A critical problem is one that people are willing to pay a considerable price to have solved

Wednesday, December 10th, 2025

Politics is nothing but an ocean of hyperbole, Bryan Caplan reminds us, as he cites this passage from Edward Banfield‘s 1974 classic, The Unheavenly City Revisited:

A great part of the wealth of our country is in the cities. When a mayor says that his city is on the verge of bankruptcy, he means that when the time comes to run for reelection he wants to be able to claim credit for straightening out a mess that was left to him by his predecessor. What he means when he says that his city must have state or federal aid to finance some improvements is (1) the taxpayers of the city (or some important group of them) would rather go without the improvements than pay for it themselves); or (2) although they would pay for it themselves if they had to, they would much prefer to have some other taxpayers pay for it. Rarely if ever does a mayor who makes such a statement mean (1) that for the city to pay for the improvement would necessarily force some taxpayers into poverty; or (2) that the city could not raise the money even if it were willing to force some of its taxpayers into poverty. In short, the “revenue crisis” mainly reflects the fact that people hate to pay taxes and that they think that by crying poverty they can shift some of the bill to someone else.

[…]

That we have not yet been willing to pay the price of solving, or alleviating such “problems” even when the price is a very small one suggests that they are not really critical. Indeed, one might say that, by definition, a critical problem is one that people are willing to pay a considerable price to have solved.

We just want every child to reach their full potential

Monday, December 8th, 2025

Freddie deBoer is exasperated with anti-hereditarians who talk as though Blank-Slatism is some reviled niche perspective, when in fact the blank slate represents the bipartisan and cross-ideological assumption that has dominated debate in education policy since before he was born:

Perhaps the reason I am so regularly exasperated with people like Hoel or Eric Turkheimer or any number of others in this conversation is because I have been marinated in the ed policy world for a long, long time, and in that world there is no debate at all: every child is capable of any academic outcome. There is no limit to what education can do. Go to your average charter school conference and the idea that individual students have any inherent or intrinsic academic tendency isn’t just unpopular, it will get you shouted out of the room. Try being a public school teacher of a 25th percentile student, telling his parents that it’s not realistic to hope to turn him into a 90th percentile student, and see how that goes for you professionally. Even if you can get people to concede that our goal shouldn’t be equality of educational outcomes, or even that students perhaps don’t all have perfectly equal potentials, such concessions will remain in the realm of the vague and the general.

(When I ask people if they think we should try to establish summative educational equality of outcomes, they say of course not, that’s a straw man, we just want every child to reach their full potential. When I ask if they think it would be alright if, say, 15% of students were a full standard deviation or more below the mean, they say that’s outrageous, we should never condone that level of failure! And it’s like, guys….)

The two most important American educational bills in the 21st century have been No Child Left Behind (bipartisan, signed by a Republican president) and the Every Student Succeeds Act (bipartisan, signed by a Democratic president). Those names are not coincidental or empty; they express exactly what the politicians who drafted them believed was possible. They reflect a cross-ideological and remarkably durable assumption in our education politics that all students can be pushed through the college-to-affluence pipeline. I wish people on the genetics research side of this debate would stop talking as though there’s some rigid hereditarian consensus when, in the ed policy world, there is in fact the exact opposite.

A cruise ship the size of a country

Saturday, December 6th, 2025

On his way to India last year, Bryan Caplan connected through Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and toured its sister-city, Dubai, too. He shares his reflections on the United Arab Emirates:

In cleanliness and crime, UAE rivals Japan.

[…]

The key ingredient of Emirati success: 88% of UAE’s population is foreign-born. That’s the highest share of any country on Earth.

[…]

I chatted with workers from both Zimbabwe and Sierra Leone. Yes, would-be migrant workers face a government approval process, so the border is not 100% open. But if you want to work hard to make a better life for yourself, your prospects of landing a work visa are decent no matter how humble your credentials.

Abu Dhabi and Dubai are living proof that Michael Clemens’ “Trillion Dollar Bills on the Sidewalk” is literal truth. Both cities look like Coruscant from Star Wars. They are absolute marvels: Gleaming cities of the future where humanity gathers to produce massive wealth. And without mass immigration, almost none of this could have been built!

[…]

In a country where everyone is rich, rich people would have to hire other rich people to clean their homes, cook their food, and watch their kids. In a nativist UAE, the only way to get good value for your money would be to leave the country!

[…]

A typical demagogue would have objected, “We don’t want to become a minority in our own homeland,” but Zayed boldly forged ahead — and created a cruise ship the size of a country. Since 1971, UAE’s population has grown from 280K people to 9.5 million. A miraculous multiple of 34x.

[…]

Most observers glowingly describe UAE’s overflowing welfare state. In a sense, they’re right.

[…]

In a more important sense, however, the UAE’s welfare state is admirably austere, because these lavish benefits are limited to Emirati citizens — and these citizens are a tiny minority of the population. If 88% of the residents of Sweden were ineligible for redistribution, no one would call it “a generous welfare state” — no matter how high the benefits for the remaining 12% happened to be.

[…]

Instead, the UAE has decisively Westernized two initially un-Western populations: native Arab Muslims and Third World migrants. How? By creating an economy dominated by Westernized multinationals. Though the Western population is low, their “soft power” has slowly but surely taken over the soul of the UAE. Verily, Western culture is a hardy weed.

[…]

“What about businesses withholding their workers’ passports?” That’s now illegal, and locals tell me the new law is well-enforced. But either way, it’s a rounding error. Foreign workers have phones, so what do you think they tell their friends and family back home? “Don’t come; they’ll confiscate your passport”? Or, “Definitely come; in five years you’ll return a rich man”?

