No one improved their reading skills at all

Sunday, September 7th, 2025

The real data on education is more than bad enough, Max Tabarrok says, to merit removing or reforming the Department of Education:

Inflation adjusted spending per pupil tripled since 1970 while reading scores haven’t budged.

There has also been an astounding amount of credential inflation. The amount of time people spend in school has increased by more than three years since the 1970s as more people graduate high school and college, but performance on tests of skill or human capital is completely stagnant.

This suggests, a la Bryan Caplan’s Case against education, that many of these extra years of schooling are actually a socially inefficient zero-sum competition where it pays individually to get the most schooling and come out on top of your peers, but everyone would be better off if people invested less time and money in competing. Hundred billion dollar subsidies to student loans and higher education institutions have exacerbated this zero-sum race for little material gain.

Evidence for this: The NCES ran two rounds of a literacy test, one in 1992 and one in 2003. The overall average score on the test didn’t change (276 vs 275 out of 500), but within every educational attainment group scores dropped massively.

High school dropouts got less literate on average because the highest scoring dropouts in the 90s became the lowest scoring graduates in the 2000s as standards were lowered and more students were pushed through into more education. Literacy scores among Graduate degree holders dropped by 13-17 points in a decade. If a graduate degree cannot even teach you how to read, it’s probably not having large effects on any other more complex forms of human capital.

This means that across this decade of rising educational attainment, no one improved their reading skills at all. Instead, the standards for graduating from each level of schooling were just lowered and people spent more years slogging through high school or college.

80,000 cameras pointed at highways and parking lots

Saturday, September 6th, 2025

Since its founding in 2017, Flock, which was valued at $7.5 billion in its most recent funding round, has quietly built a network of more than 80,000 cameras pointed at highways and parking lots across the U.S.:

Growth has been explosive, with revenue up some 70% from the estimated $175 million it booked in 2023. It’s not yet profitable and has no imminent plan to be as it prioritizes growth, backed by a $275 million March funding round led by Andreessen Horowitz. Those numbers were more than sufficient to land Flock on Forbes’ 2025 Cloud 100 list of the top private cloud computing companies. Langley says turning Flock into a $100 billion business is “very within reach.” Ilya Sukhar, an early investor and partner at VC firm Matrix who sits on Flock’s board, agrees. “It’s a bit cliché, but it does feel like we’re just getting started,” he says. “It’s not hard for me to project to a place where we get to that level.”

Each Flock license plate reader cam costs between $3,000 and $3,500, with an additional fee for FlockOS, the operating system that makes all the data Flock collects accessible via a browser or a mobile app, based on either the number of users or cameras. Dunwoody PD, for instance, pays around $500,000 annually for its array of 105 cameras, gunshot detectors, that skittering DJI drone and the software that controls it all.

Flock’s growth isn’t solely fueled by its 5,000 law enforcement customers across 49 states (it hasn’t yet installed its cameras in Alaska). It has 1,000 corporate customers, including blue chips like FedEx, Lowe’s and Simon Property, America’s largest mall owner. Then there are housing and homeowner associations, small businesses, schools and organizations like the Jewish Federation of Greater Atlanta, which has installed 64 Flock cameras across different properties in the city, including a community center that has reported a recent spike in antisemitic threats to Dunwoody police. All these customers can choose to grant the police access to their camera feeds, further expanding the surveillance coverage Flock can offer law enforcement. Many do.

Langley had no experience in police tech when he and fellow Georgia Tech alums Matt Feury, 36, and Paige Todd, 40, started the company in 2017. Previously they’d worked together on an app Langley cofounded for upgrading sports or concert seats to VIP-status events, where Feury and Todd were early employees. (It was acquired by Atlanta-based conglomerate Cox Enterprises and no longer exists.) Inspired by an unsolved robbery in Langley’s neighborhood, the trio started work on the first Flock prototype, an Android phone camera in a waterproof box that took pictures of cars and picked out license plates that could then be searched via an app.

Is modernism due to youth culture?

Wednesday, September 3rd, 2025

Robin Hanson has been puzzling over the transition from traditional to modern culture:

It happened after tech started changing a lot, when long distance trade, travel, and talk greatly increased. But with a big delay; those things had changed lots a few centuries before culture started changing fast ~1900-1920. And strangely, the new modernists were then most sure that the culture of their grandparents was not what they wanted, even though they felt quite unsure of in which new directions culture should go.

