Whom do we fear or trust?

Sunday, August 10th, 2008

Whom do we fear or trust?

[U]sing a commercial software program that generates composites of human faces (based on laser scans of real subjects), the scientists asked another group of test subjects to look at 300 faces and rate them for trustworthiness, dominance and threat. Common features of both trustworthiness and dominance emerged. A trustworthy face, at its most extreme, has a U-shaped mouth and eyes that form an almost surprised look. An untrustworthy face, at its most extreme, is an angry one with the edges of the mouth curled down and eyebrows pointing down at the center. The least dominant face possible is one resembling a baby’s with a larger distance between the eyes and the eyebrows than other faces. A threatening face can be obtained by averaging an untrustworthy and a dominant face.

(Hat tip to FuturePundit.)

Populations Expanding Where It Is Most Difficult to Grow Food

Sunday, August 10th, 2008

The New York Times notes that populations are expanding fastest where it is most difficult to grow food — and they’re not referring to Hong Kong and Singapore, but sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East:

The world’s population is projected to grow to 9 billion before 2050. Proportionally, the countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East are among the fastest growing. But those are the world’s driest regions, and by 2050, fresh water there will be twice as scarce.

We in the West may not be caught in a Malthusian Trap, but we seem determined to ignore the unintended side-effects of our aid to less developed countries that are.

Why not have profit-maximizing governments?

Saturday, August 9th, 2008

Arnold Kling has been reading and thinking about Mencius Moldbug‘s notion of neocameralism, and he asks the folks at Creative Capitalism, Why not have profit-maximizing governments?

Shareholders would be looking to maximize their returns. If the leader engages in arbitrary confiscation, she may be able to pay a nice short-term dividend. However, such a policy will lower the society’s wealth and reduce future dividends. Shareholders would prefer a more farsighted policy. A leader who protects property rights and invests in public goods probably will generate a higher share price.

A poorly-run country, such as Zimbabwe, probably would be taken over by investors seeking to profit from a turnaround. These investors would buy up shares and install new management.

I think he states his points more poetically on his own site:

One way to think about a profit-maximizing government is that it is like a slave-owner who realizes that feeding and educating his slaves is the best way to earn a high return on his assets.

Most people would say that we live in a world in which we are not slaves to government. It could be that, or it could just be that our masters are somewhat diffuse and dysfunctional.

States already have massive tax revenues, and they already sell debt. It is a bit odd that they don’t sell equity and maximize profits.

Instead, we declare that they should operate in the best interests of The People — whoever they are — and rely on tradition and social conventions to keep the politicians and bureaucrats from dividing the spoils too transparently. They do divvy them up though; they just have to do so very inefficiently, by handing out sinecures.

Sarkozy Forces the French to Join the 1980s

Saturday, August 9th, 2008

In commenting on the French — Sarkozy Forces the French to Join the 1980s — Michael Lewis (Liar’s Poker and Moneyball) explains the British transformation of the 1980s:

A few years after Margaret Thatcher came to power and launched what at the time seemed a futile war to compel the English people to embrace business values, I found myself dazed and confused in a London corner shop.

Down one aisle and up the other, I paced but found no trace of what I’d come for: the world’s finest pseudo-cookies. The shelf that once held those delicious McVitie’s wafers coated with milk chocolate was now stocked with less desirable items.

At length, I went to the middle-aged shop owner and asked where she’d hidden my favorite treats — this gift from the gods to those of us who want to pretend our cookies are merely crackers.

“We used to stock those,” she said, sweetly, “but we kept running out, so we’ve stopped.”

Right then I thought: Thatcherism is doomed. The English will never embrace efficiency, or money-making, or the-customer-is-always-right mindset, or any of those uneasy values that underpin modern capitalism.

I was wrong, obviously. The English have not merely embraced commercial values but have become so thoroughly imbued with them that London has displaced New York as the world’s money hub. A nation of people once embarrassed to complain that their soup was cold is now among the first to demand to speak to the manager.
[...]
Of course, it’s possible to change a society and to drag it into the global economic monoculture. Mrs. Thatcher showed how: Break up collectives and make people feel a little bit more alone in the world. Cut a few holes in the social safety net. Raise the status of money-making, and lower the status of every other activity. Stop giving knighthoods to artists and start giving them to department-store moguls. Stop listening to intellectuals and start listening to entrepreneurs and financiers.

Hate Becomes Love.

Don’t mind that artists and intellectuals hate you — or even that, for a time, the entire society seems to hate you. Stick to the plan long enough and the people who are good at making money acquire huge sums and, along with them, power. In time, they become the culture’s dominant voice. And they love you for it.