Ponder this: If a foreigner causes problems in the UAE, the standard punishment is deportation. So how dire could the problem of withholding passports have ever been? The main function of the new UAE law is not to protect foreign workers from employers but to protect the UAE’s reputation from international muckrackers.

It’s living proof that “trillion dollar bills on the sidewalk” is not silly blackboard economics

Thursday, December 4th, 2025

Bryan Caplan argues that the so-called “cultural costs” of immigration would have to be astronomical to outweigh the tens of trillions of dollars of gains we’re forfeiting every year from restricting it:

And they’re clearly not. If natives really cared so much about their cultures, they would be migrating en masse to low-immigration areas of their countries. They aren’t.

[…]

Since they almost never do, we should infer that their cultural attachment is weak.

This first comment, from Torches Together, offers a British perspective:

The first point seems incredibly poorly thought through.

People very clearly do move away from high-immigration neighbourhoods! This is well documented in the UK and France at the population level.

White Britons tend to move to majority-white (95%+) areas in their 30s when having kids.

We also see macro-level shifts in the classic “white flight” cases: Bradford, Saint-Denis, Southall, Blackburn, Tower Hamlets. Entire neighbourhoods that were 99% White in the 1950s are now over 90% minority.

And the answer to the question “Why don’t people move across the country?” is already in the preceding paragraph. “Somewheres” are defined by attachment to place, not race or nation or ethnicity. If you’re from south London and you’re uneasy about the pace or nature of demographic change, your options typically look like:

1) Stay put – keep your attachment to place, with less attachment to the area’s shifting ethnic profile. Quite common.; 2) Move nearby to somewhere whiter but still kinda “your area” (Essex is the classic example) – also common. 3) Move across the country to somewhere 99+% white – this is less common because you have no attachments there!

Living near productive people is attractive to other productive people and to parasites.

Bryan offers the straightforward economic solution no one seems to consider:

If the problem is negative externalities, then the usual Pigovian logic applies: Governments should measure these negative externalities — remembering to subtract any positive externalities — then impose an immigration tax of equal magnitude. Anyone who pays the tax gets in.

A tax on work visas would resolve many issues — as would stricter enforcement of ordinary laws:

I keep “gushing” [about the United Arab Emirates] because it’s living proof that “trillion dollar bills on the sidewalk” is not silly blackboard economics. Emirates is a cruise ship the size of a country, where the world’s poorest and richest come together for the betterment of both. The West is demonstrably missing a golden opportunity to enrich their citizens and humanity by tens of trillions of dollars.

The US lacks the will to enforce the rules that would make mass immigration feasible.

And the handsome sleeping lieutenants were massacred

Tuesday, December 2nd, 2025

Wind, Sand And Stars by Antoine de Saint-ExupéryDavid Foster sees a murderous parallel between the recent D.C. shooter and this passage from St-Exupery’s Wind, Sand, and Stars:

I had known el Mammun when he was our vassal. Loaded with official honors for services rendered, enriched by the French Government and respected by the tribes, he seemed to lack for nothing that belonged to the state of an Arab prince. And yet one night, without a sign of warning, he had massacred all the French officers in his train, had seized camels and rifles, and had fled to rejoin the refractory tribes in the interior.

Treason is the name given to these sudden uprisings, these flights at once heroic and despairing of a chieftain henceforth proscribed in the desert, this brief glory that will go out like a rocket against the low wall of European carbines. This sudden madness is properly a subject for amazement. And yet the story of el Mammun was that of many other Arab chiefs. He grew old. Growing old, one begins to ponder. Pondering thus, el Mammun discovered one night that he had betrayed the God of Islam and had sullied his hand by sealing in the hand of the Christians a pact in which he had been stripped of everything.

Indeed what were barley and peace to him? A warrior disgraced and become a shepherd, he remembered a time when he had inhabited a Sahara where each fold in the sands was rich with hidden mysteries; where forward in the night the tip of the encampment was studded with sentries; where the news that spread concerning the movements of the enemy made all hearts beat faster round the night fires. He remembered a taste of the high seas which, once savored by man, is never forgotten. And because of his pact he was condemned to wander without glory through a region pacified and voided of all prestige. Then, truly and for the first time, the Sahara became a desert.

It is possible that he was fond of the officers he murdered. But love of Allah takes precedence.

“Good night, el Mammun.”

“God guard thee!”

The officers rolled themselves up in their blankets and stretched out upon the sand as on a raft, face to the stars. High overhead all the heavens were wheeling slowly, a whole sky marking the hour. There was the moon, bending towards the sands, and the Frenchmen, lured by her tranquility into oblivion, fell asleep. A few minutes more, and only the stars gleamed. And then, in order that the corrupted tribes be regenerated into their past splendor, in order that there begin again those flights without which the sands would have no radiance, it was enough that these Christians drowned in their slumber send forth a feeble wail. Still a few seconds more, and from the irreparable will come forth an empire.

And the handsome sleeping lieutenants were massacred.

The Navy kept chasing a 100% solution to the point where they ended up with 0% of the ship being delivered

Sunday, November 30th, 2025

After eight years of development, billions of dollars invested, and five years since a production contract was awarded, the U.S. Navy is cancelling its Constellation-class frigate program:

By the time the final axe came down on the LCS program in 2023, the Navy had already awarded a production contract to Wisconsin-based Fincantieri Marinette Marine to build an entirely new type of advanced frigate: the Constellation class. In order to expedite production and keep costs down, the Navy opted to base this new frigate on an existing design: the Italian-French FREMM multi-mission frigate that was already being built in two variants, one for Italy and one for France. The plan was to retain roughly 85% of the original FREMM design, while changing roughly 15% to better suit the U.S. Navy’s needs and regulations.

