These Happy Golden Years

Monday, May 13th, 2013

American society is increasingly stratified, Sean Reardon says, because elite parents are investing so much in the cognitive enrichment of their kids, but the real cause, Megan McArdle notes, could simply be that all the people who are really good at school are marrying other people who are really good at school and having children who are really, really good at school:

Recently, I came across a copy of These Happy Golden Years (the final book of the Little House on the Prairie series) in a used bookshop. I couldn’t resist buying it; I spent so many happy hours with those books as a kid.

You read it differently as an adult, of course, and one of those things that struck me is that Almanzo Wilder doesn’t seem to be nearly as smart as his wife. Laura obviously liked school, and was good at it, from an early age. Almanzo hated it, and wanted to finish as quickly as possible. There’s no evidence that he reads or otherwise occupies himself with intellectual pursuits in his spare time. Laura doesn’t seem to find that strange, or to resent it; both contemporary reports and the way she writes about her husband makes it clear that she still loved him, all those decades later.

But today we’d find it hard to believe that those two could marry and be happy; what on earth would they talk about? Laura Ingalls would quite likely have gone to an elite school, and probably graduate school, then moved to a coastal city, and eventually married another bookworm. Almanzo Wilder would be married to someone like him, a hard worker who nonetheless found school tedious and left as quickly as possible. And when their two sets of children showed up at school, their test scores would be very different.

Instead they had one child, Rose Wilder Lane, who became a very talented short-story writer (her collection, Old Home Town, is a very fine and somewhat brutal study of the Missouri town where she grew up.) They could just as easily have had a child like Almanzo, whose talents lay in other directions. But the more that the educational elite clusters together, the less likely that is. And the higher the educational barrier to high-paying professions, the more tightly high income will seem to be linked to the educational proficiency of your kids.

A North Korean State of Mind

Saturday, May 11th, 2013

British filmmaker Daniel Gordon’s A State of Mind follows two young North Korean schoolgirls who are preparing for the upcoming Mass Games, held in the Dear General’s honor, where they’ll perform in an enormous, gymnastic spectacle:

Following on from the 2002 RTS award-winning documentary The Game of Their Lives, Gordon’s new film paints a candid portrait of these two young girls’ difficult (though by North Korean standards, very privileged) lives in this fascinating look at one of the world’s most hidden societies. Asia Society spoke with Daniel Gordon about the making of the documentary and his observations while in North Korea.

You were able to get unrestricted access to daily life in Pyongyang. Did the fact that you had already filmed The Game of Their Lives help you convince North Korean film authorities to grant you permission to do A State of Mind?

Absolutely. You really cannot underestimate what an impact The Game of Their Lives has had on people in North Korea. It has been broadcast over ten times on TV so everyone has seen it, everyone knows who we are and that it’s a popular film. We get very good treatment by almost everyone we meet, whether they are ordinary citizens on the streets or people in an official capacity.

Did you have a translator or guide with you the whole time?

As we say in the film, we had guides and translators with us at all times but they neither interfered nor sought to censor the material. They were there to assist us but they had no editorial input or influence.

Were you required to show them the final version of the film before releasing it to the public?

People find it hard to believe but the North Koreans had no editorial control. The first time they saw the finished version was after its first broadcast on the BBC. In essence, they trusted us to make an impartial film.

Do you find that the world of sports seems less threatening to North Korea as a subject matter for films? What attracts you to doing sports stories?

I am a sports fanatic and sports themes can tell great human stories, and remain neutral, even when the subject matter may be quite political. What fascinated me about the football team was how they emerged from a nation absolutely devastated by the Korean War to be at the World Cup just 13 years later. For A State of Mind I wanted to use the theme of daily life in Pyongyang through the eyes of these two schoolgirl gymnasts.

How did you find the two schoolgirls Kim Song Yun and Pal Hyon Sun?

We asked them for the best gymnast and met Pak Hyon Sun and her family in September 2002. Our intention was to have two gymnasts and one person who makes up the stunning backdrop. Having found Pak Hyon Sun we began filming in February 2003. She told us of her friend, Kim Song Yon and we got a feeling that we could develop their friendship as a theme. Pak is an only child, and loves going to Kim’s house, as there are three girls there. Kim learns gymnastic moves from Pak, so their relationship is mutually dependent. By April 2003, we understood that the Mass Games were going to be held indoors so there would be no backdrop so we just concentrated on the two girls.

