Francisella tularensis is lethal in 30 percent of untreated cases

Friday, August 7th, 2026

I don’t recall ever hearing the name tularemia growing up, but I’m pretty sure I was vaguely aware of something called rabbit fever — if only because I’d seen the warning against rabbititis in Hare Tonic:

“And then suddenly everything’d go black!”

Biohazard by Ken Alibek Tularemia is a debilitating illness, Ken Alibek explains (in Biohazard), rife among wild animals and common in the Rocky Mountains, California, Oklahoma, parts of eastern Europe, and Siberia:

It is a hardy organism, capable of surviving for weeks, sometimes months, in decaying animal corpses. Tularemia is primarily transmitted to humans by ticks, mosquitoes, and wild rabbits, though squirrels, sheep, cats, and dogs have also been identified as carriers. While highly infectious, it almost never spreads directly from one person to another.

Victims can be laid up for weeks with chills, nausea, headaches, and fever. If left untreated, symptoms usually last two to four weeks, but they can continue for months. Francisella tularensis is lethal in 30 percent of untreated cases.

After World War II, scientists in the United States, Britain, and Canada developed tularemia for use on the battlefield, where it could immobilize an entire division through the intensive medical care required for each stricken soldier.

Soviet commanders considered tularemia an unpredictable weapon for close-quarter tactical maneuvers. The risk of infecting one’s own troops was high. But we had obtained, from a leading international research institute in Europe, a strain capable of overcoming immunity in vaccinated monkeys.

Our civilian credentials ensured that no questions were asked when we requested it. As far as we knew, there had never been an attempt anywhere in the world to weaponize a vaccine-resistant strain of tularemia. For Kalinin, the project represented a chance to prove what Biopreparat could do.

Five hundred monkeys were ordered from Africa for tularemia tests on Rebirth Island, he explains:

Importing that many animals at one time without arousing suspicion was not as difficult as it sounds. The arrangements were made well in advance by clandestine overseas trading associations run by the Soviet Ministry of External Trade, which also supplied us with the cages and other special equipment.

[…]

Since we were testing a vaccine-resistant weapon, all of the monkeys had to be immunized before they were exposed.

[…]

There was no telephone at the test center, and the only communication with Aralsk was through cryptograms on the army’s closed-circuit communications network.

[…]

Nearly all the immunized monkeys died.

[…]

The next year we conducted new tests with an even more efficient dry variant of tularemia, following all the procedures meticulously, and the new version of weaponized tularemia entered the Soviet arsenal.

[…]

Meanwhile, at Rebirth Island, everything connected to the tularemia test, from research notes to blood samples to the monkeys’ corpses, had to be incinerated.

[…]

Open-air testing at Rebirth Island stopped in 1992. Records of what happened there no longer exist.

They should properly be called mass casualty weapons, not weapons of mass destruction

Wednesday, August 5th, 2026

Biohazard by Ken AlibekOver the centuries, Ken Alibek explains (in Biohazard), armies have used primitive methods to spread pestilence:

The Romans dropped poison into wells to contaminate their enemies’ water supplies. The English gave blankets smeared with smallpox to Indians in the eighteenth century during the French and Indian Wars. Confederate troops in the American Civil War left corpses of animals to rot in ponds along the path of Union forces. And during World War II, Japanese planes dropped porcelain bombs containing billions of plague-infected fleas over Manchuria.

[…]

Soviet scientists combined the knowledge gained from postwar biochemistry and genetic research with modern industrial techniques to develop what are called “aerosol” weapons—particles suspended in a mist, like the spray of an insecticide, or a fine dust, like talcum powder.

Temperature and weather conditions will determine the success of an aerosol’s dissemination. Bacteria and viruses are generally vulnerable to sunlight; ultraviolet light kills them quickly. Heavy rain or snow, wind currents, and humidity impede their effectiveness.

[…]

A bioweaponeer will know to strike at dusk, during periods when a blanket of cool air covers a warmer layer over the ground—a weather condition called an inversion, which keeps particles from being blown away by wind currents.

We packed our biological agents in small melon-sized metal balls, called bomblets, set to explode several miles upwind from the target city.

[…]

Primitive aerosols lose their virulence and dissipate quickly. In our labs, we experimented with special additives to keep our agents from decaying when transported over long distances and to keep them alive in adverse weather conditions.

[…]

We tested a variety of animals, including rabbits and guinea pigs, but monkeys, whose respiratory systems are so similar to ours, were the most effective surrogates for humans. An average person takes in ten liters of air every minute. A monkey inhales four. If four particles of an agent in a given volume of air killed at least 50 percent of the monkeys exposed to an aerosol, we could assume that ten particles would have an equally lethal effect on human beings.

Our standard measure of success for a biological weapon was referred to as Q50, representing the amount needed to infect 50 percent of all exposed human beings in one square kilometer of territory. The Soviet Union devoted an enormous amount of time and money to developing concentrated aerosols that could reach the Q50 level with minuscule numbers of bacterial cells or viral particles.

The most effective biological weapons go on killing long after they are used. Some viruses, such as Marburg, are so hazardous that casually inhaling as few as three microscopic viral particles several days after an attack would be enough to kill you. Biowarfare strategists often look beyond the immediate target to focus on the epidemic behavior of disease-causing agents.

Unlike nuclear weapons, which pulverize everything in their target area, biological weapons leave buildings, transportation systems, and other infrastructure intact. They should properly be called mass casualty weapons, not weapons of mass destruction.

A single twenty-ton fermenter working at full capacity could produce enough spores to fill one missile in one or two days

Tuesday, July 28th, 2026

Biohazard by Ken AlibekKen Alibek explains (in Biohazard) that he was asked how long it would take to “arm” an SS-18 missile with anthrax:

The giant SS-18 missiles, which could carry ten five-hundred-kiloton warheads apiece over a range of six thousand miles, had never been considered before as delivery vehicles for a biological attack.

When the Soviet biological warfare program began in the 1920s, our scientists attached crop sprayers to low-flying planes and hoped that a contrary wind wouldn’t blow the germs the wrong way. After World War II, bombers armed with explosives were added to the arsenal. The Cold War fueled the development of ever more destructive armaments, and by the 1970s we had managed to harness single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles for use in the delivery of biological agents. Multiple-warhead missiles represented more of a challenge. Few of the agents we had weaponized could be prepared in sufficient quantities to fill hundreds of warheads simultaneously.

