Portugal does not allow consequence-free drug use

Tuesday, August 26th, 2025

Ever since Portugal enacted drug decriminalization in 2001, reformers have argued that North America should follow suit, but when Oregon and British Columbia decriminalized drugs in the early 2020s, the results were so catastrophic that both jurisdictions quickly reversed course:

Contrary to popular belief, Portugal does not allow consequence-free drug use. While the country treats the possession of illicit drugs for personal use as an administrative offense, it nonetheless summons apprehended drug users to “dissuasion” commissions composed of doctors, social workers, and lawyers. These commissions assess a drug user’s health, consumption habits, and socioeconomic circumstances before using arbitrator-like powers to impose appropriate sanctions.

These sanctions depend on the nature of the offense. In less severe cases, users receive warnings, small fines, or compulsory drug education. Severe or repeat offenders, however, can be banned from visiting certain places or people, or even have their property confiscated. Offenders who fail to comply are subject to wage garnishment.

Throughout the process, users are strongly encouraged to seek voluntary drug treatment, with most penalties waived if they accept. In the first few years after decriminalization, Portugal made significant investments into its national addiction and mental-health infrastructure (e.g., methadone clinics) to ensure that it had sufficient capacity to absorb these patients.

This form of decriminalization is far less radical than its North American proponents assume. In effect, Portugal created an alternative justice system that coercively diverts addicts into rehab instead of jail. That users are not criminally charged does not mean they are not held accountable. Further, the country still criminalizes the public consumption and trafficking of illicit drugs.

[…]

In late 2020, Oregon embarked on its own drug decriminalization experiment, known as Measure 110. Though proponents cited Portugal’s success, unlike the European nation, Oregon failed to establish any substantive coercive mechanisms to divert addicts into treatment. The state merely gave drug users a choice between paying a $100 ticket or calling a health hotline. Because the state imposed no penalty for failing to follow through with either option, drug possession effectively became a consequence-free behavior. Police data from 2022, for example, found that 81 percent of ticketed individuals simply ignored their fines.

Additionally, the state failed to invest in treatment capacity and actually defunded existing drug-use-prevention programs to finance Measure 110’s unused support systems, such as the health hotline.

The results were disastrous. Overdose deaths spiked almost 50 percent between 2021 and 2023. Crime and public drug use became so rampant in Portland that state leaders declared a 90-day fentanyl emergency in early 2024. Facing withering public backlash, Oregon ended its decriminalization experiment in the spring of 2024 after almost four years of failure.

Route march speed was reduced from 7.5 to 5 km/h

Monday, August 25th, 2025

In 1991-1992, a pelvic stress fracture incidence of 11.2% was recorded in a cohort of 143 female Australian Army recruits:

An incidence of 0.1% was recorded in a cohort of male recruits trained in the 1992-1993 year using a nearly identical program. A number of preventive strategies were instituted in an attempt to reduce the high incidence of injury in female recruits. Route march speed was reduced from 7.5 to 5 km/h, running occurred on softer surfaces, individual step length was promoted instead of marching in step, march and run formations were more widely spaced, and interval-running training replaced traditional middle-distance runs. Pelvic stress fracture incidence decreased significantly to 0.6% in an immediately subsequent cohort of 161 female recruits (chi 2 = 15.12 for 1 df; p < 0.001). It is likely that the preventive strategies reduced bone strain by reducing the frequency and forces of impact during the training period.

(Hat tip to Arctotherium.)

We are preparing to storm positions that we should already be occupying

Friday, August 22nd, 2025

In doctrine, dogma dies hard:

Nowhere is this more evident than in NATO’s enduring obsession with the offense, particularly in the terrain of the urban environment. Despite being a fundamentally defensive alliance, most NATO exercises, training courses, and operational plans focus on seizing ground, breaching defenses, and clearing strongpoints. The result is a dangerous conceptual imbalance: armies that are prepared to attack in cities but not to defend them. In reality, they will likely have to do the latter before they ever do the former.

This is not an abstract concern. If conflict erupts in NATO’s sphere of interest, the first units to make contact will almost certainly be defending, not attacking. An adversary is likely to have the important first-mover advantage, seizing the initiative by making the opening moves. Initial objectives in such conflicts will undoubtedly include those large urban areas that straddle the main transportation infrastructure leading farther toward the adversary’s objectives. Potential adversaries know this in advance. They will plan to mass fires, integrate uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) with thermobaric payloads, and conduct urban shaping operations before launching a combined arms assault. They will not wait for NATO to organize a counterattack. War will come to the defenders.

Why, then, are NATO militaries still preparing to assault someone else’s trenches instead of holding their own?

The roots of this imbalance lie in what can only be described as a cult of the urban offense. It is baked into NATO doctrine, into training centers, and into the very language of tactical education. Urban warfare is taught almost exclusively through the narrow lens of clearing buildings, breaching doors, assaulting intersections, and suppressing enemy strongpoints. The imagery is kinetic, aggressive, and built around a World War II model of urban combat that focuses almost entirely on the tactical level.

Most of that sounds more like Delta Force’s hostage-rescue tactics trickling down through the Rangers to Big Army.

That model is outdated. NATO instructors still teach tactics developed to defeat Axis defenders in fortified cities. But modern adversaries are not relying on bunkers and machine gun nests. They are using thermobaric weapons, precision-guided bombs, loitering munitions, tandem-charge rocket-propelled grenades, and multispectral UAV reconnaissance. A shoulder-fired rocket that once might have created a breach in a wall now flattens a room, an entire floor, or even a whole building. In Ukraine, even basic UAVs are delivering thermobaric payloads through second-story windows.

