It is sobering to realize, General Groves explains in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project, that but for a chance meeting between a Belgian and an Englishman a few months before the outbreak of the war, the Allies might not have been first with the atomic bomb:
For the most important source of uranium ore during the war years was the Shinkolobwe Mine in the Belgian Congo and the most important man concerned with its operation was M. Edgar Sengier, the managing director of Union Miniere du Haut Katanga or, as it is usually called, Union Miniere.
In May of 1939, Sengier happened to be in England, in the office of Lord Stonehaven, a fellow director on the Union Miniere Board, when Stonehaven asked him to receive an important scientist. This turned out to be Sir Henry Tizard, the director of the Imperial College of Science and Technology. He asked Sengier to grant the British Government an option on every bit of radium-uranium ore that would be extracted from the Shinkolobwe Mine. Naturally, Sengier refused. As he was leaving, Sir Henry took him by the arm and said most impressively: “Be careful, and never forget that you have in your hands something which may mean a catastrophe to your country and mine if this material were to fall in the hands of a possible enemy.” This remark, coming as it did from a renowned scientist, made a lasting impression on Sengier.
A few days later, he discussed the future possibilities of uranium fission with several French scientists, including Joliot-Curie, a Nobel Prize winner. They proposed a joint effort to attempt the fission of uranium in a bomb to be constructed in the Sahara Desert. Sengier accepted their proposal in principle and agreed to furnish the raw material and to assist in the work. The outbreak of World War II in September, 1939, brought this project to a halt even before it began.
Tizard’s warning and the obvious interest of the French scientists emphasized to Sengier the strategic value of the Katanga ores, which were of exceptional richness, far surpassing in that respect any others that have ever been discovered.
Sengier left Brussels in October of 1939 for New York, where he remained for the rest of the war. From there, he managed the operations of his company, both inside and outside the Belgian Congo, and after the invasion of Belgium in 1940 had to do so without the benefit of any advice from his fellow directors who were in Belgium behind the German lines.
Before his departure from Brussels, he had ordered shipped to the United States and to Great Britain all available radium, about 120 grams, then valued at some $1.8 million. He had also ordered that all uranium ores in stock at the Union Miniere-controlled refining plant in Oolen, Belgium, be sent to the United States. Unfortunately, this order was not complied with promptly; later, owing to the German advance into Belgium, it became impossible to carry it out.
Toward the end of 1940, fearing a possible German invasion of the Belgian Congo, Sengier directed his representatives in Africa to ship discreetly to New York, under whatever ruse was practicable, the very large supply of previously mined uranium ore, then in storage at the Shinkolobwe Mine. All work at the mine had stopped with the outbreak of the war and the equipment had been transferred to vitally important copper and cobalt mining operations for the Allied war effort. In accordance with Sengier’s instructions, over 1,250 tons of uranium ore were shipped by way of the nearest port, Lobito, in Portuguese Angola, during September and October of 1940, and on arrival were stored in a warehouse on Staten Island.
Before reading Groves, I thought the decisive gift of nukes to Stalin came from a communist going to Oppenheimer and saying, ‘I’d like a vacation back in New York. You know, visit the Soviet embassy, show them some secret plans’ and Oppenheimer saying ‘Sure! My kid’s babysitter Klaus Fuchs can give you tips!’
And that happened. But Joliot-Curie, Communist party member, was thinking of building an A-bomb in the Sahara with Congo pitchblende before the Manhatten Project got started. And the Brits told Joliot-Curie everything they were told by the US, and expressed outrage at US objections.
So Stalin had multiple sources giving him how-to on nukes.
I’d thought it was one dramatic surprise, like in fiction. But it was military surprise, per General Erfurth. Multiple sources, building up a picture.
The overseas Communist party always felt the US had a plain duty to give all possible military support to the Soviet Union, forever, including nukes. Center-left coalitions in the US and Britain always pandered to this.
The strangest part of the Second World War is how the United State’s military could’ve simply marched to Moscow in a few weeks, nearly uncontested, and simply chose not to—even without the exclusive possession of atomic weaponry which it, in fact, had.
Moreover, for four full years, the United State had absolute military supremacy over the Soviet Union: between 1945 and 1949, the one could’ve nuked the other at its convenience and without credible retaliation.
