The most important source of uranium ore during the war years was the Shinkolobwe Mine in the Belgian Congo

Saturday, November 1st, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesIt is sobering to realize, General Groves explains in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, that but for a chance meeting between a Belgian and an Englishman a few months before the outbreak of the war, the Allies might not have been first with the atomic bomb:

For the most important source of uranium ore during the war years was the Shinkolobwe Mine in the Belgian Congo and the most important man concerned with its operation was M. Edgar Sengier, the managing director of Union Miniere du Haut Katanga or, as it is usually called, Union Miniere.

In May of 1939, Sengier happened to be in England, in the office of Lord Stonehaven, a fellow director on the Union Miniere Board, when Stonehaven asked him to receive an important scientist. This turned out to be Sir Henry Tizard, the director of the Imperial College of Science and Technology. He asked Sengier to grant the British Government an option on every bit of radium-uranium ore that would be extracted from the Shinkolobwe Mine. Naturally, Sengier refused. As he was leaving, Sir Henry took him by the arm and said most impressively: “Be careful, and never forget that you have in your hands something which may mean a catastrophe to your country and mine if this material were to fall in the hands of a possible enemy.” This remark, coming as it did from a renowned scientist, made a lasting impression on Sengier.

A few days later, he discussed the future possibilities of uranium fission with several French scientists, including Joliot-Curie, a Nobel Prize winner. They proposed a joint effort to attempt the fission of uranium in a bomb to be constructed in the Sahara Desert. Sengier accepted their proposal in principle and agreed to furnish the raw material and to assist in the work. The outbreak of World War II in September, 1939, brought this project to a halt even before it began.

Tizard’s warning and the obvious interest of the French scientists emphasized to Sengier the strategic value of the Katanga ores, which were of exceptional richness, far surpassing in that respect any others that have ever been discovered.

Sengier left Brussels in October of 1939 for New York, where he remained for the rest of the war. From there, he managed the operations of his company, both inside and outside the Belgian Congo, and after the invasion of Belgium in 1940 had to do so without the benefit of any advice from his fellow directors who were in Belgium behind the German lines.

Before his departure from Brussels, he had ordered shipped to the United States and to Great Britain all available radium, about 120 grams, then valued at some $1.8 million. He had also ordered that all uranium ores in stock at the Union Miniere-controlled refining plant in Oolen, Belgium, be sent to the United States. Unfortunately, this order was not complied with promptly; later, owing to the German advance into Belgium, it became impossible to carry it out.

Toward the end of 1940, fearing a possible German invasion of the Belgian Congo, Sengier directed his representatives in Africa to ship discreetly to New York, under whatever ruse was practicable, the very large supply of previously mined uranium ore, then in storage at the Shinkolobwe Mine. All work at the mine had stopped with the outbreak of the war and the equipment had been transferred to vitally important copper and cobalt mining operations for the Allied war effort. In accordance with Sengier’s instructions, over 1,250 tons of uranium ore were shipped by way of the nearest port, Lobito, in Portuguese Angola, during September and October of 1940, and on arrival were stored in a warehouse on Staten Island.

Posted in Science, War | 13 Comments »

A tank designed for urban terrain would have radically different design requirements than a main battle tank designed for open warfare

Friday, October 31st, 2025

A tank designed for urban terrain would have radically different design requirements than a main battle tank designed for open warfare:

Main battle tanks rely primarily upon their speed and long-range firepower and are willing to sacrifice extra armor to retain mobility. In urban combat, however, the reverse is true: fights are at much closer ranges, mobility is measured by the ability to navigate sharp turns and tight/narrow streets, and speed can be sacrificed to retain maximum armor protection. Other unique requirements are the ability to shoot in multiple directions at once, shoot around 90-degree corners, increased importance on the ability to shoot at high and negative elevations, and designing the hull to carry cage armor and/or active protection systems.

[…]

The first, most important, hard factor in an urban tank is its armor. Urban tanks will routinely fight at close range, and so every trick in the book will be necessary to ensure safety and survivability. Armor should be uniformly thick on the front, sides, and rear, since attacks from every angle are to be expected. A pentagon-shaped hull can offer the benefits of sloped armor and V-hulls for protection from mines. A slightly more complex alternative is an octagon-shaped hull, which can offer more angles and smaller flat surfaces for increased shot deflection. Additional armor modules, like cage armor and active protection systems, will not replace or reduce the hull armor’s thickness, and the chassis must be designed to carry them all at once without overloading.

The second hard factor, relating directly to the first, is the vehicle’s engine and mobility. Rather than being built for speed, a tank’s engine will instead resemble a bulldozer engine. An urban tank will be a very heavy vehicle, and so a bulldozer-style engine will be capable of both handling the sheer weight of the vehicle and will allow the tank to overpower obstacles.

Obstacle clearing must be an expected, routine occurrence for urban tanks, and the ability to smash through them and other man-made fortifications without requiring a separate armored bulldozer will be advantageous.

The third hard factor is the tank’s guns. An urban tank will use short-barreled guns, since longer barrels are difficult to maneuver in tight spaces and the tank is less likely to engage in long-range shooting. As a bonus, short-barreled guns are quicker to acquire targets. High-elevation and negative-elevation shooting also benefits from this quicker target acquisition.