Traffic

Saturday, August 9th, 2008

Mary Roach reviews Traffic: Why We Drive the Way We Do (and What It Says About Us) by Tom Vanderbilt, which argues, in her words, that traffic jams are not, by and large, caused by flaws in road design but by flaws in human nature:

Vanderbilt cites a statistic that nearly 80 percent of crashes involve drivers not paying attention for up to three seconds. Thus the places that seem the most dangerous — narrow roads, hairpin turns — are rarely where people mess up. “Most crashes,” Vanderbilt writes, “happen on dry roads, on clear, sunny days, to sober drivers.” For this reason, roads that could be straight are often constructed with curves — simply to keep drivers on the ball.

This basic truth — feeling safe kills — lies beneath many of the book’s insights. Americans think roundabouts are more dangerous than intersections with traffic lights. Roundabouts require you to adjust your speed, to merge, in short, to pay attention. At an intersection, we simply watch the light. And so we may not notice the red-light runner coming at us or the pedestrian stepping off the curb. A study that followed 24 intersections that had been converted from signals or stop signs to roundabouts showed an almost 90 percent drop in fatal crashes after the change.

For similar reasons, S.U.V.’s are more dangerous than cars. Not just because they’re slower to stop and harder to maneuver, but because — by conferring a sense of safety — they invite careless behavior. “The safer cars get,” Vanderbilt says, “the more risks drivers choose to take.” (S.U.V. drivers are more likely to not bother with their seat belts, to talk on cellphones, and to not wear seat belts while talking on cellphones.) So it goes for much of the driving universe. More people are killed while crossing in crosswalks than while jaywalking. Drivers pass bicyclists more closely on a road with bike lanes than on one without.

F.I.E. X-Change Vision 2000

Friday, August 8th, 2008

BusinessWeek is highlighting some Olympic innovations, and it looks like fencing has finally moved to a transparent visor, the F.I.E. X-Change Vision 2000:

Though a few other companies have designed fencing masks with transparent visors, Leon Paul’s was the first to be approved by the international fencing governing body, the Fédération Internationale d’Escrime (FIE). The scratch-resistant, polycarbonate plastic visor is coated with an antifog compound that was originally developed for jet pilots. The helmet was designed using patented contour-fit technology to fit tighter and feel lighter.

My Belt Sander Can Beat Your Circular Saw

Friday, August 8th, 2008

An electric drag racer is just a cordless drill with wheels, enthusiasts joke. Now some have taken the metaphor a bit too literally. My Belt Sander Can Beat Your Circular Saw:

In the six years since a pair of San Francisco Bay area artists held the first power tool drag races, technophiles have exported the tradition to three continents, holding similar competitions in Sacramento, Seattle, Canada, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Israel. They’ve raced everything from power drills and grinders to upright vacuum cleaners, leaf blowers, chain saws and even the occasional fire extinguisher.
[...]
Take the simplest racing tool of all: the humble belt sander. Out of the box, it’s a ready-made racer. Put it on a flat surface with the belt facing down, lock the trigger into the on position, and your tool will automatically propel itself forward like a tiny tank. (For belt sanders that don’t have trigger locks, you could make MacGyver proud by cinching down the trigger with a zip tie.)

Need more traction? Try a belt with a coarser grade of sandpaper.

Other power tools take more patience to convert. Since they’re intended for hand-held use, most tools aren’t race-ready off the shelf. For example, if you plunk a circular saw down on a wooden racetrack, you might manage to saw the track in half, but your tool won’t go anywhere.

The solution? Build a chassis. Some folks like angle iron, while others prefer welded steel, wood scraps or PVC piping. Bolt on some wheels — skateboard and in-line skate wheels are cheap and popular — and mount the saw on the frame so it bites into the track. Instead of slicing downwards, your contraption will zoom full force ahead.

If this kind of tinkering sounds tricky, there’s no need to re-invent the wheel, or the saw blade, for that matter. A detailed tutorial at Instructables.com (www.instructables.com/id/Power-Tool-Racer.-Quick-&-On-The-Cheap!) gives step-by-step directions for converting a circular saw into a racer, courtesy of Jeremy Franklin-Ross, co-founder of the Hazard Factory artists’ collective in Seattle.

Hazard Factory has a trove of online building resources, including a chat forum, at www.powertoolracer.com. Make magazine, the guide for tinkerers who want to make rodent-powered nightlights or jam-jar jets, has an instructional podcast on the subject of power tool drag racers on its site, blog.makezine.com; the host, Bre Pettis, offers a valuable reminder: “Power tools are very dangerous. … it’s just a good idea in general to keep your hands away from anything that could cut them off.”