Your film captures the very vivid and disturbing devotion that these children and adults have for their leader, Kim Jong Il. Did you get any sense from the people you met that there might be fear of punishment if they said anything on camera against the government?

No, one of the surprising and encouraging things was how open they were with us. No one looked at our footage or tried to edit it before we left the country.

(You can watch it on Netflix.)

A Neglected but Significant Anniversary

Friday, May 10th, 2013

David Foster revisits a neglected but significant anniversary:

On May 10, 1940, German forces launched an attack against Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Few people among the Allies imagined that France would collapse in only six weeks: Churchill, for example, had a high opinion of the fighting qualities of the French army. But collapse is what happened, of course, and we are still all living with the consequences. General Andre Beaufre, who in 1940 was a young Captain on the French staff, wrote in 1967:

The collapse of the French Army is the most important event of the twentieth century.

If it’s an exaggeration, it’s not much of one. If France had held up to the German assault as effectively as it was expected to do, World War II would probably have never reached the nightmare levels that it in fact did reach. The Hitler regime might well have fallen. The Holocaust would never have happened. Most likely, there would have been no Communist takeover of Eastern Europe.

This campaign has never received much attention in America; it tends to be regarded as something that happened before the “real” war started. Indeed, many denizens of the Anglosphere seem to believe that the French basically gave up without a fight–which is a considerable exaggeration given the French casualties of around 90,000 killed and 200,000 wounded. But I think the fall of France deserves serious study, and that some of the root causes of the defeat are scarily relevant to today’s world.

I’m not sure why there would have been no Communist takeover of Eastern Europe, but do read the whole thing.

Tell Me and I Will Forget

Friday, May 10th, 2013

Tell Me and I Will Forget follows paramedics as they deal with conditions in post-Apartheid South Africa:

(You can watch the whole film on Netflix.)

David Graeber and the Anarchist Revival

Wednesday, May 8th, 2013

Anarchism has never been coherent:

Karl Marx agreed with the anarchists of his day that the state should be destroyed. But he disagreed about when. He was convinced that the state would become obsolete only after the working class had taken it over, thereby destroying the class system. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, the French philosopher who popularized the term “anarchist,” thought that the idea of a revolutionary government was a contradiction in terms. “Governments are God’s scourge, established to discipline the world,” he wrote. “Do you really expect them to destroy themselves, to create freedom, to make revolution?” Mikhail Bakunin, the prickly Russian agitator, sneered at Marx’s idea of a workers’ state. “As soon as they become rulers or representatives of the people,” he wrote, they “will cease to be workers and will begin to look upon the whole workers’ world from the heights of the state.” In 1872, at a meeting in The Hague, Marx helped to expel Bakunin from the International Workingmen’s Association, formalizing a division that seemed no less stark, nearly a century and a half later, when the horizontals broke from the verticals on an August afternoon in Bowling Green.

In delivering his brief for anarchism, Graeber asks readers to take into account the movement’s history of good behavior. “For nearly a century now,” he writes, “anarchism has been one of the very few political philosophies whose exponents never blow anyone up.” This is a sly way of acknowledging that, a hundred years ago, anarchists had a rather different reputation. On May 4, 1886, in Haymarket Square, in Chicago, police tried to halt a demonstration by striking workers, and someone in the crowd threw a bomb, which killed at least ten people, including seven police officers. Chicago had become a hub of anarchist politics, and although the bomber was never identified, eight anarchists were convicted of being accessories to murder. In Europe, anarchists carried out a series of spectacular attacks, including the assassinations of one President (French), two kings (Italian and Greek), and three Prime Ministers (Spanish, Russian, and Spanish again). In the U.S., anarchism’s reputation was sealed for a generation by Leon Czolgosz, who killed President William McKinley, in 1901; he had evidently been inspired by Emma Goldman, the prominent anarchist rabble-rouser.

