When it remains activated too long, it diverts the body’s resources from normal growth and development toward cellular defense

December 22nd, 2025

Dr. Robert Naviaux, a professor of medicine, pediatrics and pathology at UC San Diego School of Medicine, suggests that a built-in stress response, called the cell danger response (CDR), might explain autism:

The review pulls together more than ten years of research across genetics, metabolism, toxicology and early brain development.

[…]

The first hit is genetic predisposition: some children inherit a “sensitive genotype” that makes their mitochondria and cellular signaling systems highly reactive to environmental changes. These can range from specific genetic syndromes to a combination of common variants. On their own, these genetic traits do not cause autism, but they create biological hypersensitivity to stress.

The second hit occurs when the environment triggers this sensitivity. This happens during a critical window from early pregnancy through the first 18–36 months of life. Triggers can include maternal immune activation, pollution or metabolic stressors. In this model, early triggers push sensitive cells into a stress state at the wrong moment.

The third hit is when that stress state continues for months during late pregnancy or early childhood. Long periods of cellular stress are proposed to disturb normal brain development, reshape mitochondria and influence gut microbes and the immune system.

Across these three hits, one mechanism ties the model together: a signaling molecule called extracellular ATP (eATP), a molecule that acts as a “danger signal”. When eATP levels stay high, cells remain in a defensive mode rather than returning to normal growth. Naviaux argues that this is not a malfunction, but rather mitochondria responding exactly as designed to a perceived threat.

“Behavior has a chemical basis. The CDR regulates that chemistry,” Naviaux explained. “When it remains activated too long, it diverts the body’s resources from normal growth and development toward cellular defense, leaving fewer resources for the developing brain.”

The review explains that the CDR is part of a universal healing cycle called salugenesis; in autism, this cycle gets stuck, preventing the return to normal cellular function. This prolonged stress prevents the necessary developmental shift from excitatory to inhibitory signaling in the brain, leading to over-excitation.

This framework also explains why many autistic children experience physical symptoms such as gut issues or sleep disturbances – signs of a body-wide stress response.

The development of nuclear energy in Germany never got beyond the laboratory stage

December 21st, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesBoris Pash, leader of the Alsos Mission, was about twenty miles ahead of the advanced elements of the Seventh Army, General Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), as they pushed through the Bavarian Alps:

Finding the bridge into Urfeld destroyed, his group of eight dismounted from their vehicles and joined a ten-man reconnaissance patrol, entering Urfeld in the late afternoon of May 2. About an hour later, a German unit tried to pass through the town and a hot fire fight broke out. Shortly afterward, the patrol withdrew, leaving Pash in control of the town but alone. I could never straighten out in my own mind just what happened that night. But the following will give a general picture.

At sundown Pash was told that a German general wished to see him. The general was admitted and immediately surrendered his entire division to the very surprised chief of the Alsos mission. Pash, thinking fast, replied that it was getting late and he did not wish to bother his own general, who was right behind him with a large force, with any formalities that night; so the Germans would have to wait until morning to have their surrender officially accepted. No sooner had the first general departed than another German commander, this time of seven or eight hundred men, arrived and the procedure was repeated. By now, Pash was thoroughly alarmed for the safety of his infinitesimal force, and, as soon as it became thoroughly dark, he withdrew quietly toward the American lines. Shortly before this he had found Heisenberg, but with the difficult situation confronting him he felt it wiser to leave him in his home for the time being. During the night, he was able to obtain the support of an infantry battalion. He returned at dawn on May 3 and picked up Heisenberg, who was waiting in an office with his bag already packed. When Pash entered, Heisenberg greeted him with: “I have been expecting you.” Heisenberg was immediately evacuated to Heidelberg.

Pash’s last effort typified the boldness with which he carried out every one of his operations, and clearly demonstrated his ability to stick to his objective, which, in this case, had been to catch Heisenberg. Heisenberg was one of the world’s leading physicists and, at the time of the German break-up, he was worth more to us than ten divisions of Germans. Had he fallen into Russian hands, he would have proven invaluable to them. As it was, he has always remained on the side of the West. Judging from other actions taken at that time, we seemed to be almost alone in our appreciation of the potential value of German scientists to the Russians. With Heisenberg in our custody, all his colleagues began to talk freely. We soon learned that, although Gerlach had been in administrative charge of the work, he had only a superficial knowledge of its technical details. Diebner was not particularly co-operative and seemed to be rather antagonistic toward Heisenberg. Gerlach and Heisenberg were on cordial terms and appeared to consider Diebner an inferior scientist. Heisenberg was, outwardly at least, actively anti-Nazi, but was nevertheless strongly nationalistic. None of them seemed to know very much about the Allies’ nuclear fission efforts; Gerlach spoke several times of the poor quality of German technical intelligence. There was no German counterpart of Alsos.

After Hamburg fell, Harteck was captured. He had written a letter on April 24, 1939, in which he advised the War Ministry that:

We take the liberty of calling to your attention the newest development in nuclear physics which in our opinion will perhaps make it possible to produce an explosive which is many orders of magnitude more effective than the present one … it is obvious that if the possibility of energy production outlined above can be realized, which certainly is within the realm of possibility, that country which first makes use of it, has an unsurpassable advantage over the others.

However, Harteck, like the other German scientists, seemed to have come to feel that, while there was some hope of producing energy from a uranium pile, it was unlikely, if not entirely impossible, that a workable weapon could be developed. The various possibilities open to the Germans were never systematically and completely investigated. This was because their work was seriously deficient in over-all direction, unity of purpose and coordination between the participating agencies. Originally, there had been a number of more or less competing groups, one under Army Ordnance, another under the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Physics, and still another under the Postal Department.

There was continual bickering, as might be expected, over supplies and material, and surprisingly enough, in the light of most American scientists’ pleas for freedom from the restrictions of compartmentalization, there was a generally nonco-operative attitude regarding the exchange of information between the various groups. Many German scientists worked alone on their individual projects and did not seem to feel any compulsion to work for the national interest. The basic reason for this was probably the generally accepted belief that the development of a nuclear weapon was not possible.

In any case, the development of nuclear energy in Germany never got beyond the laboratory stage, and even there the principal consideration was its use for power rather than for explosives. Other scientific objectives seemed to be more important and received greater governmental attention and support.

The status of the German effort at the close of the war in Europe was reminiscent of the early phases of our project in the United States, when committees were appointed only to be superseded by other committees. At times it seemed as though more thought had to be devoted to organization than to solving the problems under study.

Boris Pash led an interesting life:

Boris Fedorovich Pashkovsky was born in San Francisco, California, on 20 June 1900. His father was Reverend Theodore Pashkovsky (who would become Most Reverend Metropolitan Theophilus from 1934 to 1950), a Russian Orthodox priest and later archbishop who had been sent to California by the Church in 1894.

[…]

One of Boris´s earliest memories was of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake.

His father was recalled to Russia in 1906, and the entire family returned to Russia in 1913.

In 1916–1917, both father and son joined the ranks of the Russian army as it fought against Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in World War I: Theodore – as a military chaplain, and 16-year-old Boris – as an artillery private to the 52nd Infantry Division. During the Russian Revolution, the family fled to Simferopol, Crimea, where Boris worked for the YMCA. By February 1920, Boris joined the White navy in the Black Sea and served on the navy cruiser General Kornilov. Boris saw action against the Bolsheviks at sea, and in March 1920, he was awarded the Cross of St. George, fourth class.