Beginner builders can also find plenty of racing videos on YouTube and dozens of photographs at powertooldragraces.com/photogallery.html. Some regional racing groups hold build days, where novices learn skills alongside veteran tool freaks. Information on race schedules is at powertooldragraces.com and hazardfactory.org.

Tito Ortiz signs with Affliction

Thursday, August 7th, 2008

I did not realize that there was a Celebrity Apprentice, let alone that Tito Ortiz was on it and became friends with Donald Trump — who own the UFC’s latest competitor, Affliction. Now it looks like Tito Ortiz has signed with Affliction, and the deal is a big one:

“I guarantee you that my contract will be like no other,” said Ortiz, stopping short of giving away the specifics of a deal that could include responsibilities outside of the ring. “It will be a ground-breaking record contract for sure, without a doubt. There’s so much money to be made right now in mixed martial arts and it’s all about the fighters trying to make that money. It’s going to be a long-term deal where I put my heart and soul into the company and help build them. That’s something I’m interested in doing. They’re going to bring me on, not just as a fighter but also doing some of the back work also.”

Ortiz, who became a free agent on Monday after an 11-year career with the Ultimate Fighting Championship, met with Donald Trump on Tuesday to finalize the deal and is expected to be at Wednesday’s press conference where his first opponent will be Renato “Babalu” Sobral.

Ortiz, by the way, retired from the UFC after losing to Lyoto Machida. (It was pretty one-sided until Tito almost pulled off an impressive triangle in the final round.)

Stage magic isn’t statecraft

Thursday, August 7th, 2008

Stage magic isn’t statecraft — usually:

In September of 1856, in the face of a growing rebellion, Napoleon III dispatched Jean-Eugene Robert-Houdin to Algeria. Robert-Houdin was not a general, nor a diplomat. He was a magician – the father, by most accounts, of modern magic. (A promising young escape artist named Ehrich Weiss would, a few decades later, choose his stage name by adding an “i” to “Houdin.”) His mission was to counter the Algerian marabouts, conjurers whose artful wizardry had helped convince the Algerian populace of Allah’s displeasure with French rule.

A French colonial official assembled an audience of Arab chieftains, and Robert-Houdin put on a show that, in its broadest outlines, would be familiar to today’s audiences: he pulled cannonballs out of his hat, he plucked lit candelabra out of the air, he poured gallon upon gallon of coffee out of an empty silver bowl.

Then, as he recounted in his memoirs, Robert-Houdin launched into a piece of enchantment calculated to cow the chieftains. He had a small wooden chest with a metal handle brought onto the stage. He picked a well-muscled member of the audience and asked him to lift the box; the man did it easily. Then Robert-Houdin announced, with a menacing wave of his hand, that he had sapped the man’s strength. When the volunteer again took hold of the box, it would not budge – an assistant to Robert-Houdin had activated a powerful magnet in the floor of the stage. The volunteer heaved at the box, his frustration shading into desperation until Robert-Houdin’s assistant, at a second signal, sent an electric shock through the handle, driving the man screaming from the stage. The chieftains were duly impressed, and the rebellion quelled.

The story of Robert-Houdin’s diplomacy by legerdemain is well-established in magic lore, in large part because it is the only documented instance, at least since antiquity, in which a conjurer changed the course of world affairs. Stage magic, after all, isn’t statecraft, but spectacle and entertainment.

Now researchers have begun to realize that magic represents something more than spectacle and entertainment — not statecraft, but a deep and untapped store of knowledge about the human mind:

Misdirection is, in a sense, the conjurer’s tool that is easiest to understand – we miss things simply because we aren’t looking at them. Martinez-Conde is particularly interested in misdirection, and the question of what it is about certain movements that attract and hold our attention. Robbins, a performing pickpocket and another of the magicians to coauthor the Nature Neuroscience paper, has found, he says, that semi-circular gestures draw people’s attention better than straight ones. “It engages them more,” he says. “I use them when I’m actually coming out of the pocket.”

Martinez-Conde is intrigued by this distinction, and has hypothesized that the particular magnetism of curved motions might spring from the fact that they don’t map as easily onto the quick, straight movements, or saccades, that our eyes instinctively use to focus on objects. As a result, she suggests, curved motions might require more sustained attention and concentration to follow.

Other effects, though, are more befuddling. Often eye-tracking studies show that subjects can be looking right at an object without seeing it – car accident survivors report a similar paradox. Or, with just a little encouragement, a person can be made to see something where there’s nothing.