An urban tank would have a mixture of gun calibers for its main turret and side turrets/sponsons, since it will need to be capable of firing in multiple directions at once. Side turrets and sponsons will not necessarily require large-caliber guns, but they will require rapid-fire guns. These will often be fired around street/building corners and into buildings from the street to provide flanking fire in support of advancing infantry. Urban tanks may also incorporate a flamethrower in front. The flamethrower would be desirable for covering a tank’s underbelly from attackers in spider holes, tunnel entrances such as manholes, and/or basement windows. It can also thwart attempts to drag mines into the tank’s path and reduce ground-level enemy gun positions designed to provide grazing fire.

A major development in modern tank design is the unmanned turret. As mentioned before, urban tanks must expect enemy fire from multiple directions simultaneously, and thus would benefit from having multiple turrets like a 1920s tank or a pre-dreadnought battleship. The 1920s designs were a failure because the turrets needed to be manned.

[…]

Unmanned turrets, however, allow modern side turrets/sponsons to be much smaller and more compact than their 1920s ancestors, and keep the operators at a safe distance in the event of a direct hit and/or ammunition cook-off. Unmanned turrets can also be placed farther forward on the hull than manned turrets, since they weigh less and thus pose less risk of causing balance/center-of-gravity issues. Placing side turrets further forward, in turn, enables urban tanks to fire around 90-degree corners while exposing as little of its hull as possible. The controls for these would ideally be constructed like the A-10 Warthog’s controls, with redundancy and mechanical backups for all automated systems.

A second soft factor design element is the inclusion of escape hatches on all sides and the rear of the tank, a move that necessitates placing the engine and side turrets/sponsons towards the front of the vehicle.

[…]

Classic urban antitank tactics involve firing down onto the tank from above; while this will be less damaging to an urban tank than a main battle tank on account of its uniformly thick armor, limiting urban tankers to exiting via top hatches noticeably reduces their likelihood of escaping safely when bailing out under fire. This survivability need will also affect the design and employment of cage armor; cage armor designs must not block escape routes, and the escape routes must not widen the cage armor profile any more than is necessary. If the tank becomes too wide, then its usefulness in narrow streets declines rapidly.

Posted in War, Weapons | 5 Comments »

Our country would have been much better off in the immediate postwar years if we had had a group of officers who were thoroughly experienced in all the problems of this type of work

Thursday, October 30th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesGeneral Groves believed strongly, as he explains in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, that in time of war every possible regular officer should be in the combat area:

I was undoubtedly influenced in this belief by my personal knowledge of the disappointment suffered by many regular officers who were kept in this country during World War I, with no chance of combat experience. In my own case, I was already a cadet when the war started, and remained at West Point until a few days before the Armistice. Had my own experience been different, I would quite probably have had a considerable number of regular officers assigned to the project throughout its duration.

As I look back now with a full appreciation of the tremendous import of the development of atomic energy, I think it was a mistake not to have had them. Our country would have been much better off in the immediate postwar years if we had had a group of officers who were thoroughly experienced in all the problems of this type of work — not only in problems of atomic energy but in all the manifold problems involved in technical and scientific developments that have played such an important part in our national defense since 1945.

While I am on the subject of my own mistakes, I perhaps should add that there was another consideration, similar to this, to which I did not give adequate attention. That was the necessity of having replacements available if either Nichols or I died or became disabled. Many serious problems would have arisen if anything had happened to either of us, and it was not proper for me to have placed such great reliance, fortunately not misplaced, upon the physical and mental ability of both of us to stand up under the strain, to say nothing of the possibility of accidental death or injury, particularly since we did so much flying.

This was brought very vividly to my attention in December of 1944, when Mr. Churchill suggested that I should come to London to talk over our problems, and particularly our progress, with him and other members of his government. In discussing his request with Secretary Stimson, I said that while I would like very much to go to England, I was afraid that it might take me away from my work for a considerable period of time, especially if something developed that would make it impossible for Mr. Churchill to receive me immediately on arrival.

Mr. Stimson told me that if I went, I could not go by air, because of the hazards involved. When I said, “Well, I don’t see what difference that would make,” he replied, “You can’t be replaced.” I said, “You do it, and General Marshall does it; why shouldn’t I?” He repeated, “As I said before, you can’t be replaced, and we can.” Harvey Bundy, who was also present, said he had heard that I had previously urged flying when air safety dictated otherwise, and then asked, “Who would take your place if you were killed?” I replied, “That would be your problem, not mine, but I agree that you might have a problem.”

I went on to say that if anything happened to Nichols, I felt that I could continue to operate, though it would mean a very strenuous period for me personally, but that if it were the other way around, while Nichols was thoroughly capable of taking over my position, I thought because he was not so familiar with my responsibilities as I was with his that he could not do both my job and his.

I drew up a list of about six officers who I thought would be satisfactory, keeping in mind that it would be all-important for the man selected to be completely acceptable to Nichols, since success would depend on the utmost co-operation between them. I particularly wanted someone who would not attempt to overrule Nichols in any of his actions or recommendations until he had had time really to understand what the work was all about, and I doubted whether it would be possible for anyone to accumulate the essential background for this before the project was completed.