Clothing fashion had been changing for several centuries before, and there had also been slowly changing fashion in governance and morals. But suddenly art, sculpture, architecture, music fashion changed much more radically, and soon after norms and values also started changing faster.

At the key transition time, it seems that the culture of elite youth was more modern than the culture of older adults. And even today, most people most like the food, music, etc. popular when they were ~20yo, suggesting youth have a disproportionate role in cultural change. And elites have always had more influence over most everything.

All of these lead me to wonder if a key was the rise of school, which concentrated elite youths together so that they could form their own internal elite youth culture.

Should we have kept the American Empire?

Tuesday, September 2nd, 2025

Should we have kept the American Empire?, Max Tabarrok asks:

Note that the question of whether the US should have relinquished its maximum territorial extent is different than the one facing America in 1865 or the question of expanding American borders today. There, you have to consider the substantial costs of actually conquering territory in war. Holding on to land already conquered is less costly than conquering anew.

[…]

The first thing to notice when considering this question is that America did not actually give up all of its imperial conquests. Hawaii, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, a smattering of pacific islands, Alaska, and arguably even much of the American Southwest are spoils of conquest or purchase.

No one seriously considers giving up any of the pieces of our imperial history that we kept. The Hawaiian independence movement is perhaps the most popular, but that sets a low upper bound. This acceptance of the pieces of empire we retained suggests that if we had kept more of our 1918 peak territory, people would accept those additional pieces just as easily today.

Reluctance to give up what we kept isn’t just status quo bias. The economic performance of the states and territories still within the US compared to the nations we once controlled but are independent today is evidence that American annexation has large positive effects.

[…]

Integration under the same national umbrella seems like about the only way to sustain and spread free trade and immigration. The US can’t even manage it with Canada. The principal domestic supporters of Philippine independence, for example, were American farmers who didn’t want to face competition from tariff-free Filipino sugar, and nativists who didn’t want immigration from “alien races.”

A final general argument is, perhaps surprisingly, political legitimacy. The nations that America was closest to annexing are not only economic underperformers, they also tend to be undemocratic and authoritarian. Recently, Panama and the Dominican Republic are probably exceptions here with relatively successful and stable governance.

Latest driver death rates highlight dangers of muscle cars

Monday, September 1st, 2025

The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety has been calculating driver death rates approximately every three years since 1989, and also calculated the best and worst models according to the number of drivers in other vehicles killed in crashes with them on its last study:

Six of the 21 vehicles with the highest driver death rates for model year 2020 are variants of the Chevrolet Camaro, Dodge Challenger, Dodge Charger and Ford Mustang, while eight others are small cars or minicars. Eighteen of the 23 vehicles with the lowest driver death rates are minivans or SUVs, and 12 are luxury vehicles.

“We typically find that smaller vehicles have high driver death rates because they don’t provide as much protection, especially in crashes with larger, heavier SUVs and pickups,” said IIHS President David Harkey. “The muscle cars on this list highlight that a vehicle’s image and how it is marketed can also contribute to crash risk.”

That might not be how I’d phrase it.

But three Dodge muscle cars with excessively high driver death rates also rank among the worst performers when it comes to other-driver deaths, suggesting these vehicles are driven in an aggressive manner.

Seven of the 20 vehicles with the highest other-driver death rates are large or very large pickups, and four more are midsize SUVs — categories that aren’t represented among the models with the worst track record for protecting their own drivers. Seven of the vehicles with the highest other-driver death rates also rank among the worst for driver death rates: the Dodge Challenger two-wheel-drive, Dodge Charger two-wheel-drive, Dodge Charger HEMI two-wheel-drive, Kia Forte, Kia Optima, Kia Rio sedan and Nissan Altima.

The list of vehicles with the lowest other-driver death rates include two small, two midsize and one large car, as well as six small and 10 midsize SUVs. Ten models are luxury vehicles.

The rates include only driver deaths because all vehicles on the road have drivers, but not all of them have passengers or the same number of passengers. The number of deaths is derived from the federal Fatality Analysis Reporting System. Registration data come from IHS Markit.