[…]

Through a series of tests, I’d found a way to create a more potent anthrax weapon, so that fewer spores would be needed in an attack. The new technique allowed us to load more missiles with anthrax without straining our labs’ resources.

[…]

At least four hundred kilograms of anthrax, prepared in dry form for use as an aerosol, would be required for ten warheads.

Our seed stock for anthrax production was kept inside refrigerated storerooms at three production facilities in Penza, Kurgan, and Stepnogorsk. The seed stock would have to be put through a delicate fermenting process to breed the billions of spores required. The process was complicated—and it took time. A single twenty-ton fermenter working at full capacity could produce enough spores to fill one missile in one or two days. With additives, we could probably boost the output to five hundred or six hundred kilograms a day.

[…]

The colonels looked pleased. Two weeks was not a problem. No one expected to go to war overnight.

[…]

Anthrax takes one to five days to incubate in the body. Victims often won’t know that an anthrax attack has taken place until after they begin to feel the first symptoms. Even then, the nature of the illness will not at first be clear. The earliest signs of trouble—a slight nasal stuffiness, twinges of pain in the joints, fatigue, and a dry, persistent cough—resemble the onset of a cold or flu. To most people, the symptoms will seem too inconsequential to warrant a visit to the doctor.

In this first stage, pulmonary anthrax can be treated with antibiotics. But it would take a highly alert public health system to recognize the evidence of an anthrax attack.

[…]

The first symptoms are followed several days later by the anthrax “eclipse,” a period in which the initial discomfort seems to fade, concealing the approaching danger. Proliferating bacteria will have begun to engulf the lymph nodes, local headquarters of the body’s disease protection system. Within a matter of hours the bacteria will have taken over the entire lymphatic system. From there, they enter the bloodstream, continuing to multiply at a furious pace. Soon they begin to release a toxin that attacks all organs but is particularly damaging to the lungs, filling them with liquid and gradually cutting off their supply of oxygen.

Within twenty-four hours of this toxin’s release, a victim’s skin will begin to turn a faint bluish color. At this stage, every breath becomes more painful than the last. A choking fit and convulsions follow. The end usually comes suddenly: some victims of pulmonary anthrax have been known to die in the middle of a conversation. The disease is fatal in over 90 percent of untreated cases.

A hundred kilograms of anthrax spores would, in optimal atmospheric conditions, kill up to three million people in any of the densely populated metropolitan areas of the United States. A single SS-18 could wipe out the population of a city as large as New York.

Bioweapons are no longer contained within the bipolar world of the Cold War

Sunday, July 26th, 2026

Biohazard by Ken AlibekWhen I saw that Annie Jacobsen’s Biological War was coming out, I decided to revisit Ken Alibek’s Biohazard, which I read soon after 9/11 and the mysterious anthrax attacks — 25 years ago. He opens with his bona fides:

Between 1988 and 1992, I was first deputy chief of Biopreparat, the Soviet state pharmaceutical agency whose primary function was to develop and produce weapons made from the most dangerous viruses, toxins, and bacteria known to man. Biopreparat was the hub of a clandestine empire of research, testing, and manufacturing facilities spread out over more than forty sites in Russia and Kazakhstan. Nearly every important government institution played a role in the Soviet biological weapons program: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministries of Agriculture and Health, the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the Communist Party Central Committee, and, of course, the KGB.

[…]

Over a twenty-year period that began, ironically, with Moscow’s endorsement of the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, the Soviet Union built the largest and most advanced biological warfare establishment in the world. We were among the 140 signatories of the convention, pledging “not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain” biological agents for offensive military purposes. At the same time, through our covert program, we stockpiled hundreds of tons of anthrax and dozens of tons of plague and smallpox near Moscow and other Russian cities for use against the United States and its Western allies.

[…]

Less than a decade ago, I was a much-decorated army colonel, marked out for further promotion in one of the Soviet Union’s most elite military programs. If I had stayed in Russia, I would have been a major general by now, and you would never have heard my name. But in 1992, after seventeen years inside Biopreparat, I resigned from my position and fled with my family to the United States. In numerous debriefing sessions, I provided U.S. officials with their first comprehensive picture of our activities.

[…]

Bioweapons are no longer contained within the bipolar world of the Cold War. They are cheap, easy to make, and easy to use.

He wrote that in 1999.

He did not want to meet trouble with an empty gun

Thursday, July 23rd, 2026

The new Little House on the Prairie show opens with Laura drawing back her slingshot while hunting a rabbit — and I immediately thought, wait, would a kid on the frontier have a big rubber band?

Laura Ingalls Wilder was born in 1867. Charles Goodyear received his patent for vulcanized rubber in 1844, so rubber had been around for a couple decades, and the term “slingshot” goes back to 1849. Apparently the first “modern” slingshots go back to the 1860s, but I don’t think a girl out on the frontier would have access to cheap, used bicycle inner tubes.

Anyway, the original book definitely does not have her shooting a slingshot.

More jarringly, later in the first episode, Pa goes off without his rifle, and Ma defends Laura from wolves with it. I was confused when she gave a warning shot and then ran the lever to chamber another round, because Pa’s gun in the books is a single-shot, muzzle-loaded, percussion-cap rifle.

In fact, Chapter 3 of Little House in the Big Woods is literally called “The Long Rifle” and describes Pa’s gun in great detail:

Every evening before he began to tell stories, Pa made the bullets for his next day’s hunting. Laura and Mary helped him. They brought the big, long-handled spoon, and the box full of bits of lead, and the bullet-mold. Then while he squatted on the hearth and made the bullets, they sat one on each side of him, and watched.

First he melted the bits of lead in the big spoon held in the coals. When the lead was melted, he poured it carefully from the spoon into the little hole in the bullet-mold. He waited a minute, then he opened the mold, and out dropped a bright new bullet onto the hearth.

The bullet was too hot to touch, but it shone so temptingly that sometimes Laura or Mary could not help touching it. Then they burned their fingers. But they did not say anything, because Pa had told them never to touch a new bullet. If they burned their fingers, that was their own fault; they should have minded him. So they put their fingers in their mouths to cool them, and watched Pa make more bullets.

There would be a shining pile of them on the hearth before Pa stopped. He let them cool, then with his jack-knife he trimmed off the little lumps left by the hole in the mold. He gathered up the tiny shavings of lead and saved them carefully, to melt again the next time he made bullets.

The finished bullets he put into his bullet pouch. This was a little bag which Ma had made beautifully of buckskin, from a buck Pa had shot.