Over the years, though, anarchists’ ferocious reputation has mellowed. The Occupy movement borrowed some of its organizing tactics from the egalitarian groups that formed, in the nineteen-seventies, to try to stop the construction of nuclear power plants. And the rise of punk helped give anarchism a new image: “Anarchy in the U.K.,” by the Sex Pistols, was an ambiguous provocation; other bands, like Crass, used “anarchy” to signal their commitment to a bundle of emancipatory causes, and their independence from the socialist organizations that dominated the British left. The connection to punk lent anarchism a countercultural credibility, and in 1999, when tens of thousands of activists materialized in Seattle, intent on shutting down a World Trade Organization conference, raucous young anarchists were out in front; at one point, they smashed the window of a Starbucks. The smashed window became an icon of resistance, and the chaos in the streets of Seattle galvanized a mobilization, known as the Global Justice movement.

Twelve years later, not all of Occupy’s supporters were happy to see anarchists playing a starring role. In a contentious essay titled, “The Cancer in Occupy,” Chris Hedges called for a clean break. Hedges is a former Times reporter turned socialist author and activist, and he published his essay on the progressive Web site Truthdig, a few months after the Zuccotti eviction. His main target was the “black bloc” phenomenon, in which activists — often anarchists — dress in black clothes, with black handkerchiefs obscuring their faces, the better to cause mischief anonymously. Hedges accused black blocs of a “lust” for destruction, which he described as a sickness. “Once the Occupy movement is painted as a flag-burning, rock-throwing, angry mob we are finished,” he wrote.

In a deeply indignant response to Hedges, Graeber pointed out that black-bloc actions had been rare in the Occupy movement. Much of Hedges’s concern seemed to arise from a single incident in Oakland, when a black bloc smashed bank windows and vandalized a Whole Foods. Like many anarchists, Graeber doesn’t think property damage is violence. And he believes that so-called “mobs” have their uses — in 2001, in Quebec City, he was part of a black bloc that succeeded in toppling a chain-link fence meant to separate activists from the free-trade meeting they wanted to disrupt. He supports “diversity of tactics,” an approach that urges different kinds of activists to stay physically separate (so as not to endanger each other) but politically united. Above all, Graeber rejects what he calls “the peace police”: activists who try to control other activists’ behavior, sometimes in collaboration with the real police. His tolerance for confrontational protest stems in part from his disinclination to empower anyone to stop it.

Graeber is more worried about the charge that modern anarchists are feckless, so he is keen to give anarchists credit for changing the world. He claims that the Global Justice movement weakened the W.T.O. and scuttled the Free Trade Area of the Americas pact, which was the topic of those discussions in Quebec City. And he credits the Occupy movement with preventing Mitt Romney from becoming President. (He underestimates Romney’s own, invaluable contributions to this cause.) Graeber is pleased, too, to underscore the links between Occupy and other popular movements around the world, from the Egyptian uprising to the ongoing demonstrations of the Indignados, in Spain. He sees a global “insurrectionary wave,” united less by a shared ideology than by a shared opposition to an increasingly global social arrangement.

The rehabilitation of anarchism in America has a lot to do with the fall of the Soviet Union, which lives on in popular memory as a quaint and brutal place — an embarrassing precursor that modern, pro-democracy socialists must find ways to disavow. Graeber sees “authoritarian socialists” not as distant relatives but as longtime enemies; channelling Bakunin, he claims that the Marxist intention to smash the state by seizing it first is a “pipe dream.” For anarchists, the major historical precursors are so fleeting as to be nearly nonexistent: the Paris Commune lasted scarcely two months, in 1871; anarchists dominated Catalonia for about a year, after the Spanish revolution in 1936. The appeal of anarchism is largely negative: a promise that a different world needn’t resemble any of the ones that have been tried before.

In a new book, “Two Cheers for Anarchism” (Princeton), James C. Scott, a highly regarded professor of anthropology and political science at Yale (and, Graeber says, “one of the great political thinkers of our time”), commends anarchism precisely for its “tolerance for confusion and improvisation.” Graeber did his anthropological field work in the highlands of Madagascar, and Scott did his in Southeast Asia, but their conclusions were similar. Both of them encountered communities that lived more or less autonomously, finding ways to resist or ignore whatever governments claimed jurisdiction over them. And both are eager to expand the history of lived anarchism beyond Paris and Catalonia; it is, they argue, broader and more common than we’ve been taught.