The latest rates are based on fatalities that occurred from 2018 to 2021 for vehicles from the 2020 model year, as well as earlier models with the same designs and features. The numbers represent the estimated risks for 2020 models, but the data include models from as far back as 2017 if the vehicles have not been substantially redesigned over the intervening period. Including these older, equivalent vehicles makes the sample size larger and therefore increases the reliability of the results. To be included, a vehicle must have had at least 100,000 registered vehicle years of exposure from 2018 to 2021 or at least 20 deaths.

[…]

The lists of vehicles with the lowest driver and other-driver death rates have nine models in common. These include the Acura MDX four-wheel-drive, Audi Q5 four-wheel-drive, Chevrolet Traverse four-wheel-drive, Lexus RX 350 four-wheel-drive, Mercedes-Benz E-Class sedan four-wheel-drive, Porsche Macan, Subaru Ascent, Toyota C-HR and Volvo XC60 four-wheel-drive. Notably, six of those are luxury vehicles.

“The models that rank among the best and worst performers on both lists point to the unfortunate fact that vehicle cost remains a factor in road safety,” Harkey said.

Vehicle cost — or driver income?

Minicars had the highest driver death rates, averaging 153 deaths per million registered vehicle years. Very large luxury cars had the lowest, averaging only 4 deaths. In contrast, very large pickups had the highest other-driver death rates, averaging 121 deaths, while small sports cars had the fewest other-driver deaths, averaging only 11 per million registered vehicle years.

The average other-driver death rate for all 2020 and equivalent models was 53 deaths per million registered vehicle years. There are more other-driver fatalities than driver fatalities because these newer models are more crashworthy than many of their crash counterparts, which come from the wider U.S. fleet, made up of mostly older vehicles.

Driver Deaths Lowest Rates.jpeg
Driver Deaths Highest Rates.jpeg
(Hat tip to Grasspunk.)

If you’re not in the meetings, you can’t accurately estimate the relative levels of dishonesty and self-delusion involved

Wednesday, August 27th, 2025

Dominic Cummings discusses preference falsification and Britain’s slide to chaos:

Inside the intelligence services, special forces (themselves under attack from the Cabinet Office and NI Office as they operate as our last line of defence, see below), bits of Whitehall, and those most connected to discussions away from Westminster, there is growing, though still tiny, discussion of Britain’s slide into chaos and the potential for serious violence including what would look like racial/ethnic mob/gang violence, though the regime would obviously try to describe it differently. Part of the reason for the incoherent forcefulness against the white rioters last year from a regime that is in deep-surrender-mode against pro-Holocaust marchers, rape gangs and criminals generally, is a mix of a) aesthetic revulsion in SW1 at the Brexit-voting white north and b) incoherent Whitehall terror of widespread white-English mobs turning political and attracting talented political entrepreneurs. They’re already privately quaking about the growth of Muslim networks. The last thing they want to see is emerging networks that see themselves as both political and driven to consider violence. Parts of the system increasingly fear this could spin out of control into their worst nightmare. In No10 meetings with the Met on riots, I saw for myself a) the weird psychological zone of how much order rests not on actual physical forces but perceptions among a few elites about such forces that can very quickly change, and b) how scared the senior police are at the prospect of crucial psychological spells being broken. We can see on the streets that various forces have already realised the regime will not stop them. What if this spreads? Whitehall’s pathology has pushed it to the brink of this psychological barrier and many of them know it.

Aspects of the situation are tragi-comic. E.g if you talk to senior people in places like UAE, they tell you that bigshots in that region now tell each other — don’t send your kids to be educated in Britain, they’ll come back radical Islamist nutjobs! Our regime has spent thirty years a) destroying border control and sane immigration (including the Home Office’s jihad against the highest skilled, whom they truly loathe discussing and try to repel with stupid fees etc) and b) actively prioritising people from the most barbaric places on earth (hence immigration from the tribal areas most responsible for the grooming/rape gangs keeps rising) and c) funding the spread of those barbaric ideas and defending the organisations spreading them with human rights laws designed to stop the return of totalitarianism in Europe. In parallel, they’ve started propaganda operations with the old media to spread the meme that our ‘real danger’ is the ‘far right’ (code for ‘white people’). As Tories and Labour have continued their deranged trajectory, they have provoked exactly the reactions they most feared including the spreading meme that our regime itself has become our enemy and the growing politicisation of white English nationalism.