[…]

However, it wasn’t long before the Navy decided to depart from the FREMM design to better accommodate all of the necessary hardware. Italy and France’s FREMM frigates measure between 434 and nearly 466 feet long, but America’s new Constellation would add another 30 feet to the largest FREMM iterations, reaching 496 feet. This also came with a substantial increase in weigh from around 6,000 tons to 7,291.

Yet, making the ship bigger and heavier quickly became a problem, especially as the frigate’s requirements continued to change too. For instance, in 2022, the Navy decided to cancel plans to install a new anti-submarine warfare module into its troubled LCS ships and instead, shoehorn it into the new Constellation-class as well, citing its ability to integrate with the ship’s existing SQQ-89 ASW combat system.

In 2020, when the production contract was awarded, the Navy projected the first new Constellation-class frigates would be delivered in 2026. But by 2022, with construction underway on the first new ship, the design was still not finalized. With design elements of the ship’s structure, piping, ventilation, and other systems still incomplete, production was forced to stall, driving up costs. By the following year, the weight growth issue was becoming too big to ignore, with the ship’s displacement growing by 10% and already exceeding its maximum weight margin, calling into question whether the ship could even carry any future upgrades. The Navy even considered reducing its requirements for the ship’s speed as a result, which also called into question its ability to keep pace with fast-moving carrier strike groups.

By 2024, the first ship of the class was 36 months behind schedule, with the second already considered two years behind before its keel was even laid. The plan, as I mentioned before, was to retain roughly 85% of the FREMM frigate design to expedite production, but by that point, the Constellation design retained only about 15% of its parent design. This caused a cascade of other issues, like the need to write new code for a reported 95% of the ship’s control system software due to deviations from the FREMM design it came from, and the incorporation of new equipment and systems.

The Constellation-class frigate seemed to suffer from a classic case of scope-creep, a term used to describe a program that keeps seeing new requirements tacked onto it as it develops, resulting in cost overruns and delays. As one lawmaker put it, the Navy kept chasing a 100% solution to the point where they ended up with 0% of the ship being delivered.

He had finished Yale in 1950 and wanted to be a writer

Friday, November 28th, 2025

As Peter Matthiessen tells it, he had finished Yale in 1950 and wanted to be a writer — but how do you just become a writer?

His English professor Norman Holmes Pearson tapped him on the shoulder and asked if he wanted to do something for his country. This was happening quite a lot at Yale at the time. One of Matthiessen’s contemporaries estimated that two dozen of their classmates were recruited for the CIA through various professors. The agency called them the “P source,” for “professor.” Matthiessen wrote that Pearson opened him “like an oyster.” Not because he was ideologically driven — his politics at that point were unformed and chaotic — but because he wanted a stipend and an excuse to go to Paris, which was a city that he and his first wife, Patsy Southgate, really loved. The CIA then was reputationally much more benign, at least domestically. It hadn’t yet become known by most Americans for its involvement in coups and things like that.

[…]

He was at the Hotchkiss School during the war, in high school, and he would watch a lot of the young men slightly older than him go off to fight. He saw it as a rite of passage, a badge of honor. By the time it was his turn, when he was doing basic training in Sampson, New York, V-J Day happened. So he missed out. His letters to his girlfriends at the time are really conflicted. He was happy the war was over, but he also felt that he’d been denied something. Eventually, toward the end of 1945, he got sent off anyway, to Hawaii. His job was to do the laundry of the real soldiers who were being demobilized and sent home. He felt incredibly emasculated by this.

[…]

He would take the metro to meet his CIA handler in the Jeu de Paume, and they would stroll from the museum to the gardens near the Louvre and discuss his assignments. What he was actually working on for the CIA is still opaque. Matthiessen described it later as “deceiving people” and “serial lying.” Until the CIA releases its files, it’s always going to be a bit shadowy. I assume he was spying on other expat Americans, his friends. That’s probably why he was always cagey about it—the shame he felt about doing that.

[…]

The problem with Matthiessen’s cover soon became clear — the labor of a writer is pretty invisible to the outside world. It looks like we’re just sitting inside and not doing anything at all. Matthiessen’s handler told him he needed a visible profession.

[…]

The question of whether the CIA ever directly funded The Paris Review is an incredibly complicated one. The editors were all raising money to run the magazine, canvassing all their parents’ friends. Julius Fleischmann, of the instant-yeast family, was one of Matthiessen’s father’s friends. He and Matty Matthiessen would drink highballs on boats down in the Caribbean together. Fleischmann was a well-known philanthropist and arts patron, but it came out later that he was also a frontman for the CIA. So it’s hard to say, when he gave money to the Review, if it was his own money or if he was funneling it to the magazine through the Farfield Foundation, which the agency used to fund pro-Western propaganda.

[…]

Matthiessen felt he had to atone for all the advantages he’d enjoyed coming from this powerful family. Around 1968, he got involved with social justice movements, with Cesar Chavez and then later with the American Indian Movement. He wrote a two-part New Yorker profile of Chavez, which he then expanded into a book. And then In the Spirit of Crazy Horse, his chronicle of the shoot-out at Pine Ridge in 1975, where two FBI agents and a Native man died, was the most controversial thing he ever wrote. He was subjected to a lawsuit from the governor of South Dakota and another from an active FBI agent. His third wife, Maria, said to me at one point that he felt like he had to make up for not only his own privilege, but to atone for all the dreadful things America had done.