Having made up my list, I discussed the matter with Nichols. I asked him to look over the names and to strike from the list anyone whom he would prefer not to have in such a position. He struck several names. I always suspected he struck the first one just to see if I really meant what I had said, because it was the name of a man whom I had known for many years, and who was a very close friend. When he struck that name, I did not bat an eye, but merely said, “Well, he’s out.”

After he had crossed off the names of the men he considered unacceptable, I asked him if he had any preference among the remainder. He replied, “You name him and I’ll tell you.” I said that I felt that the best one on the list was Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell, and Nichols replied, “He would be my first choice, too.”

Posted in War | 2 Comments »

Marines’ latest Pacific strategy highlights logistics, firepower

Tuesday, October 28th, 2025

Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Eric Smith released the Force Design 2030 update, which calls for building out the Corps’ logistics capabilities abroad to better resupply and sustain forces in the Pacific in the event of a major conflict:

Some solutions to the logistics issue include a dozen expeditionary fabrication labs, which can manufacture pieces and parts for in-the-field repairs rather than wait for parts to be shipped out from domestic factories. Other high-tech options include newer uncrewed vehicles, such as the Autonomous Low-Profile Vessel, to transport equipment and supplies with minimal risk to personnel. And then there are some low-tech plans, including one to simply set up more pre-placed stockpiles in the Indo-Pacific so that Marines can more easily access weapons and ammunition.

[…]

The other major focus is on building out the Marine Corps’ firepower. The update noted that the corps has been able to field multiple offensive weapons including the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, or NMESIS, that fires ship-killing missiles, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems or HIMARS. It also has started fielding air defense systems including the Marine Air Defense Integrated System, or MADIS, which are meant to counter drones and missiles. Last month, Marines brought the NMESIS and MADIS systems to Japan for a two-week exercise with the Japanese Self-Defense Force that focused on coastal island defense. This coming week III Marine Expeditionary Force is set to test HIMARS near Mount Fuji, according to III Marine Expeditionary Force.

The actual document opens with these words:

The Marine Corps is a naval expeditionary warfighting organization. We exist for one purpose: to fight and win our Nation’s battles. That truth has not changed since 1775, and it remains the measure of our relevance today.

We are modernizing at a time when the character of war is shifting rapidly. Adversaries are fielding advanced weapons and employing new methods designed to erode our warfighting advantages. Drones, long-range precision fires, cyber effects, and electronic warfare are now daily features of conflict. The lessons drawn from contemporary battlefields underscore what Marines have long understood: combat is unforgiving, and victory belongs to the side that adapts faster, fights harder, and endures longer.

Force Design is how we ensure our Corps stays ahead of this change and is driven by a continuous Campaign of Learning tested in wargames, refined in exercises, and proven in real-world operations. We are equipping Marines with the tools to thrive in contested environments: precision fires, unmanned systems, advanced mobility, resilient command and control, and data-driven decision-making. Yet technology alone will never define us. While the character of war evolves, its nature endures, and our ethos remains aligned to that truth. We do not man the equipment, we equip the Marine. Discipline, toughness, and initiative will always remain the decisive factors in battle.

Posted in War, Weapons | 1 Comment »

Joe Rogan interviews Palmer Luckey

Sunday, October 26th, 2025

This Joe Rogan interview of Palmer Luckey is self-recommending:

Posted in Technology, War, Weapons | No Comments »

Sweden designed the jet in the 1980s specifically to survive Soviet strikes on air bases

Friday, October 24th, 2025

The Ukrainian air force may eventually re-equip with Saab Gripen E/F fighters:

The nimble supersonic jets are uniquely suited to the Ukrainian way of war, which requires the air force to spread far and wide across small airfields and even roadway airstrips in order to avoid attack.

This matters because Ukraine’s jets keep flying by avoiding big, vulnerable air bases — dispersing instead to highways and hidden strips across the country. But this survival strategy puts intense pressure on the aircraft. While Ukrainian brigades can coax American F-16s into this nomadic existence, it requires mobile support teams and kid-glove treatment.

The Gripen doesn’t — it’s built for rough-field warfare. Sweden designed the jet in the 1980s specifically to survive Soviet strikes on air bases, operating instead from highway strips scattered across the country.

Posted in War | 2 Comments »

If they ran 100 missions like that, 95 would fail

Wednesday, October 22nd, 2025

The average wait for an evacuation from the Ukrainian front is a week, with some taking as long as a month:

Wounded soldiers have died waiting despite being supplied with intravenous fluids and pain relief, he says.

Evacuations are dangerous, and commanders are constantly weighing the risks. In one case, the driver of an M113 armored vehicle sent to rescue a casualty was killed when it was hit by a drone. Six more soldiers were then injured in subsequent missions to rescue the same soldier.

[…]

“We never send people closer than 5km [3 miles] to the front if a robot can do the job,” Eugune says. “We navigate at night using landmarks like trees, towers, and roads. It’s like orienteering.”

[…]

Engineers from the unit have adapted one of its TERMIT ground robots, now known as “Mr. Hook,” to recover marooned UGVs.