Pa’s rifle obviously does not use modern metallic cartridges. Also, no one was at all concerned about lead poisoning. These are people who would happily coat a wall with lead-based paint if they could.

After the bullets were made, Pa would take his gun down from the wall and clean it. Out in the snowy woods all day, it might have gathered a little dampness, and the inside of the barrel was sure to be dirty from powder smoke.

So Pa would take the ramrod from its place under the gun barrel, and fasten a piece of clean cloth on its end. He stood the butt of the gun in a pan on the hearth and poured boiling water from the tea kettle into the gun barrel. Then quickly he dropped the ramrod in and rubbed it up and down, up and down, while the hot water blackened with powder smoke spurted out through the little hole on which the cap was placed when the gun was loaded.

Pa kept pouring in more water and washing the gun barrel with the cloth on the ramrod until the water ran out clear. Then the gun was clean. The water must always be boiling, so that the heated steel would dry instantly.

Then Pa put a clean, greased rag on the ramrod, and while the gun barrel was still hot he greased it well on the inside. With another clean, greased cloth he rubbed it all over, outside, until every bit of it was oiled and sleek. After that he rubbed and polished the gunstock until the wood of it was bright and shining, too.

The gun is obviously a black-powder muzzle-loader.

Now he was ready to load the gun again, and Laura and Mary must help him. Standing straight and tall, holding the long gun upright on its butt, while Laura and Mary stood on either side of him, Pa said:

“You watch me, now, and tell me if I make a mistake.”

So they watched very carefully, but he never made a mistake.

Laura handed him the smooth, polished cow-horn full of gunpowder. The top of the horn was a little metal cap. Pa filled this cap full of the gun-powder and poured the powder down the barrel of the gun. Then he shook the gun a little, and tapped the barrel, to be sure that all the powder was together in the bottom.

“Where’s my patch box?” he asked then, and Mary gave him the little tin box full of little pieces of greased cloth. Pa laid one of these bits of greasy cloth over the muzzle of the gun, put one of the shiny new bullets on it, and with the ramrod he pushed the bullet and the cloth down the gun barrel.

Then he pounded them tightly against the powder. When he hit them with the ramrod, the ramrod bounced up in the gun barrel, and Pa caught it and thrust it down again. He did this for a long time.

Next he put the ramrod back in its place against the gun barrel. Then taking a box of caps from his pocket, he raised the hammer of the gun and slipped one of the little bright caps over the hollow pin that was under the hammer.

He let the hammer down, slowly and carefully. If it came down quickly—bang!—the gun would go off.

It’s not an old-fashioned flintlock; it’s an up-to-date percussion-cap rifle.

So, what do we do with a freshly loaded rifle?

Now the gun was loaded, and Pa laid it on its hooks over the door.

When Pa was at home the gun always lay across those two wooden hooks above the door. Pa had whittled the hooks out of a green stick with his knife, and had driven their straight ends deep into holes in the log. The hooked ends curved upward and held the gun securely.

The gun was always loaded, and always above the door so that Pa could get it quickly and easily, any time he needed a gun.

When Pa went into the Big Woods, he always made sure that the bullet pouch was full of bullets, and that the tin patch box and the box of caps were with it in his pockets. The powder horn and a small sharp hatchet hung at his belt and he carried the gun ready loaded on his shoulder.

He always reloaded the gun as soon as he had fired it, for, he said, he did not want to meet trouble with an empty gun.

The gun was always loaded, and always above the door so that Pa could get it quickly and easily, any time he needed a gun

Whenever he shot at a wild animal, he had to stop and load the gun—measure the powder, put it in and shake it down, put in the patch and the bullet and pound them down, and then put a fresh cap under the hammer—before he could shoot again. When he shot at a bear or a panther, he must kill it with the first shot. A wounded bear or panther could kill a man before he had time to load his gun again.

But Laura and Mary were never afraid when Pa went alone into the Big Woods. They knew he could always kill bears and panthers with the first shot.

When he shot at a bear or a panther, he must kill it with the first shot.

The famous lever-action, repeating rifle “that won the West” was the Winchester Model 1873, which came out, as you might imagine, in 1873. If Pa bought a brand-new, cutting-edge rifle, in the show, that might explain why they couldn’t afford everything on their shopping list at the general store. A repeater would cost five times as much as Pa’s old muzzle-loader, and the new-fangled ammo wouldn’t’ve been cheap, either.

The opening chapter of Little House in the Big Woods mentions wolves, by the way:

Wolves lived in the Big Woods, and bears, and huge wild cats. Muskrats and mink and otter lived by the streams. Foxes had dens in the hills and deer roamed everywhere.

To the east of the little log house, and to the west, there were miles upon miles of trees, and only a few little log houses scattered far apart in the edge of the Big Woods.

So far as the little girl could see, there was only the one little house where she lived with her Father and Mother, her sister Mary and baby sister Carrie. A wagon track ran before the house, turning and twisting out of sight in the woods where the wild animals lived, but the little girl did not know where it went, nor what might be at the end of it.

The little girl was named Laura and she called her father, Pa, and her mother, Ma. In those days and in that place, children did not say Father and Mother, nor Mamma and Papa, as they do now.

At night, when Laura lay awake in the trundle bed, she listened and could not hear anything at all but the sound of the trees whispering together. Sometimes, far away in the night, a wolf howled. Then he came nearer, and howled again.

It was a scary sound. Laura knew that wolves would eat little girls. But she was safe inside the solid log walls. Her father’s gun hung over the door and good old Jack, the brindle bulldog, lay on guard before it. Her father would say,

“Go to sleep, Laura. Jack won’t let the wolves in.” So Laura snuggled under the covers of the trundle bed, close beside Mary, and went to sleep.

One night her father picked her up out of bed and carried her to the window so that she might see the wolves. There were two of them sitting in front of the house. They looked like shaggy dogs. They pointed their noses at the big, bright moon, and howled.

Jack paced up and down before the door, growling. The hair stood up along his back and he showed his sharp, fierce teeth to the wolves. They howled, but they could not get in.

The house was a comfortable house. Upstairs there was a large attic, pleasant to play in when the rain drummed on the roof. Downstairs was the small bedroom, and the big room. The bedroom had a window that closed with a wooden shutter. The big room had two windows with glass in the panes, and it had two doors, a front door and a back door.

All around the house was a crooked rail fence, to keep the bears and the deer away.