The Great General George S. Patton:
Jim, after Hitler betrayed the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the Soviets would have been nuts not to prepare for every other alliance ending in an invasion of Russia. Nazi and Communist cooperation went back before Hitler took power. German weapons and tactics were tested on Soviet territory with Soviet aid since the early 1920s.
By comparison, the US was a stranger.
The Soviet Union survived Germany’s onslaught only with United State materiel. Then the United State had nukes and the Soviet Union didn’t. It doesn’t take a genius to figure out what should’ve happened next.
Bruce says:
Which fits what we knew about Stalin, especially where intelligence is concerned.
Why would he not want maximal redundancy on something as potentially-important as this?
«The Communist party felt»? And you started so well… The Communist party mostly felt what Central Committee was told to feel by Politburo. Which after Stalin’s overhaul of power structures, in turn, heeded the Council of Five (first made official as the State Committee for Defence, but by its nature persistent no matter what).
IMO the best description of their handling of USA is the one from Moldbug:
Dominant USA factions (Roosevelt’s revolutionaries) were shown what they wanted to see, thus already considered Soviet Union their client-to-be, and surely the great “convergence” will happen any year now.
On the other side Stalin & Co understood this. They ganged up with USA on the previous hegemon (Brits), whom both regarded as not merely an obstacle, but existential threat. They agreed on the general strategy and rebuilt Germany as their patsy together (Comrade Voroshilov, Comrade Ford et al had their signatures on it, but obviously they were not “rogue actors”). The rest was a nice bonus.
They took apart the Empire-over-which-Sun-does-not-set successfully! Since the Soviet side had much greater snags at the start, at the outcome its share of meat was much smaller than planned, and the balance of power somewhat worse. This made US side even more complacent about their “minor partner”. Which shaped the follow-up stage.
Jim, second-line Red Army troops fought with amazing toughness. Whether they’d have eventually all died without US help is not known. Manstein’s ‘Lost Victories’ recorded some extremely expensive victories.
T. Beholder, the Party was always draconic about its spies and dead agents, but there was always some initiative. ‘Comrade Haldane is too busy to go on Vacation’ takes its title from Haldane’s refusal to go to Moscow and be killed.
Jim says:
Good one. Marched exactly from where and with what?
Jim says:
Yes, but then Germany’s onslaught was over. As well as loss of territories, industries and vulnerability of vital areas. And not just secure Caucasus, but access to Romanian oil.
The predictable move was for United States bosses to conclude that even though turning back on their “pardner” (Georgian bank robber) may be generally unwise, he is reliably deterred, at least for now. So they mostly concentrate on the final stage of initial plan with minimum of distractions. That is: “PROFIT!”.
Between them and their greatest payoff was a delicate task of properly securing vassals and colonies of The Empire Over Which Sun Does Not Set. Before the Brits recover enough to take them back into the fold. The Brits already had all sorts of tentacles in there, after all. Thus, ASAP.
If their old “pardner” proves less than tractable, and there will be contention, it’s better to deal with him from the position of even greater strength.
Also, plainly turning against the openly proclaimed Communists could have turned very bad within USA. This thing needed a good turning radius.
Consider what happens to ManBearPig today: it’s being phased out… but very carefully.
«Heh. He sounds like some Brit… Do we really need this dude now?»
So your argument is that the United State, bristling with by far the most powerful war economy in the world and armed to the teeth with nukes and demonstrably willing to use them—a war economy which, by the way, the Soviet Union was dependent on—the world’s first and only Nuclear Power—was significantly less powerful, or even on equal footing, with the starving, exhausted, German-countryside-mass-raping Slavoid peasant conscript armies of Stalin?
The Second World War makes sense only as a war for the preservation and expansion of Communism in Europe, and, if we are to follow the principle of cui bono, of the Jews.
Jim says:
«So you’re saying…» is #3 on Scott Adams’ list.
Anyhow, in my eyes such a turn simply could not make sense for Roosevelt or other bosses of New Deal state. If you disagree, can you formulate how this could possibly be presented as even remotely a good idea to those in charge? Politically, strategically and even operationally («march to Moscow in a few weeks» itself)?
It was a long, long time until «armed to the teeth» stage.