“Sometimes it’s simple — an electric cable or debris caught in the tracks, even abandoned village power lines can be a hazard, tangling in the vehicle’s running gear,” Eugene says. “This one’s going to be more difficult, though, the UGV weighs about 120 kilos [265lbs], and with the load it’s carrying, nearly 270 kilos in total.”

[…]

Ruslan uses a Turkish-made Hatsan 12-gauge shotgun for defense against enemy drones.

Once the UGV is on the ground, Vitalik takes control, with Serhii as co-pilot and navigator, and in less than an hour, the robot reaches the frontline, where soldiers quickly emerge from a dugout to retrieve the supplies

[…]

All the hardware and software are built in-house, and it takes about a week to adapt manufacturer-delivered UGVs so they can operate in frontline conditions, Eugene says. GPS often drops out due to Russian jamming, for example, so operators have to navigate visually using the feed from a nearby Mavic drone.

Custom software reduces delays in communication with the vehicles, but there is no standardized national system. Government-issued software is proprietary and slow to obtain, so the unit develops its own to maintain flexibility and adapt quickly to battlefield changes.

Operating UGVs is far more time-consuming than flying First-Person-View (FPV) drones, Eugene says. But while FPV drones can reach their target in minutes, they can only carry light loads.

Baba Yaga drones, for instance, can only carry about 10 kilos and wear out after roughly 100 missions. UGVs move slowly and must navigate terrain obstacles, but can deliver heavy payloads. They cost about $10,000, and Eugune says prices remain high because they are not mass-produced.

“Right now, there are only two viable roads in this sector, which the Russians patrol with drones,” he says. “UGVs are harder to detect because they’re electric and have a low thermal signature.”

The front is no longer a single trench line but, in places, a contested zone up to 15km deep with multiple layers of positions. Eugene says his team can’t cover some forested areas, forcing troops to carry supplies by hand for the last stretch. And the inconsistency of Starlink’s satellite internet connection doesn’t help.

On this mission in the Kharkiv region, the robot is running on a decentralized so-called mesh network rather than solely on Starlink, and the unit sometimes deploys a separate “bicycle penetrator” robot, which carries Starlink or mesh nodes as a forward relay. Typical signal range is about 7km, though a small aircraft carrying a transmitter can extend that to 30km.

On one mission working as a navigator for another unit that relies solely on Starlink, Eugene recalls guiding a UGV carrying a casualty over 1.7km of hostile territory. The trip took two-and-a-half hours because the Starlink connection dropped every five meters, he said.

The route was entirely within the kill zone, where no one could remain in the open, yet the injured soldier had to be moved along a regular road. “It’s just luck the UGV wasn’t destroyed,” Eugene says. “If they ran 100 missions like that, 95 would fail.”

Posted in Technology, War | No Comments »

Why start a war with America when you might avoid one?

Monday, October 20th, 2025

In August, experts gathered at Syracuse University to plan China’s invasion of Taiwan:

For two days, academics, policy analysts, and current and former U.S. officials abandoned their typical defensive postures and attempted to inhabit Beijing’s offensive strategic mindset in a wargame. They debated not how America should respond to Chinese aggression, but how China might overcome the obstacles that have so far kept it from attacking the island nation.

This role reversal yielded an uncomfortable insight. The invasion scenarios that dominate U.S. military planning — involving massive amphibious assaults on Taiwan and preemptive strikes on American bases — may fundamentally misread Beijing’s calculus. As the wargame revealed, analysts seeking to understand China’s intentions should pay greater attention to plausible alternative military pathways to reunification that involve far less force and far more political calculation.

[…]

The exercise revealed three scenarios that generated the most debate among participants. First, a limited missile barrage followed by diplomatic ultimatum — essentially, coercion without invasion. Second, a graduated escalation that stops short of attacking U.S. forces. Third, an assault designed to cripple U.S. forces at the outset and present Taipei with a new reality of isolation. Each path reflected different risk tolerances and assumptions about American resolve.

Participants quickly discovered that when confronted with the decision to attack U.S. forces, this seemed to make little strategic sense when they attempted to look at it from Beijing’s perspective. A typical assumption held by many analysts, including most participants prior to the game, and one that features prominently in American wargames, is that China will simply launch a preemptive surprise strike against U.S. forces in a manner somewhat analogous to Pearl Harbor. But why start a war with America when you might avoid one? As the game participants soon found, there is no guarantee of U.S. military involvement, nor Japan’s, nor other countries‘, if China refrains from attacking them in an opening round.

[…]

This logic shaped the exercise’s most plausible hypothetical scenario. China launches precision strikes against Taiwan’s military infrastructure while simultaneously offering generous surrender terms: local autonomy, preservation of democratic institutions, and minimal mainland administrative presence. The message to Taipei is clear: accept reunification on favorable terms or face devastation. The message to Washington and the American public is equally clear: this is a Chinese civil matter, not worth American lives.

The comparison to Hong Kong’s former autonomy arrangements, once seemingly reasonable, now rings hollow given Beijing’s crackdown there. Participants struggled with this credibility gap. Would Taiwan believe any Chinese promises after Hong Kong?