Yet our tactics have not caught up. NATO battalions in the Baltics still train to assault trench lines. But whose trenches? If Russia crosses the border, NATO’s first mission is to hold ground, not to seize it. We are preparing to storm positions that we should already be occupying.

The problem runs deeper than doctrine. The way we train shapes the way we think. When soldiers spend months rehearsing assaults but never practice layered defense or mobile delay operations, they internalize a false belief that success only comes from attacking. Urban exercises often end at the point of entry (the break-in), not with the enemy’s inevitable counterattack. There is little emphasis on hasty defense after seizure, even though many major urban battles such as Stalingrad, Ortona, Aachen, Grozny, Fallujah, Mosul, Marawi, and Sieverodonetsk required forces to shift from offense to defense, sometimes repeatedly.

Urban training environments make this worse. Most NATO sites are sterile and overly simplified. They consist of a few one- or two-story buildings arranged in a grid, with no interior clutter, no civilian presence, no collateral damage, and no realistic fire effects. These facilities are useful for rehearsing movement drills but do not prepare troops to survive real contact. No NATO unit trains under thermobaric blasts crashing through upper floors or autocannon fire ripping through multiple walls. No site simulates the violence of joint fires in dense terrain or the intensity of enemy shaping operations that strike everything around a defensive position.

[…]

This failure to replicate real-world conditions reinforces outdated thinking. If soldiers only train in sanitized environments, they will not learn how quickly a position can be located, targeted, and destroyed. If they never experience fire effects such as rounds passing through concrete, they will not understand the limits of cover or the importance of dispersion, concealment, and movement.

The lack of depth also prevents defenders from practicing fallback routes, alternate positions, and layered deception. Units become conditioned to static defense. And yet, many NATO militaries still express confidence in their ability to conduct urban operations at scale.

[…]

First, defending forces must limit the attacker’s options. One of the defender’s most pressing challenges in urban terrain is poor situational awareness in the surrounding environment. Line of sight is limited, and urban clutter obscures movement and intent. While this affects both sides, attackers often retain the initiative and usually enjoy better intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance coverage from the outset. This gives them more options for break-in points than most defenders can realistically cover.

[…]

Second, dispersion within the local urban environment must be maximized. NATO forces must abandon the one building, one squad mentality. Instead, available construction and fortification materials should be used to reinforce a distributed network of mutually supporting buildings. This creates layered strongpoints that can deliver interlocking fields of fire, absorb attrition in stages, and delay the enemy’s tempo.

Defenders should prepare loopholes for overlapping fires, establish mouseholes for concealed movement and fallback, and construct alternate positions that are ready for rapid displacement. These routes should be obscured from overhead observation to reduce vulnerability to UAV detection and indirect fire. Camouflage and concealment remain essential. Avoiding enemy intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance entirely is all but impossible, so survivability depends on signature reduction so fighting positions are not targetable or worth the attacker’s munition.

A committee of three was ideal

Saturday, August 16th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesSecretary of War Henry Stimson told General Groves that the Manhattan Engineer District should be overseen by a committee of nine or possibly seven men, as Groves explains in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project:

I objected quite vigorously on the grounds that such a large committee would be unwieldy; it would cause delays in taking action; and some, if not the majority, of its members would tend to treat it as a secondary responsibility, to the detriment of our progress. I felt that a committee of three was ideal and that any more members would be a hindrance rather than a benefit. I pointed out that I could keep three people reasonably well informed on our major problems, and, furthermore, that I would be able to obtain advice from them much more readily than I could from a larger group. In the end, my views were accepted.

[…]

There followed some general conversation, in the midst of which, and with no small amount of embarrassment on my part, for I was by far the most junior person present, I asked to be excused if I were no longer needed, for I wanted to catch the train to Tennessee and inspect the proposed production plant site, so that the land acquisition could proceed. With this, the meeting broke up. I was a bit relieved when Somervell told me several days later that my request could not have been better timed, because it convinced everyone that he had not overemphasized my urgent desire to get a job moving.

Skilled immigrants often constitute an espionage risk

Wednesday, August 13th, 2025

Given the reality of mixed loyalties, Arctotherium notes, it shouldn’t be surprising that skilled immigrants often constitute an espionage risk:

Take the infamous Pakistani nuclear physicist AQ Khan. In 1961, he moved to West Berlin as a foreign student, then to the Netherlands and finally Belgium to finish his education, graduating with a Doctorate in Engineering in 1972. Khan was undoubtedly among the best and brightest of Pakistan, the sort of high-agency STEM genius that brain drain advocates hold up as America’s greatest strength. Was allowing A.Q. Khan into the West a good decision? No.

Khan got a position at the Physics Dynamics Research Laboratory, a Dutch firm specializing in uranium enrichment via centrifuge. He stole centrifuge designs and blueprints, and after returning to Pakistan set up an international network of illicit suppliers for centrifuge parts using his contacts, leading to the 1998 Pakistani nuclear bomb. From there, he diffused nuclear technology further. The North Korean, Iranian and Libyan nuclear programs all trace back to A.Q. Khan. Pakistan has had multiple serious nuclear war scares with India in the last five years. North Korea, which has a history of doing things like axe-murder Americans, can act with relative impunity thanks to its nuclear arsenal, and Israel and the US recently bombed Iran over their nuclear program.

There are many examples from the US. For instance, Noshir Gowadia, an Indian Parsi designer of the B-2 Spirit stealth bomber, and Chi Mak, who worked on nuclear submarines, both sold secrets to China.