“Two Cheers for Anarchism” conducts a brief and digressive seminar in political philosophy, starting from the perspective of a disillusioned leftist. “Virtually every major successful revolution ended by creating a state more powerful than the one it overthrew,” Scott writes. Traditionally, this has been an argument against revolutions, but Scott wonders whether it might be an argument against states. He stops short of calling for the abolition of government, which explains the missing cheer. Instead, he highlights everyday acts of petty resistance: “foot-dragging, poaching, pilfering, dissimulation, sabotage, desertion, absenteeism, squatting, and flight.” Most of all, he urges citizens to be wary of their governments, which is good advice, but rather deflating — Scott can make anarchism sound like little more than a colorful word for critical thinking.

The Debt We Shouldn’t Pay

Tuesday, May 7th, 2013

Robert Kuttner reviews David Graeber‘s Debt: The First 5,000 Years as a way of saying cancel the debts (and redistribute the land):

Graeber, an American teaching at Goldsmiths, a part of the University of London, begins his book with an anecdote. He is attending a garden party at Westminster Abbey. The guests are international activists and do-gooders, corporate liberals as well as antiglobalization radicals. He falls into a conversation with a lawyer for a foundation and explains his involvement in the campaign to stop the International Monetary Fund from imposing austerity on third-world nations. He mentions the biblical Jubilee, in which Hebrew kings periodically proclaimed debts forgiven.

“‘But,’ she objected, as if this were self-evident, ‘they’d borrowed the money! Surely one has to pay one’s debts.’”

Graeber reminds her that even in standard economic theory, “a lender is supposed to accept a certain degree of risk.” Indeed, the higher the anticipated return, the more likely the danger of default. Yet the premise that “surely one has to pay one’s debts” is so persuasive, Graeber writes, “because it’s not actually an economic statement: it’s a moral statement.” A debt, by definition, is something you owe that must be repaid.

Despite his twenty years as a columnist for Business Week, Kuttner never really addresses the nature of corporate debt and how it might contrast with either personal debt or public debt.

When ordinary people think of debt, they think of personal debt — improvident people borrowing money to buy things they don’t really need, and to buy them now, rather than later.

In business though, debt isn’t a way to conspicuously consume beyond your means; it’s a way of financing your enterprise. The other way is equity, or shares of stock. Historically most outside financing was debt, because owning a share of the business meant becoming part-owner of the business, with all the liability that entailed — and only earning your share of whatever profits the real owner cooked the books to show.

Eventually business law matured to the point where the owners of joint-stock companies faced limited liability, and firms could declare bankruptcy. Kuttner touches on this without emphasizing how different this is from modern personal bankruptcy used to discharge credit-card debt:

My own research explores a pivotal event in the history of debt — the invention of modern bankruptcy, in 1706, by ministers of Queen Anne. Before 1706, bankruptcy simply meant insolvency, and the bankrupt was packed off to debtors’ prison. It dawned on the reformers of the day that this practice was economically irrational. As the legal historian of bankruptcy Bruce Mann wrote, “it beggared debtors without significantly benefiting creditors.” Once behind bars, a debtor had no means of resuming productive economic life, much less satisfying his debts. In this insight was the germ of Chapter 11 of the modern US bankruptcy code, the provision that allows an insolvent corporation to write off old debts and have a fresh start as a going concern.

The British devised the concept of legal discharge from debt not out of a sudden attack of compassion but because the economic crisis of the 1690s had put much of the merchant class in jail. The cause was not improvident or immoral behavior on the part of debtors, but general economic dislocation beyond their control, caused by the confluence of bubonic plague, recent wars with France, and a storm that devastated the merchant fleet in 1703. The future novelist Daniel Defoe was a leading pamphleteer promoting the idea that debtors might settle with creditors at so many pence to the pound and then have their debts legally discharged. Defoe had himself spent some months in debtors’ prison in 1692 and 1693.

But when the law was finally enacted, allowing a magistrate to settle debts with partial repayment, only substantial merchants could qualify for relief. Common debtors still languished in jail, since their penury had scant wider consequences. Yet an important conceptual breakthrough had occurred. Canceling some debts was deemed economically efficient. Legal historians such as Bruce Mann have observed that, for capitalism to proceed, it was necessary to shift the economic thinking and legal policy governing debt from moral questions to instrumental ones.