[…]

Despite decades of modernization, the People’s Liberation Army has not fought a major conflict since 1979. It has never conducted an amphibious assault on a major scale. Its logistics remain untested. Its command structure is riddled with political interference. In contrast to most wargames that portray the Chinese military as a competent machine operating at maximum efficiency, the perspective from Beijing is likely more sobering.

These limitations don’t make China weak — they make it cautious.

[…]

If China’s theoretically preferred strategy involves limited strikes and political coercion, Taiwan needs resilience against pressure campaigns, not just beach defenses. This means hardening critical infrastructure, preparing the population psychologically, and maintaining political unity under extreme stress. It also means understanding the dynamics of how China will attempt to lure Taiwan into an early surrender and then taking steps to undermine these.

[…]

If Beijing believes it can achieve reunification through limited force and favorable terms, traditional military deterrence fails. Therefore, arguably more important than Taiwan’s military vulnerabilities are its political vulnerabilities. While Taiwan has so far remained steadfast in maintaining its independence, the combined effects of China finally crossing the military threshold, limited prospects of outside military help, and Beijing offering favorable surrender terms (backed by threats of massive escalation for refusal), might prove sufficient to undermine the will to fight.

Posted in Policy, War | 3 Comments »

The resistance started to fade as more and more Soldiers came to grips, literally, with the enemy

Wednesday, October 8th, 2025

Matt Larsen describes some lessons learned early in the War on Terror:

As the team entered the second house the number one man seemed to be struggling with something as he went through the first door. The number two man, keying off of the direction taken by number one turned left, the opposite direction from number one which is the standard Close Quarters Battle (CQB) method, and the number three, SSG Miranda came in to follow number one who at this point was obviously engaged with someone. So as not to be stuck standing in the doorway, what is known in CQB as the fatal funnel because enemy fire will normally be concentrated there, Rich placed the palm of his non-firing hand on the back of number one and pushed him and the person he was tangled up with further into the room.

The enemy had a grip on the number one man’s weapon and was fighting to get control of it, although this was not clear to Miranda who was looking at the scene through the narrow green tinted view of his night vision goggles.

While struggling to gain control of his weapon, number one pulled on it as if to rip it out of enemy’s hands. This is known as the “Tug of War” technique, when an enemy has hold of your weapon by the barrel if you simply step back and pull, it will normally be pointed straight at him allowing you to shoot. In doing so he stepped slightly back and toward the center of the room.

With nothing now between him and the man number one had been struggling with, Miranda grasped him with his non-firing hand and using an advancing foot sweep tossed him easily into the center of the room.

At the same moment, with his weapon finally clear enough, number one fired a three round bust into the enemy. Unfortunately with Rich Miranda still grasping the enemy’s shirt, one of the rounds passed through his left arm before striking the enemy.

[…]

Miranda himself was one of the more experienced fighters in the entire Special Forces. He had been training, mostly on his own, for years and was an accomplished Judo player and kickboxer.

[…]

The bottom line was simple: their Combatives training and their mission training were separate. The CQB doctrine when the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan started was that if a soldiers’ rifle malfunctioned they should either take a knee so teammates could cover their sector of fire, or transition to a sidearm. In practice neither option works inside the typical urban rooms we fought in, eight to ten feet end-to-end. When you go through that door, it isn’t a marksmanship contest. It is a fight! You shove the enemy against a wall or over furniture, wrestle for control, and then bring whatever weapon, rifle, pistol, or knife, you can to finish it.

Combatives is an inherent part of many types of missions, Close Quarters Battle in particular, and it must be treated as such. At the time, however, it was not. Doctrine and training treated Combatives as a separate, optional subject: role-players were occasionally used to simulate noncombatants, but live Combatives as a integral portion of mission training seldom if ever happened. The prevailing mindset came from leaders shaped by twenty years of peacetime habits who didn’t want to confront the realities of fighting in rooms. The doctrine they produced was weak and the soldiers who followed it were less prepared than they needed to be. Combatives and marksmanship address different ranges; without both integrated into mission training, teams were handicapped before they ever crossed the threshold.

The resistance started to fade as more and more Soldiers came to grips, literally, with the enemy.

Posted in Martial Arts, War | 2 Comments »

After the bomb was dropped he became quickly Commodore and then Rear Admiral

Tuesday, October 7th, 2025

Peggy Bowditch was a young girl when she and her family moved to Los Alamos in 1943, where her father, Rear Admiral William Sterling “Deak” Parsons, was chosen by General Groves to become head of ordnance for the Manhattan Project:

I was eight when we moved there, and just short of eleven when we left after the war. My father had worked on the proximity fuse. Although he was a regular Navy officer, he had worked in science, from the beginning of World War II on. And General Groves picked him and he meshed with Oppenheimer, so he became the head of ordnance at Los Alamos.

[…]

He was Captain, Navy Captain William Sterling Parsons, and later, after the bomb was dropped he became quickly Commodore and then Rear Admiral.

[…]

A spy there under our very roof was our babysitter, Klaus Fuchs. He would come and take care of my sister and me, and since we were five and eight, we did not need much looking after. But we had a piano in the house and he loved to play the piano, so that was our babysitter. Then, when I got a little older, I was actually Peter Oppenheimer’s babysitter. I mean, you should not really trust a ten-year-old to babysit, but you know, with a guard walking around outside, what could go wrong?