On 1 July 1920, he married Lydia Vladimirovna Ivanova, and chose to return to the United States when the Bolshevik consolidation of power became apparent. He was able to secure employment with the YMCA in Berlin, where his son Edgar Constantine Boris Pashkovsky was born on 14 June 1921.

Upon returning to the United States with his family in 1923, he attended Springfield College, in Springfield, Massachusetts, where he graduated with a Bachelor of Physical Education. It was during this time that he changed the family name from Pashkovsky to Pash.

Pash taught and coached baseball at Hollywood High School in Los Angeles from 1924 until 1940, where students included Lana Turner, Judy Garland, and Mickey Rooney. During this time he continued his education, receiving a Master of Science in Education from the University of Southern California in 1939. He also joined the United States Army Reserve, and was assigned to the Infantry Intelligence Branch. As part of his training, he qualified for certification by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Each drone costs around $50,000

December 20th, 2025

A BBC defence correspondent in Kyiv reports on their secret missile factory:

We’re driven blindfolded to a secret location where Ukraine is making one of its latest weapons.

We’re told to turn off our phones — such is the secrecy around the production of Ukraine’s Flamingo cruise missile.

For Ukraine, dispersing and hiding the production of weapons like this is key to survival. Two factories belonging to the company that makes it — Fire Point — have already been hit.

Inside the one we’re visiting we’re told not to film any features such as pillars, windows or ceilings. We’re also asked not to show the faces of workers on the assembly line — where Flamingo missiles are at various stages of completion.

Even under fire, Ukraine is ramping up its arms industry. President Volodymyr Zelensky says the country now produces more than 50% of the weapons it uses on the front line. Almost its entire inventory of long-range weapons is domestically made.

[…]

The head of Ukraine’s Armed Forces, General Oleksandr Syrskyi, says Ukraine’s long-range strikes have already cost the Russian economy more than $21.5bn this year.

[…]

Of course Russia has been doing the same, and on a greater scale. On average it has been launching around 200 Shahed drones a day; Ukraine’s response has been about half that number.

[…]

Fire Point didn’t even exist before Russia’s full-scale invasion. But the start-up is now producing 200 drones a day. Its FP1 and FP2 drones, each the size of a small aeroplane, have carried out 60% of Ukraine’s long-range strikes. Each drone costs around $50,000 — a third of the price of a Russian Shahed drone. Russia is still producing nearly 3,000 of those a month.

[…]

Until the end of last year, under President Biden, the United States supplied nearly $70bn-worth of military support to Ukraine. That was soon stopped under President Trump — instead he has set up a scheme to allow European Nato to purchase US weapons.

Ukraine still needs outside help, not least with intelligence, targeting and money. But it is trying to be more self-sufficient.

German scientists did not support their country in the war effort

December 19th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesIt was quite interesting, General Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), to watch the pattern of the total German scientific effort emerge:

I have always considered Goudsmit’s opinion much to the point: “On the whole, we gained the definite impression that German scientists did not support their country in the war effort. The principal thing was to obtain money from the government for their own researches, pretending that they might be of value to the war effort. One genuine selling point which they used extensively was that pure research in Germany in many fields was far behind the United States.”

Although most of our objectives in Germany lay in the French zone of advance, one that was particularly important to us — the Auer-gesellschaft Works in Oranienburg, about fifteen miles north of Berlin — lay in what was to be the Russian zone. The information that Alsos had uncovered in Strasbourg had confirmed our earlier suspicions that the plant was engaged in the manufacture of thorium and uranium metals which were to be used in the production of atomic energy and hence probably for the manufacture of an atomic bomb. Since there was not even the remotest possibility that Alsos could seize the works I recommended to General Marshall that the plant be destroyed by air attack.

When he approved, I sent Major F. J. Smith, of my office, to explain the mission to General Carl Spaatz, who was then in command of our Strategic Air Forces in Europe. Spaatz co-operated wholeheartedly and, in a period of about thirty minutes during the afternoon of March 15, 612 Flying Fortresses of the Eighth Air Force dropped 1,506 tons of high explosives and 178 tons of incendiary bombs on the target. Poststrike analysis indicated that all parts of the plant that were aboveground had been completely destroyed. Our purpose in attacking Oranienburg was screened from Russians and Germans alike by a simultaneous and equally heavy attack upon the small town of Zossen, where the German Army’s headquarters were situated. I have since learned that as an entirely unexpected bonus the Zossen raid incapacitated General Guderian, then Chief of the German General Staff.

[…]

[T]he experimental uranium pile at Berlin Dahlem had been removed to Haigerloch, another small town near Hechingen. They reported a shortage of heavy water, explaining that their only source of it had been in Norway. The pieces of the puzzle were beginning to fall into place at last.

Bothe disclosed that the total German effort on atomic physics had consisted of himself and three helpers: Heisenberg with ten men; Dopel in Leipzig, assisted by his wife; Kirchner in Garmisch with possibly two assistants; and Stetter in Vienna with four or five others. Hahn, he said, was engaged in work on chemical problems.

The Heidelberg group told us that Gerlach’s approval was required before any physicist could obtain the means for scientific work. If he wanted the highest priority rating, called DE, he had to have the additional approval of Albert Speer, Minister of Armaments and Munitions.

Later, Bothe expressed his belief that the separation of uranium isotopes by thermal diffusion was impossible and indicated that the only work on isotope separation being done in Germany involved the centrifugal method. He added that this work was under the direction of Dr. Harteck. Bothe said he knew of no element higher than 93, although he recognized that since element 93 was a beta emitter, 94 must exist. He repeatedly expressed his opinion that the uranium pile as a source of energy was decades away and that the use of uranium as an explosive was altogether impracticable. He claimed not to know of any theoretical or experimental work being done in Germany on the military applications of atomic fission, but he agreed that such work could be under way without his knowledge.

After repeated questioning about the military value of the cyclotron, Bothe admitted that it had been regarded as a means for obtaining radioactive material for bombs.

[…]

Some of his personal letters, however, did cast doubts upon his assertion that he knew nothing of the work being done at Bisingen and Sigmaringen. From other sources, the interrogators learned that Bothe had returned a considerable quantity of uranium to Degussa after he had no further use for it.

Kuhn was present throughout Bothe’s interrogation. When it was over, he called one of the Alsos men aside and told him about the technical and scientific library of the German Chemical Society, of which he was the custodian. He claimed that it was the best of its kind in the world and included accounts of most of the German chemical activities in the war. To avoid the risks of heavy bombing, the library had been concealed in a number of caves and eventually was moved to a salt mine. Quite evidently, Kuhn preferred to have it taken over by the Americans rather than by the Russians. Unfortunately, it was behind the Russian lines.

[…]

Gertner said that he had worked with Joliot in Paris, from September of 1940 to July of 1943. He and Joliot, who had been close friends, had discussed the possibility of an atomic bomb and they had agreed that its development was not feasible.

[…]

He had reached the conclusion that it would be impossible to develop an atomic bomb because of the difficulties involved in separating isotopes. He further believed that, of all the separation methods, the centrifuge process offered the best prospects of success, but the low production rates that had been achieved by that method appeared to rule it out.

