The Dark Side Of Cooperation

Tuesday, April 13th, 2010

Franz De Waal, author of Chimpanzee Politics, has a new book coming out, The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society. Robin Hanson went to see him speak and found De Waal oddly incapable of analyzing his own topic and seeing the dark side of cooperation:

One might argue that empathy is good because it promotes cooperation. But a striking experiment in the latest AER shows the dark side of cooperation; better cooperation within teams that fight each other can lead to far more destruction and waste.

In the one-on-one version of the experiment, subjects are paired and each side gets a budget of 1000 tokens, some of which can be spent fighting over a common prize of another 1000 tokens. That prize is distributed in proportion to tokens spent fighting for it. For example, if you spent 300 and your opponent spent 100 tokens fighting, then you’d get 750 and they’d get 250 of the prize tokens. Together with the 700 you didn’t spend fighting, you’d end up with 1450 tokens.

The one-shot Nash equilibrium here is for each side to spend 250 tokens fighting, and walk away with 1250; half of the prize is destroyed in the struggle. The same opponents interact for twenty (or 40) rounds, and if that allowed perfect coordination between the opponents, they’d each contribute 1 token to the fight and walk away with 1499; only 0.2% of the prize would be destroyed.

There was also a team-on-team version of the experiment. Four people on each side could contribute to their side’s fighting pot, and a 1000 token per person prize is again distributed in proportion to the relative size of the pots. Sharing a pot creates a free rider problem; each team member would rather that other members contribute more to the fight. This reduces the one-shot Nash fighting contributions to 63, so that each walks away with 1437; only 1/8 of the prize is destroyed in the struggle.

Finally they tried teams with internal punishment. Each token a team member spent punishing another would destroy three of that person’s tokens. If such punishment allowed teams to coordinate perfectly, we’d be back to one-on-one equilibria.

The actual experimental results are summarized in this figure:

In the one-on-one version, subjects were far more eager to fight, relative to one-shot Nash predictions, on average destroying all of the prize. They fought less as time passed, but even after forty rounds fought far more than Nash suggests. Free-riding did reduce team efforts, though only down to the Nash level for individuals. And punishment enabled teams to coordinate to destroy more than the whole prize, an effect that doesn’t seem to diminish with time.

So, relative to what simple uncoordinated self-interest would predict, humans are far more eager to fight each other. And while punishment does allow teams to coordinate internally, teams completely fail to coordinate with each other; instead they coordinate to fight so hard that they destroy more than what they fight over.

House Season Finale Filmed Entirely with Canon 5D Mark II

Tuesday, April 13th, 2010

The season finale of House, which will air on May 17th, was “filmed” entirely on a digital SLR “still” camera.

Greg Yaitanes, the director of the show, confirmed this via Twitter and answered some questions:

@MVRamunno: What is the difference in how it looks on a TV screen compared to a regular camera?

Greg Yaitanes: richer. shallow focus pulls the actors faces to forground [sic]

@oamad0101: How many frames per second and why a Canon 5D Mark II?

GY: 24p and wanted it for ease of use in tight spaces.

@unikissa: Ok, seriously. Can you tell us something about the lenses you used?

GY: all the canon primes and the 24-70 and the 70-200 zoom

@sarabury: Did you have to change any of your working practices to fit in with differences between the 5D and a typical setup?

GY: some. focus was hard with these lenses but more “cine-style” lenses are being made as we speak.

@marykir: were you using CF cards for storage or some sort of mass storage mod? seems like you would need a lot of cards :)

GY: some 18gb or something like that card. gave us 22 min of footage.

@Drdiagnostic: How was the quality as compared 2 the traditional camera used in shooting?

GY: i loved it and feel it’s the future. cameras that can give you these looks

@klizma: How did you manage to stabilize the camera in tight spaces? Any special kind of brackets?

GY: no. mostly gave it a hand held feel. or on a small tripod

The Vivos Underground Survival Shelter Network

Tuesday, April 13th, 2010

A few years ago, when Robin Hanson gave his talk on Catastrophe, Social Collapse and Human Extinction, he opened with some math — namely an explanation of how many disasters follow a power law, and the expected deaths from one big catastrophe may outweigh the expected deaths from many smaller wars, plagues, earthquakes, etc. Even a small chance of human extinction is a big deal.

Thus, building disaster refuges might make sound economic sense.

I wouldn’t characterize the folks at Vivos as sound or sensible:

Bill Chappell at NPR has some fun with the whole thing.

The Looting Scenario

Tuesday, April 13th, 2010

A few years ago, Arnold Kling saw a great race between Medicare spending and technological progress (“Moore’s Law”):

Four Scenarios Moore’s Law Fails Moore’s Law Succeeds
Medicare is Reformed Low Gear Capitalist Utopia
Medicare is Not Reformed Economic Implosion Affordable Welfare State

The Singularity is behind schedule and the ruling class doesn’t seem to know what it’s doing, which could lead to an economic implosion or looting scenario:

Douglass North famously said that when the institutions of a society reward piracy, ambitious people become pirates. When the institutions reward wealth creation, people create wealth. In finance, our institutions did much to reward piracy in the past decade.

In the Looting Scenario, what is going to be rewarded is what we call rent-seeking. Basically, over the next twenty years, wealth transfer by government will be much more important than wealth creation — and the amount available for transfer could actually decline. For example, I expect that benefits for the elderly will become increasingly means-tested and savings will be increasingly taxed, to the point where the marginal return to saving will approach zero. If the marginal return to saving is low, and government deficits are high, then capital formation is going to be low. It’s hard to see how you get rapid innovation in that kind of world.