[…]

After the war, we certainly continued our friendship with the Oppenheimers and went up to Princeton, oh, it is hard to remember how often. But the friendship continued and it was fun to go and visit them. And I remember I was struggling with my geometry homework, and Kitty Oppenheimer was the one who helped me [Laughs].

And then in December of ’53 my father heard at a cocktail party that Oppie had been separated from his Q clearance, and he was so upset that he came home and began a heart attack, which he checked with the Encyclopedia Britannica, which was his idea of where you go. And it did not sound as if he had a heart attack. The next morning, Mother took him to Bethesda Hospital and he died, a week after his 52nd birthday.

And, of course, Oppie did lose his security clearance.

[…]

General Groves would show up now and then, and he was a terrific administrator. I mean, he got the Pentagon built, and he was head of the Manhattan Project, but he was basically, I would describe his personality as bully. And there was an Army colonel, maybe, Whitney Ashbridge, who was, I think he was a graduate of West Point, and a very nice fellow, but Groves was a regular Army officer and Ashbridge was maybe engineering duty only. So Groves looked down on him. And one morning at inspection time, he and Groves were marching along, the soldiers were coming by, and Groves saw a piece of trash blowing and ordered Ashbridge to pick up the trash in front of the troops, which was really demeaning. I remember my father talking about what a nasty thing that was.

After the war, my parents would still see and they would play tennis with Groves and his daughter [Gwen Groves Robinson]. Groves was the kind of tennis player who did cuts and nasty shots. His daughter, Gwen, she was a good player. But, I remember General Groves asking me, he said, “Would you like me to send your father back to Los Alamos?”

Well, since I loved it, “Oh, yes, yes, yes.” Of course, he was just fooling, just, you know, typical bully type, taking advantage of a kid’s enthusiasm.

My father came and went. He went to Washington quite often. And Groves, I do not know whether he was nervous. For some reason, he was nervous about air transport, so you always travelled by train. That was considered safe, and of course, the trains were pretty nice then. I never got to leave Los Alamos, except to go to Albuquerque or Santa Fe.

Posted in War | No Comments »

They are engaged in cargo cult meaning-making, the pursuit of a pseudo-religion

Monday, October 6th, 2025

Freddie DeBoer sees us entering a new period of spectacular acts of public violence:

After decades of unusually low levels of such violence, we may now be returning to conditions similar to those of previous eras where such acts become distressingly common — notably, the turn of the 20th century, with the wave of anarchist assassinations from 1881 to 1914, the Haymarket Affair, and the Galleanist bombings, as well as the “Days of Rage” of the 1970s, including the Weather Underground, the Symbionese Liberation Army, and FALN (the Puerto Rican separatist movement).

[…]

Mass shootings and similar events are now so normalized that it can be difficult to sort out whether we’ve slipped into such an era, but my fear is that recent violence will spread and grow, that in fact each act will serve as an accelerant for the next, as the cascading violence will help the people who commit this violence see their work as part of some broader movement that gives them the meaning they seek.

This is, in fact, my overarching argument: that where we are trained to see public violence as the outcome of ideology — those anarchist assassinations, 9/11, Oklahoma City, Anders Breivik, Yukio Mishima — in the 21st century, a certain potent strain of political violence is not the product of ideology but rather an attempt to will ideology into being through violence itself. To create meaning in a culture steeped in digital meaninglessness by the most destructive means available. The 21st century school shooter (for example) does not murder children in an effort to pursue some teleological purpose; the 21st century school shooter exists in a state of deep purposelessness and, at some level and to some degree, seeks to will meaning into being through their actions. This is part of why so many of them engage in acts of abstruse symbolism and wrap their politically-incoherent violence in layers of iconography; they are engaged in cargo cult meaning-making, the pursuit of a pseudo-religion. The tail wags the dog; acts we have grown to see as expressions of meaning are in fact childish attempts to will meaning into being through violence.

Posted in Crime, Policy | 2 Comments »

Ukrainian troops are using Latvian-built electric scooters

Friday, October 3rd, 2025

Ukrainian troops are using Latvian-built electric scooters to move quickly, quietly, and off-road:

The Mosphera military e-scooters used by Ukrainian operators are made by Latvian firm Global Wolf Motors, are about twice the size of a regular scooter, and have motorcycle tires, Klavs Asmanis, the founder and CEO, told Business Insider.

These nimble, off-road e-scooters can hit 62 mph, cover up to 186 miles on a single battery charge, and weigh just 163 pounds, making them easier to handle than heavier bikes.

Asmanis said they can make deliveries to the front lines, do reconnaissance in Russia-held territory, and quickly evacuate lightly wounded troops, among other missions, and Ukraine is putting them to work.

[…]

Asmanis said the scooters offer advantages over other vehicles being used in this war. For instance, they are smaller and lighter than traditional vehicles, they don’t drown out the buzzing sound of drones, they’re easier to quickly bail out of in an emergency, and the scooters don’t require risking a car, truck, or other vehicle that could be packed with gear for other missions on quick, daring dashes.