The vanishing ball illusion is one of the most basic tricks a magician can learn: a ball is thrown repeatedly into the air and caught. Then, on the final throw, it disappears in midair. In fact, the magician has merely mimed the last throw, following the ball’s imagined upward trajectory with his eyes while keeping it hidden in his hand.

But if the technique is easily explained, the phenomenon itself is not. If done right, the trick actually makes observers see the ball rising into the air on the last toss and vanishing at its apex. As Rensink points out, this is something more powerful than merely getting someone to look in the wrong direction – it’s a demonstration of how easy it is to nudge the brain into the realm of actual hallucination. And cognitive scientists still don’t know exactly what’s causing it to happen.

Hyperion Power Module

Thursday, August 7th, 2008

The Hyperion Power Module — which promises clean, safe, affordable, reliable power — seems like just the ticket for powering one’s secret super-scientist laboratory — and any associated death-rays — in a remote, off-grid location:

Invented at the famed Los Alamos National Laboratory, Hyperion small modular power reactors make all the benefits of safe, clean nuclear power available for remote locations. For both industrial and community applications, Hyperion offers reliable energy with no greenhouse gas emissions. Hyperion power is also cheaper than fossil fuels and, when you consider the cost of land and materials, watt to watt, Hyperion’s innovative energy technology is even more affordable than many developing “alternative” energy technologies.

Small enough to be transported on a ship, truck or train, Hyperion power modules are about the size of a “hot tub” — approximately 1.5 meters wide. Out of sight and safe from nefarious threats, Hyperion power modules are buried far underground and guarded by a security detail. Like a power battery, Hyperion modules have no moving parts to wear down, and are delivered factory sealed. They are never opened on site. Even if one were compromised, the material inside would not be appropriate for proliferation purposes. Further, due to the unique, yet proven science upon which this new technology is based, it is impossible for the module to go supercritical, “melt down” or create any type of emergency situation. If opened, the very small amount of fuel that is enclosed would immediately cool. The waste produced after five years of operation is approximately the size of a softball and is a good candidate for fuel recycling.


Perfect for moderately-sized projects, Hyperion produces only 25 MWe — enough to provide electricity for about 20,000 average American sized homes or its industrial equivalent. Ganged or teamed together, the modules can produce even more consistent energy for larger projects.

Better Batteries Charge Up

Thursday, August 7th, 2008

MIT’s Technology Review reports on secretive startup EEStor’s latest extravagant claims. Better Batteries Charge Up:

Dick Weir, founder and chief executive of EEStor, a startup based in Cedar Park, TX, says that the company has manufactured materials that have met all certification milestones for crystallization, chemical purity, and particle-size consistency. The results suggest that the materials can be made at a high-enough grade to meet the company’s performance goals. The company also said a key component of the material can withstand the extreme voltages needed for high energy storage.

“These advancements provide the pathway to meeting our present requirements,” Weir says. “This data says we hit the home run.”

EEStor claims that its system, called an electrical energy storage unit (EESU), will have more than three times the energy density of the top lithium-ion batteries today. The company also says that the solid-state device will be safer and longer lasting, and will have the ability to recharge in less than five minutes. Toronto-based ZENN Motor, an EEStor investor and customer, says that it’s developing an EESU-powered car with a top speed of 80 miles per hour and a 250-mile range. It hopes to launch the vehicle, which the company says will be inexpensive, in the fall of 2009.

As they say, skepticism in the research community is high.

(Hat tip to FuturePundit.)

Contagious cancer

Thursday, August 7th, 2008

David Quammen discusses contagious cancer — like the variant killing off the Tasmanian Devil:

Devil tumor isn’t the only form of cancer ever to achieve such a feat. Other cases have occurred and are still occurring. The most notable is Canine Transmissible Venereal Tumor (CTVT), also called Sticker’s sarcoma, a sexually transmitted malignancy in dogs. Again, this is not merely an infectious virus that tends to induce cancer. The tumor cells themselves are transmitted during sexual contact. CTVT is widespread (though not common) and has been claiming dogs around the world at least since a Russian veterinarian named M. A. Novinsky first noted it in 1876. The distinctively altered chromosome patterns shared by the cells of CTVT show the cancer’s lineal continuity, its identity across space and through time. Tumor cells in Dog B, Dog C, Dog D, and Dog Z are more closely related to one another than those cells are to the dogs they respectively inhabit. In other words, CTVT can be conceptualized as a single creature, a parasite (and not a species of parasite, but an individual), which has managed to spread itself out among millions of different dogs. Research by molecular geneticists suggests the tumor originated in a wolf, or maybe an East Asian dog, somewhere between 200 and 2,500 years ago, which means that CTVT is probably the oldest continuous lineage of mammal cells presently living on Earth. The dogs may be young, but the tumor is ancient.