These deep state discussions about the growing prospect of violence, like the focus group discussions about ‘civil war’, have seeped through to few MPs or hacks. And the evolution of the Cabinet Office in recent years has excluded ministers, spads and the PM from almost any visibility inside the NSS, the National Security Secretariat of the CO, which has acquired power from the rest of the security/intelligence system and runs a failing empire within a failing empire. When I said in 2020 that, among the general changes to the dysfunctional No10/CO system, the oversight of NSS must change so it became visible and legible again to the PM’s office so we could participate in debates like — what are the actual priorities of the intelligence services vis Putin and Xi — some senior officials tried to pretend that zero political scrutiny of NSS was somehow a constitutional principle. After I left, this system became even more closed and dysfunctional, hence the total lack of true strategic thinking connecting ends-ways-means over Ukraine and all things defence procurement becoming more and more Kafka-esque as the MoD shipped stuff to Ukraine. I repeat: the lack of legibility of the NSS is without historical precedent in the UK for centuries and is related to broader issues of Whitehall’s dysfunction, the disgraceful shambles of the MoD etc.

SW1’s OODA loop has operated for years as a massive denial-of-service-attack on its own perceptions of reality — constant cycles of ephemeral emotional hysteria and Narrative Whiplash while No10 has no capability to execute priorities. A great recent example: Professor Ansell saying that the Zelensky Oval Office interview meant that Farage’s prospects had ‘peaked’ (widely Bluesky’d approvingly!) — an emotional spasm entirely in tune with SW1’s NPC network reflecting OODA-as-DOS-attack. This has, as I’ve argued for years, made it more and more vulnerable to history’s remorseless pattern: slow rot, elite blindness, fast crisis, sudden collapse.

The old parties lost their last chance to fix things in a sort-of normal way when the Trolley and his girlfriend told everyone in 2021 they were going ‘back to normal politics’. SW1 cheered including the Tory MPs who got culled en masse in 2024. Sunak doubled down on optimising for *pats on the head from Permanent Secretaries and lawyers*. After Starmer won, SW1’s NPCs tweeted to each other how they now had ‘serious grownups’ and we’d return to ‘normal government’.

But this was just another cycle of delusional SW1 Narrative Whiplash. The Starmer project blew up on contact with the reality of Whitehall. Now both parties are led by Dead Players. Both old parties are structurally knackered. And the NPCs tweeting ‘hurrah for the grownups, Sue Gray is the Jedi we need’ a few months ago are now Bluesky-ing ‘disgusting rhetoric from Starmer’.

Starmer is speed-running Sunak’s demented combination of a) massively raising the salience of immigration/boats with b) a set of policies that everyone who understands the details knows cannot possibly do what he’s promising.

Why is he doing it? Because, like Sunak, he’s caught between a) political advice that the country is enraged over immigration/boats and wants action, b) the adamantine priority of the dominant faction in Whitehall — i.e the force that actually orients 99% of policy — is maintaining 1) the HRA/ECHR-judicial review system and 2) the cross-party HMT/OBR/university-endorsed immigration/asylum Ponzi. Being a Dead Player optimised to ‘defend the institutions’ at all costs however pathological, Starmer has, aping Sunak, synthesised the political advice of McSweeney and the priority of the officials/lawyers actually running No10/70WH and generated his own version of Sunak’s demented combination.

If you’re not in the meetings, you can’t accurately estimate the relative levels of dishonesty and self-delusion involved.

Portugal does not allow consequence-free drug use

Tuesday, August 26th, 2025

Ever since Portugal enacted drug decriminalization in 2001, reformers have argued that North America should follow suit, but when Oregon and British Columbia decriminalized drugs in the early 2020s, the results were so catastrophic that both jurisdictions quickly reversed course:

Contrary to popular belief, Portugal does not allow consequence-free drug use. While the country treats the possession of illicit drugs for personal use as an administrative offense, it nonetheless summons apprehended drug users to “dissuasion” commissions composed of doctors, social workers, and lawyers. These commissions assess a drug user’s health, consumption habits, and socioeconomic circumstances before using arbitrator-like powers to impose appropriate sanctions.

These sanctions depend on the nature of the offense. In less severe cases, users receive warnings, small fines, or compulsory drug education. Severe or repeat offenders, however, can be banned from visiting certain places or people, or even have their property confiscated. Offenders who fail to comply are subject to wage garnishment.