Modern Chapter 11 bankruptcy is not old-fashioned bankruptcy. That‘s Chapter 7 bankruptcy, where the business ceases operations, and a trustee sells all of its assets and distributes the proceeds to its creditors.

Modern Chapter 11 bankruptcy often wipes out the shareholders — the former “owners” — but allows the company to continue operations, if it is worth more to its new owners — the creditors — as a going concern than as a simple jumble of assets.

Kuttner sees this as a double standard:

The double standard in debt relief that favored large merchants, present at the creation of bankruptcy law in 1706, persists today in many different forms. It gets surprisingly little attention in the debt debates. Despite the tacit assumption that “surely one has to pay one’s debts,” the evasion of repayment is both widespread and selective. Corporate executives routinely walk away from their debts via Chapter 11 of the national bankruptcy law when that seems expedient. Morality scarcely enters the conversation — this is strictly business.

Even more galling is the fact that the executives who drove the company into the ground often keep control by means of a doctrine known as debtor-in- possession. A judge simply permits the company to write off old debts, while creditors collect so many cents on the dollar out of available assets. Every major airline has now been through bankruptcy, and US Airways has gone in and out of Chapter 11 twice. In this process, all creditors are not created equal. Since banks typically have liens on the aircraft, bankers get paid ahead of others. Major losers are employees and retirees, since Chapter 11 allows a corporation to break a labor contact or reduce pension debts. Shareholders also lose, but by the time bankruptcy is declared, the company’s share value has usually dwindled to almost nothing. Much of the private equity industry uses the strategy of acquiring a company, taking it into bankruptcy, thus shedding its debts, and then cashing in on its subsequent profitability. Despite the misleading term private “equity,” tax-deductible private debt is the essence of this industry, which relies heavily on borrowed money to finance its takeovers.

Homeowners, however, are explicitly prohibited from using the bankruptcy code to reduce their outstanding mortgage debt.

Kuttner clearly sees debt along the progressive-liberal oppressor-oppressed axis of Arnold Kling’s three-axis model. Big creditors are oppressors. Small debtors are oppressed. End of story.

Genuine Reactionary Propaganda

Monday, May 6th, 2013

The Carlyle Club is pleased to present genuine reactionary propaganda:

Reactionaries demand that the reign of terror stop

Reactionaries believe in classical international law

Reactionaries save it for Isabella of Castile

Reactionaries save it for Frederick the Great

Reactionaries don't vote for anyone

Reactionaries want a functioning government

Reactionaries listen to the Brandenburg Concertos

Reactionaries read The Latter Day Pamphlets

Farmers and Bandits

Sunday, May 5th, 2013

China has gone through periods of anarchy and state-control, so good farmer qualities — working hard, being thrifty, and planning for the long term — led to success only some of the time:

There was thus a parallel model of selection that favored “big man” qualities: charisma, verbal bombast, physical strength, ability to intimidate, talent for mobilizing gangs of young men…

This point is discussed by Feichtinger et al. (1996) who see Chinese history as a shifting equilibrium between farmers, bandits, and the State: “Farmers who produce a good, bandits who steal this good, and rulers fighting against banditry and taxing farmers.” When the State weakened, as it often did, farmers had to placate bandits as best they could. Banditry may have then surpassed farming as the best way to accumulate wealth, prestige, access to women and, ultimately, reproductive success.

As Bianco (1991) notes:

About ten years ago, a Chinese scholar, invited to spend his holidays in Haute-Provence, was worried: “There aren’t too many bandits there?” As an emigrant settled in France since the revolution, he continued — and to this day continues — to associate the countryside with banditry as a matter of course. For a rich family like his own (otherwise he would not have become a scholar), the obsessive fear of a bandit raid, of being taken away or of extortion was constant. The landowners maintained private militias who could at least stand up to the small gangs, and their sons avoided venturing too far away for fear of being kidnapped. The oldest son especially was the most valued prey because the family would have to rush to pay a high ransom to ensure the continuity of their lineage and appease the spirits of their ancestors.

[…]

On some rail lines of southern China, the train almost never reached its destination without being attacked at least once [by bandits]. In the province of Yunnan, highwaymen controlled most of the roads, stopped and ransomed travelers, and those merchants who persisted in pursuing their occupation, since commercial traffic ended up being choked off or became more selective.

