But at the opportune moment they were ready to shoot the works

March 18th, 2026

Soldier’s Load by S. L. A. MarshallThe finest young battalion and company officers that S.L.A. Marshall knew, he explains (in The Soldier’s Load and the Mobilty of a Nation) were men of this type:

They were sedulous in planning and preparation. They made their dispositions painstakingly. They insisted on personal reconnaissance to a point where it nettled their subordinates. Thus they had at all times the feel of their own situation, which is half of the battle. But at the opportune moment they were ready to shoot the works.

Knowing is half the battle. The other half is extreme violence.

The autonomy software wasn’t supposed to be enabled until the boats were suitably far out to sea

March 17th, 2026

Project Maven by Katrina MansonOne day in June, 2025, a group of self-driving military boats lined up for a test event at Channel Islands Harbor Marina, a mile north of Port Hueneme Naval Base:

The boats were part of the Replicator program, which was then two years old and less than two months away from the official deadline to deliver thousands of maritime and air drones. The pressure was building.

Things began with support vessels towing autonomous boats out to sea; the drones’ engines were set to neutral and their autonomy mode turned off. The test focused not so much on the vehicles themselves—known as global autonomous reconnaissance crafts, or GARCs—as on the software that allowed them to function on their own. Two separate companies, the defense contractor L3Harris Technologies and Anduril, had made autonomous operating systems for the boats. That day, Replicator was testing GARCs that ran on each company’s product.

As a safety precaution, the autonomy software wasn’t supposed to be enabled until the boats were suitably far out to sea. But one drone running L3Harris’ system suddenly lurched forward. Its autonomy mode, which had somehow turned on, required it to keep a distance of 80 meters (262 feet) from all other objects. The robo-boat sped away, still tethered to the towboat. It alternately accelerated and decelerated, then started crisscrossing in front from port side to starboard side in a semicircling action.

The captain of the towboat had no way of taking over control of the automated vehicle, whose erratic movements caused his own vessel to capsize, throwing him into the water. Still tethered to the towboat, the drone turned back toward it and—for reasons that remain unclear—started advancing at rapid speed.

A captain towing a separate GARC saw what was happening and raced toward the scene, positioning his vessel between his floating comrade and the advancing drone. A third towboat pulled the captain out of the water, and he escaped without serious injury. It had been just three minutes since the drone had gone rogue.

A safety investigation soon diagnosed the problem: An operator on the dock had inadvertently sent a message to the drone remotely disabling the safety lock meant to prevent it from switching into autonomy mode—a classic “fat-finger mistake.” A spokesperson for L3Harris said in a statement that the operator who caused the issue didn’t work at the company and that its software had “demonstrated its ability to control a mix of uncrewed platforms, payloads, and commercial technologies even if they were produced by different manufacturers.” A physical button was added to drone boats to block such accidental commands, and the boats were tweaked to prominently display the mode under which they were operating. Rival companies would start sharing safety lessons.

But the incident illustrated problems that still existed with the Pentagon’s drone strategy and couldn’t be resolved with the addition of another button or two. Replicator had still not progressed to the point that its creators were comfortable putting live ammunition on an unmanned vessel, let alone sending one into a scenario where it would be expected to coordinate with other vehicles or carry out a specific attack plan. The program did manage to deliver hundreds of drones by the August deadline, but it fell far short of its initial goal.

Only the matériel moved and used contributes to success in war

March 16th, 2026

Soldier’s Load by S. L. A. MarshallS.L.A. Marshall explains modern supply chains (in The Soldier’s Load and the Mobilty of a Nation) in 1950:

The greater becomes the mobility and carrying capacity of an army’s transport system, the stronger becomes the necessity for keeping the supply system fluid, for reducing surpluses all along the line from the factory to the front, and for G-4′s learning to sleep without dreaming of disaster because he has no strategic reserve.

In industry or in military organization, what is the final justification for putting more money into an improved transportation system? Simply that it is the best way to forestall the waste that comes of warehousing, stockpiling and deterioration of goods. To develop yet greater road speed and dependability in military transport serves a valid strategic purpose only in the measure that it enables us to reduce the supply burden. It simply defeats its own ends if it finally builds up supply volume until it chokes movement and drains the fighting line of needed manpower. Tactical strength depends on fighting power based on freedom to supply the combat troops. But oversupply will as surely stifle that freedom as overproduction will impair the prosperity of a civilian economy.

Only the matériel moved and used contributes to success in war. That which remains stored is a gift to the enemy.

He then veers into what’s coming militarily:

Highly mobile advanced bases, field bases that scarcely need to resort to dumping, ports that measure their capacity in the speed of the tum-around of the carriers in both directions, maintenance crews as adept with a Tommy gun as with a grease gun-these things mean the kind of strategic mobility the future requires.