Welcome to Fear City: A Survival Guide for Visitors to the City of New York

Wednesday, November 26th, 2025

Welcome to Fear CityIn June, 1975, New York City’s police and corrections officers handed out pamphlets titled Welcome to Fear City: A Survival Guide for Visitors to the City of New York:

The Incidence of crime and violence in New York City is shockingly high, and is getting worse everyday. During the four month period ended Apr. 30, 1975, robberies were up 21%; aggravated assault was up 15%; larceny was up 22%; and burglary was up 19%.

Now, to “solve” his budget problems, Mayor Beame is going to discharge substantial numbers of firefighters and law enforcement officers of all kinds. By the time you read this, the number of public safety personnel available to protect residents and visitors may already have been still further reduced. Under those circumstances, the best advice we can give you is this: Until things change, stay away from New York City if you possibly can.

Nevertheless, some New Yorkers do manage to survive and even to keep their property intact. The following guidelines have been prepared by a council of firefighters and law officers to hetpyou enjoy your visit to the City ofNew York in comfort and safety.

Good luck

1 . Stay off the streets after 6 P.M. Even in midtown Manhattan, muggings and occasional murders are on the increase during the early evening hours. Do not be misled by the late sunsets during the summer season. If you walk in midtown at about 7;30 P.M., you will observe that the streets are nearly deserted.

2, Do not walk. If you must leave your hotel after 6 P.M., try not to go out alone. Summon a radio taxi by telephone, or ask the hotel doorman to call a taxi while you remain in the hotel lobby. Follow the same procedure when leaving the restaurant, theatre, or other location of your evening activity.

3. Avoid public transportation. Subway crime is so high that the City recently had to close, off the rear half of each train in the evening so that the passengers could huddle together and be better protected. It has been proved that increasing the number of Transit police officers will cause a reduction in subway crime, but the announced decreases in Transit patrol will have the opposite effect. Accordingly, you should never ride the subway for any reason whatsoever. In midtown Manhattan, you may, at only slight risk, ride the buses during daylight hours only,

4. Remain in Manhattan. Police and fire protection in other areas of the city is grossly inadequate and will become more inadequate. In the South Bronx, which is known to police officers as “Fort Apache,” arson has become an uncontrollable problem, if you remain in midtown areas and restrict your travel to daylight hours, emergency service personnel are best ableto provide adequate supervision and protection.

5. Protect your property. Theft has become so great a problem that the City, is urging everyone to engrave identifying numbers on all property, and the Police Department has purchased special engraving pens which are made available to the public. If you walk on Madison Avenue or in other major midtown locations during business hours, you will observe that many merchants keep their doors locked and will admitcustomers only after careful inspection. After hours, they protect their premises with special heavy safety gates. Accordingly, you should observe the following precautions.

6. Safeguard your handbag, if you carry a handbag or similar personal luggage, try to hold It firmly with both hands whenever you are in public. Never let it out of your hands; above all, never let It out of your sight Places that seem most secure, such as restaurants or cocktail lounges, are often the most dangerous. Even a moment’s inattention can result in a serious loss.

/. Conceal property in automobiles. If a package is visible on the seat or floor of your automobile, even though the vehicle is locked, there is an excellent chance that your property will be gone when you retprn, Accordingly, all property should be locked In the trunk or the glove compartment. Do not park your car and then transfer property into the trunk; you will probably be observed. All property should be secured before you arrive at your parking place. Remember also to keep all doors locked and all windows closed when you are In the vehicle. Remember too that auto thefts have Increased this year.

8. Do not leave valuables in your hotel room, and do not deposit them in the hotel vault. Hotel robberies have become virtually uncontrollable, and there have been some spectacular recent cases in which thieves have broken into hotel vaults. At present, bank vaults appear to be the only depositories that offer an acceptable degree of security for personal property.

9. Be aware of fire hazards. The Fire Department is severely undermanned at present and further reductions are in prospect. Accordingly,
you may have to evacuate quarters without assistance if fire should occur from either natural or malicious causes. Try to avoid buildings that are not completely fireproof and familiarize yourself with exits and escape routes wherever you are. In hotels, try to obtain a room that is close by the fire stairs.

These guidelines have been prepared and distributed as a public service by the Council for Public Safety, Room 576, 299 Broadway, New York. NY 10007.

Mamdani’s win was largely propelled by the young credentialed precariat

Saturday, November 8th, 2025

End Times by Peter TurchinThe Mamdani Moment, Peter Turchin argues, perfectly illustrates the “credentialed precariat”:

Ten years ago the political landscape in the US was dominated by two parties: one of the “1 percent” (wealth holders) and one of the “10 percent” (credential-holders). Both parties focused on advancing the interests of the ruling class, while ignoring those of the 90 percent. I am, of course, simplifying a lot here; for a more detailed and nuanced explanation see End Times.

In 2016 Donald Trump channeled growing popular immiseration to begin reformatting the Republicans into a right-wing populist — “MAGA” — party. This process is quite incomplete.

Meanwhile, the Democrats had effectively controlled the left-wing populists in their party, by a combination of suppression (think Bernie Sanders) and cooptation (think AOC). As a result, by 2024 the Democratic Party evolved into the sole party of the ruling elites.

[…]

Many pundits commented on the observation that Mamdani enjoyed support among younger voters. Indeed, 78% of the youngest cohort (18-29 years old) voted for him and only 18 for Cuomo, for the Mamdani advantage of 60 points.