[…]

At about this time a major problem arose in Washington. The division of Germany into three zones of occupation had been arranged at Yalta. Later, when it was decided to establish a fourth zone to be occupied by the French, the readjustment of the American zone’s boundaries was handled by a committee of representatives of the State Department and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. All the information that had been developed by Alsos indicated that the principal German work on atomic energy was being conducted in the general area Freiburg-Stuttgart-Ulm-Friedrichshafen, a large part of which would be turned over to the French. Hechingen lay near the center of this area and was in the French Army’s zone of advance, far removed from the zone of any American unit.

As I saw it, there could be no question but that American troops must be the first to arrive at this vital installation, for it was of the utmost importance to the United States that we control the entire area that contained the German atomic energy activities.

[…]

Consequently, I was forced to initiate some drastic measures to accomplish our purpose. One of these became known as Operation Harborage.

According to this plan, American troops would have to get into and hold the area long enough for us to capture the people we wanted, question them, seize and remove their records, and obliterate all remaining facilities, for my recent experiences with Joliot had convinced me that nothing that might be of interest to the Russians should ever be allowed to fall into French hands. Having reached this conclusion, I discussed the matter with Secretary Stimson and General Marshall together. After I had outlined briefly what I wanted, and we had considered the possible value of the information we might gather, we all turned to the big wall map in the Secretary’s office. To my great embarrassment, I was unable to find Hechingen on this map, and both the Secretary and the Chief of Staff were equally unsuccessful. Finally, Mr. Stimson summoned his aide, Colonel William H. Kyle, who succeeded eventually in locating our target at the bottom of the map, not more than two feet above the floor. If a photographer had been present at that time when the four of us were almost on our hands and knees, gazing intently at this point barely off the floor, he might well have caught one of World War II’s more interesting photographs.

A short discussion followed, during which General Marshall asked me how I would ensure the capture of our objectives. I suggested that the necessary American troops, possibly as much as a reinforced corps, should cut diagonally across the advancing French front. Marshall agreed and sent for Major General J. E. Hull, Head of the Operations Division, War Department, General Staff, telling him to issue instructions to General Eisenhower that would take care of our requirements.

[…]

Since the war, I have had occasion to discuss Operation Harborage and other Alsos operations with a number of the officers who were involved. In the course of these discussions, I have made it a point to tell them how much I always appreciated the co-operation given my representatives throughout the European Theater, when the only justification that they had for their apparently outlandish requests were simple memoranda addressed “To Whom It May Concern,” signed by either Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, or in a few cases by Colonel Frank McCarthy, the Secretary of the General Staff, and stating that their mission was of the utmost importance and that the Secretary of War would appreciate any assistance that could be rendered. Invariably, I have been told that it was not a case of kindness on the part of anyone in the European Theater, for these letters were most unusual and they realized that the matters involved must be of paramount importance. But over and above this, I have always felt great pride and pleasure upon hearing from these same commanders that while my officers were far from high-ranking, they were obviously of such ability and so convinced of the importance of their mission and the strength of their backing that they would have accomplished their missions no matter what obstacles stood in their way.

[…]

The WIFO plant was seized quickly and without incident. It was in a terrible condition from repeated bombings, but fortunately the manager had stayed on the job. Hidden in his house was an inventory of the plant’s property, which showed the whereabouts of the missing ore. Approximately eleven hundred tons of it were soon found stored in barrels under open sheds above-ground.

Most of the barrels were either broken or rotten, and it was obvious that the ore would have to be repacked before it could be moved. Complicating the problem was the fact that there were still many German units in the area. Fortune smiled upon Lansdale’s group again when the CIC agents found a barrel factory close at hand. The owner of the plant, who was also the local burgomaster, was soon prevailed upon to round up a sufficient number of laborers and to resume operations. During the next two weeks, with Agent Schriver in charge, and while under intermittent enemy fire, this factory turned out about twenty thousand fruit barrels.

Lansdale, in the meantime, had gone back to SHAEF, where he saw General Smith, and procured the services of a truck company. Trucks were in great demand at this period and the men, all Negroes with one white lieutenant, were exhausted from lack of sleep. They were further handicapped by being far from their normal maintenance bases. Nevertheless, they performed splendidly, and with the use of forced labor to repack and load the ore, the entire tonnage was removed during three days and nights to an airport hangar at Hildes-heim, near Hanover, well behind the Allied lines. A small amount of the ore was lost en route because of the number of truck ditchings caused by the extremely rough roads.

[…]

Observing the ore’s hue and noting that it was escorted by Hambro, a member of a well-known London banking family, many of the British were convinced that it was gold.

From Hanover, a considerable tonnage was moved by air to England. There was too much, however, to carry all of it in this manner, so arrangements were made to move the remainder by rail to Antwerp about two hundred miles away, and thence by ship to England. The precautions for insuring its delivery proved inadequate and somewhere along the line, probably in a switching yard, three cars disappeared, but after an intensive search, Agent Schriver found them, much to our relief.

From England, the ore was sent over to the United States.

[…]

It was becoming apparent that there were two groups in Germany working on the uranium pile, the first under Diebner at Frankfurt and the second under Heisenberg. Heisenberg’s group had been started in 1939 as a co-operative project of the most important physicists in Germany, with headquarters at the Institute of Physics in Berlin. There had been a certain amount of competition between the two groups, and quarrels over who would get materials continued even after all research had been officially consolidated under Gerlach. In Gertner’s opinion, the work done under Diebner was not so good as that over which Heisenberg had supervision.

Having pretty well exhausted its Heidelberg sources, Alsos next turned its attention to the Frankfurt area, where the uranium metal required by the German project had been produced. It found there that the degrees of purity achieved were not particularly high.

Following closely behind the advancing American front, on April 12, Alsos moved in and seized Diebner’s laboratory and offices, which were located in an old schoolhouse. Pash’s people found, however, that the majority of the scientists, together with most of their documents, materials and equipment, had been evacuated on April 8, to carry on their work elsewhere. Nevertheless they picked up some uranium oxide, various pieces of equipment, an extensive physics laboratory and many files. From these last it appeared that Germany’s military interest had been aroused in early 1940 by the experiments of Hahn and Strassman. It had been suggested then that uranium could be used to form an explosive, as well as to serve as a source of energy. Work to this end had been started by Heisen-berg’s group in Berlin, using uranium ore from Joachimsthal, which had been transformed into powdered U-238. This attempt at making a pile, however, was unsuccessful, primarily, I believe, because of the clumsiness of the experimental equipment. Heisenberg’s group continued experiments with their apparatus until about the end of 1941, always with negative results. In spite of their failures, Heisen-berg and von Weizsäxcker calculated that by making a number of modifications to their equipment a self-sustaining pile could be built. The work was transferred to Leipzig, where, in 1942, a pile gave positive results, but was not self-sustaining. This led to the initiation late in 1942 of the so-called large-scale experiments at Berlin Dahlem. Finally, late in 1944, an exponential pile was constructed in Berlin. This, however, was what might be termed purely academic scientific experimentation.

[…]

Something had to be done, and, as usual, Pash did it. He asked for help, and General Harrison gave him operational control of the 1279th Engineer Combat Battalion. With this force he seized Haiger-loch on April 23 and immediately began dismantling the laboratory. Its major feature was the exponential pile, which had been brought there from Berlin in February and concealed in a tunnel under a high cliff. The Alsos detachment was greatly assisted by the arrival of a number of British scientists under the leadership of Sir Charles Hambro, and was able to complete its operations in Haigerloch before the French reached there.