In the yard in front of the house were two beautiful big oak trees. Every morning as soon as she was awake Laura ran to look out of the window, and one morning she saw in each of the big trees a dead deer hanging from a branch.

Pa had shot the deer the day before and Laura had been asleep when he brought them home at night and hung them high in the trees so the wolves could not get the meat.

In Little House on the Prairie, the book, they definitely hear wolves, but Pa is with the family, with his gun, when one approaches in the night, and — spoiler alert — it’s not an alpha wolf leading the pack to come eat little Laura.

Dozens of Navy professional articles have bemoaned its weakness in mine clearance

Monday, July 20th, 2026

The collapse of negotiations between the US and Iran can be traced to a single point of failure, Mark Cancian (a retired Marine colonel) says, the inability of the US military to keep the Strait of Hormuz open in the face of Iranian opposition:

The challenge has been long anticipated. The Navy has been thinking about it for 45 years, ever since it escorted tankers through the Persian Gulf in the 1980s and successfully thwarted Iranian efforts to control traffic. As a junior Marine officer, I participated in amphibious planning exercises to capture islands in the Strait. Yet, when the moment came for the Navy to implement its plans, nothing happened.

[…]

With assured passage through the Strait, the US would not need to allow a reconstruction fund, sanctions relief, or return of frozen assets. Time would be on our side.

Instead, the two sides have resumed strikes against each other and reinstated their respective blockades.

[…]

Much criticism must also fall on the military, particularly the Navy, which has “Keep[ing] the seas open and free” in its mission statement — but has not given senior decisionmakers acceptable options because of historical, glaring gaps in capability that it has not addressed.

Specifically, the service has long ignored mine warfare and instead depends on allies for this capability. Dozens of Navy professional articles have bemoaned its weakness in mine clearance, pointing to previous failures in Korea (1951), the Persian Gulf (1985) and Desert Storm (1990-1991).

[…]

And yet, the last of the Avenger class of mine countermeasure vessels (MCM) has retired, while the replacements (mine clearance modules on LCVs) have been few, delayed and plagued with problems.

[…]

Ultimately, the Navy needs something like in-stride minesweeping capability, the ability to clear a channel in hours or days, not weeks or months. It’s also clear that an implication of current US policy is that the United States must retain some of these capabilities itself and cannot always rely on allies and partners.

The Navy also needs to rediscover its skills at convoy escort. During the world wars, the US Navy was a master at this. Those skills have apparently atrophied. As part of this effort, the Navy needs to test and settle on its doctrine. Traditionally, escorts have sailed with the convoy, providing close-in protection. That worked for the one small convoy that the Navy ran under Project Freedom, but the Navy’s new concept is to create a safe corridor from a distance, without tying warships to particular groups of cargo ships. That sounds great. Will it work?

Finally, the Navy, like the other services, needs to develop mechanisms to counter drones. Firing $5.3 million SM-3s at $30,000 Iranian Shahed drones is not sustainable. Ashore, adding a counter-drone battery is relatively straightforward. Integrating it into a ship’s fire control system is complicated, but necessary.

This is not just a Middle East issue. If Iran succeeds in establishing the principle that neighboring countries can control constricted waterways, other straits worldwide might come under national control, and the whole world would suffer, including the United States.

The car and the telephone allowed for the bureaucratization of coercion

Tuesday, July 14th, 2026

The car and the telephone, Kulak argues, allowed for the bureaucratization of coercion:

If you look at the orders given to British Captains and Admirals during the Napoleonic wars, these orders were often shockingly cursory. Sometimes only 1-2 sentences would be the whole of the Admiralty’s direction to a ship’s Captain for months at a time.

[…]

These orders were not so simple because the task was simple, but because it was COMPLEX and skilled British Captains needed the greatest of discretion with which to act. They were weeks if not months out from new orders, and the admiralty weeks if not months away from news of occurrences on the other side of the world.

[…]

You see this not only in the royal navy, but also on the American frontier, where Marshalls, Sheriffs, Mayors, and US Army Captains often wielded power to rival knights and dukes in the old world, and ran not inconsiderable risk in doing so.

[…]

What the invention of the Automobile and telephone did was it changed all of that. By increasing the speed of reaction times from days to minutes or hours, and by increasing the speed of communications from days or weeks to seconds, the very nature of authority changed.

Before applying something such as the income tax would be an unfeasibly dangerous proposition. A simple modicum of non-compliance would require tax agents to go out, and even if they went out in force, they’d probably be disappeared very quickly, with the only lead being that they disappeared between Thursday and Sunday and were vaguely going to be present in some area or county. It might take another 4 days after they were noted missing to get someone out there to check on them.

[…]

Whereas before trustworthy, competent, literate, moral Ethically predictable, men who were capable of distant travel, dynamic decision making, and enforcing their decisions with violence were the major limiting factor in the depths of state control that is possible… And such men were inherently prideful and had class interests around their rights as high status free gentlemen and their places of respect within the communities they administered; Former Colonel Washington LED the rebellion against the Crown… Whereas before you had to deal with all of that, Now you could use Anyone.

Indeed the modern state invariably chooses for it’s regulators and inspectors sexually failed women, the disabled, the sexually isolated or despised, and the racially and ethnically outcast. All explicitly BECAUSE they are of the lowest status without the state (what do you think Diversity, Equity and Inclusion means? It mean selecting people for being low status without the state) and will obey basically anything the state demands because, unlike the violent competent men of discretion who could do anything else or go anywhere and assume a leadership role, the DEI bio-slop who fill the government bureaucracy are complete nobodies without their jobs.

[…]

Unlike the earlier generations of lawmen, these infinitely expanding regulators need never actually enforce anything themselves, they need only send messages or “reach out” and if at any point they feel the slightest physical threat, they can call the police who are empowered to make ZERO decisions but are still capable of violence, and of calling in an endless stream of more police officers, tactical teams, and Helicopters should you prove resistant.

None of the people with power have a gangster or KGB agent’s stoic familiarity with death and danger

Sunday, July 12th, 2026

Kulak notes that western powers are playing with fire when they use assassination against non-western powers:

On August 20, 2022, 29 year old Daria Dugina was killed in a car bombing on the outskirts of Moscow. The bomb, it was widely agreed, had been intended for her father the famed/infamous Russian philosopher Alexander Dugin ( whose works are now shockingly hard to get in English and appears on my “Real Banned Books List”), and while there were lots of deflections and denials, it was fairly widely agreed the plot had been carried out with US and UK backing by Ukrainian aligned insurgents and agents within Russia.