The Looting Scenario is one in which public employees and pensioners have the incentive to just take as much as they can while they can get it. It is a scenario in which people talk about the deficit, and wise heads say we must do something about it, but the only politically feasible approach is to raise taxes. Even so, it turns out that higher tax rates bring in less revenue than projected, because of the incentives to consume leisure and engage in black-market activity.

Seven years ago, it would not have occurred to me that our ruling class would be so bad that the Looting Scenario would be likely. My guess is that, even among libertarians, just about everyone else still has faith that our ruling class will not let the Looting Scenario take place. However, I think it is one of the higher-probability scenarios out there. Where others think of the upper bound of incompetence as, say, Jimmy Carter or George Bush, I think about truly historic blunders that make Carter and Bush seem brilliant. I see our current economic strategy as comparable in folly to the “search and destroy” strategy in Vietnam or the mass offensives of World War I. So, if I sound crazy on this blog, that is where I am coming from.

A Spy Satellite Turned Upside Down

Tuesday, April 13th, 2010

Nick Szabo offers a very brief history of the space program:

We once heard endlessly about supposed spin-offs from NASA (Tang? Are you really a fan of Tang?). In reality, almost everything successful NASA has done was a spinoff of technology developed by private entities (Robert Goddard’s Smithsonian-funded work on liquid rockets before the war, Bell Labs that invented the transistor and the communications satellite and much else), German military engineers (Von Braun and company), and most directly contractors of the U.S. Department of Defense.

The only important technologies that can be mostly attributed to NASA are preposterously costly and impractical programs such as the Shuttle and International Space Station. The initial launch vehicles used by NASA and (more importantly) the U.S. military, the Jupiter, Athena, Delta, Titan, and Atlas, were repurposed intermediate-range or intercontinental missiles. No basic changes were needed to go from launching big nuclear bombs to the other side of the planet to launching slightly smaller satellites into orbit. When the spacecraft got larger they added booster rockets. Eventually, mostly due to military and commercial purchases, these ICBM designs evolved into the expendable launch vehicles that transport all military and commercial satellites to their orbits to this day.

The U.S. military’s contractors were already building spy satellites, which would prove very useful for keeping track of the Soviet nuclear missiles aimed at the U.S., when Sputnik flew. Old World War II general and then President Dwight Eisenhower wanted the Soviet Union to set a legal precedent that flying satellites over foreign territory without permission was fine. Traditionally land ownership and sovereign territory had been deemed to rise to infinity. Airplanes had become a novel exception to the rule for private land ownership, but not for sovereign control. Sovereign permission is generally required for airplanes, including (or especially) for the spy planes the U.S. military was already flying over the Soviet Union. As crucial as these flights were for U.S. security, they were also a violation of international law, and the Soviet Union shooting them down was justified under that law. The flights were thus a major propaganda loss for the U.S. in the eyes of other countries. Eisenhower could not win the legal or propaganda argument for spy satellites unless he let Soviet actions make the argument for him.

The Soviets, in their own propaganda quest to exaggerate the state of their otherwise mostly backwards technology, obliged. But Sputnik, which did nothing but orbit and beep, drove the U.S. space-crazy. It was not the first or last time we’ve had such a moral panic, and over the old general’s wise reservations NASA was born. Democratic politics now demanded that we be “ahead” of the Soviets in purely symbolic ways, mostly in how fast and far we launched our new media heroes, the astronauts. Echoes of this moral panic motivate the odd politics of NASA to this day, in the form of complaints about how it’s disgraceful to pay Russians to launch American astronauts, warnings that it would somehow be a disaster if China planted any flags on the moon before we send our astronauts back there, and so on.

The space race was on. The Soviets repurposed their nuclear missiles to launch the Sputniks, Yuri Gagarin, and so on. When they tried to develop a new rocket specialized for sending cosmonauts to the moon, it spectacularly failed, albeit under top-secret conditions so that laymen never heard of it in the West. Rejiggered Atlas and Titan ICBMs launched astronauts huddled inside NASA’s Mercury and Gemini capsules. The Saturn that launched Apollo to the moon was mostly a scaled-up Jupiter missile, overseen by the Jupiter team which had been recently transferred from the Army to NASA. (Whether Apollo itself was really so historically important as is often claimed I discuss here). Apollo nevertheless must be counted as a genuine big accomplishment of NASA in its early years. But NASA’s planetary probes? Repurposed spy satellites, made by the same contractors on the same spacecraft buses. The Hubble Telescope? They basically turned a spy satellite upside down. Yes, I know I’m glossing over many technological improvements during this era, and much rejiggering and tinkering done in converting military missions to civilian ones and missiles to launchers — but the useful improvements were largely made by military contractors in the nuclear missile programs, and the rejiggerings by those same contractors but for NASA or for military spy satellites and launches, not by NASA itself for its projects.

Oprah Winfrey in 1986

Tuesday, April 13th, 2010

In 1986, right before her Chicago talk show went national and made television history, Oprah Winfrey spoke with David Mills — and it’s abundantly clear how she got where she was, and how she kept on going:

Mills: I hope people don’t take it wrong when you say that race is not an issue to you. “Is she forgettin’ about us now that she’s making —”

Winfrey: Oh, that’s such a — You know, I have people call me up and say there are not enough black people on the show. You don’t do this for blacks, you don’t do that. You’re not black enough.