In the meantime, Pash, with one company of the 1279th Engineers, moved on to Hechingen, which he captured on April 24. Efforts to take this town the night before had been strongly resisted, but the final attempt was virtually unopposed. Pash seized a large atomic physics laboratory and a number of the leading German physicists, including von Weizsäxcker and Wirtz.

The next morning he moved into Tailfingen, where they took over a large chemistry laboratory and captured Otto Hahn and Max von Laue. At Stadtilm, Alsos had found signed receipts for all the secret reports and documents that had been sent to the various scientists. But as the men were picked up, one by one, they all announced blandly that everything had been destroyed. Hahn, however, answered promptly, “I have them right here.”

The capture of Hahn was simple. A German on the street, when questioned, pointed the way to an old school building which contained his laboratory. After the school was surrounded by troops, F. A. C. Wardenburg and James Lane, both chemical engineers from du Pont and two of our Alsos scientific personnel, walked in and asked for Hahn. They were shown into his laboratory and started their interrogations. “It was just like a business call on a customer,” was their apt description. By now French Moroccan troops were in the area, yet the mission still had not found the German stores of heavy water and uranium oxide that had been used in the Haigerloch pile. Fortunately, the French were few in number, and the many German units scattered throughout the countryside kept them fully occupied while Alsos was getting its job done.

Skillful questioning of the German scientists by Goudsmit and his associates finally disclosed the hiding place of the heavy water and uranium and, on April 26, the heavy water was removed from the cellar of an old mill near Haigerloch and sent back to Paris. About one and a half tons of small metallic uranium cubes were dug up from a plowed field just outside the town. These, too, were quickly dispatched to Paris. Both water and uranium were then shipped to the U.S., to be disposed of by the Combined Development Trust.

On the twenty-seventh, the German scientists were taken to Heidelberg for further questioning, and later removed to Rheims. As they were in the act of leaving, von Weizsäxcker suddenly blurted out the information necessary to locate the still missing records of the German research programs. They were sealed in a metal drum, which had been deposited in the cesspool in back of von Weizsäxcker’s house.

By the end of April, Alsos was heavily engaged in mopping-up activities. Most of the material we wanted had been secured. A few important scientists — notably Heisenberg — still eluded us. But, generally, our principal concern at this point was to keep information and atomic scientists from falling into the hands of the Russians.

Self-help books for women vs. men aren’t selling the same story

December 18th, 2025

Self-help books for women vs. men aren’t selling the same story, Rob Henderson notes:

If you walk through the self-help section and compare the books marketed to men with those aimed at women, the contrast is striking. The books for men tend to emphasize stoicism, discipline, and self-sufficiency: become more focused, toughen up, don’t let the world knock you off your path, no one is coming to save you. The message is essentially that you need to strengthen yourself and earn your way forward.

The books for women, by contrast, rarely begin with the idea that you’re lacking something that needs to be built. Instead, the theme is closer to: you’re already great, but you keep getting in your own way. The world hasn’t recognized your value because you haven’t fully accepted it yourself. The promise is that once you stop beating yourself up and embrace who you already are, others will see it too.

Two very different messages — one built around improvement, the other around affirmation.

France acquired a bargaining power out of all proportion to anything to which her early patents entitled her

December 17th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesGeneral Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project) the problem of the French scientists:

The circum­stances that made this possible go back to 1939, when a group of French scientists, working under Joliot’s leadership, had patented a number of inventions that they claimed would provide means for controlling the energy of the uranium atom. They assigned their rights in these patents to the Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, an agency of the French Government.

One of Joliot’s assistants in this work was Hans von Halban. In June of 1940, when France was collapsing under the German onslaught, von Halban had left for England, taking with him the entire French supply of heavy water, a number of scientific papers, and a verbal commission from Joliot to act for the Centre in attempting to obtain the best possible terms to protect future French interests in the atomic field.

[…]

At the same time, the British employed von Halban and three of his associates from the Centre, eventually, as I have said, assigning them to the laboratories of the Tube Alloys Project in Montreal. By 1944, a number of other Centre scientists had left France to join the Free French Provisional Government in Algiers. The French working in the Montreal laboratories maintained contact with their former colleagues in North Africa and, through them, with their former leader, Joliot, who remained in Paris throughout the German occupation.

[…]

Upon his return to London, von Halban was closely questioned by my agents about his discussions with Joliot and it became obvious, as we had expected, that he had not held the conversation within the bounds of any “barest outline.” Vital information relating to our research had been disclosed—information that had been developed by Americans with American money, and that had been given to the British only in accordance with interchange agreements subsidiary to the Quebec Agreement. It confirmed facts that Joliot might have suspected, but which he otherwise could not have known. This information had always been scrupulously regarded as top secret.

[…]

Having effected a breach in the Quebec Agreement, Joliot proceeded to exploit it. He met with the Chancellor in February, 1945, and made it clear to Sir John that, while France had no immediate desire to press the issue, if she were not eventually admitted to full collaboration with the United States and Britain in the project, she would have to turn to Russia.

Thus, France acquired a bargaining power out of all proportion to anything to which her early patents entitled her. She was enabled to play power politics with our accomplishments and to bring, or threaten to bring, Russia into the picture. The United States was forced to sit quietly by while a large measure of the military security that we had gone to such pains to maintain was endangered and prematurely compromised by the actions of other governments over which we had no control.

In May of 1945, the French Government instructed Joliot to begin work on an atomic energy project. Joliot turned to his colleague, Pierre Auger, who had been working in the Montreal laboratories. Anticipating our concern, the British hastened to assure us that Auger would not participate in the actual work, but would limit his activities strictly to putting the French back on the right line if they made any serious errors. While Dr. Chadwick and I were both confident of Auger’s integrity, we realized that naturally his greatest loyalty was to his own country.

[…]

My sole source of satisfaction in this affair came from a remark made by Joliot to an employee of the United States Embassy in Paris: while the British had always been most cordial to him and had given him much information, he said, he got virtually nothing from the Americans he encountered.

This is essentially a subterranean precision strike

December 16th, 2025

Palmer Lucky recently made a bunch of comments about subterranean warfare and everyone snarked, Object Zero notes, all the tools to do it already exist today:

It’s an oil rig of course. But rather a directional drilling rig with a heavy duty derrick and a travelling block suitable for getting the full tensile capacity out of 6-5/8 drill pipe. This already exists.

When you drill an oil well you drill 30ft at a time, every time you drill 30ft, you stop and screw another 30ft length of drill pipe to the drill string and then keep turning to the right.

Oil wells always used to be vertical, but as oil reservoirs are usually pancake shaped drillers figured out how to drill a bend radius in the well so that the well bore could run a long horizontal length through more of the oil reservoir, as this allows more oil to flow into the well (well has more wall area in contact with the oil bearing rock).

These days, a good driller can keep the drill bit within about +/-0.5m of where they want it to be. You can steer the drill “bottom hole assembly” that drills the well using some clever motors and hydraulic signals.

This is essentially a subterranean precision strike. It already exists. It’s like fly by wire, but a mile underground travelling through rock.

Now what about weapons, explosives, munitions, etc. obviously for military applications you want some sort of explosive and the oil industry doesn’t do explosives.

Au contraire, have you heard of perforation guns?

Perforation guns are used on every oil well. Once the well has been drilled you case the walls with steel casing pipe (slide a big pipe into the well to stop the walls collapsing) and then run a production tube into the casing pipe. Production tubing is just another very long steel pipe but one that comes off a coil.