Immigration fractures national markets

Tuesday, August 12th, 2025

If you want to join Britain’s thriving cocaine smuggling industry, Arctotherium notes, you have to be Albanian:

There’s no a priori reason why this should be the case. Albanians do not have a racial, cultural, geographic or political affinity for Colombian narcotics. A reasonable and informed observer in 2000 would not have predicted that they would come to dominate the industry. Yet such an obsever would have predicted that some ethnic minority would because organized crime is almost always organized along ethnic lines. This is true even when the ethnic minority is less criminal on average than society at large, as with the Jewish mafia in early 20th century America.

This phenomenon isn’t unique to criminal enterprises. Chaldeans control 90% of the grocery stores in Detroit. 40% of the truck drivers in California are Sikh, and about a third of US Sikhs are truck drivers. About 95% of the Dunkin’ Donuts stores in Chicago and the Midwest are owned by Indians, mostly Gujarati Patels. In New England and New York, 60% of Dunkin’ Donuts stores are operated by Portuguese immigrants. 90% of the liquor stores in Baltimore are owned by Koreans.

[…]

The key point is that immigration fractures national markets. Once a niche is taken over, outsiders can no longer compete in that niche.

There is still competition within ethnic groups inside the niches, but these groups are tiny fractions of the population and often have informal institutions and kinship structures that allow them to act as cartels.

[…]

Cambodians run about 80% of the donut shops in Southern California (despite being only 0.17% of the state’s population). The Cambodian donut empire got its start with refugee Ted Ngoy, who first learned the trade thanks to an affirmative action program to increase minority hiring at Winchell’s Donuts. The Cambodians were able to completely dominate this traditional American culinary sector through a mix of extended family credit and the use of tong tines, an informal lending club.

[…]

This ability to borrow money cheaply made financing much easier for them than for their American competitors. Once the business was purchased, Cambodians could also keep operating costs down through informal employment of family labor, allowing them to get around expensive income taxes, not to mention labor laws and regulations — including ones around child labor.

[…]

Gujaratis, mostly with the surname Patel, run an estimated 42% of the hotels and motels in the United States — despite being only 0.3% of the US population (and an even lower percentage back in 1999 when this was first noticed). Their dominance rises to 80–90% of motels in small town America. The Patel motel cartel got its start with an illegal immigrant, Kanjibhai Desai, in the 1940s. The initial attraction for Patels was that motel ownership did not require English proficiency, and as with the Cambodians, Patel motel owners were able to use informal ethnic loan networks and immigrant family labor brought in via family reunification to undercut their American competitors. Patels now totally dominate the hospitality industry in the US outside of the big chains.

Over half the nail salons in the US are run by Vietnamese, which rises to more than 80% in California (they are only 0.7% of the US population). Just like the Patels and the Cambodians, Vietnamese immigrants were able to finance nail salons more easily than American competitors because they had access to below-market credit from family and friends.

[…]

After the ethnic network was established, Vietnamese owners gained another advantage over non-Vietnamese competitors: better access to workers and training. The language barrier is part of this; once most salon owners spoke primarily Vietnamese, prospective workers had to as well, and cosmetology schools began teaching courses in Vietnamese rather than English.

Groves was too aggressive and might have difficulty with the scientific people

Saturday, August 9th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesVannevar Bush headed the U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) during World War 2, and General Groves admits that Dr. Bush was quite disturbed at Groves’ appointment as head of the Manhattan Project, as he explains in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, because he felt Groves was too aggressive and might have difficulty with the scientific people. After their first inauspicious meeting, Groves went back to his office:

Finding my secretary, Mrs. O’Leary, there, I told her I was being reassigned and that if she wanted to come along, I would be glad to have her. I added, in what proved to be a great understatement, that this would be a very quiet and easy job for her and she should be sure to bring along some knitting to keep herself occupied. This prediction proved valid for about two days.

When I returned home that evening I told my wife and daughter and wrote to my son, a cadet at West Point, that I had a new job, that it involved secret matters and for that reason was never to be mentioned. The answer to be given if they were asked what I was doing was, “I don’t know, I never know what he’s doing.” To my son, I added, “If it is an officer who knows me well, and he is persistent, you can add, ‘I think it’s something secret.’”

[…]

Unlikely as it may seem to many people, they first learned of the nature of my assignment at the same moment, three years later, that the bombing of Hiroshima was announced to the rest of the world.

Is warfare becoming more performative?

Friday, August 8th, 2025

Is warfare becoming more performative?

In the span of three weeks this June, the world witnessed three extraordinary military operations: Ukraine’s decimation of Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, Israel’s sweeping overnight key leader and air defense neutralization in Iran, and America’s ultra long-range bunker busting at Fordo and other Iranian nuclear sites. Each operation shared commonality in audacity, scale, and something surprising: detailed and immediate operational disclosure. These weren’t the limited scope press briefings or carefully circumscribed military reports seen in other high profile missions, like the raid that killed Osama bin Laden or the drone strike that killed Qasem Soleimani. Instead, presidential statements were quickly augmented by comprehensive overviews from that nation’s senior defense officials, complete with easily distributed media: drone footage, confirmational imagery, and mission graphics.

[…]

Like the “shock and awe” of the 2003 Iraq War or CNN’s coverage of the first Gulf War, the June operations captured global attention using novel tools — social media, real-time distribution, and comprehensive disclosure.

[…]

While precedents like Desert Storm showed conflict in real time, they did not bring the viewer into the metaphorical planning room. The June operations showed both conflict and the means and methods used to wage it. Details disclosed were not guessed at by talking heads or pundits, but were officially relayed by the highest levels of national authority. Rather than achieving tactical objectives through one channel and strategic communication through established signaling formats, Ukraine, Israel, and the United States integrated tactical execution with strategic messaging into single operational frameworks.

[…]

Ukraine, Israel, and the United States all sacrificed valuable military information — details that might limit similar methods, capabilities, and flexibility in future missions — in exchange for immediate strategic communication gains.