[…]

Let’s first look at credential-holders. Astonishingly, the proportion of people, voting in this election, who had at least “some college” experience is 80%. 31% have earned a Bachelor’s and fully 27% hold an advanced degree, with both groups giving Mamdani an advantage of 19 points (57% for Mamdani, 38% for Cuomo).

To tell the truth, I first didn’t believe these numbers. Such concentration of credentialed individuals is amazing. But according to the NYC government survey in 2023, two years ago the proportion of New Yorkers with a bachelor’s degree or higher was 43%, increasing from 33% in 2010. Of the White adults (25 or older) two-thirds completed college. Talk about degree overproduction…

Next, income. Here the relationship is nonlinear. The poorest (earning less than $30,000 per year) and the richest ($300,000 or more) gave more votes to Cuomo, while those in between preferred Mamdani. Thus, the richest 8%, earning $300k or more, preferred Cuomo by 29 points. The problem for Cuomo was that those in the middle category comprised 77% of voters. The biggest degree of preference for Mamdani compared to Cuomo — 20 points — was among those earning $50-99k. This was also the largest group (27% of voters). The next group, $100-199k, were close behind: 18 points for Mamdani.

It may seem strange to call those earning 50-100k “precariat,” but one must take into account that NYC is a very expensive city. The median rent for two-bedroom apartments in New York City increased 15.8% over the past year and is now $5,500 per month (see Zohran’s Park Slope Populists by John Carney), or $66,000 per year. In other words, you will spend two-thirds of your $100,000 income just to keep a roof over your head.

[…]

Still, these numbers provide strong support for the idea that Mamdani’s win was largely propelled by the young credentialed precariat: the youth with college degree, or higher, earning just enough to live on the edge.

The whole state college system is genius at making men politically inert

Wednesday, October 29th, 2025

Devin Helton argues that the whole state college system really is genius at making both young 115-IQ, high-T men and wealthy older men politically inert:

I can’t even determine if it is totally degenerate or a great social technology invention for society stability, just currently used by a bad regime.

You break up their hometown networks, send them to state colleges that are in their own little bubbles in the boonies, spoil them relatively cheaply with booze and college football and young coeds.

Then the social networks get broken up again once they are thrown into the job market at age 23 in random cities, away from friends, left scrambling to build a life.

And then the networks get broken up a third time when they have to move from the expensive down-towns where the career-starting jobs are, to the suburbs to raise a family.

And so at 40 their kids start school with fellow stranger parents and the curriculum has been changed from learning about Columbus and Pilgrims to gender-scrambling and race communism but there is no ability for the parents to coordinate and do anything about it.

And, then you reward the super-elites with fellowships and professorships and presidencies at the college, so they get access to the hot young co-eds too. What a brilliant system.

What’s breaking stability now is that the neocon right got stale, but the left is so high on their own supply that they refuse to play ball with the new right/MAGA and offer them even a small share of the university plum jobs and peaches.

The Antichrist is a Luddite

Saturday, October 25th, 2025

Peter Thiel recently delivered a series of four lectures on behalf of ACTS 17 Collective — a nonprofit dedicated to Acknowledging Christ in Technology and Society (ACTS) — about the Antichrist:

Thiel kicks off the lecture series by identifying himself as two things in his private life: “A small-o orthodox Christian” and a “humble classical liberal.” Thiel claims his fears about the Antichrist are his only “deviation from classical liberal orthodoxy,” and his analogy between the Antichrist and one-worldism, one of the central motifs of his lectures, is unmistakably libertarian.

While the rapid rise in AI and other advanced technologies has led many to believe that the Antichrist will use technology to accomplish his goals — the New York Times opinion columnist Ross Douthat has even suggested to Thiel that the surveillance technology provided by Palantir could be a tool for the Antichrist — Thiel says in his first lecture that, “in the 21st century, the Antichrist is a Luddite who wants to stop all science.” In his second lecture, Thiel goes on to identify “the legionnaires of the Antichrist [as people] like Eliezer Yudkowsky, Nick Bostrom, and Greta Thunberg [who] argue for world government to stop science.”

Although Thiel doesn’t explicitly reference Crisis and Leviathan (1987) — the celebrated book by American historian and economist Robert Higgs — he warns that the former precipitates the latter. In his first lecture, Thiel cites Matthew 24:6 to insist that “the Antichrist will come to power by talking about Armageddon non-stop” and 1 Thessalonians 5:3 as evidence that the Antichrist will rise to power by promising “peace and safety.” In his second lecture, Thiel explains how “a new, reformed government called ‘Leviathan,’” as described by political philosopher Thomas Hobbes in his 1651 political treatise, that wields supreme power to cow men into peaceful cooperation, will be ridden by the Antichrist “to take over the world.”

Opposition to totalitarianism aside, not all of Thiel’s comments fit comfortably within the libertarian worldview. Thiel criticizes “zombie liberalism” and “lame libertarian abstractions,” preferring an anti-communist ideology where “you could do some pretty bad stuff because the communists were so much worse.” For example, Thiel praises the CIA of the ’60s, ’70s, and ’80s, for being “sort of this rogue thing outside the State Department,” which he says was full of communists.