And I say: I look in the mirror every morning, just as my ancestors did, who came and worked in the factories for pennies-per-day labor, and they graced their mirrors every morning, and no one had to tell them they were black.

When I was 14 years old, I heard Rev. Jesse Jackson say that excellence is the best deterrent to racism. And it was a truth that resonated with me. And it is what I have always believed. Even before I heard him speak, it’s what I believed. It had not been articulated for me.

And the doctrine that I have followed has been: If you are the best at what you do — there’s nobody else better in the class than you are — then the teacher better have a damn good excuse for putting you back. I mean, there are no excuses when you’re the best. So my goal is always to be the absolute best, period.

If something goes wrong in my life, I don’t say it’s because I’m a woman, because I’m black. I say, well, first let me check out what I did or didn’t do.

I was taken off the air as an anchorwoman in Baltimore in 1977. I was taken off the 6 o’clock news. Friends of mine said, “It happened to you because you’re black. It wouldn’t have happened if you weren’t black.” I knew — this was what I knew — that if I had been the best, if I had been ready for it, they couldn’t have done it to me. They could not have done it.

I wasn’t ready. I was still very immature… and wasn’t seasoned enough for that market. And now I’m seasoned. Now I’m ready. Had nothing to do with race. So when I say it’s not an issue, I mean that I have never used my race to defend my ability or inability to do or not do something.

I certainly recognize that racism exists, and has to be fought. People have different ways of fighting it. Mine is to be the best that I am. …

Even during the whole Black Power movement when everybody was saying “Black is beautiful, black is beautiful,” trying to convince themselves, it had never occurred to me that it wasn’t beautiful. It never occurred to me that this was something I now had to tell myself, because I always thought I was.

It never occurred to me that I was less than any other white person because in every class, in every competition, I was always the No. 1 kid.

Elites at Cross-Purposes

Tuesday, April 13th, 2010

Horizontal conflict is a major theme of the cliodynamics of Peter Turchin:

Turchin faces an uphill battle in creating his subset of psychohistory. But his initial results are interesting. Focusing on pre-industrial agricultural societies, Turchin argues that the primary reason for the rise of empires is an idea of Ibn Khaldun’s called asabiyah. Asabiyah is the “strong force” that gives a human group its ability to cooperate; it’s roughly equivalent to James Burnham’spolitical formula”. Ibn Khaldun argued that the most productive environment for building asabiyah was a border community between nomads and farmers that was under constant threat of attack. This enhanced asabiyah often allowed the border community to defeat its enemies, then conquer them, and become an empire.

Turchin extends Ibn Khaldun’s idea by arguing that it’s specifically along “metaethnic frontiers” that empires arose. This is a frontier between societies that are not only diametrically opposed in means of production (e.g. pastoralist vs. agriculturalist) but diametrically opposed in culture as well. Some examples that Turchin offers are the frontiers between his native Russia and the Crimean Tatars, European Americans and American Indians, Han Chinese and Huns-Turks-Mongols-Manchus, Christian Spain and Muslim al-Andalus, Republican Rome and the Gauls, and Imperial Rome and the German tribes. The vast cultural differences between cultures bestride a frontier produce asabiyah more effectively than frontiers between people with a similar culture (e.g. the Franco-German frontier). This asabiyah is often sufficiently strong enough to make a political community along a metaethnic frontier expand into an empire.

For the forces that maintain asabiyah, Turchin points to studies based around the ultimatum game:

The ultimatum game is a game often played in economic experiments in which two players interact to decide how to divide a sum of money that is given to them. The first player proposes how to divide the sum between the two players, and the second player can either accept or reject this proposal. If the second player rejects, neither player receives anything. If the second player accepts, the money is split according to the proposal. The game is played only once so that reciprocation is not an issue.

These experiments seem to reveal three classes of people within any human group: knaves, saints, and moralists, as Turchin pointed out in his book War and Peace and War:

During the 1990s, several economists, most notably Ernst Fehr at the University of Zurich and his colleagues, decided to test the assumptions of rational choice theory experimentally…[and] what these experiments, and many others like them, reveal is that society consists of several types of people. Some of them — perhaps a quarter in experiments with American college students — are self-interested, rational agents — ‘the knaves’. These will never contribute to the common good, and will choose free-riding unless forced to [contribute] by fines imposed upon them. The opposite type, also about a quarter, are the unconditional cooperators, or ‘the saints’. The saints continue to contribute to the common pool and lose money, even when it is obvious to everybody that cooperation has failed (although most of them reduce the amount of their contribution). The largest group (40 to 60 percent in most experiments) are the conditional cooperators, or ‘the moralists’. The preference of the moralists is to contribute to the pot, so that everyone would be better off. However, in the absence of the mechanism to punish noncontributors, free-riding proliferates, the moralists become disgusted by this opportunistic behavior, and withdraw their cooperation. On the other hand, when the punishment option is available, they use it to fine the knaves [even though imposing a fine comes at a cost to them...and] the group [eventually] achieves the cooperative equilibrium at which, paradoxically, the moralists do almost as well as the knaves, because they now rarely (if ever) need to spend money on fining the free-riders.