Indeed many US aligned “Journalists”, “Open Source Intelligence” types, Bellingcat associated influencers, and other CIA aligned carve outs openly CELEBRATED the death of Daria, since she had been involved in Putin aligned political youth organizing.

Of course, the fact political volunteers and door knockers have NEVER been considered legitimate military targets, nor the fact the real target was a PHILOSOPHER and everything he had ever done would have been perfectly legal to do even within the United States under the auspices of the first amendment… that somehow never occured to these commentators. Nor the wider US intellectual class, and somehow neither did the natural logical conclusion.

Russia is by and large NOT run by its political organizers and academics. You could probably kill 1000 Russian university professors and it wouldn’t unbalance the Russian state too extraordinarily. Russia is run by a combination of old Soviet secret policemen, gangsters, and crooked/”reformed” oligarchs all attempting to reorganize themselves into a somewhat respectable upper-class, with a blend of impressive and farcical results.

Before he was killed in an internal power struggle the former head of Wagner PMC Yevgeny Prigozhin embodied this, turning from a St. Petersburg gangster, to a prisoner, to a (definitely money laundering) caterer for the presidential palace, to the head of a PMC mercenary company. Every prominent person in Russia has a career like this Right down to Putin going from a KGB officer, to a gangster/political fixer, to president… Every elite member of russian society is basically leading a life ripped right from Grand Theft Auto IV, complete with the eternal struggles of trying to “go legit” and formalize everything as a normal upper-class elite, to being dragged back into gangsterism or even soviet power struggles by their complex past.

Put simply the actual Russian Elite are not people very intimidated by assassination. They’ve all known people to be killed in power struggles, espionage, and criminal altercations, and are used to the anxiety that death might wait for them around the corner. And the US and Ukraine lashing out at academics who might be intimidated doesn’t really affect them.

However, if the Russian state did the logical tit-for-tat escalation and responded in kind… that would shake America to its knees. America actually IS run by its academics, political organizers, and bureaucrats. And almost none of the people with power have a gangster or KGB agent’s stoic familiarity with death and danger.

Killing a Russian Academics daughter did very little to the Russian state… It’d be a very different story for Russia’s armed agents to do the same in America and kill Chelsea Clinton, daughter of current Columbia professor Hillary Clinton.

It’s be a very different story if Russia assassinated Brookings senior fellow Robert Kagan, husband of former under-secretary of state Victoria Nuland. Or any number of Harvard, Stanford, Yale or Princeton political philosophers or International Relations commentators, or members of their family.

Runaway

Monday, July 6th, 2026

I have zero recollection of the movie Runaway coming out in 1984 — and, more tellingly, no recollection of it playing on cable or coming up in conversation after that. At some point in this last decade, it came up somehow, as a bit of a punchline, because it features Gene Simmons — yes, Gene Simmons of KISS — shooting a high-tech pistol with homing-missile rounds.

This did not sell me on the idea of seeking it out. Gene Simmons hams it up, but the other stars play their roles well enough — even though they’re hardly believable as a team of techies:

It turns out that this isn’t a sci-fi B movie — it’s by Michael Crichton — and it’s (unevenly) prescient about modern technology:

It’s about the introduction of smart weapons into civilian life – like the Exocet missile. The pilot who sunk the battleship Sheffield in the Falklands war never even saw the target. He just fired at it over the horizon. When people buy a coffeemaker these days, they expect it to have a microprocessor in it. What about when they buy a gun?

The setting feels like 1984, but with Heathkit robots that work like what we’re now expecting in the next few years. When a “runaway” robot goes rogue, they send in Tom Selleck’s character, who dons something like shark-diving chainmail and BMX gear — and calls for a “floater” drone with a TV camera to go in ahead of him. Prescient. He then dispatches the robot with a totally incongruous laser pistol, despite carrying a semi-auto pistol throughout the film. Again, its prescience is uneven.

Interestingly, the villain uses a “floater” with a smoke bomb, but when he goes to assassinate our heroes he uses what amounts to an RC car with a bomb — something we kids all came up with independently, back in the day.

Ukraine understands Russia in ways that Western services never fully can

Friday, June 26th, 2026

Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 exposed deep weaknesses inside Ukraine’s security services, including the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU):

In 2015, the CIA helped support the creation of the SBU’s Fifth Directorate, a specialized unit that combined counterintelligence and special operations. According to reporting by The New Yorker, the unit developed networks of agents inside occupied territory, conducted surveillance operations and carried out some of Ukraine’s earliest covert actions against Russian proxy forces.

[…]

Among the officers who emerged from this period was future HUR chief Kyrylo Budanov.

The Times reported in February 2024 that Budanov served in Unit 2245, an elite military intelligence formation that worked closely with the CIA after 2015. The unit specialized in recovering Russian military equipment, communications systems and other material that could be analyzed by both Ukrainian and American intelligence services.

The intelligence gathered from captured Russian equipment provided valuable insight into Moscow’s capabilities while helping deepen cooperation between Ukrainian and American services.

Budanov was later wounded while conducting operations against Russian-backed forces in eastern Ukraine and received rehabilitation at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center in the United States. He would go on to lead Ukraine’s military intelligence agency.

Officers trained during the years immediately following Crimea now occupy senior leadership positions throughout Ukraine’s intelligence and security services.

[…]

A December New York Times investigation noted that CIA officers and US military planners had assisted Ukraine in refining its campaign against Russia’s energy sector.

Rather than attacking refineries indiscriminately, planners reportedly focused on hard-to-replace components. In one case, a CIA expert identified a critical refinery coupler whose destruction could leave a facility offline for weeks.

The same logic reportedly informed Ukraine’s campaign against Russia’s so-called shadow fleet, the network of aging vessels used to export sanctioned Russian oil around the world.

[…]

Following the public confrontation between President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office in February 2025, Washington temporarily suspended intelligence cooperation with Kyiv, raising concerns about the future of US support.

However, The Times reported that CIA Director John Ratcliffe successfully argued for maintaining the agency’s presence inside Ukraine despite broader political disagreements over military aid. The CIA reportedly retained personnel in the country and expanded funding for several Ukraine-related programs.

The decision reflected a reality often overlooked in discussions about Western assistance: Ukraine also provides value to the United States. As Bogan put it, “Ukraine understands Russia in ways that Western services never fully can.”