[…]

In many ways, the evolution of performative warfare is predictable within modern information operations. Even highly successful influence campaigns face the challenge of retaining attention in today’s saturated information environments, and the natural method of recapturing audience focus is through increasingly dramatic and credible demonstrations.

They have cities in the Arctic, we only have villages

Wednesday, August 6th, 2025

Prisoners of Geography by Tim MarshallThe word arctic comes from the Greek arktikos, Tim Marshall explains (in Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Explain Everything About the World), which means “near the bear,” Ursa Major, whose last two stars point toward the North Star:

The Arctic Ocean is 5.4 million square miles; this might make it the world’s smallest ocean but it is still almost as big as Russia, and one and a half times the size of the United States.

[…]

The Arctic region includes land in parts of Canada, Finland, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States (Alaska). It is a land of extremes: for brief periods in the summer the temperature can reach 26 degrees Celsius in some places, but for long periods in winter it plunges to below minus 45. There are expanses of rock scoured by the freezing winds, spectacular fjords, polar deserts, and even rivers.

[…]

The first recorded expedition was by a Greek mariner named Pytheas of Massalia in 330 BCE who found a strange land called Thule. Back home in the Mediterranean, few believed his startling tales of pure white landscapes, frozen seas, and strange creatures, including great white bears; but Pytheas was just the first of many people over the centuries to record the wonder of the Arctic and to succumb to the emotions it evokes.

[…]

As for the first person to reach the North Pole, well, that’s a tricky one, given that even though there is a fixed point on the globe denoting its position, below it, the ice you are standing on is moving, and without GPS equipment it is hard to tell exactly where you are. Sir William Edward Parry, minus a GPS, tried in 1827, but the ice was moving south faster than he could move north and he ended up going backward; but he did at least survive.

Captain Sir John Franklin had less luck when he attempted to cross the last non-navigated section of the Northwest Passage in 1848. His two ships became stuck in the ice near King William Island in the Canadian archipelago. All 129 members of the expedition perished, some on board the ships, others after they abandoned the vessels and began walking south. Several expeditions were sent to search for survivors, but they found only a handful of skeletons and heard stories from Inuit hunters about dozens of white men who had died walking through the frozen landscape. The ships had vanished completely, but in 2014, technology caught up with geography and a Canadian search team using sonar located one of the vessels, HMS Erebus, on the seabed of the Northwest Passage and brought up the ship’s bell.

The fate of Franklin’s expedition did not deter many more adventurers from trying to find their way through the archipelago, but it wasn’t until 1905 that the great Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen charted his way across in a smaller ship with just five other crew. He passed King William Island, went through the Bering Strait and into the Pacific. He knew he’d made it when he spotted a whaling ship from San Francisco coming from the other direction. In his diary he confessed his emotions got the better of him, an occurrence perhaps almost as rare as his great achievement: “The Northwest Passage was done. My boyhood dream—at that moment it was accomplished. A strange feeling welled up in my throat; I was somewhat overstrained and worn—it was weakness in me—but I felt tears in my eyes.”

Twenty years later, he decided he wanted to be the first man to fly over the North Pole, which, although easier than walking across it, is no mean feat. Along with his Italian pilot, Umberto Nobile, and fourteen crew, he flew a semirigid airship over the ice and dropped Norwegian, Italian, and American flags from a height of three hundred feet. A heroic effort this may have been, but in the twenty-first century it was not seen as one giving much legal basis to any claims of ownership of the region by those three countries.

[…]

The melting of the ice cap already allows cargo ships to make the journey through the Northwest Passage in the Canadian archipelago for several summer weeks a year, thus cutting at least a week from the transit time from Europe to China. The first cargo ship not to be escorted by an icebreaker went through in 2014. The Nunavik carried twenty-three thousand tons of nickel ore from Canada to China. The polar route was 40 percent shorter and used deeper waters than if it had gone through the Panama Canal. This allowed the ship to carry more cargo, save tens of thousands of dollars in fuel costs, and reduced the ship’s greenhouse emissions by 1,300 metric tons.

[…]

The northeast route, or Northern Sea Route as the Russians call it, which hugs the Siberian coastline, is also now open for several months a year and is becoming an increasingly popular sea highway.

[…]

In 2009, the US Geological Survey estimated that 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids, and 90 billion barrels of oil are in the Arctic, with the vast majority of it offshore. As more territory becomes accessible, extra reserves of the gold, zinc, nickel, and iron already found in part of the Arctic may be discovered.

ExxonMobil, Shell, and Rosneft are among the energy giants that are applying for licenses and beginning exploratory drilling. Countries and companies prepared to make the effort to get at the riches will have to brave a climate where for much of the year the days are endless night, where for the majority of the year the sea freezes to a depth of more than six feet, and where, in open water, the waves can reach forty feet high.

[…]

The claims to sovereignty are not based on the flags of the early explorers but on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This affirms that a signatory to the convention has exclusive economic rights from its shore to a limit of two hundred nautical miles (unless this conflicts with another country’s limits), and can declare it an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The oil and gas in the zone are therefore considered to belong to the state. In certain circumstances, and subject to scientific evidence concerning a country’s continental shelf, that country can apply to extend the EEZ to 350 nautical miles from its coast.

The melting of the Arctic ice is bringing with it a hardening of attitude from the eight members of the Arctic Council, the forum where geopolitics becomes geopolarctics. The “Arctic Five,” those states with borders on the Arctic, are Canada, Russia, the United States, Norway, and Denmark (due to its responsibility for Greenland). They are joined by Iceland, Finland, and Sweden, which are also full members. There are twelve other nations with Permanent Observer status, having recognized the “Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction” in the region, among other criteria. For example, at the 2013 Arctic Council, Japan and India, which have sponsored Arctic scientific expeditions, and China, which has a science base on a Norwegian island as well as a modern icebreaker, were granted Observer status.