It’s the moralists who maintain asabiyah:

The experiments also point to the key role of the moralists…. Self-righteous moralists are not necessarily nice people, and their motivation for the ‘moralistic punishment’ is not necessarily prosocial in intent. They might not be trying to get everyone to cooperate. Instead, they get mad at people who violate social norms. They retaliate against the norm breakers, and feel a kind of grim satisfaction from depriving them of their ill-gotten gains. It’s emotional, and it’s not pretty, but it does ensure group cooperation…. [Moreover,] that capacity for trust and moralistic punishment are wired into our brains. At some level, they are as basic as our abilities for finding food, or finding mates. It does not mean all humans will always behave in a cooperative manner. People are different…[and] societies differ in their ability to sustain collective action. But the capacity for cooperation (even if it is never exercised by many people) is part of what makes us human….[In addition,] as a result of our ability to use symbols, the idea of a social group (‘us’) has a peculiar grip on human imagination. Because of our psychological makeup, we tend to think of social groups, such as nations, as more ‘real’ than they are ‘in reality.’ And, because people treat nations as real, they behave accordingly and, paradoxically, make them real…Two key adaptations enabled the evolution of [human] ultrasociality. The first one was the moralist strategy: cooperate when enough members in the group are also cooperating, and punish those who do not cooperate. A band that had enough moralists to tip its collective behavior to the cooperative equilibrium outcompeted, or even exterminated, bands that failed to cooperate. The second adaptation, the human ability to use symbolic markers to define cooperating groups, allowed the evolution of sociality to break through the limits of face-to-face interaction, [and] the scale of human societies increased in a series of leaps.

Empires decline when asabiyah-driven imperial conquest brings wealth, security, and power. High asabiyah societies have strong vertical and horizontal cohesion and cooperation between elites and non-elites and within the elites and non-elites, fed by the moralists among the elites and non-elites. However, a great deal of asabiyah formation is driven by the pressure of external attacks. Imperial conquest can remove the immediate threat of external attacks. The lack of an immediate external threat leads to declines in asabiyah as elites and non-elites pursue divergent agendas and the influence of moralists decline. Elites tend to divide and that open opportunities for internal non-elites and external actors. This is what tends to push elites over the edge.

Loss of an elite doesn’t have to be a net loss. The rotation of elites is usually required to reinvigorate a society. However, the process is often unpleasant for everyone involved.

Pro Football Players Are Really, Really Fast

Monday, April 12th, 2010

Compared to ordinary Joes, pro football players are really, really fast — even the big, fat linemen:

David Simon on The Wire

Monday, April 12th, 2010

A few years ago, David Mills interviewed his friend David Simon, right after Simon had collected his AFI award for The Wire:

If you look at the outcomes for these gangsters — we devoured the Barksdales. They’re either all in jail or dead. Basically what we’ve said was, “If it seemed like they were controlling events, look again. This is a Greek tragedy. All their hubris, all of their vanity, all their sound and fury, it amounted to death and marginalization.” Much like the longshoremen, much like the cops who buck the system. The thing is a Greek tragedy.

So much of American drama — look at The Shield. Not to get into The Shield specifically, but nothing is more the quintessential American dramatic impulse than to make the individual bigger than the institutions which he serves. Vic Mackey, he is the id that rages well beyond the LAPD. It’s “What is he capable of? What is he not capable of?”

The Wire has not only gone the opposite way, it’s resisted the idea that, in this post-modern America, individuals triumph over institutions. The institution is always bigger. It doesn’t tolerate that degree of individuality on any level for any length of time. These moments of epic characterization are inherently false. They’re all rooted in, like, old Westerns or something. Guy rides into town, cleans up the town, rides out of town.

There’s no cleaning it up anymore. There’s no riding in, there’s no riding out. The town is what it is.

How to Write about Africa

Monday, April 12th, 2010

Binyavanga Wainaina explains how to write about Africa:

Always use the word ‘Africa’ or ‘Darkness’ or ‘Safari’ in your title. Subtitles may include the words ‘Zanzibar’, ‘Masai’, ‘Zulu’, ‘Zambezi’, ‘Congo’, ‘Nile’, ‘Big’, ‘Sky’, ‘Shadow’, ‘Drum’, ‘Sun’ or ‘Bygone’. Also useful are words such as ‘Guerrillas’, ‘Timeless’, ‘Primordial’ and ‘Tribal’. Note that ‘People’ means Africans who are not black, while ‘The People’ means black Africans.
[...]
Remember, any work you submit in which people look filthy and miserable will be referred to as the ‘real Africa’, and you want that on your dust jacket. Do not feel queasy about this: you are trying to help them to get aid from the West. The biggest taboo in writing about Africa is to describe or show dead or suffering white people.

Animals, on the other hand, must be treated as well rounded, complex characters. They speak (or grunt while tossing their manes proudly) and have names, ambitions and desires. They also have family values: see how lions teach their children? Elephants are caring, and are good feminists or dignified patriarchs. So are gorillas. Never, ever say anything negative about an elephant or a gorilla. Elephants may attack people’s property, destroy their crops, and even kill them. Always take the side of the elephant. Big cats have public-school accents. Hyenas are fair game and have vaguely Middle Eastern accents. Any short Africans who live in the jungle or desert may be portrayed with good humour (unless they are in conflict with an elephant or chimpanzee or gorilla, in which case they are pure evil).

After celebrity activists and aid workers, conservationists are Africa’s most important people. Do not offend them.

(Hat tip to Graham’s Automatic Ballpoint.)