Still, Thiel recognizes state power as a double-edged sword, identifying the American empire as simultaneously “the natural candidate for Katechon” — the entity that delays the emergence of the Antichrist — “and Antichrist; ground zero of the one-world state, ground zero of the resistance to the one-world state.” In his third lecture, Thiel names “tax treaties, financial surveillance, and sanctions architecture” as defining features of the international “Antichrist-like system” of international governance. Thiel explains how “it’s become quite difficult to hide one’s money” in the wake of the Patriot Act, the “extensive” administrative state (the Treasury Department, in particular), and the centralization of payments on the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications system — an international messaging network better known as SWIFT, which banks use to process global payments. All of these factors make it impossible to “escape from global taxation if you’re a U.S. citizen,” he says. Thiel links this erosion of financial freedom to Revelation 13:16-17, which prophesies about a society where an individual’s ability to engage in commerce is contingent upon brandishing the mark of the beast on one’s body.

Christianity provided this sense of purpose for Europe

Tuesday, October 21st, 2025

Taking Religion Seriously by Charles MurrayPart of Charles Murray’s journey to Taking Religion Seriously came through writing Human Accomplishment:

Any book that attempts to explain the explosion of innovation, wealth, and creative artistry in Europe from the fifteenth through the nineteenth centuries must reckon with the role played by the Christian faith. He argued in the book that such creativity flows most freely when “the most talented people believe that life has a purpose and that individuals can act efficaciously to fulfill that purpose.”

Christianity provided this sense of purpose for Europe, and its decline had noticeable effects as well. Murray notes that as the Christian faith faded as a motivator of elite action, technical achievement may have continued, but true art did not. Art that attempts to represent transcendent truth, access the beauty of reality, or point to goodness was elevating. Murray thinks that the replacement of this older ideal of art with one that casts artists as visionaries or rebels has led to art’s degradation as “artists tend to make their work about their personal preferences, and those preferences tend to be banal, or wrongheaded, or both.” He offers this as another clue: anyone who agrees with him that art is not what it once was might consider the connection between art and faith. But at the very least, he suggests that it is interesting that the loss of transcendent purpose in human life is reflected in numerous dark ways in art.

Yet, Murray is keenly aware of how astonishing the leap from any of his clues to considering Christian teachings must seem, and he dedicates considerable attention to explaining this. His own engagement with these questions began after reading C.S. Lewis and considering the apologist’s presentation of natural law alongside Murray’s own deep involvement with evolutionary psychology.

Fully convinced that evolutionary psychology offers “one of social science’s most important tools for understanding human behavior,” Murray nonetheless observed a problem: Even if evolved norms can explain the universality of certain moral rules, what do we make of the instances when our natural instincts conflict with what we know to be right? While psychology can at least model an answer (at least when family or friends are involved), Murray argues that the field seems to have little explanation for “agape: unconditional love, focused on giving rather than receiving, not based on merit or acquaintance with the recipient.” Given the extraordinary focus Christianity places on this sacrificial sense of love, Murray believed he had to decide, finally, what he made of the person of Jesus of Nazareth.

Why start a war with America when you might avoid one?

Monday, October 20th, 2025

In August, experts gathered at Syracuse University to plan China’s invasion of Taiwan:

For two days, academics, policy analysts, and current and former U.S. officials abandoned their typical defensive postures and attempted to inhabit Beijing’s offensive strategic mindset in a wargame. They debated not how America should respond to Chinese aggression, but how China might overcome the obstacles that have so far kept it from attacking the island nation.

This role reversal yielded an uncomfortable insight. The invasion scenarios that dominate U.S. military planning — involving massive amphibious assaults on Taiwan and preemptive strikes on American bases — may fundamentally misread Beijing’s calculus. As the wargame revealed, analysts seeking to understand China’s intentions should pay greater attention to plausible alternative military pathways to reunification that involve far less force and far more political calculation.

[…]

The exercise revealed three scenarios that generated the most debate among participants. First, a limited missile barrage followed by diplomatic ultimatum — essentially, coercion without invasion. Second, a graduated escalation that stops short of attacking U.S. forces. Third, an assault designed to cripple U.S. forces at the outset and present Taipei with a new reality of isolation. Each path reflected different risk tolerances and assumptions about American resolve.

Participants quickly discovered that when confronted with the decision to attack U.S. forces, this seemed to make little strategic sense when they attempted to look at it from Beijing’s perspective. A typical assumption held by many analysts, including most participants prior to the game, and one that features prominently in American wargames, is that China will simply launch a preemptive surprise strike against U.S. forces in a manner somewhat analogous to Pearl Harbor. But why start a war with America when you might avoid one? As the game participants soon found, there is no guarantee of U.S. military involvement, nor Japan’s, nor other countries‘, if China refrains from attacking them in an opening round.

[…]

This logic shaped the exercise’s most plausible hypothetical scenario. China launches precision strikes against Taiwan’s military infrastructure while simultaneously offering generous surrender terms: local autonomy, preservation of democratic institutions, and minimal mainland administrative presence. The message to Taipei is clear: accept reunification on favorable terms or face devastation. The message to Washington and the American public is equally clear: this is a Chinese civil matter, not worth American lives.

The comparison to Hong Kong’s former autonomy arrangements, once seemingly reasonable, now rings hollow given Beijing’s crackdown there. Participants struggled with this credibility gap. Would Taiwan believe any Chinese promises after Hong Kong?

[…]

Despite decades of modernization, the People’s Liberation Army has not fought a major conflict since 1979. It has never conducted an amphibious assault on a major scale. Its logistics remain untested. Its command structure is riddled with political interference. In contrast to most wargames that portray the Chinese military as a competent machine operating at maximum efficiency, the perspective from Beijing is likely more sobering.

These limitations don’t make China weak — they make it cautious.

[…]

If China’s theoretically preferred strategy involves limited strikes and political coercion, Taiwan needs resilience against pressure campaigns, not just beach defenses. This means hardening critical infrastructure, preparing the population psychologically, and maintaining political unity under extreme stress. It also means understanding the dynamics of how China will attempt to lure Taiwan into an early surrender and then taking steps to undermine these.