Unlike devil tumor — now known as Devil Facial Tumor Disease, or DFTD — CTVT is generally not fatal. It can be cured with veterinary surgery or chemotherapy. In many cases, even without treatment, the dog’s immune system eventually recognizes the CTVT as alien, attacks it, and clears it away, just as our own immune systems eventually rid us of warts.

The case of the Syrian hamster is more complicated. This tumor arose around 1960, when researchers at the National Cancer Institute, in Bethesda, Maryland, performed an experiment in which they harvested a naturally occurring sarcoma from one hamster and injected those cells (as cancer scientists often do) into healthy animals. When the injected hamsters developed malignancies, more cells were harvested. Each such inoculation-and-harvest cycle is called a passage. The experiment involved a dozen such passages, and over time the tumor began to change. It had evolved. The later generations, unlike the first, represented a sort of super tumor, capable of getting from hamster to hamster without benefit of a needle. The researchers caged ten healthy hamsters together with ten cancerous hamsters and found that nine of the healthy animals acquired tumors through social contact. The hamster tumor had leapt between animals—or anyway, it had been smeared, spat, bitten, and dribbled between them. (The tenth hamster got cannibalized before it could sicken.) In a related experiment, the tumor even passed between two hamsters separated by a wire screen. The scientists had in effect created a laboratory precursor of what would eventually afflict Tasmanian devils in the wild: a Frankenstein malignancy, a leaping tumor, which could conceivably kill off not just individuals but an entire species.

Sadly, “the phenomenon of transmissible tumors isn’t confined to canines, Tasmanian devils, and Syrian hamsters”:

There have been human cases, too. Forty years ago a team of physicians led by Edward F. Scanlon reported, in the journal Cancer, that they had “decided to transplant small pieces of tumor from a cancer patient into a healthy donor, on a well informed volunteer basis, in the hope of gaining a little better understanding of cancer immunity,” which they thought might help in treating the patient. The patient was a fifty-year-old woman with advanced melanoma; the “donor” was her healthy eighty-year-old mother, who had agreed to receive a bit of the tumor by surgical transplant. One day after the transplant procedure, the daughter died suddenly from a perforated bowel. Scanlon’s report neglects to explain why the experiment wasn’t promptly terminated — why they didn’t dive back in surgically to undo what had been done to the mother. Instead, three weeks were allowed to pass, at which point the mother had developed a tumor indistinguishable from her daughter’s. Now it was too late for surgery. This cancer moved fast. It metastasized, and the mother died about fifteen months later, with tumors in her lungs, ribs, lymph nodes, and diaphragm.

The case of the daughter–mother transplant and the case of the Syrian hamsters have one common element: the original sources of the tumor and the recipients were genetically very similar. If the genome of one individual closely resembles the genome of another (as children resemble their parents, and as inbred animals resemble one another), the immune system of a recipient may not detect the foreignness of transplanted cells. The hamsters were highly inbred (intentionally, for experimental control) and therefore not very individuated from one another as far as their immune systems could discern. The mother and daughter were also genetically similar — as similar as two people can be without being identical twins. Lack of normal immune response, because of such closeness, goes some way toward explaining why those tumors survived transference between individuals.

Low immune response also figures in two other situations in which tumor transmission is known to occur: pregnancy and organ transplant. A mother sometimes passes cancer cells to her fetus in the womb. And a transplanted organ sometimes carries tiny tumors into the recipient, vitiating the benefits of receiving a life-saving liver or kidney from someone else. Cases of both kinds are very rare, and they involve some inherent or arranged compatibility between the original victim of the tumor and the secondary victim, plus an immune system that is either compromised (by immuno-suppressive drugs, in the organ recipient) or immature (in the fetus).

Other cases are less easily explained. In 1986, two researchers from the National Institutes of Health reported that a laboratory worker, a healthy nineteen-year-old woman, had accidentally jabbed herself with a syringe carrying colon-cancer cells; a colonic tumor grew in her hand, but she was rescued by surgery. More recently, a fifty-three-year-old surgeon cut his left palm while removing a malignancy from a patient’s abdomen, and five months later he found himself with a palm tumor, one that genetically matched the patient’s tumor. His immune system responded, creating an inflammation around the tumor, but the response was insufficient and the tumor kept growing. Why? How? It wasn’t supposed to be able to do that. Again, though, surgery delivered a full cure. And then there’s Henri Vadon. He was a medical student in the 1920s who poked his left hand with a syringe after drawing liquid from the mastectomy wound of a woman being treated for breast cancer. Vadon, too, developed a hand tumor. Three years later, he died of metastasized cancer because neither the surgical techniques of his era nor his own immune system could save him.