Solitude and Leadership

Monday, April 12th, 2010

William Deresiewicz, who taught at Yale for 10 years, gave a speech on leadership to the plebe class at West Point last October:

So what I saw around me were great kids who had been trained to be world-class hoop jumpers. Any goal you set them, they could achieve. Any test you gave them, they could pass with flying colors. They were, as one of them put it herself, “excellent sheep.” I had no doubt that they would continue to jump through hoops and ace tests and go on to Harvard Business School, or Michigan Law School, or Johns Hopkins Medical School, or Goldman Sachs, or McKinsey consulting, or whatever. And this approach would indeed take them far in life. They would come back for their 25th reunion as a partner at White & Case, or an attending physician at Mass General, or an assistant secretary in the Department of State.

That is exactly what places like Yale mean when they talk about training leaders. Educating people who make a big name for themselves in the world, people with impressive titles, people the university can brag about. People who make it to the top. People who can climb the greasy pole of whatever hierarchy they decide to attach themselves to.

But I think there’s something desperately wrong, and even dangerous, about that idea. To explain why, I want to spend a few minutes talking about a novel that many of you may have read, Heart of Darkness. If you haven’t read it, you’ve probably seen Apocalypse Now, which is based on it. Marlow in the novel becomes Captain Willard, played by Martin Sheen. Kurtz in the novel becomes Colonel Kurtz, played by Marlon Brando. But the novel isn’t about Vietnam; it’s about colonialism in the Belgian Congo three generations before Vietnam. Marlow, not a military officer but a merchant marine, a civilian ship’s captain, is sent by the company that’s running the country under charter from the Belgian crown to sail deep upriver, up the Congo River, to retrieve a manager who’s ensconced himself in the jungle and gone rogue, just like Colonel Kurtz does in the movie.

Now everyone knows that the novel is about imperialism and colonialism and race relations and the darkness that lies in the human heart, but it became clear to me at a certain point, as I taught the novel, that it is also about bureaucracy — what I called, a minute ago, hierarchy. The Company, after all, is just that: a company, with rules and procedures and ranks and people in power and people scrambling for power, just like any other bureaucracy. Just like a big law firm or a governmental department or, for that matter, a university. Just like — and here’s why I’m telling you all this — just like the bureaucracy you are about to join. The word bureaucracy tends to have negative connotations, but I say this in no way as a criticism, merely a description, that the U.S. Army is a bureaucracy and one of the largest and most famously bureaucratic bureaucracies in the world. After all, it was the Army that gave us, among other things, the indispensable bureaucratic acronym “snafu”: “situation normal: all fucked up” — or “all fouled up” in the cleaned-up version. That comes from the U.S. Army in World War II.

You need to know that when you get your commission, you’ll be joining a bureaucracy, and however long you stay in the Army, you’ll be operating within a bureaucracy. As different as the armed forces are in so many ways from every other institution in society, in that respect they are the same. And so you need to know how bureaucracies operate, what kind of behavior — what kind of character — they reward, and what kind they punish.

So, back to the novel. Marlow proceeds upriver by stages, just like Captain Willard does in the movie. First he gets to the Outer Station. Kurtz is at the Inner Station. In between is the Central Station, where Marlow spends the most time, and where we get our best look at bureaucracy in action and the kind of people who succeed in it. This is Marlow’s description of the manager of the Central Station, the big boss:

He was commonplace in complexion, in features, in manners, and in voice. He was of middle size and of ordinary build. His eyes, of the usual blue, were perhaps remarkably cold…. Otherwise there was only an indefinable, faint expression of his lips, something stealthy — a smile — not a smile — I remember it, but I can’t explain…. He was a common trader, from his youth up employed in these parts — nothing more. He was obeyed, yet he inspired neither love nor fear, nor even respect. He inspired uneasiness. That was it! Uneasiness. Not a definite mistrust — just uneasiness — nothing more. You have no idea how effective such a… a… faculty can be. He had no genius for organizing, for initiative, or for order even…. He had no learning, and no intelligence. His position had come to him — why?… He originated nothing, he could keep the routine going — that’s all. But he was great. He was great by this little thing that it was impossible to tell what could control such a man. He never gave that secret away. Perhaps there was nothing within him. Such a suspicion made one pause.

Note the adjectives: commonplace, ordinary, usual, common. There is nothing distinguished about this person. About the 10th time I read that passage, I realized it was a perfect description of the kind of person who tends to prosper in the bureaucratic environment. And the only reason I did is because it suddenly struck me that it was a perfect description of the head of the bureaucracy that I was part of, the chairman of my academic department — who had that exact same smile, like a shark, and that exact same ability to make you uneasy, like you were doing something wrong, only she wasn’t ever going to tell you what. Like the manager — and I’m sorry to say this, but like so many people you will meet as you negotiate the bureaucracy of the Army or for that matter of whatever institution you end up giving your talents to after the Army, whether it’s Microsoft or the World Bank or whatever — the head of my department had no genius for organizing or initiative or even order, no particular learning or intelligence, no distinguishing characteristics at all. Just the ability to keep the routine going, and beyond that, as Marlow says, her position had come to her — why?

That’s really the great mystery about bureaucracies. Why is it so often that the best people are stuck in the middle and the people who are running things — the leaders — are the mediocrities? Because excellence isn’t usually what gets you up the greasy pole. What gets you up is a talent for maneuvering. Kissing up to the people above you, kicking down to the people below you. Pleasing your teachers, pleasing your superiors, picking a powerful mentor and riding his coattails until it’s time to stab him in the back. Jumping through hoops. Getting along by going along. Being whatever other people want you to be, so that it finally comes to seem that, like the manager of the Central Station, you have nothing inside you at all. Not taking stupid risks like trying to change how things are done or question why they’re done. Just keeping the routine going.