Throughout the process, users are strongly encouraged to seek voluntary drug treatment, with most penalties waived if they accept. In the first few years after decriminalization, Portugal made significant investments into its national addiction and mental-health infrastructure (e.g., methadone clinics) to ensure that it had sufficient capacity to absorb these patients.

This form of decriminalization is far less radical than its North American proponents assume. In effect, Portugal created an alternative justice system that coercively diverts addicts into rehab instead of jail. That users are not criminally charged does not mean they are not held accountable. Further, the country still criminalizes the public consumption and trafficking of illicit drugs.

[…]

In late 2020, Oregon embarked on its own drug decriminalization experiment, known as Measure 110. Though proponents cited Portugal’s success, unlike the European nation, Oregon failed to establish any substantive coercive mechanisms to divert addicts into treatment. The state merely gave drug users a choice between paying a $100 ticket or calling a health hotline. Because the state imposed no penalty for failing to follow through with either option, drug possession effectively became a consequence-free behavior. Police data from 2022, for example, found that 81 percent of ticketed individuals simply ignored their fines.

Additionally, the state failed to invest in treatment capacity and actually defunded existing drug-use-prevention programs to finance Measure 110’s unused support systems, such as the health hotline.

The results were disastrous. Overdose deaths spiked almost 50 percent between 2021 and 2023. Crime and public drug use became so rampant in Portland that state leaders declared a 90-day fentanyl emergency in early 2024. Facing withering public backlash, Oregon ended its decriminalization experiment in the spring of 2024 after almost four years of failure.

The astronomer, like the Shinto priests, must climb his mountain

Thursday, August 21st, 2025

Percival Lowell (1855 – 1916), the founder of the Lowell Observatory, inspired Martian romances like A Princess of Mars in multiple ways:

Lowell, the liberally bankrolled son of a New England manufacturing dynasty, led an eccentric but not unproductive life, devoting himself in his twenties and thirties to the study of Far-Eastern religious practices and in the last half of his life to the study of the planet Mars. More people know of Lowell’s Martian obsession than know of his interest in the shamanic practices of the Koreans and Japanese, but the earlier fascination thoroughly informs the later one. Lowell’s theory of the fourth planet as the home of an immensely ancient and philosophical civilization in turn informs the generic Martian Romance, beginning with Burroughs’ “John Carter” trilogy, whose writer-imitators found their venues in the pulpy purveyances of commercial fiction, the bright covers of which would beckon to hungry souls from the display rack. Lowell wrote up his ethnological forays in a series of books, among them Chosön – the Land of Morning Calm (1886), Noto – an Unexplored Corner of Japan (1891), and Occult Japan – Shinto, Shamanism, and the Way of the Gods (1894). Occult Japan begins with Lowell’s first-hand description of a shamanic ritual at the crater-edge of Ontake, a dormant volcano in Kagoshima prefecture. Two young monks help a third to enter a trance whereupon an ancestral spirit possesses and speaks through the medium. “The veil was thrown aside,” Lowell writes; “we stood face to face with the gods.”[xii] Occult Japan ends with a long chapter, “Noumena,” wherein Lowell goes in quest of “that innermost something that each of us calls ‘I,’” “the essence of the Ego,” or “the Self.”[xiii] Perhaps the gods and the Self are, in fact, one.

The symbolic features of the Shinto landscape recur in Lowell’s books about Mars. Lowell built his observatory in 1894 on what came to be known as Mars Hill in the then non-populous desert-town of Flagstaff, in the Arizona Territory. The astronomer, like the Shinto priests, must climb his mountain. He must, as well, alter his perspective. In The Evolution of Worlds (1910), Lowell writes that, whereas “astronomy is usually thought of as the study of the bodies visible in the sky” and is thought to concern itself only with “the present state of the universe”; the astronomer in fact “attempt[s] to peer into [the universe’s] past and to foresee its future.”[xiv] The astronomer deals, counter-intuitively, less with the visible than with “the contemplation of the invisible” through apperception “by the mind’s eye.”[xv] In Mars and its Canals (1906), having proven by his own lights the inhabited status of that world, Lowell writes that the Martians must qualify as “life of a high order,” in that “where the conditions of life have grown more difficult, mentality must characterize more and more its beings in order for them to survive.”[xvi] A certain rather Puritanical attitude might, Lowell grants, determine that “the very strangeness of Martian life precludes for it an appeal to human interest,” but quite the opposite is the case: “The less the life there proves a counterpart of our earthly state of things, the more it fires fancy and piques inquiry as to what it be.”[xvii] It matters little to Lowell whether the intellectual establishment acknowledges his argument. He quite candidly reveals himself as more the seer and adventurer than the staid man of science. It might be significant that in his youth, before his independence, he spent six years running a cotton-mill for his father. Lowell declares, and in so doing fuses himself with the science-fiction aficionado transfixed by a magazine cover on a high rack, that, in aging, “we but exchange… the romance of fiction for the more thrilling romance of fact,” and “the stranger the realization the better we are pleased.”[xviii]