There are a couple reasons why cancer doesn’t normally spread to other individuals:

“Cells are very effete. Very susceptible to dying in the outside world.” They dry out, they wither, they don’t remain viable when they’re naked and alone. Bacteria can form spores. Viruses in their capsules can lie dormant. But cells from a metazoan? No. They’re not packaged for transit.

And that’s only one of two major constraints, Weinberg said. The second is that if cancer cells do pass from one body to another, they are instantly recognized as foreign and eliminated by the immune system. Each cell of any sort bears on its exterior a set of protuberant proteins that declare its identity; they might be thought of as its travel papers. These proteins are called antigens and are produced uniquely in each individual by the MHC (major histocompatibility complex) genes. If the travel papers of a cell are unacceptable (because the cell is an invader from some other body), the T cells (one type of immunological police cell) will attack and obliterate it. If the invader cell shows no papers at all, another kind of police cell (called NK cells) will bust it. Only if the antigens on the cell surface have been “downregulated” discreetly but not eliminated altogether can a foreign cell elude the immune system of a host. That’s what Canine Transmissible Venereal Tumor seems to have done: downregulated its antigens. It shows fake travel papers — blurry, faded, but just good enough to get by.

Hampton Sides sheds light on Mancur Olson and Ronald Coase

Wednesday, August 6th, 2008

Nick Szabo finds that Hampton Sides sheds light on Mancur Olson and Ronald Coase in his new book, Blood and Thunder: The Epic Story of Kit Carson and the Conquest of the American West:

Most of the book involves interactions between Indian tribes, often nomadic, and agricultural-based Mexican and Anglo-Saxon cultures. The Navajo, for example, were nomadic herders that also profited from stealing, usually livestock, from nearby Pueblo, Mexican, and later United States ranches. In his account of prehistory Sides relates how, a few hundred years before Columbus, the spectacular pueblos (apartment buildings) of the Anasazi farm-based civilization in the Chaco Canyon were abandoned just as the Navajo were migrating into Anasazi territory from the north. Sides invokes as the main reason the popular ecological theory: that the Anasazi declined due to depleting nearby resources such as soils and forests, and suggests the Navajo as a contributing reason.

I think this gets it backwards. The Navajo entry at the same time the Anasazi’s pueblos were abandoned is no coincidence, it is the main cause. Faced by a militarily superior group of roving bandits, the Anasazi’s agricultural property was no longer secure. The Anasazi, ruled by stationary bandits, were conquered by the Navajo, nomadic herders and hunters. Further evidence that Mancur Olson’s bandit theory, rather than ecological theory, explains the abandonment of their civilization in the Chaco Canyon is that the Anasazi culture didn’t disappear, it declined and moved. Their descendants are the Pueblo Indians, and they dispersed to build a pueblos at the fringes of the Navajo territory. (“Anasazi”, incidentally, is a Navajo term meaning “ancestors of our enemies”). Accelerated depletion of resources is a symptom of insecure property rights: where property is insecure people act (with respect to natural resources rather than with respect to fellow humans) as roving bandits, whereas secure property owners extract their resources like stationary bandits, i.e. at a much lower and far more sustainable rate.

Per Olson the Navajo, being roving bandits (with respect to both people and fixed resources) would have had a far higher Laffer maximum extortion rate and thus were not able to accumulate wealth to support a level of civilization nearly as high as the Anasazi under stationary bandits had supported. The Pueblo Indians and later the Mexicans who bordered the Navajos and other roving bandit cultures were able to support agriculture, but were far poorer than other most other fully agricultural regions of the time due to the costs of Navajo and Apache raids. The fall of the Anasazi was hardly the first time roving bandits had conquered stationary bandits causing a massive decline in wealth and civilization: it is a common pattern throughout history.

(Incidentally, the Laffer maximum for banditry from a sedentary neighbor, where there are a few but not many competing bandits, is probably somewhere in between the maxima for fully roving and fully stationary bandits: Sides recounts how the Navajo would not steal every animal from their Pueblo or Mexican neighbors during raids, but made sure to leave them enough breeding stock to rebuild their herds).

That covers Mancur Olson. What about Ronald Coase?