[…]

If Beijing believes it can achieve reunification through limited force and favorable terms, traditional military deterrence fails. Therefore, arguably more important than Taiwan’s military vulnerabilities are its political vulnerabilities. While Taiwan has so far remained steadfast in maintaining its independence, the combined effects of China finally crossing the military threshold, limited prospects of outside military help, and Beijing offering favorable surrender terms (backed by threats of massive escalation for refusal), might prove sufficient to undermine the will to fight.

How GDP Hides Industrial Decline

Sunday, October 19th, 2025

Patrick Fitzsimmons has been mulling a paradox:

U.S. GDP keeps going up, yet it seems like we make less stuff and that most of the smart people I know work fake jobs. Growing up in the nineties, most of my toys and clothes had tags saying “Made in Hong Kong” or “Made in Vietnam.” But the high-skill, high-tech goods—the washing machine, the car, my computer—were often made in America. Now? From my e-bike to my laptop, from my refrigerator to my mattress, very few goods I own, high-tech or low-tech, were made in the USA.

[…]

Sometimes there are discrepancies between your real-world observations and the data. But this goes far beyond just being a discrepancy: the data is saying the complete opposite of what we see with our own eyes, hear from our acquaintances in the job market, and deduce logically from our knowledge of demographics, technology, industry, and trade. How is this possible? The answer is actually very simple: the data is completely wrong. But you can only figure this out if you go line-by-line into the hundreds of pages of government GDP calculation methodology documentation. Which is exactly what I did.

[…]

I challenge anyone who believes in these statistics to tell me what in the real world happened so that raw tonnage of steel was down, real gross output of steel was flat, usage of inputs was up, but “real value-added” was also up, and up hugely. Nobody can explain these numbers. The BEA cannot—I have asked them! If the raw data still exists, nobody has access to it because it was confidential.

The basic problem is that real value-added calculations only work if there are no quality adjustments and there hasn’t been any substitutions in the inputs. If those assumptions do not hold, you can get wild and nonsensical results. Since those assumptions do not actually hold in the real world, those nonsensical results are mixed into the overall calculation in ways that are impossible to account for, thus making the entire number bogus.

My guess is that what happened with steel production is that factories have moved from using raw iron ore to scrap metal as an input. The scrap metal is actually closer to a final good and requires much less energy to turn into steel. But GDP calculations do not know that scrap metal is closer to a final good. What the GDP calculations see is that materials have become more expensive and that energy inputs are less, so it seems like the steel factories are maintaining output with much less input, and thus value-added is greater. The reality, though, is that the United States is not producing any more steel out of factories, the United States is not producing a greater percentage of the steel value chain than in 1997, and the 125% increase in real value-added is a spurious result that represents neither making more stuff nor making better stuff.

[…]

This is not just my critique: a former deputy chief at the BEA, Professor Doug Meade, has sharply criticized real value-added as a metric. In a 2010 conference paper, he wrote, “more than 60 years after it was first introduced, there is still no fundamental agreement on the meaning of real value added, or its price. Most who use it for the study of productivity loosely describe it as a measure of ‘real output’ although strictly speaking it is not that.” He continues to argue that comparing real value-added between years only works under the conditions of no quality adjustments, no input substitutions due to price changes, and no changes to the terms of trade. If those conditions do not hold, then, he says diplomatically, “it would be unclear what [real value-added] is measuring” Or as economist Thomas Rymes, observing the same issues, put it more directly: “a fictitious measure of output with no meaning.”

[…]

Since nominal value-added is not adjusted by price indexes, it avoids all the problems we discussed with real value-added.

But, once again, the problem with the nominal value-added comparison is that it is not a comparison of actual things—it is a comparison of sales receipts. Thus a given quantity of products that is produced by a bloated cost structure will count as more “GDP” than the same number of products produced by an efficient factory. This is not just a theoretical problem—we know for a fact that the Chinese company BYD produces an equivalent to the Tesla Model 3 for half the price. Thus, $30,000 of manufacturing value-added in the U.S. might represent one car being produced, while for China it might represent two cars, and thus is actually double the output. In general, the China-U.S. dollar exchange rate is not a market rate and thus the conversion does not reflect in any meaningful sense the value of products.

Worse, many U.S. products are more expensive not because they are higher-end and better quality, but because they are protected from competition by tariffs, patents, regulation or national security requirements. For instance, Purism makes an all-in-the-USA phone for $2,000—the phone is no better than a $500 Chinese or South Korean phone, but sells at a premium for the U.S. security market. Others in procurement tell stories of getting quotes for printed circuit boards that cost $5,000 from China but $50,000 in America, thus only government and regulated industries buy American circuit boards. American-made municipal buses can cost three times the price as those made in China, but cities often face rules requiring them to buy American. For a particularly egregious example, thanks to the protections of the Jones Act, American ships cost an astounding ten times as much to build as their foreign counterparts.

[…]

Which is more “output”—one million drones sold for a total of $2 billion dollars, versus one B2 stealth bomber for the same price? A $2,000 custom-made dress for the Met Gala, or one hundred pairs of denim work pants? Nominal value-added comparisons treat them as equivalent.

Nominal value-added cannot tell the difference between a country like 1790s Spain, a manufacturer of luxury goods with inflated nominal prices thanks to New World gold, and 1790s England, a ruthless manufacturer of inexpensive goods that is on its way to world domination. A comparison between countries that simply looks at sales revenues—not at the actual amount of ships, phones, and things produced for that revenue—is simply not a useful comparison.