Consumerism and sports fandom may be enough to keep this country together

Tuesday, August 19th, 2025

In his commencement address at Portland State University in 1998, President Bill Clinton told the crowd, “Within five years, there will be no majority race in our largest state, California“:

“In a little more than 50 years, there will be no majority race in the United States. No other nation in history has gone through demographic change of this magnitude over so short a time.”

[…]

The white majority crowd cheered at this statement, apparently thrilled at the prospect of living in a country that was no longer theirs. The clip shocked conservative X users. It seemed so brazen for the president and his audience to celebrate the Great Replacement. Nearly 30 years later, America is bearing out the truth in Clinton’s observations. It’s most likely that America will be minority white sooner than 2050, and whites are already a minority in several states.

[…]

While immigration has certainly changed much, it hasn’t quite “Balkanized” the country. One reason is that immigrants are now everywhere. One can encounter Hispanics and Indians in rural Arkansas. They’re too dispersed to form something along the lines of a Spanish or Hindi Quebec. They’re also too inclined to assimilate to America’s modern consumer identity.

[…]

“Demographics is destiny” became a powerful catchphrase to warn conservatives of what the future will look like without a white majority. Both liberals and the “far right” believed that demographic change would lead to a permanent Democratic majority. It was expected that non-whites would band together as a rainbow coalition against whiteness. That hasn’t panned out. Trump did extraordinarily well among minorities in the last election — while running on one of the most-race charged platforms in recent memory.

[…]

White nationalists were once confident that a diverse America would make whites embrace racial consciousness. That event has yet to happen. Just 15 percent of whites say their racial identity is important to them, which stands in stark contrast to the majority of every other group who say that identity is important to them. Nearly 95 percent of Americans approve of interracial marriage.

[…]

As [Pat Buchanan] acknowledged in a conversation with Ralph Nader 14 years ago, consumerism and sports fandom may be enough to keep this country together even with dramatic demographic change and a declining quality of life.

We really don’t know what it would be like to live in a red city in a red state

Monday, August 18th, 2025

When his best friend in Austin quips, “It’s great living in a blue city in a red state,” Bryan Caplan is tempted to reply, “ We really don’t know what it would be like to live in a red city in a red state — or even a red city in a blue state.”

Why? Because they barely exist. Zero cities with over one million people currently have Republican mayors.

From the standpoint of the textbook Median Voter Model, this is awfully puzzling. Even if urbanites are extremely left-wing, you would expect urban Republicans to move sharply left to accommodate them. Once they do so, the standard prediction is that Republicans will win half the time. But plainly they don’t.

One possibility is that Republican politicians are too stubbornly ideological to moderate. But the idea that virtually no one in the Republican Party is power-hungry enough to tell urban voters what they want to hear is deeply implausible.

The better explanation, as I’ve explained before, is that urban voters have party preferences as well as policy preferences. They don’t just want left-wing policies; they want left-wing policies delivered by the Democrats.

They would become the middle class

Sunday, August 17th, 2025

In Western Europe, Peter Frost notes, a consensus emerged on the need to execute violent males so that law-abiding people could live in peace:

By the Late Middle Ages, courts were condemning to death between 0.5 and 1% of all men in each generation, with perhaps just as many dying at the scene of the crime or in prison while awaiting trial. The pool of violent men dried up until most murders occurred under conditions of jealousy, intoxication or extreme stress. As a result, the homicide rate fell from 20–40 homicides per 100,000 in the Late Middle Ages to 0.5–1 per 100,000 in the mid-20th century.

People could now get ahead through trade and work, rather than through theft and plunder. This new, pacified environment favored the growth of the market economy and the success of those who possessed the necessary skills, especially literacy, numeracy and budgeting. They would become the middle class.