[…]

Moscow has already put a marker down—a long way down. In 2007, it sent two manned submersibles 13,980 feet below the waves to the seabed of the North Pole and planted a rust-proof titanium Russian flag as a statement of ambition. As far as is known, it still “flies” down there today. A Russian think tank followed this up by suggesting that the Arctic be renamed. After not much thought, they came up with an alternative: “the Russian Ocean.”

[…]

Russia and Norway have particular difficulty in the Barents Sea. Norway claims the Gakkel Ridge in the Barents as an extension of its Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ), but the Russians dispute this, and they have a particular dispute over the Svalbard Islands, the northernmost point on earth with a settled population. Most countries and international organizations recognize the islands as being under (limited) Norwegian sovereignty, but the biggest island, Svalbard, formerly known as Spitsbergen, has a growing population of Russian migrants who have assembled around the coal-mining industry there. The mines are not profitable, but the Russian community serves as a useful tool in furthering Moscow’s claims on all of the Svalbard Islands.

[…]

Norway, a NATO state, knows what is coming and has made the High North its foreign policy priority. Its air force regularly intercepts Russian fighter jets approaching its borders; the heightened tensions have caused it to move its center of military operations from the south of the country to the north, and it is building an Arctic battalion.

Canada is reinforcing its cold-weather military capabilities, which includes five new navy warships with moderate ice-breaking capability to be delivered between 2018 and 2022. Announcing the increase in the spring of 2015, Prime Minister Stephen Harper said, “Canada has a choice when it comes to defending our sovereignty over the Arctic. We either use it or lose it.”

[…]

Russia meanwhile is building an Arctic army. Six new military bases are being constructed and several mothballed Cold War installations—such as those on the Novosibirsk Islands—are reopening, and airstrips are being renovated. A force of at least six thousand combat soldiers is being readied for the Murmansk region and will include two mechanized infantry brigades equipped with snowmobiles and hovercraft.

[…]

The Murmansk brigades will be Moscow’s minimum permanent Arctic force, but Russia demonstrated its full cold-weather fighting ability in 2014 with an exercise that involved 155,000 men and thousands of tanks, jets, and ships. The Russian Defense Ministry said it was bigger than exercises it had carried out during the Cold War.

[…]

As Melissa Bert, a US Coast Guard captain, told the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC: “They have cities in the Arctic, we only have villages.”

[…]

The Russians know that NATO can bottle up their Baltic Fleet by blockading the Skagerrak Strait. This potential blockade is complicated by the fact that up in the Arctic their Northern Fleet has only 180 miles of open water from the Kola coastline until it hits the Arctic ice pack. From this narrow corridor it must also come down through the Norwegian Sea and then run the potential gauntlet of the GIUK gap to reach the Atlantic Ocean. During the Cold War, the area was known by NATO as the Kill Zone, as this was where NATO’s planes, ships, and submarines expected to catch the Soviet fleet.

Fast-forward to the new cold war and the strategies remain the same, even if now the Americans have withdrawn their forces from their NATO ally Iceland. Iceland has no armed forces of its own and the American withdrawal was described by the Icelandic government as “short-sighted.” In a speech to the Swedish Atlantic Council, Iceland’s Justice Minister Björn Bjarnason said: “A certain military presence should be maintained in the region, sending a signal about a nation’s interests and ambitions in a given area, since a military vacuum could be misinterpreted as a lack of national interest and priority.”

[…]

It takes up to $ 1 billion and ten years to build an icebreaker. Russia is clearly the leading Arctic power with the largest fleet of icebreakers in the world, thirty-two in total, according to the US Coast Guard Review of 2013. Six of those are nuclear-powered, the only such versions in the world, and Russia also plans to launch the world’s most powerful icebreaker by 2018. It will be able to smash through ice more than ten feet deep and tow oil tankers with a displacement of up to seventy thousand tons through the ice fields.

By contrast, the United States has a fleet of one functioning heavy icebreaker, the USCGC Polar Star, down from the eight it possessed in the 1960s, and has no plans to build another. In 2012, it had to rely on a Russian ship to resupply its research base in Antarctica, which was a triumph for great-power cooperation, but simultaneously a demonstration of how far behind the United States has fallen.

It’s basically a stretched-out, stripped-down all-terrain vehicle without doors or a roof with seating for as many as nine soldiers

Sunday, August 3rd, 2025

The Army’s new Infantry Squad Vehicle, successor to the Humvee, is built by GM Defense, based on the Chevrolet Colorado ZR2 midsize truck, using 90% Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) parts — including Chevrolet Performance off-road racing components:

It’s basically a stretched-out, stripped-down all-terrain vehicle without doors or a roof with seating for as many as nine soldiers.

[…]

Thousands of pounds lighter and $80,000 cheaper than the Humvee, the Infantry Squad Vehicle is based on the Chevrolet Colorado truck built in Missouri.

Infantry Squad Vehicle

“You can repair it anywhere on earth as long as you have access to commercial parts rather than a special military vehicle with special military parts,” said Miller, the Army’s top technical adviser.

[…]

The vehicle isn’t meant to withstand an attack, the official said. It’s designed to whisk soldiers within a few miles of the frontline and allow them to walk a short distance to the fight.

[…]

Its lighter weight, relative to a Humvee, means the Infantry Squad Vehicle can be carried by a Black Hawk helicopter for a short distance with a sling. A twin-rotor Chinook helicopter can carry two of the trucks inside its cargo bay for a greater distance. A Humvee’s weight requires a Chinook, and then just one can be carried in a sling.