The problem is that oil cannot flow into the well, because the walls are cased with steel casing pipe, so the driller attaches a perforation gun to the bottom of the production tubing and fires the gun in the bottom of the well.

The perforation gun is a long heavy mandrel with 100s of guns all pointing radially. These guns shoot holes in the steel casing pipe so that the well can start to flow. The whole system delivers 100s of armour piecing guns via the subterranean domain.

Maybe Schlumberger is a stealth defence prime?

Anyway, it’s possible to drill your well maybe a mile deep then to turn horizontal and drill many many miles toward some target (10 miles is the record for commercial applications, but a lot more is possible before you hit technical maximums).

You can then steer the drill bit back up toward the surface and even out of the ground, delivering a 30ft rod that pierces up out of the ground and blasts 100s of armour piercing rounds in a 360 degree zone from ground level to 30ft elevation.

Think how scary this would be (I’ll post a video below).

Delivering perf guns via a surfacing long horizontal leg seems like a certain way to level a building including heavily reinforced or bunkered facilities.

This is all doable today, it’s just expensive compared to other options.

Militant, at any event, after the armistice

December 15th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesItalian scientific research and development, General Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), had been generally disorganized and was almost militant in its resistance to the Fascist state — militant, at any event, after the armistice:

Both Wick and Amaldi had served in the Italian Army and since the surrender had been hiding in Rome. During the war they had engaged in theoretical research principally on isotope separation, neutron, infrared and cosmic rays. They had no direct information about German research in the field of nuclear fission, for they had never been asked to do any work with or for the Germans. They claimed not to understand the significance of heavy water, and they were not aware of any new activity at the Joachimsthal uranium mines in Czechoslovakia.

Wick had made a trip into Germany during June and July of 1942, and had seen and talked at some length with a number of German physicists at that time and, together with Amaldi, had been shown some of the correspondence between various German scientists; thus they were able to supply us with some useful information. They were most co-operative, and what they gave us was the basis for the compilation of brief accounts of the activities and locations of a number of Germans who were of outstanding interest to the MED. Although later investigations in Germany proved that some of the information obtained in Rome was not wholly accurate, in the main it was well worth the trouble we had gone to in collecting it.

[…]

Throughout the European campaign, as far as atomic efforts were concerned, Alsos members had the tremendous advantage of knowing where they were going and whom and what they were seeking. When they landed on the Continent, they had in hand the fruits of Calvert’s labors, in the form of a comprehensive list of intelligence “targets” — the names of key individuals, where they worked and where they lived; and the location of the laboratories, workshops and storage points, and other items of interest to us. At the head of the list was the famous French atomic scientist, Frederic Joliot-Curie (later High Commissioner of Atomic Energy for France), and his equally famous wife, Irene Curie, the daughter of Madame Curie, discoverer of radium.

[…]

On August 25, they reached Paris, at the Porte d’Orleans, ahead of the French troops, and waited there for about half an hour until General LeClerc arrived with his armored division. The General led the triumphal entry, at 8:55 that morning, but tucked into the column, directly behind the first tank was an American jeep containing the first representatives of the U.S. Army: Pash, Calvert and two other Alsos agents.

[…]

There, on the steps of the university, they found Joliot and some of his staff, all wearing FFI arm bands. That evening they celebrated the liberation with Joliot by drinking some champagne he had reserved for the occasion. The American soldier’s staff of life, the K ration, served as the hors d’oeuvres. In keeping with the scientific surroundings, the champagne was drunk from laboratory beakers.

In the course of their conversation with Joliot, the names of two of his former colleagues came up: Hans von Halban, born an Austrian in Leipzig and later naturalized as a French citizen, and Lew Kowarski. Both men had left France for England in June of 1940 and had been working in the British Tube Alloys Project in Canada. Joliot immediately surmised that there was some connection between them, Pash and Calvert, and the uranium problem.

They did not openly tell him at first what they wanted of him. However, after an hour’s conversation, Joliot willingly told them just what they wanted to hear: that it was his sincere belief that the Germans had made very little progress on uranium and they were not remotely close to making an atomic bomb. He said he had refused to perform any war work for the Nazis and had forbidden them to use his laboratories for such purposes. However, after the occupation commenced, he said he did allow two German scientists to move into his laboratory to continue academic work on nuclear physics. He added that he talked with them frequently and clandestinely checked their work at night after the laboratory was closed, thus keeping constant surveillance on their activity. How true this all was we never knew.

[…]

The College of France, which was Joliot’s laboratory, owned a cyclotron, and a number of German scientists of interest to the MED had spent varying lengths of time there operating it. Among them was Professor Erich Schumann, who headed the German Army Research conducted by the Ordnance Department and who, during the war, served as the personal adviser on scientific research to Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel. Schumann was credited with initiating work on the German uranium project, although by the end of 1942 his responsibilities had been transferred to the Reich’s Research Council.

Another visitor to Joliot’s laboratory was Dr. Kurt Diebner, who in 1939 had served as Schumann’s right-hand man and who had continued nuclear research under the Reich’s Research Council. Then there was Professor Walther Bothe, an outstanding German nuclear experimentalist in the physics laboratory of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research. Dr. Abraham Essau, who until early 1944 was in charge of physics under the German Ministry of Education in the Reich’s Research Council, had made a number of visits to Paris. Essau had been president of the Ministry’s Bureau of Standards until January, 1944, when he was replaced as Plenipotentiary for Nuclear Physics by Walther Gerlach. There was also Dr. Wolfgang Gertner, an able German scientist who, before the war, had been associated with Ernest Lawrence in the United States. Gertner was an outstanding German authority on cyclotron operations. Joliot’s other visitors had included Dr. Erich Bagge, a member of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute, who specialized in isotope separation, and Dr. Werner Maurer, an experimental physicist engaged in nuclear research.

Joliot consistently maintained that he had acquiesced in the Germans’ use of the cyclotron with the distinct understanding that its use would not be of direct military assistance to their war effort. There was no independent evidence that this condition was made. There may have been a promise made to him by some of the German scientists, or they may have said that there appeared to be no military possibilities that could result from the use of the cyclotron, but I never found any real proof of Joliot’s contention. Certainly, his subsequent behavior — and I shall come to that shortly — gave us room for doubt.

[…]

The most difficult problem that Calvert’s intelligence group had to tackle was to find out where Hitler was hiding his atomic scientists. They knew, as everyone did, that before the war the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin had been a focal point for all atomic physicists and atomic research, not only in Germany, but in all of Europe. It was there that Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman had carried out their startling experiments. It was also the home of Max Planck, the internationally famous atomic scientist.

As the war drew on, however, and the bombing of Berlin was stepped up, we had learned from both aerial reconnaissance and a Berlin scientist, who got word to us through the Norwegian underground, that research on uranium had been moved, presumably to a safer location, but where he did not know.

[…]

The first information had trickled through in the summer of 1943. It seemed so innocuous that we did not appreciate its full import until much later. It was in the form of a report from an ungraded1 Swiss informant, received by the British Secret Intelligence, stating that a certain Swiss scientist, who was allegedly pro-Nazi, was aiding in the development of an explosive a thousand times more powerful than TNT. His experiments and research were being conducted in the greatest of secrecy in an unused spinning mill in Bisingen, Germany. Inasmuch as Allied Intelligence was receiving hundreds of reports of this nature daily, and coupled with the absence from this one of any telltale words or phrases, such as uranium, atoms, heavy water, cyclotrons or the like, Calvert catalogued this item but did not attach immediate importance to it.