User error, it turned out, was actually designer error

Friday, June 19th, 2026

Inside the Box by David EpsteinAfter Vietnam, David Epstein explains (in Inside the Box), the Army moved from Nylon flak vests to Kevlar, then added rifle-proof ceramic plates, and then added extra protection against “frag” for the neck, groin, shoulders, etc.:

When a vehicle rolled over, or caught fire, or went underwater, soldiers were unable to move quickly enough to escape.

In 2007, a redesign of body armor that was meant to improve mobility was only able to save a single pound. Instead of reducing weight, the new design featured a quick release tab that the wearer could pull to cause the armor to drop off. It was helpful in an emergency, but didn’t solve the overall mobility problem.

[…]

Shortly before the GAO report was published, the secretary of defense ordered the military to open all combat jobs to women, which made the issue of bulky armor even more acute. As women joined the close-combat force, some were outweighed by their equipment. Aside from the weight, it didn’t fit well. On average, of course, women are smaller than men, and shaped differently in ways that are both obvious and nonobvious—proportional to their height, for example, they tend to have shorter limbs.

Pierre-Zamora is thirty-eight, and told me that back when she got her first vest in basic training, the bottom of the ceramic plates were so low that they’d jab into her thighs when she bent down, making it difficult to squat or bend over. And the vest was so broad that she had to yank it to one side in order to shoulder a rifle.

[…]

“I’m a short, heavy guy,” Miller said. “My torso length says I should wear a small vest, but my gut says I should wear a medium.”

Miller’s comment is reminiscent of a story recounted by scientist Todd Rose in his book The End of Average. Rose described how, at the dawn of jet-powered aviation in the 1940s, US Air Force pilots were suffering an enormous number of training accidents. Seventeen pilots crashed in a single day. The carnage was ascribed to pilot error, until a young lieutenant prompted a closer look at the jet cockpits. They had been designed based on the average measurements of hundreds of pilots. But even taking just a few basic body measurements—like height, sleeve length, thigh circumference—the lieutenant found that essentially no individual was near the average on all of them. In designing a cockpit to fit the average pilot, plane manufacturers had designed a cockpit that fit no one. The solution was adjustable cockpits. User error, it turned out, was actually designer error.

The Army learned the same lesson with protective gear. Not long after the GAO report (and the stuck infantryman), the Army started rolling out the body armor version of an adjustable cockpit: the modular scalable vest, or MSV. With interchangeable parts, it allowed soldiers to remove weight if they didn’t absolutely need it. It also gave the flexibility to match a size small outer vest with the belly protection of a size medium, which solved Miller’s torso-length / gut conundrum.

The MSV was sleeker and lighter than its predecessor. Instead of eleven standard sizes, the new armor came in eight, three of which were specifically based on measurements of female soldiers: extra-small short (extra-narrow vest with short ceramic plates); small-short; and small-long (narrow vest with long plates). With those new sizes, something unexpected happened.

“Women are about two percent of the close-combat force,” Miller told me. “But what we found is about twenty percent of that force is best fit in equipment we built for these women.” So many men were better off with the vests designed for women that the Army made sure to brand them carefully. “I’ve had to explain to Congress several times that we built the vest for women,” Miller said, “but we call it unisex because we want men to wear it.”

In particular, physically fit men in the close-combat force often switched from a medium in the old vests to small-long in the new ones—a narrower vest but a protective plate long enough that it still covered their vital organs. A lot of men had also been yanking aside their vest to shoulder a rifle, but now they didn’t have to. Additionally, a notch behind the neck was built into the new gear to make space for women’s hair buns. As it turned out, everybody liked to be able to lift their head while prone, so it became a standard feature. And a new, more meticulous sizing process that benefited women benefited everyone.

[…]

As Miller told me: “Looking at some more extreme users, or niche users, and using them to make something better for everybody, that’s kind of what we did here.”

[…]

The challenges faced by “extreme users,” as Miller referred to them—whether they be people who are particularly small or big, old or young, or with disabilities—frequently represent more extreme versions of the challenges that many other users face. Universal design, then, is just good design, and centering user constraints is a way to focus on the most important challenges.

Todd Rose gave a Google talk on his book years ago:

The device was designed to make an injured soldier more self-sufficient

Wednesday, June 10th, 2026

The U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command’s new Intrepid Battlefield EXoskeleton (IBEX) is a shoulder-to-foot brace that allows injured troops to stand, walk, and shoot when evacuation is impossible or delayed:

The device was designed to make an injured soldier more self-sufficient, so they can move themselves to safety instead of relying on the two-to-four additional troops it takes to carry a victim on a litter. The goal, the Army said in a release Wednesday, is to keep more soldiers firing until help arrives.

IBEX Mk2 Prototype

Weighing just seven pounds, the IBEX can fold into the size of a one liter bottle and be carried quickly to an injured soldier. It relieves the pressure on soft tissue, nerves and blood vessels, and is able to bear body weight.

Lower-leg injuries are often from gunshots or bomb blasts, the Army said, and soldiers suffered many such injuries during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. They can also be injured operating in rough terrain or bad weather.

Troops deployed to combat zones sustained over 22,000 non-amputated lower leg injuries between 2001 and 2018, according to the National Library of Medicine, which also reported that 68% of extremity injuries were fractures or open wounds.

The Navy’s mission is now to establish sea control where possible and sea denial where required

Monday, May 4th, 2026

The era of the Transoceanic Navy, focused on power projection from uncontested seas, is over, Commander Jeff Vandenengel argues, and the era of the Panoceanic Navy, focused on sea control and sea denial, has begun:

In the Continental Phase, from the nation’s founding until the 1890s, the United States fought for North American dominance. Because most threats were on land, the Navy played a subordinate role to the Army and focused primarily on coastal defense, commerce protection and raiding, and support of forces ashore, earning weak public support and limited resources as a result. The Oceanic Phase, from the 1890s until the end of World War II, focused on national efforts to achieve supremacy against threats emanating from the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Based on that national aim and shaped by the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Navy sought to achieve command of the sea through the construction of a powerful battle fleet, giving it a convincing strategic concept that earned the service great public support and resources. Finally, Huntington introduced the Eurasian phase of national policy that started at the end of World War II and featured the replacement of oceanic threats with a new continental threat, the Soviet Union. He then introduced the transoceanic Navy, which would use command of the sea to influence events ashore and give it a new strategic concept to earn public support and resources.