We forget, especially the libertarians among us, how awful things were before the State pacified social relations. It was this pacification that made free and open societies possible. It especially made the market economy possible. Ironically, when the Communists wiped out banditry — something no previous regime had managed to do — they also laid the basis for their country’s future economic takeoff.

Lessons Learned in an Alternate Universe

Saturday, May 4th, 2013

Back in high school, Scott Alexander and some friends decided to make up a fantasy world, Bridge to Teribithia-style, and the game spread. He shares some lessons learned from spending 5,000 virtual years in an alternate universe:

The total lack of rules or advance planning with which we constructed Micras gives it an amazing feature unmatched in any other role-play I know of: the game is exactly identical to the meta-game.

A country is a bunch of people coming together and claiming to be a country and doing country-like things (kind of like in reality). The king — or Shah, or President, or Premier, or Ayatollah — of the country is whoever can convince other people to call them the king and obey their orders (kind of like in reality). The country’s land is pretty much whatever land they can convince other people to accept they have (ibid). The constitution is whatever document you can convince everyone else to sign (…).

If one person wants to found their own single-person country, no one can stop them, but they’re less likely to be taken seriously or considered a Great Power. If lots of people come together to form a country, no one can stop them, but they had better be able to get along and agree on the rules. If you want to unite to ostracize somebody, no one can stop you, but you’d better be able to get more people on your side than they have on theirs.

If you want to claim you have a billion nuclear bombs, no one can stop you, but they’ll just say you’re a terrible simulation partner and ignore you when you say you bomb them. If you want to claim you are pure pacifists, no one can stop you, but then you better either have an alternate plan for protecting yourself (like strong allies) or be prepared to just absent yourself from the military simulation and annoy everyone else. If you want to write a history of your country that conflicts with histories everyone else has written, no one can stop you, but no one is going to take your history seriously either or build upon it or make it part of their canon.

As a result, while other geeks were learning how to calculate damage from Magic Missiles, I was learning how to manipulate consensus reality. I guarantee you one of these skills is more valuable than the other.

The skill of manipulating consensus reality seems more or less identical to the skill commonly called “leadership”. It is easy to underestimate. The whole gag of the comic strip Dilbert is underestimating leadership. These brilliant engineers do the actual hard work, and then some idiot just says “work faster!” or something similarly dumb and gets hailed as a leader and paid a much higher salary and given credit for the group’s success.

[...]

I think the most important thing I learned about leadership is to avoid it. It’s stressful, everyone blames you for everything, and “getting to make decisions” sounds a lot better before you realize how banal and annoying 99% of decisions are. But I also learned that large organizations tend to have a position that pretty much controls everything from behind the scenes but doesn’t have to cope with the appearance of power. In Shireroth it’s called “Steward”. In Westeros it was “King’s Hand”. I don’t know about the USA, but I wouldn’t be surprised if it was “White House Chief of Staff”. These positions are a whole lot more fun, and surprisingly there’s a lot less competition for them.

Closely related is learning how many people are optimizing for appearance — which means if you’re optimizing for something else it’s pretty easy to strike compromises that give everyone what they want. If you’re fighting for control of a province, the compromise “your enemy gets an important sounding title like Archduke with almost completely ceremonial powers, and you get a boring sounding title like Undersecretary of Resource Management that controls the place’s economy and military” works a surprising amount of the time. Same with titling a bill “The X Party Wins Bill” and getting leading members of the X Party to support it and having the Y Party protest it angrily and not have any policy proposals of the X Party in it at all.

The third important thing I learned is to have a lot more respect for politicians and people in power. I think everyone should have the media perform a hatchet job on them at least once. It’s this really scary feeling when you know you’re trying to be honest and do the right thing, and yet you see how easy it is for a hostile writer to cast every single thing you do as corrupt and destructive. And how quick everyone is to believe them. And how attempts to set the record straight get met with outraged “how dare you give one of those typical sputtering non-apologies!”. It reminds me of those computer games where “ACCUSE” is just a button you press, and it doesn’t even matter what the accusation is or whether it makes sense. Once someone has invoked the genre of scandal, it will play out the same either way, proceeding deterministically along political lines until everyone reaches the usual compromise of agreeing you’re scummy and dishonest but not worth the trouble of impeaching.