(Hat tip à mon père.)

Malcolm McLaren, RIP

Monday, April 12th, 2010

Malcolm McLaren, the infamous promoter of the Sex Pistols — and of himself, of course — recently passed away at the age of 64, from cancer.

Steve Sailer has quite a bit to say about McLaren and his sense of humor:

I always liked best Malcolm’s own 1983 minor hit single Buffalo Gals, which pointed out explicitly what I’d been saying since about 1979: rapping sounds an awful lot like that most uncool of all musical forms: square dance calling.

McClaren took the 1840s minstrel show song Buffalo Gals, which had evolved into a square dance call, and had some some New York rappers back him up while he rapped it (this was back in the early days before the racial wall hardened, when white people, such as Blondie, Talking Heads, and the Clash, were allowed to rap):

Buffalo Gals go round the outside,
Round the outside, round the outside
And dozey-do your partners

To make sure nobody missed his point, McClaren’s Buffalo Gals video features footage of square dancing. (Here’s an even better video of a Buffalo Gals square dance on the Lawrence Welk Show.)

I assumed that the world would now get the joke: rap was descended from minstrel shows and the dorkiest of all white forms of music: square dance calling. What more could shame black people, after four years of hip-hop, into going back to something they do very well, singing? Perhaps popular music would finally climb out of the rut of rap, the novelty music gimmick that had refused to die?

I was wrong.

And that was one of Malcolm’s better ideas.

Speaking of McLaren’s better ideas:

Around 1980, McClaren came up with the good idea of building pop music on top of tribal rhythms from Burundi, first for Adam Ant, and then he took Ant’s backing band away, including the prodigious drummer David Barbarossa, to form Bow Wow Wow. There was always speculation that Barbarossa’s album tracks had to be multilayered in the studio, but when I saw Bow Wow Wow around 1981, he was moving his hands faster than any drummer I’d seen.

But Malcolm could never have too much controversy, so he hired a 14-year-old girl to be a lead singer and promoted her as a sex kitten. At the show I attended in LA, she blew her voice out painfully on the second song, suggesting to me that 14-year-old girls shouldn’t be on rock band world tours.

Sailer, of course, always looks for a racial or ethnic angle — and tends to find one:

Anyway, when I was reading McClaren’s obituaries yesterday, being reminded of how far he’d gotten in the garment and entertainment industries on sheer chutzpah, I decided to look up more about McClaren because I thought it was striking that he could have the most stereotypically Jewish career imaginable, yet be a Scotsman named Malcolm Robert Andrew McLaren. Pointing this out would be good way to shatter stereotypes!

But, then I worried that I ought to check his maternal line and his upbringing before saying this in public. To my surprise (although I shouldn’t have been surprised), when I looked up McClaren on Wikipedia yesterday, I found:

McLaren was born to Pete McLaren, a Scottish teenaged war deserter, and Emmy (née Isaacs) in the suburbs of post-World War II London. His father left when he was two and he was raised by his maternal grandmother, Rose Corre Isaacs, the formerly wealthy daughter of Portuguese Sephardic Jewish diamond dealers, in Stoke Newington. McLaren told Andrew Denton on Enough Rope, that his grandmother always said to him, “To be bad is good… to be good is simply boring”…. When he was six, McLaren’s mother married Martin Levi, a man working in London’s rag trade.

Stealing the Mona Lisa

Sunday, April 11th, 2010

Stealing the Mona Lisa wasn’t so hard:

As the Louvre’s maintenance director, a man named Picquet, passed through the Salon Carré during his rounds on the morning of August 21, 1911, he pointed out Leonardo’s Mona Lisa, telling a co-worker that it was the most valuable object in the museum. “They say it is worth a million and a half,” Picquet remarked, glancing at his watch as he left the room. The time was 7:20 a.m.

Shortly after Picquet departed the Salon Carré, a door to a storage closet opened and at least one man — for it would never be proved whether the thief worked alone — emerged. He had been in there since the previous day — Sunday, the museum’s busiest. Just before closing time, the thief had slipped inside the little closet so that he could emerge in the morning without the need to identify himself to a guard at the entrance.

There were many such small rooms and hidden alcoves within the ancient building; museum officials later confessed that no one knew how many. This particular room was normally used for storing easels, canvases, and art supplies for students who were engaged in copying the works of the old masters. The only firm anti-forgery requirement the museum imposed was that the reproductions could not be the same size as the original.

Emerging from the closet in a white artist’s smock, the intruder might have been mistaken for one of these copyists — or, perhaps, for a member of the museum’s maintenance staff, who also wore such smocks, in a practice intended to demonstrate that they were superior to other workers. If anyone noticed the thief, he would likely be taken for another of the regular museum employees.

As he entered the Salon Carré, the thief headed straight for the Mona Lisa. Lifting down the painting and carrying it into an enclosed stairwell nearby was no easy job. The painting itself weighs approximately 18 pounds, since Leonardo painted it not on canvas but on three slabs of wood, a fairly common practice during the Renaissance. A few months earlier, the museum’s directors had taken steps to physically protect the Mona Lisa by reinforcing it with a massive wooden brace and placing it inside a glass-fronted box, adding 150 pounds to its weight. The decorative Renaissance frame brought the total to nearly 200 pounds. However, only four sturdy hooks held it there, no more securely than if it had been hung in the house of a bourgeois Parisian. Museum officials would later explain that the paintings were fastened to the wall in this way to make it easy for guards to remove them in case of fire.