He said they excel in forested areas. “Its e-scooter-style wheelbase makes it easy to weave between trees” and trails, while its 163-pound weight “means that if it does get stuck, it’s far easier to pull out compared to a motorcycle.”

They’re also far easier to hide when not in use, in bushes or under branches.

[…]

Asmanis said his vehicles are better suited to conflict than typical e-scooters, describing them as “in the middle between scooter and motorcycle” because it has much larger wheels, like motorcycles do, than regular scooters.

Posted in Technology, War | 12 Comments »

Many of the decarceration agenda’s proposals have been tried

Monday, September 29th, 2025

In 2019, more than 1,000 Democratic Socialists of America gathered in Atlanta for their national convention, where they endorsed decarceration:

The background to the resolution clearly outlines the underlying ideology: “DSA will promote a socialist vision of prison abolition that protects people from corporate exploitation as well as dismantling racist incarceration and ending prosecutions of the working class.” The DSA’s official platform further asserts that “incarceration, detention and policing are active instruments of class war which guarantee the domination of the working class and reproduce racial inequalities.”

Following the national organization’s lead, New York City DSA issued its Agenda for Decarceration in January 2020. The program consisted of nine existing legislative proposals and seven new ones aimed at reducing Gotham’s incarcerated population. Among these were the elimination of cash bail; decriminalization of drug possession and prostitution; creation of supervised injection sites; abolishing mandatory minimums; reducing maximum sentences with retroactive effects; and restrictions on the use of solitary confinement. The agenda also included a “no new jails” pledge, which prohibited supporting more jail construction.

[…]

Many of the decarceration agenda’s proposals—bail reforms, restrictions on solitary confinement, decriminalization of drug possession—have been tried, in New York or elsewhere.

In 2019, New York eliminated bail for most misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies. Over the next two years, the city’s pretrial prison population fell by over 40 percent. At the same time, major crimes rose 36.6 percent. New York remains the only state that forbids judges from considering a suspect’s potential danger to the community when setting bail.

In 2015, New York City moved to end the use of solitary confinement for prisoners under 21. In 2021, New York State passed the HALT Act, which limits solitary confinement to 15 days for all prisoners and bans it altogether for younger and older inmates. As City Journal’s Charles Fain Lehman argued, these restrictions have contributed to greatly increased prison violence and eliminated one of the main tools corrections officers use to maintain order.

Oregon tried decriminalization of drug possession in 2021. Subsequently, narcotic-related deaths and open-air drug markets proliferated in its largest city, Portland, which was described as a “war zone.”

Other proposals from the Agenda for Decarceration might be implemented soon. Take Intro 798, a city council bill to abolish the NYPD’s Criminal Group Database, which centralizes information on alleged gang members, reported incidents, and gang dynamics. Though this item is off the legislative agenda for now, Mamdani recently expressed support for abolishing the database, echoing Councilwoman Althea Stevens’s reproach that most of the individuals on the list are minorities. NYPD Deputy Commissioner of Legal Matters Michael Gerber responded to Stevens by observing that the perpetrators of violence were also disproportionately minority.

Finally, Mamdani and other elected DSA officials who signed the agenda stand by their intention to close the city’s Rikers Island jail facility by the legally mandated 2027 deadline. The mayoral front-runner has argued that faster timelines for court hearings, as well as additional bail reforms, could help shrink the city’s jail population. Brad Lander, who serves as the city’s comptroller and has backed Mamdani in the race, praised a 2024 move on the part of Chief Administrative Judge Zayas that aimed to do the same.

Expediting cases and attempting to address the underlying factors of crime are desirable moves in their own right. But, as Lehman noted in a report for the Manhattan Institute, “under almost no conceivable scenario can the city expect to safely and sustainably reduce daily jail population to 3,300”—the borough-based jails’ expected capacity by 2027.

Posted in Crime, Policy | No Comments »

Our country would have been much better off in the immediate postwar years if we had had a group of officers who were thoroughly experienced in all the problems of this type of work

Sunday, September 28th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesGeneral Groves believed strongly, as he explains in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, that in time of war every possible regular officer should be in the combat area:

I was undoubtedly influenced in this belief by my personal knowledge of the disappointment suffered by many regular officers who were kept in this country during World War I, with no chance of combat experience. In my own case, I was already a cadet when the war started, and remained at West Point until a few days before the Armistice. Had my own experience been different, I would quite probably have had a considerable number of regular officers assigned to the project throughout its duration.

As I look back now with a full appreciation of the tremendous import of the development of atomic energy, I think it was a mistake not to have had them. Our country would have been much better off in the immediate postwar years if we had had a group of officers who were thoroughly experienced in all the problems of this type of work—not only in problems of atomic energy but in all the manifold problems involved in technical and scientific developments that have played such an important part in our national defense since 1945.

While I am on the subject of my own mistakes, I perhaps should add that there was another consideration, similar to this, to which I did not give adequate attention. That was the necessity of having replacements available if either Nichols or I died or became disabled. Many serious problems would have arisen if anything had happened to either of us, and it was not proper for me to have placed such great reliance, fortunately not misplaced, upon the physical and mental ability of both of us to stand up under the strain, to say nothing of the possibility of accidental death or injury, particularly since we did so much flying.