A committee of three was ideal

Saturday, August 16th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesSecretary of War Henry Stimson told General Groves that the Manhattan Engineer District should be overseen by a committee of nine or possibly seven men, as Groves explains in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project:

I objected quite vigorously on the grounds that such a large committee would be unwieldy; it would cause delays in taking action; and some, if not the majority, of its members would tend to treat it as a secondary responsibility, to the detriment of our progress. I felt that a committee of three was ideal and that any more members would be a hindrance rather than a benefit. I pointed out that I could keep three people reasonably well informed on our major problems, and, furthermore, that I would be able to obtain advice from them much more readily than I could from a larger group. In the end, my views were accepted.

[…]

There followed some general conversation, in the midst of which, and with no small amount of embarrassment on my part, for I was by far the most junior person present, I asked to be excused if I were no longer needed, for I wanted to catch the train to Tennessee and inspect the proposed production plant site, so that the land acquisition could proceed. With this, the meeting broke up. I was a bit relieved when Somervell told me several days later that my request could not have been better timed, because it convinced everyone that he had not overemphasized my urgent desire to get a job moving.

The North Sea and the Baltic form the core zone of certain tendencies

Thursday, August 14th, 2025

DNA from human remains is showing us how different populations have evolved over time, Peter Frost explains, not only during prehistory but also well into recorded history:

This evolution has affected a wide range of mental and behavioral traits: cognitive ability, time preference, propensity for violence, monotony avoidance, rule following and empathy, among others.

[…]

Why did the North Sea overtake the Mediterranean in international trade? Certainly, the latter region was adversely affected by the Arab conquests of the Middle East and North Africa. But the economic decline began much earlier. Shipwrecks on the bottom of the Mediterranean have been dated overwhelmingly to the time between the first century BC and the first century AD. Silver mining in Spain and Cyprus likewise fell sharply after the first century AD, as shown by lead contamination of Greenland’s ice sheet.

This decline occurred not only before the Arab conquests of the seventh and eighth centuries, but also before the barbarian invasions of the fourth and fifth and the Imperial Crisis of the third. And it seems inconsistent with modern economic thinking: bigger markets should create economies of scale, as well as a better match between supply and demand. So what caused things to go wrong?

[…]

One cause was the low level of social trust. People trusted only their close friends and relatives, keeping everyone else at arm’s length. As a result, economic activity was bottled up within family networks, the major exception being physical marketplaces where buyer and seller could meet face to face. Because the market principle remained trapped within small pockets of space and time, it could not generalize to all transactions in Roman society. An economy of markets never evolved into a true market economy.

[…]

One [other cause] was a deterioration of physical health, as indicated by the length of long bones belonging to over 10,000 adult men and women born between 500 BC and 750 AD. The data show a steady decrease from the second century BC, reaching a low point in the second half of the first century AD, followed by a slow recovery and then a dramatic recovery from the fifth century AD.

[…]

The study’s authors concluded that the Romans created not only an integrated Mediterranean economy but also “the first integrated disease regime”.

[…]

The other cause was a decrease in average cognitive ability. Fewer people could master the skills of numeracy, literacy and budgeting that are so essential to economic activity.

This decline was driven by an uncoupling of reproductive success from economic success—as I argued in a previous article. The wealthy were no longer using their wealth to bring children into the world. A rich man might prefer to leave his wife for a younger woman of low social status, often adopting her children. Or he might never marry. The resulting fall in cognitive ability can be seen in DNA retrieved from the human remains of that period.

[…]

The North Sea and the Baltic form the core zone of certain tendencies that, for at least a millennium, have prevailed north and west of a line running from Trieste to St. Petersburg, i.e., the “Hajnal line.” These are tendencies toward individualism, the nuclear family, late marriage and solitary living, as well as a greater willingness to trust strangers and form bonds of impersonal prosociality.

Such tendencies didn’t come into being with the market economy — they arose long before for an unrelated reason. But they did provide the best behavioral conditions for a market economy once the possibility of creating one emerged.

Skilled immigrants often constitute an espionage risk

Wednesday, August 13th, 2025

Given the reality of mixed loyalties, Arctotherium notes, it shouldn’t be surprising that skilled immigrants often constitute an espionage risk:

Take the infamous Pakistani nuclear physicist AQ Khan. In 1961, he moved to West Berlin as a foreign student, then to the Netherlands and finally Belgium to finish his education, graduating with a Doctorate in Engineering in 1972. Khan was undoubtedly among the best and brightest of Pakistan, the sort of high-agency STEM genius that brain drain advocates hold up as America’s greatest strength. Was allowing A.Q. Khan into the West a good decision? No.