[…]

When we read a headline saying GDP data shows “car output has increased,” we think the U.S. has made more cars. We then apply our own views as to whether the quality of the car has changed. When we sneak quality into a measure but still call it “output,” we are double-counting and embedding the subjective in the objective, and we lose track of the hard numbers. We are not making more quantity of cars per person like the data says, we are making fewer cars, but with Bluetooth and crumple zones.

[…]

While the BLS provides general information about the quality adjustment process, the specific methodology and the actual decisions are not documented. At the heart of GDP we find this subjective, bureaucratic black box. When we see that “output” of cars has increased since 1997, it is impossible for any commentator to know how that increase in “output” breaks down between actual number of cars, horsepower boosts, safety features, durability improvements, convenience features, blue tooth, power locks, and on and on.

[…]

The point is not that any of these methods is right or wrong. The point is that if you have a half-dozen plausible ways of adjusting for quality, none of which from first principles is more objective than another, and you rule out one method for giving ludicrously low results, and one method for ludicrously high results, and just choose a middle route that feels reasonable, then the result of this adjustment is not an objective measure of output. All you have done is launder vibes into something that has the appearance of an objective number.

[…]

The point is not that any of these methods is right or wrong. The point is that if you have a half-dozen plausible ways of adjusting for quality, none of which from first principles is more objective than another, and you rule out one method for giving ludicrously low results, and one method for ludicrously high results, and just choose a middle route that feels reasonable, then the result of this adjustment is not an objective measure of output. All you have done is launder vibes into something that has the appearance of an objective number.

You can’t just compare tax rates

Saturday, October 18th, 2025

Brian Albrecht explains why you can’t just compare tax rates between, say, income taxes and tariffs:

Double a tax rate, and you quadruple the deadweight loss. This is a standard result in public finance, and it suggests we should spread our tax burden across many bases rather than concentrate it in one place.

Here’s the intuition. When you impose a small tax, you only kill off marginal transactions—deals that barely made sense in the first place. The buyer was almost indifferent about purchasing, or the worker was almost indifferent about working that extra hour. These marginal transactions don’t create much surplus, so losing them doesn’t cost much.

But as you increase the tax rate, you start killing off transactions with larger and larger surplus. Beyond eliminating the deals that barely made sense, you’re now eliminating deals where both parties really wanted to trade, where there were substantial gains from the exchange. The surplus lost from these inframarginal transactions is much larger.

This is why deadweight loss grows with the square of the tax rate. Double the tax, and you lose transactions that had twice the surplus. The effect multiplies. A 10% tax might eliminate deals that create $1 of surplus each, but a 20% tax eliminates deals worth $1 and deals worth $2. The total loss is 4x, not 2x.

[…]

If you want to compare across markets, you need another basic idea from taxation: deadweight loss depends on elasticities.

[…]

Some supplies are essentially fixed—you can’t create more of them no matter how high the price goes. Other goods can be produced in unlimited quantities at constant cost. Some demands are highly elastic (people readily substitute to alternatives), while others are inelastic (people need the good regardless of price). These elasticities determine how much distortion a given tax rate creates. The tax rate alone tells you nothing.

More elastic demand or supply curves generate larger deadweight losses. The flipside is the classic Ramsey result: tax less elastic goods more heavily.

[…]

Consider taxing a good with a perfectly inelastic supply—say, land in a specific location. The supply curve is vertical. No matter what price landowners receive, they supply the same amount of land because they can’t create more of it. By definition, there is no deadweight loss. The tax doesn’t change behavior.

What happens when we increase the tax rate on land? The tax raises revenue, but it generates no deadweight loss. Landowners absorb the entire tax through lower prices, but the quantity of land traded doesn’t change. There’s no distortion in the allocation of resources. You could tax land at 100%, and the deadweight loss would still be zero.

This demolishes the idea that you can look at tax rates in isolation. There is no nice connection between tax rate and deadweight loss that transcends the specific good being taxed.

Now compare this to a tariff on imported goods, where supply and demand are both elastic. The tariff creates a wedge between what consumers pay and what producers receive. This wedge distorts both consumption decisions (people buy less than they would otherwise) and production decisions (domestic producers make more than they would in an undistorted market). We get the classic deadweight loss triangle.

And it’s not just that imports aren’t perfectly inelastic. They’re very elastic! Estimates vary but one recent paper puts the long-run elasticity at 14, implying a huge deadweight loss.

The formula that deadweight loss increases with the square of the tax rate applies to both taxes. It tells us doubling tariffs with quadruple the deadweight loss. But it tells us nothing about which tax we should increase and the deadweight loss across the two markets. The land tax, even at a 100% rate, might generate zero distortion. The tariff, even at a 2.5% rate, creates real costs because of the huge elasticities. Elasticities matter. You can’t compare tax rates across different bases without accounting for how responsive behavior is to each tax.

[…]

But tariffs are worse than general consumption taxes because they tax only some goods—and imports are a small share of total consumption.

In the US, imports are roughly 10% of consumption. This means tariffs apply to a base that’s one-tenth of a general consumption tax would. When Lott compares a 2.5% tariff to a 40% income tax, he’s ignoring that these rates apply to completely different denominators.

Think of it this way: if you want to raise $100 from a tax that applies to everyone’s $1,000 of consumption, you need a 10% rate. But if you want to raise that same $100 from a tax that only applies to $100 of imports (10% of consumption), you need a 100% rate. The narrow base means you need a much higher rate to raise equivalent revenue.

This logic applies to any narrow excise tax.