The last important thing I learned is to be nice. It practically never fails that somebody who thinks they’re really cool joins Micras, makes fun of one of our admittedly disproportionate number of people with no real life or social skills, bullies and harasses them for months or even years… and then that person is the swing vote in an important election, or finds themselves sitting on a deposit of valuable rare earth metals everyone needs. My favorite cases are when neither of those two things happens, and the person just spends five years sorting out their issues and becoming smarter and more competent, and then ends up in charge of everything solely by their own merit. I am pleased to report they rarely forget how the bully behaved when they were young and stupid.

The Pentagon Wars

Friday, May 3rd, 2013

I haven’t watched The Pentagon Wars, but the key segment, describing the evolution of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle says it all, I suspect:

Will Obamacare work?

Thursday, May 2nd, 2013

A new study out of Oregon shows Medicaid’s limits:

In its second-year results, the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment, which randomly selected 10,000 people in Oregon to get Medicaid (only about 6,300 actually got the benefit), and then compared them with a randomly selected control group, found that those who got Medicaid did not on average have healthier blood pressure, cholesterol levels, or diabetic blood pressure control than those who did not get Medicaid. Those with Medicaid did see some reduction in out of pocket health expenses. They were also less likely to be diagnosed with depression.

The Medicaid recipients also ended up utilizing a lot more health care — care that has to be paid for — than those who didn’t get coverage. But they didn’t use the emergency room any less than the control group.

How is this being presented in the media? A bit differently…

Making Mordor’s Economy Work

Wednesday, May 1st, 2013

Making Mordor’s economy work takes some effort, if you assume the ashen wasteland produces no food yet feeds an army:

If Mordor was trading something, then we imagine that this would be swords. Sauron had both mines and forges, and so supply should not have been an issue. A medieval sword cost around 6d (6 pence) each. We got in touch with expert Hector Cole, master arrowsmith and archaeological ironworker, who gave us some ideas of medieval sword manufacture.

Six smiths produce ten swords per day, 6d (6 pence) per sword, 60d revenue per day.

Bearing in mind that within Mordor itself there isn’t an economy; it’s a command system governed by Sauron and his Nazgul. So mining and manufacture costs aren’t monetary, and all 60d can be spent on other things. Like…

Food. Feeding an army isn’t easy. One option for mass consupmtion is pig.

A hog roast can feed about 100 at a sitting. Assuming 3 meals per day this is 33 orcs per pig. A medieval pig cost 2 shilling (24 pence) each. So 100 orcs can be fed for 72d per day.

So to keep 500 orcs fighting, around 35 orcs are needed to be smithing, and about 1 orc smelting.

Thus for Mordor’s economy to work, constant wars would be needed to keep up the demand for weapons, so that Mordor could trade them for food. This raises the question of how moral it would be for Sauron not to start wars. Due to the requirements of smithing and smelting, about 7% of orcs would be involved in ‘civilian’ roles. When considering firewood, building, and particularly mining, this figure would become much higher.

(Hat tip to Tyler Cowen.)

Newly Pacified

Tuesday, April 30th, 2013

Peter Frost looks at what drives people to violence:

I first went to elementary school in a largely English Canadian neighborhood of Scarborough. Schoolyard fights were only occasional, and there was almost always a good reason. My family then moved to a largely Scotch-Irish town in central Ontario. There, the schoolyard fights were a daily occurrence, and they seemed to happen for no reason at all. I eventually found out the reason… something to do with “respect” or rather the lack of it.

We like to think that people everywhere respond to situations more or less as we do. If the response is anger — red boiling anger that can kill — we assume there must be a very good reason. Otherwise, the person wouldn’t be so angry.

Hence the puzzlement over the Boston bombers. What drove them to such an act?

“Normal” is a relative term, and in other societies, such as Algeria, people do kill for apparently trifling reasons, as Frantz Fanon discusses in Les damnés de la Terre:

Very often the magistrates and police officers are stunned by the motives for the murder: a gesture, an allusion, an ambiguous remark, a quarrel over the ownership of an olive tree or an animal that has strayed a few feet. The search for the cause, which is expected to justify and pin down the murder, in some cases a double or triple murder, turns up a hopelessly trivial motive. Hence the frequent impression that the community is hiding the real motives.