This was brought very vividly to my attention in December of 1944, when Mr. Churchill suggested that I should come to London to talk over our problems, and particularly our progress, with him and other members of his government. In discussing his request with Secretary Stimson, I said that while I would like very much to go to England, I was afraid that it might take me away from my work for a considerable period of time, especially if something developed that would make it impossible for Mr. Churchill to receive me immediately on arrival.

Mr. Stimson told me that if I went, I could not go by air, because of the hazards involved. When I said, “Well, I don’t see what difference that would make,” he replied, “You can’t be replaced.” I said, “You do it, and General Marshall does it; why shouldn’t I?” He repeated, “As I said before, you can’t be replaced, and we can.” Harvey Bundy, who was also present, said he had heard that I had previously urged flying when air safety dictated otherwise, and then asked, “Who would take your place if you were killed?” I replied, “That would be your problem, not mine, but I agree that you might have a problem.”

I went on to say that if anything happened to Nichols, I felt that I could continue to operate, though it would mean a very strenuous period for me personally, but that if it were the other way around, while Nichols was thoroughly capable of taking over my position, I thought because he was not so familiar with my responsibilities as I was with his that he could not do both my job and his.

Mr. Stimson said, “I want you to get a Number Two man immediately who can take over your position, and with Nichols’ cooperation, carry on in the event that something happens to you.” He added, “You can have any officer in the Army, no matter who he is, or what duty he is on.”

I drew up a list of about six officers who I thought would be satisfactory, keeping in mind that it would be all-important for the man selected to be completely acceptable to Nichols, since success would depend on the utmost co-operation between them. I particularly wanted someone who would not attempt to overrule Nichols in any of his actions or recommendations until he had had time really to understand what the work was all about, and I doubted whether it would be possible for anyone to accumulate the essential background for this before the project was completed.

Having made up my list, I discussed the matter with Nichols. I asked him to look over the names and to strike from the list anyone whom he would prefer not to have in such a position. He struck several names. I always suspected he struck the first one just to see if I really meant what I had said, because it was the name of a man whom I had known for many years, and who was a very close friend. When he struck that name, I did not bat an eye, but merely said, “Well, he’s out.”

After he had crossed off the names of the men he considered unacceptable, I asked him if he had any preference among the remainder. He replied, “You name him and I’ll tell you.” I said that I felt that the best one on the list was Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell, and Nichols replied, “He would be my first choice, too.”

Posted in Science, Technology, War | 2 Comments »

The psychological roots of “assassination culture” are a mix of ideological radicalism and feelings of powerlessness

Saturday, September 27th, 2025

The Network Contagion Research Institute (NCRI) describes itself as “a nonpartisan research institute leading the field of cybersocial science.” Back in April, Fox News described NCRI’s then-new piece as a disturbing new report that revealed that violent political rhetoric online, including calls for the murder of public figures like President Donald Trump and Elon Musk, was being increasingly normalized, particularly on the left:

“What was formerly taboo culturally has become acceptable,” Joel Finkelstein, the lead author of the report, told Fox News Digital. “We are seeing a clear shift – glorification, increased attempts and changing norms – all converging into what we define as ‘assassination culture.’”

The NCRI study traces the cultural shift back to the assassination of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson by Luigi Mangione in December 2024. What followed, researchers say, was a viral wave of memes that turned Mangione into a folk hero.

According to the study, these memes have sparked copycat behavior targeting other figures associated with wealth and conservative politics.

“It’s not just Luigi anymore,” Finkelstein said. “We’re seeing an expansion: Trump, Musk and others are now being openly discussed as legitimate targets, often cloaked in meme culture and gamified online dialogue.”

A ballot measure in California, darkly named the Luigi Mangione Access to Health Care Act, is just one real-world outgrowth of this online movement.

NCRI conducted a non-probability based nationally representative survey of more than 1,200 U.S. adults, weighted to reflect national census demographics. The findings were stark: Some 38% of respondents said it would be at least “somewhat justified” to murder Donald Trump, and 31% said the same about Elon Musk.

When counting only left-leaning respondents, justification for killing Trump rose to 55% and Musk to 48%.

“These are not isolated opinions,” the report states. “They are part of a tightly connected belief system linked to what we call left-wing authoritarianism.”

“Trump represents the perfect target for assassination culture. He’s powerful, he’s rich and he’s provocative,” said Finkelstein to Fox News Digital. “That puts him on the highest shelf for those who glorify political violence.”

When asked whether destroying a Tesla dealership was justified, nearly four in 10 respondents agreed it was, to some degree. Among self-identified left-of-center participants, support for vandalism and property damage was significantly higher.

“Property destruction wasn’t just an outlier opinion, it clustered tightly with support for political assassinations and other forms of violence,” said Finkelstein. “This points to a coherent belief system, not just isolated grievances.”

[…]

Finkelstein believes the psychological roots of “assassination culture” are a mix of ideological radicalism and feelings of powerlessness, particularly in the aftermath of electoral losses.

“When people feel like they have no say, no future and no leadership offering vision, they become susceptible to radical ideation,” he said. “And that’s when the memes turn into permission structures for real violence.”

Posted in Crime, Policy, War | 4 Comments »

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