Today, the nation’s primary threat has shifted from the Soviet Union to China, which has an economy, military, and set of ambitions that make it a fundamentally different and more menacing adversary. As a result, Huntington’s Eurasian Phase is over and a new phase of national policy has begun, to be dominated by diplomatic, informational, military, and economic competition between the United States and China. Within that competition, China’s construction of a fleet and military designed to challenge the U.S. Navy has degraded U.S. command of the sea to its lowest point in 80 years, undermining the transoceanic Navy’s strategic concept and ability to contribute to national policy.

In its place a new doctrine is taking shape, the theory of the panoceanic Navy, shifting away from projecting power ashore and toward reestablishing command of the sea to enable the flow of friendly military forces and trade while denying that movement to the adversary.

[…]

The U.S. Navy established command of the sea following World War II. That victory, Huntington showed, created a paradoxical crisis: The Navy had built a fleet to establish command of the sea and then achieved just that. Its success meant there were no credible adversaries at sea, undermining the service’s long-held strategic concept that it would guard against oceanic threats and needed a large fleet to do so. The Navy’s ability to win public support and earn the resources necessary to contribute to national objectives suffered as a result.

[…]

The primary challenger to that command is the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), now the world’s largest navy by hull count—if not yet by tonnage—with approximately 25 percent more warships than the U.S. Navy, a disparity expected to grow to almost 50 percent by 2030. Approximately 70 percent of those PLAN warships have been launched since 2010, compared to just 25 percent of U.S. warships, meaning it is no longer a fleet of old, obsolete coastal vessels.

[…]

The Navy’s strenuous submarine production efforts and the Marine Corps’ Force Design are implicit acknowledgements that the United States no longer enjoys uncontested command of the sea. Large numbers of fast-attack submarines are only necessary if there are large numbers of warships for them to sink and large areas in which surface ships would be at too great a risk to operate. Similarly, Marine littoral regiments are only necessary if Marines must “stand in” a high-threat zone, at risk of being cut off from naval support; medium landing ships (LSMs) are only desirable if large amphibious warships cannot deliver Marines where and when desired; and the Marine Corps’ sea control efforts are only necessary if that control is contested.

[…]

Even nonstate actors, because of the proliferation and democratization of long-range sensors, networks, and weapons, are able to contest that command, at least on a regional basis. The Houthis launched more attacks on U.S. Navy ships in two years than all other adversaries had in the preceding 79 years.

[…]

Today, the Navy is built to project power ashore against continental threats but no longer enjoys the command of the sea necessary to do so.

[…]

China now has the world’s second largest economy, manufactures more goods than the next four leading countries combined, and is a global leader in research, innovation, and patents. It has the world’s largest navy, army, conventional rocket force, merchant marine, maritime law enforcement fleet, and the Indo-Pacific’s largest aviation force.

[…]

Whereas the transoceanic Navy shifted focus “away from the oceans and towards the land masses on their far side,” the focus now returns to the sea. The proliferation of long-range sensors, networks, and weapons, however, means it is increasingly difficult for any fleet to achieve sea control—never mind command of the sea. In addition, while conflicts in the Oceanic Phase were primarily decided by fleet-on-fleet actions, the proliferation and democratization of technologies means non-naval forces (Houthis with land-based antiship missiles on the low end of the spectrum and the PLARF on the high end, for example) now have an unprecedented ability to engage fleets, greatly expanding the range and scope of the naval battlefield. What results is the theory of the panoceanic Navy.

[…]

The Pacific phase now features competition between two nations with powerful fleets and large maritime trade flows, and so the site of decisive action has shifted back to the sea. Whoever prevails there will win the ability to influence events ashore, whether through military functions, such as power projection and deterrence, or through the protection and denial of trade and accumulation of national wealth and power. Even the simple viewing of a map makes it obvious: The two competing superpowers are separated by the world’s largest ocean, and it is here that the military competition will be decided.

[…]

At sea, the PLAN has equipped most of its warships, aircraft, submarines, and larger robotic and autonomous systems (RASs) with antiship missiles, meaning almost every platform in its fleet, not just capital ships, poses a significant threat. Even if Chinese aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers could be defeated, clandestine forces such as the world’s largest submarine fleet, PLA mining—forces, and the Chinese maritime militia—could significantly delay if not prevent U.S. sea control.

[…]

In the land domain, the PLARF operates from mobile launchers that are difficult to find and uses weapons that outrange most of those in the U.S. fleet, giving it the ability to strike ships thousands of miles from the coast. The U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Design is focused on using distributed and hidden stand-in forces to affect events at sea, a model the Houthis used to contest U.S. sea control efforts for almost two years. A ship has always been a fool to fight a fort, and now the fort (land-based forces) is mobile, has excellent scouting, long-range communications and weapons, and may be harder to find than the ship.

[…]

Naval history has been dominated by desperate struggles to find the enemy, but today the space and cyber domains may reduce the time necessary to do so from months to minutes.

[…]

Whereas the oceanic Navy focused on fleet-on-fleet actions in a constrained part of an ocean and the transoceanic Navy focused on engagements between the fleet and continental forces in constrained littoral regions, the panoceanic Navy will have to strive to establish sea control against a wide array of military forces operating from multiple domains, with sensors, networks, and weapons of such long range to make it seem like the oceans are one continuous battlefield—a panoceanic arena.

[…]

Taken together, these trends have lowered the obstacles to a credible attack and raised the requirements for credible defense, making sea denial easier and sea control harder. That has already played out in regional contests. In the Red Sea, to attempt sea denial, the Houthis needed a truck, a computer, and a RAS, whereas the U.S. Navy, to achieve sea control, needed a guided-missile destroyer with a highly trained crew, phased-array radars and satellite networks, and multiple types of advanced interceptors. The Houthis might not have known themselves whether their attacks failed; the world would have known almost immediately had U.S. defenses failed. The Houthis capitalized on that disparity to contest U.S. Navy sea control efforts for almost two years without a navy, without an air force, and without a credible industrial base. The Houthis’ sea-denial efforts must be assessed as partially successful—despite U.S. naval officers’ and sailors’ superb performance in battle—as evidenced by the significant reductions in merchant shipping willing to risk a Red Sea transit. Similarly, the Ukrainians denied the Black Sea to the Russians primarily by using land-based missiles and RASs, and in doing so established a measure of sea control for their own maritime shipping.

[…]

Given the threats the United States now faces, the nation’s resulting strategy, and the reality of modern combat at sea, the Navy’s mission is now to establish sea control where possible and sea denial where required.