While having lost access to lots of resources during a war, yes.
There was anything better at large-scale (in “knife fights” of small forces in a familiar terrain several British vassals could outmatch it, sure) land war? Both in attrition and maneuver.
As to economy… Red Army in Finland was backed by the entirety of Soviet MIC in late 1939. Red Army in Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation left its supply railway and ran 350 km ahead, over desert and mountains, about 1.5 mil troops in 3 coordinated fronts, with armor and everything. Was it exhausted in late 1945? Sure, somewhat. But experience mattered, and not just personally for Vasilevsky or even R&D.
In August 1945, the United State dropped 100% of its nuclear stockpile, Little Boy and Fat Man, on Japan. The following summer, in July 1946, the United State had seven to nine nukes, implying a production rate of one nuke per month or two.
The United State should not have nuked Japan. Japan should have been contained and a favorable peace treaty negotiated—no nuking, no invasion, full isolation. The United State should have taken Finland, set up a B-29 base there, and dropped its first nukes on Moscow. The Soviet Union cleanly decapitated, the United State should have turned its sights to Mainland China. The U.S. Army should have returned to the Trans-Siberian Railroad and deposed Zedong. The Communist Chinese Party dealt with, the Chinese government in exile could have returned from Taiwan.
No evisceration of Germany, no Cold War, no Chinese Century.
Stalin…
lost 1.1 to 1.2 million at Stalingrad and didn’t flinch;
lost ~ 800,000 at the Battle of Kursk and didn’t flinch;
let 670,000 military/civilians officially (up to over 2 million by independent historians) die due to starvation, disease and cold in the blockade of Leningrad and didn’t flinch.
Russian top military kahuna Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov “The Butcher” got his nickname for using troops as cannon fodder (1.16 million to over 2 million lost at the Battle of Rzhev meat grinder).
The total number of deaths in both Hiroshima and Nagasaki was between 150,000 and 246,000.
I have a question for ya, Jim: are you by any chance in charge of American military loosing miserably to Russia in Ukraine these days?
Jim says:
This must take place in some alternate universe, where at very least those in charge of New Deal State would have very different goals. There are also no hindrances like United States strike wave of 1945–1946, need to solidify grip on the conquered territories and take over British colonies ASAP, need for 10 years of McCarthyism to at least superficially divorce various Progressive sects from their kin controlled by Kremlin, etc etc. Perhaps no von Neumann’s mind games, either.
Since you don’t describe the underlying conditions and path from anywhere to this situation, nothing meaningful can be said of it.
Thus, the rest applies to the known real world conditions of the time.
This part has that cheerful “easy mode” spirit of Millennium Challenge 2002.
Just like that, walked in and taken Finland somehow. And then set up a base. All off-screen. No big deal. While everyone would… watch all this sleepily?
Including Finland itself, which was quite troublesome for Red Army with the kind of hardware US Army still did not have in 1946 and willingness to take losses.
As well as Soviet Union, which was no stranger to false flag operations and striking good deals with certain future enemies, never mind former ones.
And, of course, anything in Finland is very much in range for USSR.
For one, it takes a single submarine to have a wild “unmapped German minefield” appear at the worst possible place and time.
Again, this makes sense only in a sleepy kingdom of easy mode. Where Stalin had 10 years long hibernation in his Kremlin lair anyway (so why even bother?), along with the rest of GKO and Politburo.
And every single Soviet intelligence service would somehow fail to notice preparations for such an operation long before the first ship left the port. Do you think this was remotely feasible at the time?
They kind of did. This kind of did not end well.
You skipped from 1946 to 1949.
Anyhow, that’s a large scale land war in Asia. With Soviet intervention for the other side. The result would be the proxy war season starting much earlier. With greater expenses, before USA absorbed new resources and on the background of huge strikes and thorough infiltration by forces now becoming actively hostile. Sounds kind of suicidal.
And we are back in an alternate universe without State Department.
No kidding.
I’m supposed to believe that the United State could demonstrably successfully put down Germany but not Finland?
Anything “in range” of the U.S.S.R. was equally in range of a U.S. nuke.
The Soviet Union was still dependent on the United State. What were they going to do?
Don’t make me laugh.
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/lend-lease-eastern-front