he carries 170 of the 7-62 mm.”

“But we are a long way off 3 mm. calibre, are we not, M. Bloch?”

Indeed, we are a long way off from 3 mm rounds. It took two World Wars and a few smaller ones before the Americans led the way down to a glorified .22 — in part because smaller rounds don’t behave as predicted by such a simple analysis. They are lighter though.

“Not so far. It is true that very many countries have not yet adopted so small a bore. Your country, for instance, has between “7.5 and 8 mm. The United States have adopted one with 6; Germany is contemplating the adoption of 5; but the 3 mm. gun will probably be the gun of the future, for the increased impetus of the small bore and its advantage in lightness will compel its adoption.”

“You speak of the increased penetrative power of the bullet. Do you think this will add considerably to the deadliness of rifle-fire?”

“Oh, immensely,” said M. Bloch. “As you contract the calibre of the gun you increase the force of its projectile. For instance, a rifle with a calibre of only 6.5 mm. has 44 per cent. more penetrative power than the shot fired by an 8 mm. rifle. Then, again, in previous wars, if a man could throw himself behind a tree he felt comparatively safe, even although the bullets were hurtling all round. To-day the modern bullet will pierce a tree without any difficulty. It also finds no obstacle in earthworks such as would have turned aside the larger bullets. There is therefore less shelter, and not only is there less shelter, but the excessive rapidity with which the missile travels (for it is absurd to call the slender projectile, no thicker than a lead pencil, a ball) will add enormously to the destructive power of the shot. Usually when a bullet struck a man, it found its billet, and generally stopped where it entered; but with the new bullet this will not be the case. At a near range it will pass through successive files of infantry, but what is more serious is that should it strike a bone, it is apt to fly upwards or sideways, rending and tearing everything through which it passes. The mortality will be much greater from this source than it has been in the past.”

“But is this not all very much theory? Have you any facts in support of your belief that the modern bullet will be so much more deadly than its predecessor? In England quite the opposite impression prevailed, owing to the experience which we gained in Jameson’s raid, when many of the combatants were shot through and seemed none the worse, even although the bullet appeared to have traversed a vital part of the body.”

M. Bloch replied: “I do not know about the Jameson raid. I do know what happened when the soldiers fired recently upon a crowd of riotous miners. It is true that they fired at short range, not more than thirty to eighty paces. The mob also was not advancing in loose formation, but, like most mobs, was densely packed. Only ten shots were fired, but these ten shots killed outright seven of the men and wounded twenty-five, of whom six afterwards died. Others who were slightly wounded concealed their injuries, fearing prosecution. Each shot, therefore, it is fair to estimate, must have hit at least four persons. But ignoring those unreported cases, there were thirty-two persons struck by bullets. Of these, thirteen died, a proportion of nearly 40 per cent., which is at least double the average mortality of persons hit by rifle-bullets in previous wars. It has also been proved by experiments made by firing shots into carcases and corpses, that when the bullet strikes a bone it acts virtually as an explosive bullet, as the point expands and issues in a kind of mushroom shape. Altogether I take a very serious view of the sufferings,” continued M. Bloch, “and of the injury that will be inflicted by the new weapons.”

As the interviewer mentions, the newer, small, high-velocity rounds — like the 7 mm Mauser used by the Spanish in the Spanish-American War — left a small clean hole, which may explain why armies weren’t quick to adopt even smaller, faster rounds.

A Tactics Primer

Thursday, October 13th, 2011

William S. Lind provides a rather colorful tactics primer — written for Marines? — explaining the difference between Second and Third Generation tactics:

Second Generation tactics, like those of the First Generation, are linear. In the attack, the object is to push a line forward, and in the defense it is to hold a line. As we saw in so many battles in and after World War I, the result is usually indecisive. One side or the other ends up holding the ground, but the loser retires in reasonably good order to fight again another day.

Usually, achieving a decision, which means taking the enemy unit permanently out of play, requires one of two things, or both in combination: ambush or encirclement. Modern, Third Generation tactics reflect an “ambush mentality,” and also usually aim for encirclement. To that end, Third Generation tactics are sodomy tactics: the objective is to get in the other guy’s rear.

On the defense, that is accomplished by inviting the enemy to attack, letting him penetrate, and then launching a counterattack designed to encircle him, not push him back out. This was the basis of the new, Third Generation German defensive tactics of 1917, and also the German Army’s standard defense in World War II.

On the offense, the rule is not “close with and destroy” but “bypass and collapse.” The goal is to penetrate deep into the enemy’s rear, by stealth or by force (the Germans used a three, not two, element assault, and the largest element was the exploitation element), then roll up the enemy’s forward units from the flank and rear while overrunning his artillery, headquarters and supply dumps. The same approach was used by the Panzer divisions on the operational level, leading to vast encirclements of hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops on the Eastern Front in 1941.

The U.S. military today knows little or nothing of this. It did attempt an operational encirclement of the Iraqi Republican Guard by 7th Corps in the First Gulf War, but that attempt failed because 7th Corps was too slow. On the tactical level, most American units have only one tactic: bump into the enemy and call for fire. The assumption is that America’s vast firepower will then annihilate the opponent, but that seldom happens. Instead, he lives to fight again another day, like Osama and his al Qaeda at Tora Bora.

While the central problem here is conceptual — sheer ignorance of Third Generation tactics — there is a physical aspect to it as well. On foot, American soldiers are loaded down with everything except the kitchen sink, and they will probably be required to carry that too as soon as it is digitized. To use tactics of encirclement, you need to be at least as mobile as your enemy and preferably more so. The kind of light infantry fighters we find ourselves up against in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan are just that, light. They can move much faster on their feet than can our overburdened infantry. The result is that they ambush us, then escape to do it again, over and over. Flip-flops in the alley beat boots on the ground.

As the students in my seminar at Quantico discovered early in the year, the decisive break, both in tactics and in organizational culture, is not between the Third and Fourth Generations but between the Second and Third. It is little short of criminal that the American military remains stuck in the Second Generation. The Third Generation was fully developed in the German Army by 1918, almost a century ago. It costs little or nothing to make the transition. To those who understand how the Pentagon works, that may be the crux of the problem.

There is nothing light about our light infantry.

Mazda Kills The Rotary Engine

Wednesday, October 12th, 2011

Mazda kills the rotary engine after a 45-year production run that included powering the first and only Japanese car to win the 24-hour Le Mans endurance race.

The Japanese automaker, based in Hiroshima, introduced its first rotary engine car in 1967 and is the only automaker in the world that makes rotary engine vehicles. Such engines have fewer moving parts and are quieter than comparable piston engines but are more expensive to manufacture and consume more fuel.

The RX-8 is the only model in Mazda’s lineup with the rotary engine.

The piston-less Wankel rotary engine is… odd.