Next, in the fall of 1943, American censorship had intercepted a letter from a prisoner of war in which he mentioned that he was working in a “research laboratory numbered ‘D.’” The letter was postmarked Hechingen, Germany, which is three miles north of Bisingen, in the Black Forest region of Germany, where many secret German projects had been moved. But again the report was so scanty that one could hardly assume that Germany’s atomic research was being carried on in these outwardly sleepy little villages.

It.was not until the spring of 1944 that Calvert received his first solid information. Then the OSS reported from Berne, Switzerland, that a Swiss scientist and professor had said that Dr. Werner Heisenberg, an internationally famous nuclear physicist and one of Germany’s top atomic scientists—if not the top—was living near Hechingen. We knew from other intelligence that Heisenberg was working on the uranium problem. With this new bit of information, Calvert knew that he had found the hiding place of Hitler’s top atomic scientists.

[…]

Calvert’s next big problem was to try to penetrate the area. To do that he would have to get somebody who knew it extremely well. British Intelligence located a vicar living in England who before the war had been Vicar of Bisingen. He was able to pinpoint and identify buildings and factories for us. He also pointed out buildings that had housed spinning mills.

At the same time Calvert sent a very reliable and able OSS agent, Moe Berg, the former catcher of the Washington Senators and Boston Red Sox, and a master of seven foreign languages, into Switzerland to prepare for a surreptitious entry into the Hechin-gen-Bisingen area. While Berg was in Switzerland, he picked up additional information and, passing himself off as a Swiss student, even attended a lecture given by Heisenberg, who had been granted permission to travel outside Germany to deliver this one speech. When I heard of Calvert’s plan for Berg to go into the Hechingen-Bisingen area, I immediately stopped it, realizing that if he were captured, the Nazis might be able to extract far more information about our project than we could ever hope to obtain if he were successful.

[…]

Starting in July, Calvert put the Bisingen-Hechingen area under constant air-photo surveillance. The pilots who flew these missions were never told of the nature of the suspected targets, lest they be interrogated in the event of a crash landing. At first our aerial reconnaissance produced nothing new. Then in the fall of 1944, we had our biggest scare to date. After one aerial sortie it was observed that near the town of Bisingen a number of slave labor camps had been erected with incredible speed. Ground had been broken and a complex of industrial sites had mushroomed within a period of two weeks. Railroad spurs had been constructed; mountains of materials had been moved in; power lines had been erected; and there was every indication that something was being built that commanded the utmost priority. Aerial interpreters, intelligence officers, our own technicians and scientists were all baffled after studying the photographs. Nobody could offer any sensible explanation of this new construction. All we knew was that throughout the past year we had been getting reports that this area was housing Germany’s top atomic scientists. The only thing upon which we could all agree was that whatever the construction was, it was unique. Naturally the first question that came to our minds was whether this was the start of Germany’s “Oak Ridge.” If it was, we did not want to bomb it immediately, since that would only drive the project underground and we would run the risk of not finding it again in time. Yet we could not let construction progress too far, particularly since this was just at the time when it was thought that the Germans might withdraw to the Black Forest and make it a redoubt area. Fortunately our anxiety was short-lived, and the fear of a German atomic plant was dissipated almost as quickly as it had arisen, when some British mining experts recognized that what we had been observing so closely was nothing more than a new form of shale-oil-cracking plant.

[…]

Before the war, when Union Miniere was the world’s leading supplier of uranium and radium, a number of German firms had purchased uranium products for normal peacetime uses, as well as for retrading purposes. The shipments involved in such transactions normally consisted of less than a ton per month of assorted refined materials, but since June, 1940, orders from a number of German companies had increased spectacularly.

A preliminary study conducted by Union Miniere indicated that a quantity of material was still in Belgium. Part of it was ready for shipment, but probably had not yet been removed. When I learned of this, I immediately sent Furman back to Europe with instructions to locate and secure the material. He and Pash conferred with General Bedell Smith, who arranged for the British 21st Army Group to support Alsos in its recovery operations, without revealing to the British the name or purpose of the material being sought. The area where they expected the ore to be was then in the front lines of the British sector and under light sniper fire. Pash and two of his agents hunted for it from September 19 to 25 before they finally found it. The captured ores amounted to sixty-eight tons, which were placed under joint American and British control and removed from Belgium to the United States by way of England.

Information obtained in Belgium led to further investigations in Eindhoven, near Antwerp, where we learned that in May of 1940, nine cars containing approximately seventy-two tons of uranium ores had been shipped out to Le Havre, France, ahead of the German invasion. Apparently, the Germans had seized two of the nine carloads at Le Havre, while the remainder were rerouted to Bordeaux. I instructed Alsos to obtain clearance from Supreme Headquarters, and then to locate this material and secure as much of it as possible. Pash and Calvert concentrated at first on an area in the vicinity of Perigueux, France, and finally in early October expanded their search to include much of southwestern and southern France. They were greatly hindered in their search by the presence of several thousand German troops, who had been cut off south of the Loire River by the Seventh Army. Eventually, they found thirty tons of the missing ore in Toulouse, but the remaining forty-two tons eluded us.

Calvert had by then determined where almost all of the Union Miniere ore in Germany was located and asked permission to make plans to go behind the German lines to get it. I denied his request, for I thought that any such attempt would be doomed to failure, and, what was more important, it would alert the Germans to the fact that we considered the ore to be of such value that we would take great risks to obtain it.

[…]

This operation at Strasbourg was by far the most successful that Alsos had conducted up to that time. The information gained there indicated quite definitely that Hitler had been apprised in 1942 of the possibilities of a nuclear weapon. Nevertheless, all evidence from Strasbourg clearly pointed to the fact that, as of the latter part of 1944, the enemy’s efforts to develop a bomb were still in the experimental stages, and greatly increased our belief that there was little probability of any sudden nuclear surprise from Germany.

Virtually his only critics were Pinker, Judge Richard Posner, and Steve Sailer

December 14th, 2025

It’s bizarre to think back to how intellectually prestigious Malcolm Gladwell was in the first decade of this century, Steve Sailer notes:

Virtually his only critics were Pinker, Judge Richard Posner, and myself.

I actually was moderately sympathetic to Gladwell because I bothered to understand his strengths and weaknesses.

The key to understanding Gladwell is to grasp that he is essentially a public relations professional of the kind that research universities employ to write press releases to make their professors’ academic papers more understandable to the upper middlebrow general audience. But Malcolm had somehow lucked into doing the same thing — punching up academic studies — for The New Yorker.

As I’ve pointed out several times, academic PR is a useful and honorable trade. I’ve frequently quoted PR specialists’ press releases about new papers rather than the original paper in a scholarly journal because the PR pro has emphasized the study’s most interesting finding, found vivid examples, added a little human interest, and otherwise provided amiable helps for us non-specialists. And he has the professor read it over before he sends it out to make sure he didn’t get anything too wrong.

The job is a little like being a trial lawyer in that you are supposed to make the best case for your client (in this case, the professor). But it’s less demanding because the other side isn’t employing a lawyer also trying to win the debate for his client.

Malcolm was extremely good at taking an academic’s technical research and polishing it up to be comprehensible and appealing to New Yorker subscribers.

