The Peace of Amiens gave Napoleon a breathing space to pursue plans to stimulate economic growth through state intervention and protectionism, Andrew Roberts explains (in Napoleon: A Life), a policy originally pioneered by Louis XIV’s finance minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert:
Napoleon had read Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations in translation in 1802, but considered Britain’s Industrial Revolution too advanced for France to be able to compete against her in open markets. Instead he put his faith in government subsidies in strategic industries, technical training schools, prizes for inventions, visits to British factories (that is, industrial espionage), technology fairs, the improvement of the Jacquard silk-weaving process, an industrial exhibition in Paris (at which the cotton-spinning business of Richard Lenoir took 400,000 francs’ worth of orders) and the setting up of twenty-two chambers of commerce across France in December 1802. Yet by the end of his reign, France had reached only the level of industrialization that Britain had enjoyed in 1780, an indictment of revolutionary, Directory and Napoleonic economic policy and the Colbertism they all followed.
[…]
The Colbertian use of tariffs furthermore skewed trade so that high customs barriers in Italy meant that raw silk from Piedmont which used to go to Lombardy was instead sent to Lyons; Dutch producers had to pay duties on goods sold in France, but not vice versa, and so on.
[…]
Napoleon had managed greatly to increase confidence in France’s finances and in her ability to honour her government’s bonds, but even so they never managed to match Britain’s in this period. At his best, he was forced to borrow at higher rates than Britain at its worst.
Was Stalin a vastly better central reformer than Bonaparte?
As wikings say, «citation needed». From Napoleon. Now, competing with the British fleets was certainly not something he could do directly. And they were the only serious player in the game left after they crushed Spanish and Dutch presence on the seas not by “too advanced Industrial Revolution” — not that this practically mattered.
Jim says:
Very different situations.
Stalin’s troubles on the outside were unavoidable, yet not urgent. His main problem was with the Trotsky’s followers and other local maniacs running rampant and eagerly fighting for power.
Napoleon’s main problem was with the Brits and their stranglehold on trade. And he could not fully isolate and reduce external interaction to the comfortable level of protectionism. Hence attempts to implement the “reverse blockade” of Europe, that’s just what it would take.
Inside… it was not that bad by the time he took power. Even his would-be assassins had obvious British ties. He did not have the problem of fighting off the next Robespierre wannabe so bad that he would need a secret police within a secret police within his secret police.
Stalin or Napoleon better central planners? Napoleon was a polymath. Stalin seems to have read a lot, but he sure wasn’t Napoleon’s equal.
The Code Napoleon settles the issue.In Napoleon’s letters, he says the point of the Code Napoleon was that he could tax any enemy to destruction with ease. But, he could do that because the Code was a such a huge improvement on previous French law.
Bruce says:
That’s the second question.
And that’s the third question. =)
But on this one… Stalin’s style was all about the cadres. Sure, there were things he could not delegate. But most of the time his main concerns remained the same: to have the best available people in the right places and have them work toward maximally useful objectives, not wasting their time. So he talked to those who did things for him. Most of his waking time. All sorts of people — military commanders, spies, aircraft designers, songwriters… And of course much like he had competing spies working in parallel, he interviewed these separately, not assembling experts in one crowd to generate consensus unless necessary.
Books are nice, but they don’t come with “interrogate the author about this or that important point” feature.