Boys in such a society are expected to get in fights, come home with bruises, and play “manly” games that build courage and endurance:

This pattern of behavioral development doesn’t differ completely from my [Peter Frost's] own. The difference is largely one of degree. But there’s also a difference in kind: the violent male as an independent actor who fights for himself and his immediate family. For “normal” boys in Western society, male violence is legitimate only when done under orders for much larger entities: the home team, the police, the country, NATO… Everywhere else, it is evil, criminal, and pathological.

[...]

Male violence has long been viewed differently in different societies. In our own, it is stigmatized, except when done “under orders” by soldiers or the police. Some societies, however, had no police or army until recent times. Every adult male was expected to use violence to defend himself and his family. Yes, you could go to a law court to settle your differences with someone. But even if the court ruled in your favor, the sentence still had to be enforced by you, your brothers, and other male family members. That’s the way things were done. For millennia and millennia.

[...]

Initially, all adult males everywhere had to defend themselves and their families, not by paying taxes but by getting their hands bloody. This situation changed with the rise of the State. In other words, some powerful men became so powerful that they could impose a monopoly on the use of violence. Only they or their underlings could use it. Male violence had been “nationalized” and could be used only if ordered by the State or in narrowly defined situations of self-defense.

In this new pacified environment, the violent male went from hero to zero. He became a criminal and was treated accordingly. Society now favored the peace-loving man who got ahead through work or trade. This process has been described for England and other parts of Western Europe by several academics, like Gregory Clark. With the establishment of strong States toward the end of the Dark Ages, and a subsequent pacification of social relations, the incidence of violence declined steadily. Violent predispositions were steadily removed from the population, either through the actual execution of violent individuals or through their marginalization and lower reproductive success. The meek thus inherited the earth (see previous post).

Or rather a portion of it. In some parts of the earth, particularly remote mountainous areas, State control came very late. These are societies in the earliest stages of pacification. Male violence is a daily reality, which the State can only contain at best. Such is life in Chechnya … and elsewhere.

(Hat tip to Konkvistador.)

Is Fairness About Clear Fitness Signals?

Monday, April 29th, 2013

Giving everyone equal rights means giving the strong license to oppress the weak, Fitzhugh said. That’s kind of the point, Robin Hanson might say:

“Fairness” is often described in terms of equality of outcomes. But in a game, the “fairest” rules are often those that make the ablest players mostly likely to win, instead of those that distribute wins most evenly among players.

Even outside of games, a wide range of otherwise puzzling common intuitions about fairness can be understood if the fundamental “game” of life is seen as wooing, i.e., attracting mates by showing that you have fit genes. The fairest social institutions are then those in which success correlates as much as possible with genetic fitness.

For example, it can seem fair that the most attractive witty athletic folks get more mates and money, but seem unfair that the rich can buy better education for their children. Makeup can seem fair, while breast implants seem unfair.

(Hat tip to sark.)

6 Ways to Make a Better Argument for Gun Control

Monday, April 29th, 2013

Otherwise-leftist blogger Kontra lives in Virginia and owns guns.  Kontra offers gun-control Democrats 6 ways to make a better argument:

Allow me this humble suggestion: The best way to convince the American public that you’re not interested in taking guns away is to stop talking about taking guns away.

Firstly, when your politicians are asked, “Do you support state legislation to ban the manufacture, sale and possession of handguns?” as Obama was in his 1996 Senate campaign, you should never answer “Yes,” as Obama did. Publicly advocating a ban on all handguns is not the way to convince people that you’re not interested in banning guns. Furthermore, when you are campaigning for president, never say the phrase “I continue to support a [federal] ban on concealed carry,” as Obama did in 2004. This gives people the impression that your intention is to prevent the states from setting reasonable guidelines on who can defend themselves outside of their home.

If you then win the election, do not go on to fully support gun bans in two US cities — Chicago and D.C. — in which law-abiding citizens are disarmed, citing them as models for gun policy while trying to convince the rest of the country that you really aren’t interested in banning their guns. (Guess which two US cities you’re most likely to be killed by a gun in.)

It has become almost cliché for smirking Democrats to attempt to ridicule people like myself by crooning, “Obama wants to take our guns!” in a stereotyped hillbilly drawl — something particularly offensive to some folks here in the south — when in fact, Obama has said exactly that.