Their best prospects lay in the use of plutonium

December 13th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesIt had begun to seem possible early in 1943, General Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), that the Germans could have progressed to the point where they might be able to use atomic bombs against us, or, more likely, against England:

Although this possibility seemed extremely remote to me, a number of the senior scientists in the project disagreed. One even went so far as to urge that I should warn the American people in an official broadcast that the United States might be hit by an atomic bomb. Naturally, I was opposed to doing any such thing. What I thought more likely was that the Germans would use an ordinary explosive bomb containing radioactive material. If we were unable to neutralize the effects of such a weapon promptly, a major panic could easily sweep through the Allied countries.

However, as the plans for the invasion of Europe began to take form, we considered very seriously indeed the possibility that the Germans might lay down some kind of radioactive barrier along the invasion routes. We could not calculate with any certainty the likelihood of their doing this, for we were truly in the dark then about their progress in atomic development. It had always seemed to most of us that their best prospects lay in the use of plutonium, which would demand a much smaller industrial effort as well as considerably less in the way of time, critical equipment and materials than any other method—provided they were willing to ignore safety precautions. This I felt the Germans would do, for considering what we already knew of their treatment of their Jewish minority, we could only assume they would not hesitate to expose these same citizens to excessive radiation. Hitler and his ardent supporters, we felt, would consider this a proper use for an “inferior” group, quite apart from the saving in effort and materials and time. Moreover, we knew that in the course of developing the plutonium process the Germans were certain to discover that tremendous quantities of highly radioactive fission products would be produced in their reactors. It would be perfectly natural for them to think of using these to lay down a barrier through which ground troops could not pass without disastrous results.

At the request of the Military Policy Committee, a three-man group, Conant, Compton and Urey, assisted by other project members, had made a study of radioactive poisoning; and on the basis of their report we had ordered a supply of portable Geiger counters and were training a number of our personnel to use them.

[…]

The Chief Surgeon, Major General Paul R. Hawley, issued two cover orders designed to insure that GHQ would be promptly alerted if the Germans did resort to radioactive warfare, but worded in such a way as to disguise the real nature of the danger. One order said that trouble had been experienced with fogging (which always results when film is exposed to radiation) on certain photographic and X-ray films and that if any such trouble was noted by troops in the field, an immediate report should be made, citing lot numbers, so that defective film could be withdrawn from use.

After 50 Years, MIT Chemists Finally Synthesize Elusive Anti-Cancer Compound

December 12th, 2025

MIT chemists have, for the first time, successfully created in the laboratory a fungal molecule called verticillin A, which was first discovered more than 50 years ago and has been recognized for its potential as an anticancer agent:

Researchers first reported the isolation of verticillin A from fungi, which use it for protection against pathogens, in 1970. Verticillin A and related fungal compounds have drawn interest for their potential anticancer and antimicrobial activity, but their complexity has made them difficult to synthesize.

In 2009, Movassaghi’s lab reported the synthesis of (+)-11,11?-dideoxyverticillin A, a fungal compound similar to verticillin A. That molecule has 10 rings and eight stereogenic centers, or carbon atoms that have four different chemical groups attached to them. These groups have to be attached in a way that ensures they have the correct orientation, or stereochemistry, with respect to the rest of the molecule.

Once that synthesis was achieved, however, synthesis of verticillin A remained challenging, even though the only difference between verticillin A and (+)-11,11?-dideoxyverticillin A is the presence of two oxygen atoms.

[…]

“What we learned was the timing of the events is absolutely critical. We had to significantly change the order of the bond-forming events,” Movassaghi says.

The verticillin A synthesis begins with an amino acid derivative known as beta-hydroxytryptophan, and then step-by-step, the researchers add a variety of chemical functional groups, including alcohols, ketones, and amides, in a way that ensures the correct stereochemistry.

[…]

Once the researchers had successfully completed the synthesis, they were also able to tweak it to generate derivates of verticillin A. Researchers at Dana-Farber then tested these compounds against several types of diffuse midline glioma (DMG), a rare brain tumor that has few treatment options.

The researchers found that the DMG cell lines most susceptible to these compounds were those that have high levels of a protein called EZHIP. This protein, which plays a role in the methylation of DNA, has been previously identified as a potential drug target for DMG.

[…]

The verticillin derivatives appear to interact with EZHIP in a way that increases DNA methylation, which induces the cancer cells to under programmed cell death. The compounds that were most successful at killing these cells were N-sulfonylated (+)-11,11?-dideoxyverticillin A and N-sulfonylated verticillin A. N-sulfonylation — the addition of a functional group containing sulfur and oxygen — makes the molecules more stable.

It would take a combination of three requisite factors to make a bomb

December 11th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesGeneral Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), that in making his initial appraisal of the German atomic picture, Captain Horace K. Calvert knew it would take a combination of three requisite factors to make a bomb:

Those were: (1) a sufficient number of top nuclear scientists and technical assistants; (2) the basic fuel for a bomb—uranium, and possibly thorium, probably combined with uranium; and (3) laboratories to develop it and industrial means to make it.

He started working on the fuel problem first, for we were sure of Germany’s scientific and industrial ability to do the job. Thorium seemed out of the question, since it is mined chiefly in Brazil and India and, because of embargoes, Germany had been unable to import any since the war began, and had had only insignificant stocks on hand before the war. The basic fuel was thought to be uranium. Considering our own firsthand knowledge of the enormous industrial effort required to produce U-235, we were confident that we would have seen evidences of any such program had one existed. It seemed more likely that they would use plutonium. That they had enough to launch an atomic program seemed to be within the realm of possibility, for we knew there had been a large stockpile of refined uranium ore at Oolen, Belgium, a few miles outside Brussels, which originally had been the property of Union Miniere.

The only other possible supply of uranium was the mines at Joachimsthal, Czechoslovakia, which was not a particularly significant source. Most of this ore was shipped to a uranium plant outside Berlin, the Auer-Gesellschaft. British Intelligence kept in touch with the activities of these mines, and in July, 1944, Calvert’s group started periodic aerial surveillance over the entire mining area, studying the pictures in detail for new shafts and aboveground activity. Tailing piles from each mine were microscopically measured from one reconnaissance to the next. By knowing the general grade of the ore and measuring the piles, we could determine with some degree of accuracy the mine’s daily production. There were no signs of extraordinary activity.

It would have been imperative for Hitler to enlist the aid of all his top scientists. Allied Intelligence had established that many of them were working on the “V” weapon; particularly at Peenemiinde, but to our knowledge no nuclear physicists had been reported there. Calvert started a search for some fifty German nuclear scientists. He knew that there must be many young scientists who had come up since Hitler’s rise to power of whom we had no knowledge; however, if we could locate a few of the top people, they should lead us to the rest. All the present and back issues of the German physics journals were scrutinized. Foreign-born nuclear scientists in the United States, like Enrico Fermi, O. R. Frisch and Niels Bohr, as well as anti-Nazi professors and scientists in Switzerland, Sweden and other neutral countries, were questioned in detail to obtain any past or present information they might have on the whereabouts of the German scientists. The names of all German scientists were placed on watch lists with American and British intelligence agencies which were daily scanning German newspapers that had been smuggled out. Before long we had recent addresses for a majority of the scientists in whom we were interested.