There are a large number of people who, following David Friedman, use the Coase Theorem as if it applied to the coercive bargaining that occurs in an anarchy. Sides’ relentless accounts of attacks and reprisals put a lie to this Coaseian analysis of anarchy. The Navajo came as close, perhaps, to anarchy has any recorded culture has ever come. They had, for example, no sovereign leaders with which to make binding treaties. When American generals tried to make treaties with individuals they thought were Navajo chiefs, they would find that said “chiefs” could not actually enforce treaty terms, at least not beyond their own small band. Thus promises, for example, by Navajo “chiefs” to stop animal-stealing raids turned out to be unenforceable, because these “chiefs” could not actually punish young men in the many other Navajo bands for their raiding. (Even with sovereign governments there is still a tension between limiting the scope of sovereign power, e.g. by a doctrine of enumerated powers or by federalism, and giving the federal government complete “freedom of treaty”, i.e. the ability to enter treaties on any subject, or at least in suppression of any kind of coercion, that they can actually enforce against their citizens and residents).

Coercion in all the forms one can imagine, and many that one would rather not try to imagine, was endemic to life among the native American tribes and to relations between those tribes and encroaching civilizations of the Mexicans and later Americans. Raids involving theft (especially of livestock), looting, kidnapping, rape, murder, war, massacre, torture, extortion, mutilation of the living and the dead, and many other, shall we say, non-Coaseian interactions were a normal part of the external relationships between the Indian tribes and between the encroaching civilizations and those tribes. “Counting coup”, that is keeping track of wrongs that needed to be avenged, was standard among the Indian cultures and became standard among people like Kit Carson who dealt with them. Another interesting phenomenon is that the tit-for-tat cycle of violence between tribes was often based on group blame: rather than solving the (usually insurmountable) problem of identifying and punishing the particular perpetrators, missions of vengeance would usually target relatives, fellow tribe members, or even broader groups that happened to be convenient. Sometimes Indians aggrieved by a white attack would even take revenge on whites generally, for example the next group of white emigrants to come down the Santa Fe Trail, and this far too often happened in the reverse direction as well. Sometimes individual blame morphed into group blame when a tribe to which an alleged perpetrator was thought to belong failed to arrest and surrender the accused. This circumstance was especially used by American armies to justify invasion, massacre, and ethnic cleansing of tribes that refused to surrender or punish (often because they had no sovereign power to capture or punish) their thieves, kidnappers, and murderers. The role such group blame plays in contemporary politics is left as an exercise for the reader.

Trading Places

Wednesday, August 6th, 2008

In Trading Places, Alan Ehrenhalt of The New Republic longingly looks at the demographic inversion of the American city — hoping that American cities like Chicago might transform into nineteenth-century Vienna:

We are not witnessing the abandonment of the suburbs or a movement of millions of people back to the city all at once. But we are living at a moment in which the massive outward migration of the affluent that characterized the second half of the twentieth century is coming to an end. For several decades now, cities in the United States have wished for a “24/7″ downtown, a place where people live as well as work, and keep the streets busy, interesting, and safe at all times of day. This is what urbanist Jane Jacobs preached in the 1960s, and it has long since become the accepted goal of urban planners. Only when significant numbers of people lived downtown, planners believed, could central cities regain their historic role as magnets for culture and as a source of identity and pride for the metropolitan areas they served. Now that’s starting to happen, fueled by the changing mores of the young and by gasoline prices fast approaching $5-per-gallon. In many of its urbanized regions, an America that seemed destined for everincreasing individualization and sprawl is experimenting with new versions of community and sociability.

Why has demographic inversion begun? For one thing, the deindustrialization of the central city, for all the tragic human dislocations it caused, has eliminated many of the things that made affluent people want to move away from it. Nothing much is manufactured downtown anymore (or anywhere near it), and that means that the noise and grime that prevailed for most of the twentieth century have gone away. Manhattan may seem like a loud and gritty place now, but it is nothing like the city of tenement manufacturing, rumbling elevated trains, and horses and coal dust in the streets that confronted inhabitants in the early 1900s. Third-floor factory lofts, whether in Soho or in St. Louis, can be marketed as attractive and stylish places to live. The urban historian Robert Bruegmann goes so far as to claim that deindustrialization has, on the whole, been good for downtowns because it has permitted so many opportunities for creative reuse of the buildings. I wouldn’t go quite that far, and, given the massive job losses of recent years, I doubt most of the residents of Detroit would, either. But it is true that the environmental factors that made middle-class people leave the central city for streetcar suburbs in the 1900s and for station-wagon suburbs in the 1950s do not apply any more.