Once safely out of sight behind the closed door of the stairwell, the thief quickly stripped the painting of all its protective “garments” — the brace, the glass case, and the frame. Since the Mona Lisa’s close-grained wood, an inch and a half thick, made it impossible to roll up, he slipped the work underneath his smock. Measuring approximately 30 by 21 inches, it was small enough to avoid detection.

Though evidently familiar with the layout of the museum, the thief made one crucial mistake in his planning. At the bottom of the enclosed stairway that led down to the first floor of the Louvre was a locked door. The thief had obtained a key, but now it failed to work. Desperately, as he heard footsteps coming from above, he used a screwdriver to remove the doorknob.

Down the stairs came one of the Louvre’s plumbers, named Sauvet. Later, Sauvet — the only person to witness the thief inside the museum — testified that he had seen only one man, dressed as a museum employee. The man complained that the doorknob was missing. Apparently thinking that there was nothing strange about the situation, Sauvet produced a pliers to open the door. The plumber suggested that they leave it open in case anyone else should use the staircase. The thief agreed, and the two parted ways.

The real trick was in selling it, which got Vincenzo Perugia caught — while the real mastermind made his fortune:

Eventually, Valfierno peddled the ultimate prize: the Mona Lisa itself, in June 1910. Not the genuine painting, but a forged copy, along with forged official papers that convinced the buyer (an American millionaire) that, in order to cover the theft, Louvre officials had hung a replica in the Salon Carré. The buyer, unfortunately, had been a little too free in bragging about his new acquisition, which prompted the newspaper Le Cri de Paris to publish an article — a year before the actual theft — stating that the Mona Lisa had been stolen.

Still, it had been a disturbing experience, one that Valfierno was determined to avoid a second time: “The next trip, we decided, there must be no chance for recriminations. We would steal — actually steal — the Louvre Mona Lisa and assure the buyer beyond any possibility of misunderstanding that the picture delivered to him was the true, the authentic original.”

Valfierno never intended to sell the real painting. “The original would be as awkward as a hot stove,” he told Decker. The plan would be to create a copy and ship it overseas before stealing the original. “The customs would pass it without a thought, copies being commonplace and the original still being in the Louvre.” After the Mona Lisa had been stolen, the imitation could be taken out and sold to a buyer who was convinced he was getting the missing masterpiece.

“We began our selling campaign,” recalled Valfierno, “and the first deal went through so easily that the thought ‘Why stop with one?’ naturally arose. There was no limit in theory to the fish we might hook.” Valfierno stopped with six American millionaires. “Six were as many as we could both land and keep hot,” he told Decker. The forger then carefully produced the six copies, which were sent to America and kept waiting for the proper time to be delivered. Valfierno said that an antique bed, made of Italian walnut, “seasoned by time to the identical quality of that on which the Mona Lisa was painted” provided the panels that the forger painted on.

Now came what Valfierno thought was the easy part: “Stealing the Mona Lisa was as simple as boiling an egg in a kitchenette,” he told Decker. “Our success depended upon one thing — the fact that a workman in a white blouse in the Louvre is as free from suspicion as an unlaid egg.” Recruiting someone — Perugia — who actually had worked in the Louvre was helpful because he knew the secret rooms and staircases that employees used.

Perugia did not act alone, Valfierno said. He had two accomplices who were needed to lift the painting, with its heavy protective container and frame, from the wall and carry it to a place where the frame could be removed. Valfierno did not name them either.

The one hitch in the plan was that Perugia had failed to test the duplicate key Valfierno ordered to be made for the door at the bottom of the staircase. At the moment he needed it, the key failed to turn the lock. While he was removing the doorknob, the trio heard footsteps from above, and Perugia’s two accomplices hid themselves. The plumber appeared but, seeing only one man in a white smock, had no reason to be suspicious. He opened the door and went on his way, soon followed by Perugia and the other two thieves. At the vestibule, the guard stationed there had temporarily abandoned his post.

An automobile waited for the thieves and took them to Valfierno’s headquarters, where the gang celebrated “the most magnificent single theft in the history of the world.” Now the six copies that had been sent to the United States could be delivered to the purchasers. Because each of the six collectors thought he was receiving stolen merchandise, he could not publicize his acquisition — or even complain should he suspect it wasn’t the genuine article.

Perugia was paid well for his part in the scheme. However, he squandered the money on the Riviera, and then, knowing where Valfierno had hidden the real Mona Lisa, stole it a second time. “The poor fool had some nutty notion of selling it,” Valfierno told Decker. “He had never realized that selling it, in the first place, was the real achievement, requiring an organization and a finesse that was a million miles beyond his capabilities.”

Usain Bolt, Mutant

Sunday, April 11th, 2010

Usain Bolt is a 6’5″, 210-lb mutant with scoliosis who has gone from dominating the 200-meter dash to the 100-meter — without really trying:

When the other men reach their top speed, their limit, Usain Bolt continues to accelerate. By the fifty-meter mark, he has caught up to the leader. By the sixty-meter mark, a noticeable gap has emerged between him and the rest of the pack. By the seventy-meter mark, he is covering more than twelve meters of ground — about forty feet — every second, a pace faster than the speed limit for automobiles in most neighborhoods. Nobody has ever moved this fast before under his own power. Usain Bolt’s top speed is simply significantly higher than anyone else’s, ever.