Khan got a position at the Physics Dynamics Research Laboratory, a Dutch firm specializing in uranium enrichment via centrifuge. He stole centrifuge designs and blueprints, and after returning to Pakistan set up an international network of illicit suppliers for centrifuge parts using his contacts, leading to the 1998 Pakistani nuclear bomb. From there, he diffused nuclear technology further. The North Korean, Iranian and Libyan nuclear programs all trace back to A.Q. Khan. Pakistan has had multiple serious nuclear war scares with India in the last five years. North Korea, which has a history of doing things like axe-murder Americans, can act with relative impunity thanks to its nuclear arsenal, and Israel and the US recently bombed Iran over their nuclear program.

There are many examples from the US. For instance, Noshir Gowadia, an Indian Parsi designer of the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, and Chi Mak, who worked on nuclear submarines, both sold secrets to China.

Immigration fractures national markets

Tuesday, August 12th, 2025

If you want to join Britain’s thriving cocaine smuggling industry, Arctotherium notes, you have to be Albanian:

There’s no a priori reason why this should be the case. Albanians do not have a racial, cultural, geographic or political affinity for Colombian narcotics. A reasonable and informed observer in 2000 would not have predicted that they would come to dominate the industry. Yet such an obsever would have predicted that some ethnic minority would because organized crime is almost always organized along ethnic lines. This is true even when the ethnic minority is less criminal on average than society at large, as with the Jewish mafia in early 20th century America.

This phenomenon isn’t unique to criminal enterprises. Chaldeans control 90% of the grocery stores in Detroit. 40% of the truck drivers in California are Sikh, and about a third of US Sikhs are truck drivers. About 95% of the Dunkin’ Donuts stores in Chicago and the Midwest are owned by Indians, mostly Gujarati Patels. In New England and New York, 60% of Dunkin’ Donuts stores are operated by Portuguese immigrants. 90% of the liquor stores in Baltimore are owned by Koreans.

[…]

The key point is that immigration fractures national markets. Once a niche is taken over, outsiders can no longer compete in that niche.

There is still competition within ethnic groups inside the niches, but these groups are tiny fractions of the population and often have informal institutions and kinship structures that allow them to act as cartels.

[…]

Cambodians run about 80% of the donut shops in Southern California (despite being only 0.17% of the state’s population). The Cambodian donut empire got its start with refugee Ted Ngoy, who first learned the trade thanks to an affirmative action program to increase minority hiring at Winchell’s Donuts. The Cambodians were able to completely dominate this traditional American culinary sector through a mix of extended family credit and the use of tong tines, an informal lending club.

[…]

This ability to borrow money cheaply made financing much easier for them than for their American competitors. Once the business was purchased, Cambodians could also keep operating costs down through informal employment of family labor, allowing them to get around expensive income taxes, not to mention labor laws and regulations — including ones around child labor.

[…]

Gujaratis, mostly with the surname Patel, run an estimated 42% of the hotels and motels in the United States — despite being only 0.3% of the US population (and an even lower percentage back in 1999 when this was first noticed). Their dominance rises to 80–90% of motels in small town America. The Patel motel cartel got its start with an illegal immigrant, Kanjibhai Desai, in the 1940s. The initial attraction for Patels was that motel ownership did not require English proficiency, and as with the Cambodians, Patel motel owners were able to use informal ethnic loan networks and immigrant family labor brought in via family reunification to undercut their American competitors. Patels now totally dominate the hospitality industry in the US outside of the big chains.

Over half the nail salons in the US are run by Vietnamese, which rises to more than 80% in California (they are only 0.7% of the US population). Just like the Patels and the Cambodians, Vietnamese immigrants were able to finance nail salons more easily than American competitors because they had access to below-market credit from family and friends.

[…]

After the ethnic network was established, Vietnamese owners gained another advantage over non-Vietnamese competitors: better access to workers and training. The language barrier is part of this; once most salon owners spoke primarily Vietnamese, prospective workers had to as well, and cosmetology schools began teaching courses in Vietnamese rather than English.