It was much less than our total over-all spending in a normal week

Saturday, August 2nd, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesIn September, 1942, Leslie Groves was serving as Deputy Chief of Construction of the Army Corps of Engineers, overseeing all Army construction, at home and abroad, but he wanted to get in on the real action. Instead, as he explains in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, he was offered a role in Washington:

“I don’t want to stay in Washington.”

“If you do the job right,” Somervell said, “it will win the war.”

My spirits fell as I realized what he had in mind. “Oh, that thing,” I said.

[…]

Though a big project, it was not expected to involve as much as $100 million altogether. While this was more than the cost of almost any single job under my jurisdiction, it was much less than our total over-all spending in a normal week.

[…]

“The basic research and development are done. You just have to take the rough designs, put them into final shape, build some plants and organize an operating force and your job will be finished and the war will be over.”

[…]

In the course of our discussion, we agreed that, because the Pentagon was so nearly finished and because I had had so much to do with it, I would continue to control its construction, despite my new assignment. There were two reasons for this. First, my sudden disappearance from the work on the Pentagon would attract much more notice than would my absence from my other Army construction activities. Second, because of the natural interest in the Pentagon displayed by a number of Congressmen, it would be better for me to continue to carry the responsibility for that job than to pass it on to someone else who was unfamiliar with its past problems and their many political ramifications.

[…]

I thought that there might be some problems in dealing with the many academic scientists involved in the project, and I felt that my position would be stronger if they thought of me from the first as a general instead of as a promoted colonel. My later experiences convinced me that this was a wise move; strangely enough, it often seemed to me that the prerogatives of rank were more important in the academic world than they are among soldiers.

At the time I was brought into the picture, research on the uses of atomic energy had been going on at a gradually accelerating pace since January, 1939, when Lise Meitner explained that the uranium atom could be split.

[…]

Virtually all laboratory research until this time had been aimed at achieving a controlled chain reaction, using U-235, a rare isotope of uranium which comprises less than one percent of the metal in its natural state. This isotope has the property of fissioning readily—a property which the far more abundant form of uranium, U-238, does not display. But it soon became apparent that unless unprecedented quantities of this material could be produced in a much purer state, a U-235 chain reaction would be impossible. The basic problem was to arrive at an industrial process that would produce kilograms of a substance that had never been isolated before in greater than sub-microscopic quantities.

[…]

The way for a major breakthrough was open as a result of studies that suggested the theoretical feasibility of transmuting U-238 into a highly fissionable new element, plutonium, which might then be separated from the parent uranium by chemical means. The hope was that this would be easier to do than to isolate or concentrate the rare U-235 by physical means. The group headed by Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg at the University of California undertook to prepare extremely small amounts of plutonium, and in March of 1941 succeeded in creating the first submicroscopic amounts of Plutonium-239. Later that month the California group confirmed the theory that under neutron bombardment plutonium atoms fissioned as readily as atoms of U-235.

[…]

The entry of the United States into World War II caused the abandonment of all projects aimed at developing atomic energy as a source of power and gave added impetus to the efforts to build an atomic bomb.

[…]

It is to their everlasting credit that Bush and his colleagues had the discernment to recognize the limitations of their own organization as well as the moral fortitude to admit them in the national interest. Very few men, confronted with a similar situation, would have done so.

Consequently, when the Top Policy Group met on December 16, 1941, Bush recommended that the Army Corps of Engineers carry out the construction work, and asked that a competent Army officer become thoroughly familiar with the project.

[…]

When the Corps of Engineers started its work, its job was simply to build and operate the production plants. The problems involved in the development of the bomb and its delivery were for the time being largely ignored.

Nor was the full magnitude of the project generally appreciated. No one thought of it as entailing expenditures running into the billions of dollars.

A Chinese blockade could cripple Taiwan’s electricity

Friday, August 1st, 2025

A Chinese blockade could cripple Taiwan’s electricity, recent war games suggest:

“Energy is the weakest element in Taiwan’s resilience against coercion,” warned the report by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The overwhelming preponderance of energy must be imported and is thus vulnerable to a blockade.”

China could supplement a blockade with attacks on Taiwan’s electrical grid, as Russia has done with some success in Ukraine.

“Total electricity production might be reduced to 20 percent of pre-blockade electricity levels,” CSIS said. At that level, all manufacturing ceases – including computer chips vital to the U.S. and the global economy.

These conclusions came from a series of 26 war games run by CSIS to test a blockade of Taiwan, an attractive option for Beijing that offers the prospect of Taiwan agreeing to “reunify” with China, without the need for a bloody and risky Chinese amphibious invasion.

[…]

Taiwan can also reduce its dependence on imported energy. This could include boosting its reserves of oil, natural gas and coal, and even reopening its last nuclear plant, which shut down in May. Meanwhile, the island’s electrical grid could be hardened, including stockpiles of spare parts such as transformers and turbines.

For its part, the U.S. could increase its air transport capacity for a Berlin 1948-style airlift. While insufficient to meet all of Taiwan’s needs, “in some circumstances, an airlift could have a powerful moral effect and provide some breathing room,” CSIS said. In addition, the U.S. Navy will need to improve its capability for convoy escort.

They shut down their last nuclear reactor in May?