The third main category of pre-D-Day investigation, laboratories and industrial plants, was studied in much the same way. Lists were compiled of all of the precious metal refineries, the physics laboratories, the handlers of uranium and thorium, manufacturers of centrifugal and reciprocating pumps, power plants and other such installations as were known to exist in the Axis countries. These were placed on a master list from which they were not removed until we had positive information that they were not engaged in, or supplying, an atomic program. All plants where work of an unknown nature was being conducted were checked through aerial reconnaissance, the underground, OSS and all the numerous intelligence agencies.

A critical problem is one that people are willing to pay a considerable price to have solved

December 10th, 2025

Politics is nothing but an ocean of hyperbole, Bryan Caplan reminds us, as he cites this passage from Edward Banfield‘s 1974 classic, The Unheavenly City Revisited:

A great part of the wealth of our country is in the cities. When a mayor says that his city is on the verge of bankruptcy, he means that when the time comes to run for reelection he wants to be able to claim credit for straightening out a mess that was left to him by his predecessor. What he means when he says that his city must have state or federal aid to finance some improvements is (1) the taxpayers of the city (or some important group of them) would rather go without the improvements than pay for it themselves); or (2) although they would pay for it themselves if they had to, they would much prefer to have some other taxpayers pay for it. Rarely if ever does a mayor who makes such a statement mean (1) that for the city to pay for the improvement would necessarily force some taxpayers into poverty; or (2) that the city could not raise the money even if it were willing to force some of its taxpayers into poverty. In short, the “revenue crisis” mainly reflects the fact that people hate to pay taxes and that they think that by crying poverty they can shift some of the bill to someone else.

[…]

That we have not yet been willing to pay the price of solving, or alleviating such “problems” even when the price is a very small one suggests that they are not really critical. Indeed, one might say that, by definition, a critical problem is one that people are willing to pay a considerable price to have solved.

120 kilograms of heavy water were being delivered to the Nazis each month

December 9th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesWe did not make any appreciable effort during the war, General Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), to secure information on atomic developments in Japan:

First, and most important, there was not even the remotest possibility that Japan had enough uranium or uranium ore to produce the necessary materials for a nuclear weapon. Also the industrial effort that would be required far exceeded what Japan was capable of. Then, too, discussions with our atomic physicists at Berkeley, who knew the leading Japanese atomic physicists personally, led us to the conclusion that their qualified people were altogether too few in number for them to produce an effective weapon in the foreseeable future. Finally, it would have been extremely difficult for us to secure and to get out of Japan any information of the type we needed.

[…]

Positive support for our reasoning that the Germans were vitally interested in atomic energy had come from Norway, where before the war, in the town of Rjukan, about seventy-five miles west of Oslo, the Norwegians had constructed a complex of hydroelectric and electrochemical plants. When the Nazis occupied the country in 1940, they had required the operators of the Rjukan works to enter into contracts to produce heavy water which was to be shipped to Berlin for experimental use in the development of atomic energy. In September of 1942 we had estimated that approximately 120 kilograms of heavy water were being delivered to the Nazis each month under the terms of this contract.

[…]

The first attempt to put these works out of commission involved the use of guerrilla forces. Some five months after my request, three Norwegians, especially trained in sabotage techniques, and wearing British uniforms, parachuted into Norway, where they were met by local guerrillas. After nearly a week of hard cross-country skiing, they arrived at Rjukan and attacked the factories there on February 27, 1943.

The first reports on this action were most encouraging. A news dispatch from Oslo, which was relayed to Stockholm, stated that damage was “not extensive except at the place where the attempt was made and there the devastation was total.” Subsequent reports from Sweden were even more encouraging, calling this “one of the most important and successful undertakings the Allied saboteurs have carried out as yet during the war.”

These same Swedish newspapers caused me some headaches when they went on to speculate at considerable length about the importance of heavy water, pointing out that “many scientists have pinned their hopes of producing the ‘secret weapon’ upon heavy water, namely an explosive of hitherto unheard-of-violence.” These items were picked up by the London papers and finally, on April 4, 1943, New York readers were greeted by such headlines as “Nazi ‘Heavy Water’ Looms as Weapon.” Immediately, Dr. Harold Urey, who had discovered heavy water, was deluged with calls from reporters wanting more information. He neatly sidestepped all such inquiries with the statement that “So far as I know, heavy water’s uses are confined solely to experimental biology. I have never heard of an industrial application for heavy water, and know of no way it can be used for explosives.”

Meanwhile, the British were hard at work assessing the damage done to the Rjukan works in the February raid. Their first estimates indicated that heavy-water production had been set back by about two years. We had different information, but our suspicions were not confirmed until we learned definitely that the plant had resumed partial operations in April. Yet doubt can be contagious and, under our gentle prodding, Sir John Dill soon felt himself compelled to inform General Marshall that a more realistic appraisal of the damage indicated that the plant could be completely restored in about twelve months. After some discussion of launching another commando raid—a full-scale one this time—General Marshall, at my behest, proposed to Sir John Dill that, instead, the plants be made a first priority bombing objective. This proposal led ultimately to a massive air attack on Rjukan in November of 1943. Although this mission in itself was not particularly destructive, it apparently led the Germans to believe that more attacks would follow. This belief, together with the problem of constant sabotage by workers in the plants, and probably a lack of appreciation at high government levels of the possible value of the product, caused the Nazis to give up their attempts to repair the damage done by the saboteurs in February. All apparatus, catalyzers and concentrates used in the production of heavy water were ordered shipped to Berlin. Norwegian guerrillas interfered with every step of the transfer, successfully destroying much valuable equipment and even going so far as to sink the ferry which carried a large part of the heavy water.

We just want every child to reach their full potential

December 8th, 2025

Freddie deBoer is exasperated with anti-hereditarians who talk as though Blank-Slatism is some reviled niche perspective, when in fact the blank slate represents the bipartisan and cross-ideological assumption that has dominated debate in education policy since before he was born:

Perhaps the reason I am so regularly exasperated with people like Hoel or Eric Turkheimer or any number of others in this conversation is because I have been marinated in the ed policy world for a long, long time, and in that world there is no debate at all: every child is capable of any academic outcome. There is no limit to what education can do. Go to your average charter school conference and the idea that individual students have any inherent or intrinsic academic tendency isn’t just unpopular, it will get you shouted out of the room. Try being a public school teacher of a 25th percentile student, telling his parents that it’s not realistic to hope to turn him into a 90th percentile student, and see how that goes for you professionally. Even if you can get people to concede that our goal shouldn’t be equality of educational outcomes, or even that students perhaps don’t all have perfectly equal potentials, such concessions will remain in the realm of the vague and the general.

(When I ask people if they think we should try to establish summative educational equality of outcomes, they say of course not, that’s a straw man, we just want every child to reach their full potential. When I ask if they think it would be alright if, say, 15% of students were a full standard deviation or more below the mean, they say that’s outrageous, we should never condone that level of failure! And it’s like, guys….)

The two most important American educational bills in the 21st century have been No Child Left Behind (bipartisan, signed by a Republican president) and the Every Student Succeeds Act (bipartisan, signed by a Democratic president). Those names are not coincidental or empty; they express exactly what the politicians who drafted them believed was possible. They reflect a cross-ideological and remarkably durable assumption in our education politics that all students can be pushed through the college-to-affluence pipeline. I wish people on the genetics research side of this debate would stop talking as though there’s some rigid hereditarian consensus when, in the ed policy world, there is in fact the exact opposite.