In New York social circles, he was known as the “Jewish James Bond”

Friday, April 24th, 2026

The Last Spy looks at 102-year-old CIA spymaster Peter Sichel, who passed away last year:

In New York social circles, he was known as the “Jewish James Bond”: a refugee from Nazi Germany whose gratitude to his American hosts was such that he volunteered to join the US army and became the CIA’s first station chief in Berlin as a mere twentysomething, filing early warnings about Soviet activity that have been credited with ringing in the cold war.

Like 007, Peter Sichel also appreciated a fine tipple, and after leaving the US foreign intelligence service it was he who briefly turned a sweet German white, Blue Nun, into one of the best-selling wines in the world.

A film released in UK cinemas a year after his death aged 102, however, shows Sichel as something more akin to a Jewish Jason Bourne: a former agent who grew increasingly disillusioned with CIA meddling and turned a trenchant critic from beyond his grave of US foreign policy – especially in Iran.

[…]

Born in 1922 in Mainz, into a well-off family of wine merchants whose clients included the Ritz in Paris, Sichel’s early upbringing included a stint at a public school in Buckinghamshire.

But after the introduction of the Nuremberg race laws in 1935 the Sichels escaped first to Bordeaux and then to New York, where the young man volunteered to join the US army the day after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor.

Sichel’s language skills and affable manner drew the attention of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the precursor organisation to the CIA, and he was recruited to extract intelligence from German prisoners of war.

Even then, a firm belief in the value of carefully amassed information over head-first action put him on a confrontation course with the military. “He’s considered a hero, but he was a bad general,” Sichel said of George S Patton, often hailed as one of the most brilliant US generals of the second world war. “He was a very stupid man.”

After the allied victory over Nazi Germany, the OSS director, Allen Dulles, asked the 23-year-old “wunderkind” to stay in Berlin and run the intelligence agency’s activities in US-occupied territory.

Sichel took over the handling of key informants and laid a spy network across the eastern zone, infiltrating the KGB headquarters in Karlshorst with a honey trap — a woman who had an affair with the KGB head’s chauffeur — and managing to recruit two members in the SED (Socialist Unity party) Central Committee and the DWK (German Economic Commission) as US agents.

After being moved back to Washington in 1954 to head the CIA’s German and eastern European desk, he was involved in US propaganda efforts such as the establishment of Radio Free Europe, and oversaw “Operation Gold”, the digging of a 450-metre (1,400ft) tunnel from West to East Berlin to tap Soviet-controlled underground telephone cables.

[…]

“People in high places have an idea of what the picture should be, and if the intelligence doesn’t fit, they don’t believe the intelligence,” Sichel says in The Last Spy.

It’s a mindset that Sichel argues led the US to view any nationalist leader elected around the globe who defied American hegemony to be a Soviet puppet-in-waiting, and justified taking covert action to unseat leaders such as Iran’s Mossadegh, Guatemala’s Jacobo Árbenz, Congo’s Patrice Lumumba and Sukarno in Indonesia.

Sichel was involved in some of these operations, sending a female agent disguised as an air hostess to retrieve a stool sample after Sukarno had visited an onboard toilet, to investigate a (false) rumour that the nationalist Indonesian president was suffering from ill health.

But inside the CIA the German-born spy chief was now a vocal critic, leading to him being investigated by the FBI under suspicion of harbouring communist sympathies in the late 50s. Disillusioned, he retired from the intelligence agency in 1960 and took over his family wine business, which he ran from New York.

The phenomenal commercial success of his brand of sweet-tasting liebfraumilch wine, named Blue Nun to make it more easily pronounceable to customers in the US and the UK, meant Sichel did not look back on his career with bitterness when he died in February 2025

Most aircraft losses happen not in the air but on the ground

Wednesday, April 22nd, 2026

Wargame after wargame exploring a Taiwan scenario has reached the same conclusion:

Most aircraft losses happen not in the air but on the ground. Airbases across the Western Pacific sit within range of PLA missiles. Active air and missile defenses at forward bases cannot reliably defeat salvos at the scales China can generate, and passive defenses — hardened shelters, dispersed parking, rapid runway repair, and decoys — remain inadequate across most of the theater. High-value aircraft parked on exposed ramps at predictable locations are among the easiest targets an adversary can service.

And the vulnerability is not limited to aircraft on the ground. On March 19th, an Air Force F-35A made an emergency landing after a combat mission over Iran, with the pilot reported in stable condition. Unconfirmed footage suggested the jet may have been engaged by a passive, road-mobile air defense system. Iran’s fixed air defense systems had already been heavily degraded by that point. If mobile systems in a diminished network can still put an F-35 on the ground, the threat from China’s intact, layered, and far denser air defenses is of a different order entirely.

This problem compounds because of the F-35’s heavy ground footprint. The jet depends on maintenance facilities, diagnostic systems, spare parts inventories, fuel and munitions stores, and the skilled maintainers who keep the fleet flyable. A runway crater can be filled. A destroyed parts depot or logistics server cannot be easily replaced in theater. Destroy any piece of that support infrastructure, and you degrade sortie generation as effectively as destroying the aircraft themselves. The concentration of high-value equipment and personnel at each operating location makes the F-35’s basing problem qualitatively different from that of simpler aircraft. The loss is not just one jet but the capacity to generate sorties from that site.

The natural response to base vulnerability is dispersal — spreading aircraft across more locations to complicate targeting. But dispersal pushes fighters in exactly the wrong direction. It stretches supply lines that are already thin, fragments maintenance capacity across more sites, and moves aircraft farther from their targets. Distance should then be compensated for, either with standoff weapons or with tankers, and both are brittle. Standoff munitions like the Long Range Anti-Ship Missile are expensive, produced in limited quantities, and have not been procured at scales intended to sustain a weeks-long campaign against a peer adversary. Every mile of additional standoff the operational geometry demands draws down a stockpile that cannot be replenished in wartime.

Tankers are the alternative, but they are large, slow, non-stealthy aircraft that, against China, would orbit within the engagement envelopes of fighters and sensors designed specifically to kill high-value airborne targets. China’s dense, layered, and mobile integrated air defense network pushes those tanker orbits ever farther from the fight. Against Iran, tanker tracks could be established in relatively permissive airspace with minimal risk. Against China, those tankers would be priority targets. Losing them does not just reduce range, but it also collapses the operational architecture, because the fighters cannot reach the fight without them. Every step backward to survive trades away the ability to fight, and every workaround for distance depends on something fragile.