You can bring the Old World’s knowledge and technology to the new, but if geography is against you, then you will have limited success

Wednesday, July 30th, 2025

Prisoners of Geography by Tim MarshallLatin America, particularly its south, is proof, Tim Marshall explains (in Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Explain Everything About the World), that you can bring the Old World’s knowledge and technology to the new, but if geography is against you, then you will have limited success, especially if you get the politics wrong:

In the United States, once the land had been taken from its original inhabitants, much of it was sold or given away to small landholders; by contrast, in Latin America the Old World culture of powerful landowners and serfs was imposed, which led to inequality. On top of this, the European settlers introduced another geographical problem that to this day holds many countries back from developing their full potential: they stayed near the coasts, especially (as we saw in Africa) in regions where the interior was infested by mosquitoes and disease. Most of the countries’ biggest cities, often the capitals, were therefore near the coasts, and all roads from the interior were developed to connect to the capitals but not to one another.

In some cases, for example in Peru and Argentina, the metropolitan area of the capital city contains more than 30 percent of the country’s population.

[…]

Mexico is growing into a regional power, but it will always have the desert wastelands in its north, its mountains to the east and west, and its jungles in the south, all physically limiting its economic growth. Brazil has made its appearance on the world stage, but its internal regions will remain isolated from one another; and Argentina and Chile, despite their wealth of natural resources, will still be far farther away from New York and Washington than are Paris and London.

[…]

Their total population (including the Caribbean) is 600 million people, and yet their combined GDP is equivalent to that of France and the UK, which together comprise 120 million people.

[…]

At its widest point, west to east, from Brazil across to Peru, it is 3,200 miles. On the western side is the Pacific, on the other the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, and the Atlantic. None of the coastlines have many natural deep harbors, thus limiting trade.

Central America is hill country with deep valleys, and at its narrowest point is only 120 miles across. Then, running parallel to the Pacific, for 4,500 miles, is the longest continuous mountain chain in the world—the Andes. They are snow-capped along their entire length and mostly impassable, thus cutting off many regions in the west of the continent from the east. The highest point in the Western Hemisphere is here—the 22,843-foot Aconcagua Mountain—and the waters tumbling down from the mountain range are a source of hydroelectric power for the Andean nations of Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela. Finally, the land descends, forests and glaciers appear, we are into the Chilean archipelago, and then—land’s end. The eastern side of Latin America is dominated by Brazil and the Amazon River, the second longest in the world after the Nile.

[…]

The relative flatland east of the Andes and temperate climate of the lower third of South America, known as the Southern Cone, are in stark contrast to the mountains and jungle farther north and enable agricultural and construction costs to be reduced, thus making them some of the most profitable regions on the entire continent—whereas Brazil, as we shall see, even has difficulty moving goods around its own domestic market.

[…]

In the nineteenth century, many of the newly independent countries broke apart, either through civil conflict or cross-border wars, but by the end of that century the borders of the various states were mostly set. The three richest nations—Brazil, Argentina, and Chile—then set off on a ruinously expensive naval arms race, which held back the development of all three.

[…]

Particularly bitter is the relationship between Bolivia and Chile, which dates back to the 1879 War of the Pacific in which Bolivia lost a large chunk of its territory, including 250 miles of coastline, and has been landlocked ever since. It has never recovered from this blow, which partially explains why it is among the poorest Latin American countries. This in turn has exacerbated the severe divide between the mostly European lowlands population and the mostly indigenous peoples of the highlands.

[…]

Despite the fact that Bolivia has the third-largest reserves of natural gas in South America it will not sell any to Chile, which is in need of a reliable supplier. Two Bolivian presidents who toyed with the idea were thrown out of office and the current president, Evo Morales, has a “gas to Chile” policy consisting of a “gas for coastline” deal, which is dismissed by Chile despite its need for energy. National pride and geographical need on both sides trump diplomatic compromise.

[…]

Guatemala claims Belize as part of its sovereign territory but, unlike Bolivia, is unwilling to push the issue. Chile and Argentina argue over the Beagle Channel water route, Venezuela claims half of Guiana, and Ecuador has historical claims on Peru.

[…]

In its far north, Mexico has a two-thousand-mile-long border with the United States, almost all of which is desert. The land here is so harsh that most of it is uninhabited.

[…]

All Mexicans know that before the 1846–48 war with the United States the land that is now Texas, California, New Mexico, and Arizona was part of Mexico. The conflict led to half of Mexico’s territory being ceded to the United States. However, there is no serious political movement to regain the region and no pressing border dispute between the two countries. Throughout most of the twentieth century they squabbled over a small piece of land after the Rio Grande changed course in the 1850s, but in 1967 both sides agreed the area was legally part of Mexico.

[…]

Mexico’s major mountain ranges, the Sierra Madres, dominate the west and east of the country and between them is a plateau. In the south, in the Valley of Mexico, is the capital—Mexico City—one of the world’s megacapital cities with a population of around 20 million people.

On the western slopes of the highlands and in the valleys the soil is poor, and the rivers of limited assistance in moving goods to market. On the eastern slopes the land is more fertile, but the rugged terrain still prevents Mexico from developing as it would like. To the south lie the borders with Belize and Guatemala.

[…]

The cartels responded by creating a land route—up through Central America and Mexico, and into the American Southwest. This in turn led the Mexican drug gangs to get in on the action by facilitating the routes and manufacturing their own produce. The route partially follows the Pan-American Highway, which runs south to north up the continent. Originally designed to move goods in each direction to a variety of countries, it is now also used to move drugs north to the United States. The multibillion-dollar business sparked local turf wars, with the winners using their new power and money to infiltrate and corrupt the Mexican police and military and get inside the political and business elites.

[…]

Central America has little going for it by way of geography but for one thing. It is thin. So far, the only country to gain advantage from this has been Panama, but with the arrival of new money from China that may be about to change.

[…]

In 1914, the newly built, fifty-mile-long, American-controlled Panama Canal opened, thus saving ships an eight-thousand-mile journey from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean and leading to economic growth in the canal region. Since 1999, the canal has been controlled by Panama, but is regarded as a neutral international waterway that is safeguarded by the US and Panama navies. And therein, for the Chinese, lies a problem.