His top speed is such a spectacle, so phenomenal, so searing that many who witness this race, who see Bolt cross the line in 9.69 seconds, breaking his own three-month-old world record by three hundredths of a second, don’t notice, until they see the replay, what is perhaps the most salient and frightening thing about his performance: Approximately eighty meters into the race, twenty meters from the finish line, Bolt stops trying. It happens right after he throws a quick glance to the right, toward lane seven, the lane of his chief rival, a fellow Jamaican named Asafa Powell who held the world record before Bolt did. Prior to the start of the race, Bolt believed Powell was his only credible threat. Now seeing that Powell is nowhere in sight, that, indeed, no other runner is visible, Bolt lets something like a smile cross his lips. Then his arms stop pumping. He drops them to his sides, pulls his shoulders back, pushes his chest out, splays his fingers. His legs continue to cycle, but he no longer provides them additional impetus. He coasts. Several meters before he crosses the finish line, a full half second before he wins the 100-meter final by one of the widest margins in Olympic history, he brings his right fist up and thumps his chest.

Ethan Siegel, a theoretical astrophysicist at Lewis & Clark College, recently charted a graph to demonstrate that, judging by the incremental progression of the 100-meter world record over the past hundred years, Bolt appears to be operating at a level approximately thirty years beyond that of the expected capabilities of modern man. Mathematically, Bolt belonged not in the 2008 Olympics but the 2040 Olympics. Michael Johnson, the hero of the 1996 Olympic summer games, has made the same point in a different way: A runner capable of beating Bolt, he says, “hasn’t been born yet.”

The secret to success as a sprinter might just be not training too hard:

Glen Mills, who has been Bolt’s coach since 2005, is down on the field, watching another one of his runners skip sideways down a row of hurdles, the young man’s legs kicking up and over each one like a chorus girl’s. A digital stopwatch hangs from Mills’s thick neck, dangling just above his potbelly. Mills has close-cut gray hair, narrow eyes, a perpetually sardonic expression. Were someone to have charted a graph depicting Bolt’s story up to the point that Mills became his coach, it would have shown a steep parabolic trajectory, a rapid rise followed by a precipitous fall. Like many promising runners, Bolt had come out of nowhere, burned brightly for a few years — setting a number of junior records — then appeared to have burned out. In 2004, at seventeen years old, Bolt made the Jamaican national team and competed in that year’s Olympic Games in Athens, but his performance there was poor: He never made it past the first round in his only event, the 200 meters. His progress stalled, then reversed.

“When I got him, he was injured,” Mills says. “Also, his coordination and all those things were off. And his scoliosis was affecting his hamstring. So we had to do some work.” Much of that work consisted of not working so hard. Mills cut down on Bolt’s high-intensity workouts and put him instead on a training regimen that emphasized strength and flexibility, building up his core muscles to compensate for his problematic spine, honing Bolt’s body and technique until he was ready to fully harness his gift. Although Bolt continued to compete, for the two years of 2006 and 2007, he didn’t place first in any races. It wasn’t until 2008 that Mills’s training regimen came to fruition, and the world took notice of what had been taking root at this worn track on the grounds of an old Kingston sugar plantation.

What does it take to be a genius?

Saturday, April 10th, 2010

What does it take to be a genius? Some combination of talent, drive, and luck:

In Murray’s tabulation, the six most influential composers are Beethoven and Mozart (tied for first), followed by Bach, Wagner, Haydn, and Handel.

You’ll note that they were all born in German-speaking countries in the 17th through 19th Centuries. (In fact, Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven were all in Vienna at the same time in the spring of 1787. Haydn and Mozart were friends, Haydn became Beethoven’s teacher, although they didn’t get along, and whether Mozart and Beethoven ever met is still disputed.)

It seems unlikely that all the best compositional talent in human history happened to be born in a small fraction of Europe over a fairly short spell.

Indeed, in most fields, the greats generally emerge during specific efflorescences. The advantages of being in the right time and place can be immense, especially before electronic communications.

Think of the difficulties besetting a hypothetical 19th Century American with the innate talent to have been a leading orchestral composer. For instance, Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony premiered in Vienna in 1808, but didn’t make it to America until 1842, by which point it was old hat in Europe.

Moreover, after first hearing Beethoven’s Ninth in 1846, American critics complained that his famous “Ode to Joy” melody sounded like “Yankee Doodle Dandy.” America just didn’t quite offer the kind of cultural atmosphere helpful toward becoming a great art music composer. Instead, 19th Century American prodigies such as Stephen Foster, John Philip Sousa, and Scott Joplin took the lead in less august forms of music.

And, yet, the notion that golden age German-speakers enjoyed some genetic advantages in musical talent is not implausible. Their music-centered culture would have encouraged assortative mating among the musically gifted.

Most famously, the The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians lists 80 distinguished musicians from 1550 to 1850 with the surname of “Bach.” (Nobody knows how many descendants of the clan’s daughters bore other last names.) They weren’t stars until the generation after Johann Sebastian, but they did all right for themselves.

The musicality of the Bachs wasn’t an accident. The Bachs usually married daughters of other families in the church music business, girls who were musically literate enough to copy scores for them.

For example, Johann Sebastian Bach’s first wife (by whom he had seven children, two of whom became famous composers) was his second cousin. After her death, his second wife (by whom he had 13 children, two of them prominent composers) was the daughter of a well-known trumpeter and herself a singer of some renown.

How could he afford that?

Well, there were a lot of jobs for musicians. In the early 16th Century, Martin Luther had exuberantly advocated vocal music for the masses, which necessitated professional leadership.

As we are discovering about human evolution, you get more of what you pay for.