Nor, in general, does the scourge of urban life in the 1970s and ’80s: random street violence. True, the murder rates in cities like Chicago, Philadelphia, and Cleveland have climbed in the last few years, but this increase has been propelled in large part by gang- and drug-related violence. For the most part, middle-class people of all colors began to feel safe on the streets of urban America in the 1990s, and they still feel that way. The paralyzing fear that anyone of middle age can still recall vividly from the 1970s — that the shadowy figure passing by on a dark city street at night stands a good chance of being a mugger — is rare these days, and almost nonexistent among young people. Walk around the neighborhood of 14th and U streets in Washington, D.C. on a Saturday night, and you will find it perhaps the liveliest part of the city, at least for those under 25. This is a neighborhood where the riots of 1968 left physical scars that still have not disappeared, and where outsiders were afraid to venture for more than 30 years.

The young newcomers who have rejuvenated 14th and U believe that this recovering slum is the sort of place where they want to spend time and, increasingly, where they want to live. This is the generation that grew up watching “Seinfeld,” “Friends,” and “Sex and the City,” mostly from the comfort of suburban sofas. We have gone from a sitcom world defined by “Leave It to Beaver” and “Father Knows Best” to one that offers a whole range of urban experiences and enticements. I do not claim that a handful of TV shows has somehow produced a new urbanist generation, but it is striking how pervasive the pro-city sensibility is within this generation, particularly among its elite. In recent years, teaching undergraduates at the University of Richmond, the majority of them from affluent suburban backgrounds, I made a point of asking where they would prefer to live in 15 years — in a suburb or in a neighborhood close to the center of the city. Few ever voted for suburban life.

Hulls in the Water

Tuesday, August 5th, 2008

Robert Kaplan notes that the current military catchphrase is boots on the ground. In the future, it could be hulls in the water:

The period of 1890 to 1989 was about dominance: controlling vast oceanic spaces by making sure your national navy had more ships than those of your competitors. This era reached its zenith in 1945, when the U.S. Navy and its vast fleet of supply ships numbered 6,700. With no peer competitor in sight, the president and Congress moved quickly to cut that Navy, along with the standing Army, considerably. By 1950, the United States had only 634 ships.
[...]
For the remainder of the Cold War, the Navy was able to hold the line at roughly 600 ships, in part by arguing for its importance in supporting a ground war against the Soviet Union and its allies — it would be the Navy’s job to get soldiers to the fight, and to soften up the battlefield with offshore firepower.

In 1991, the Gulf War provided a live-action demonstration of this capacity. Even so, by 1997, post–Cold War budget cuts had reduced the Navy to 365 ships. (In the Quadrennial Defense Review of that year, the Pentagon established a “red line” of 300 ships, below which the Navy would not go.) Of course the 300-ship Navy could still, in the words of Robert O. Work, vice president for strategic studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, in Washington, “pound the snot” out of primitive challengers like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, because the precision revolution in weaponry enabled, for instance, a single wire-guided missile from a U.S. destroyer to accomplish what in Vietnam had required wave after wave of carrier-based planes.

Still, the fewer vessels you have, the riskier each deployment, because a ship can’t be in two places at once. Due to the rapid increase in ship-borne trade, globalization favors large navies that protect trade and tanker routes. Additionally, while the United States remains a great naval power, it is no longer a maritime power; that is, we don’t have much of a merchant fleet left to support our warships in an emergency. We’ve been priced out of the shipbuilding market by cheap-labor countries in Asia.

All of this puts us in a precarious position. History shows that powerful competitor navies can easily emerge out of nowhere in just a few decades. The vast majority of American ships that saw combat in World War II had not even been planned before the spring of 1941. The Indian navy, which may soon be the third-largest in the world, was not on many people’s radar screens at the close of the Cold War. Nor, for that matter, was the now-expanding Chinese submarine fleet. Robert Work told me that he believes the eventual incorporation of Taiwan into China will have the effect that the Battle of Wounded Knee had on the United States: It will psychologically close an era of national consolidation for the Chinese, thereby dramatically redirecting their military energies outward, beyond their coastal waters. Tellingly, whereas the U.S. Navy pays homage to Mahan by naming buildings after him, the Chinese avidly read him; the Chinese are the Mahanians now.

Then there is the Japanese navy, which now operates 117 warships, including 16 submarines. In a sense, we’re back to 1890, when a spark of naval competition among rising powers like Japan, Germany, and the United States left Britain unable to maintain its relative advantage.

To understand our tenuous grip on military power, Kaplan recommends two classics on naval power: Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, which was written in 1890, and Julian S. Corbett’s Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, which came out in 1911. (Both are included in Roots of Strategy Book 4.)