[…]

The Panama Canal may well be a neutral passageway, but at the end of the day, passage through it is dependent on American goodwill. So, why not build your own canal up the road in Nicaragua? After all, what’s $50 billion to a growing superpower?

[…]

In the fall of 2016 the project was not going well. Mr. Wang lost an estimated 85 percent of his fortune in the Chinese stock market crash of September 2015. Most construction work was delayed, but all sides insisted the project would succeed.

[…]

Beijing now sells or donates arms to Uruguay, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and Peru, and offers them military exchanges. It is trying to build a military relationship with Venezuela, which it hopes will outlast the Bolivarian revolution if and when it collapses. The arms supplies to Latin America are relatively small-scale but complement China’s efforts at soft power. Its sole hospital ship, Peace Ark, visited the region in 2011. It is only a three-hundred-bed vessel, dwarfed by the American one-thousand-bed version that also visits, but it was a signal of intent and a reminder that China increasingly “gets” soft power.

Oceania’s geopolitical logic is obvious

Sunday, July 27th, 2025

The main driver of the rise of empires, Peter Turchin argues, is interstate competition:

The intensity of this competition, in turn, is dialed up by advances in military technologies. Each military revolution, thus, generates a set of mega-empires. Today we live in the historical shadow of two most consequential military revolutions.

The iron-cavalry revolution dates to about 1000 BCE.

[…]

To cut the long story short, the iron-cavalry revolution transformed the Great Eurasian Steppe into an engine of imperiogenesis. This continental heartland was the home of nomadic pastoralists, whose main military force consisted of horse archers.

[…]

The other consequential revolution was, of course, the one that originated in Western Europe around 1400 CE. Its two components were gunpowder weapons and ocean-going ships. So I refer to it as the “Gunship Revolution.” The parallels between the two revolutions are quite striking. Inner Asians rode horses and shot arrows, while Europeans rode ships and shot cannon balls. The world ocean played the same role as the “sea of grass.” Historians noted these similarities. For example, the historian of Southeast Asia, Victor Lieberman, referred to Europeans as “White Inner Asians.”

Readers, who are familiar with geopolitical theories of Mackinder, Mahan, Spykman, and others (if not, check out this Wikipedia article), will immediately recognize the similarities between what I am talking about here and various geographical concepts central to these theories (the Heartland, the Rimland, the Islands…).

[…]

Thus, the Great Steppe (which is treated as a pivotal region by several geopolitical theories) today is of little significance, except for its historical effect. By 1900 it was completely taken over by Russia and China. Today it’s home to a bunch of weak and geopolitically insignificant states, such as Mongolia and the “Stans.” The successors of old mega-empires, which arose on the Steppe frontiers, is where Eurasian power now resides.

The second pole of power is “Oceania,” which originated on the western shores of Eurasia during the sixteenth century (Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and the British Isles), then spread across the Atlantic, and now is a global empire, ruled from Washington and Brussels as a secondary capital (although there are cracks between these two seats of power due to Donald Trump’s policies). A good way to visualize this geopolitical entity is a map of American military bases.

Oceania’s geopolitical logic — encirclement of Eurasian empires — is obvious.

We made certain that each member of the project thoroughly understood his part in our total effort — that, and nothing more

Saturday, July 26th, 2025

Now It Can Be Told by Leslie M. GrovesIn the introduction to Leslie Groves’ Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, Edward Teller painted a picture of the general. The general himself opens with a foreword:

I have recorded here only that which I am qualified to write about — my own experiences during the development of atomic energy between September 17, 1942, and December 31, 1946, the period during which I was in charge of the Manhattan Project.

[…]

Gradually more and more of the details of our work have been declassified and, with the issuance of an executive order in May, 1959, the curtain was drawn aside on the story of the project.

[…]

The command channels of the Manhattan Engineer District (MED) — the name given to the atomic bomb project — had no precedent. They grew up with the project and were changed as conditions changed. Yet the basic concept — that of always keeping authority and responsibility together — never changed.

[…]

We made certain that each member of the project thoroughly understood his part in our total effort — that, and nothing more.

[…]

Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), and Dr. James B. Conant, Chairman of the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), a subdivision of OSRD, were primarily responsible for President Roosevelt’s decision to transform the atomic energy development program from a research project into a program aimed at producing a decisive military weapon. Once the military purpose of the project became governing, Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell, Chief of the Army Services of Supply, and Major General W. D. Styer, his Chief of Staff, entered the picture. Within a few months they brought me in to head up the project, subject, of course, to the personal approval of General Marshall, Secretary of War Stimson, and, finally, the President.

[…]

At first, I was responsible only for the engineering, construction and operation of the plants to produce bomb materials. Had our work been routine and clearly defined, my responsibility probably would have ended there. However, it soon became evident to Dr. Bush and to me that if serious delays to our work were to be avoided the MED should expand its research activities, and take over control of all the atomic research projects then under the management of the OSRD, thus uniting authority with responsibility. This transfer was effected without friction during the fall and winter of 1942 by the simple device of allowing the OSRD contracts to continue in force until they expired, at which time they were replaced by new ones in which the MED was the contracting agency. The transition was so smooth, indeed, that, as I have read accounts of that period by some of the people involved, I have been struck by the fact that they did not seem to be aware of just when the transfer of authority actually took place.

[…]

Thus I became responsible, particularly to General Marshall, Secretary Stimson and President Truman, for the over-all success of the use of the bomb against Japan. This assignment included selecting the target cities, subject to the approval of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War; preparing the orders and instructions for the bombing operations; and arranging for Army and Navy units to provide the necessary support to our overseas effort.