It is said that we are entering an era of area warfare, and that at last the old alignments are gone forever. Fronts may be anywhere; guerrilla warfare will be the normal order. Any link in the communications zone will be in danger of being overrun.

[…]

The more fluid the form of war, the more necessary it is for flexibility to be the main characteristic both of the machinery and the lrainiPg doctrine. That is the logical counter to the increased range and killing power of today’s decisive weapons. As the threat rises against all rear installations, wholly new requirements will be imposed on military organization. And chief among them that all soldiers be trained for fighting — that the rear be supplied with mobile counteroffensive power — and that the structure of the rear avoid massiveness, and acquire a new mobility.

The evident value of such a submarine tanker for refueling oil-burning surface ships in wartime has kept this concept alive

March 15th, 2026

For decades now it has been possible to wield sea power without a navy, and the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz is demonstrating just how vulnerable ordinary shipping is to modern missiles and drones — which got me wondering about the practicality of a submersible oil tanker:

In the early ’70’s there was great interest in economically transporting oil from the large oil finds in the Arctic to the markets in the U.S. and Europe. Either pipelines or marine systems seemed feasible. But, bringing the oil out by submarine tanker — on a year-round basis — appeared to be the most cost-effective approach. Consequently a design study of an Arctic submarine tanker was conducted by General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division to demonstrate the practicality of this approach.

Though this project never materialized, the evident value of such a submarine tanker for refueling oil-burning surface ships in wartime has kept this concept alive. A battle group of nonnuclear powered carriers and escorts, capable of being refueled from a submerged tanker — on any course and at relatively high speed — would greatly increase transit speeds while ensuring a vital underway replenishment capability, particularly in a conventional war environment of enemy ocean surveillance satellites and enemy long range cruise missiles.

The submarine tanker designed by Electric Boat was most economically sized to carry 250,000 deadweight tons of oil. With a length of 1,000 feet, an 80 foot draft, a submerged displacement of 360,000 tons, an operating depth of 1,000 feet and a sustained speed or 18 knots, this giant submarine could transit efficiently under the Arctic ice, through the restrictions in the Northwest Passage and readily avoid icebergs in Davis Strait.

Since this tanker could and probably would load its oil from a bottom loading pad, its total cycle of operations could be secure from enemy observation. Although designed for peacetime commercial use, it could be considered an asset to be activated as a naval auxiliary in wartime. Thus, an enemy campaign against such a vital element in U.S. logistics should have little chance of being successful. With the U.S. advocating a “forward offensive maritime strategy,” the security or its critical refueling elements “under the gun” of enemy homeland defenses even moreso emphasizes the submarine tanker solution.

When the attractiveness of this submerged commercial tanker for wartime naval operations became evident, a further design study for the underwater refueling system was conducted. A probe and drogue system similar to that used for aircraft refueling from tanker aircraft was shown to be feasible — the submarine positioning itself under the surface ship and pumping oil up through ·its telescopic probe into a bottom drogue on the surface ship. The safety factor in this method of refueling was particularly good because of the stability of the submarine under all sea conditions and the little movement of a surface ship drogue, positioned at its center of flotation.

The vessel is essentially a large, rectangular tanker-like ship hull with the long internal cylindrical pressure-resisting hull, usually associated with a submarine, centered within the outer rectangular hull. The central hull contains the living and control spaces, pumps and auxiliaries, and the propulsion machinery. Except for the free flooding ends of the ship, the remainder is filled with oil cargo in the loaded condition and sea water in the ballasted condition. The variable cargo tanks on either side are provided to compensate for the difference between density of sea water and the oil.

The propulsion is by twin screws driven by steam turbines. Steam is supplied by a pressurized water reactor, similar in design to those presently in use for commercial electric power generation. The nuclear steam supply system produces steam for the two propulsion trains, each plant developing 37.500 SHP at the propeller for a total of 75,000 SHP. The sustained sea speed would be 18 knots.

By the end of World War II, the Germans were using “milk cow” submarines in this role — but submarines have come a long way since then. In particular, modern submarines travel more efficiently while submerged, not less, because they’re designed primarily for undersea travel, where they encounter no wave-making resistance.

They also encounter no air, which is why “true” submarines only became practical with the advent of nuclear power. But there are non-nuclear forms of air-independent propulsion (AIP), like fuel cells:

Fuel cells are not new. They have undergone significant technological improvements from when they were first considered for submarine propulsion by Germany in the 1950s. The principle of producing power is straightforward; hydrogen and oxygen gas react to produce water and an electrical current. It is the reverse process of electrolysis, where a current is sent through liquid water to split the bonds between the oxygen and hydrogen atoms. Through engineering optimization, enough electrical power can be harnessed from this reaction to power a variety of loads. Current uses include cars, buses, remote cell phone towers, and forklifts. The German Navy already has a hydrogen fuel cell–powered submarine class, the Type 212, first launched in 2005, and variants it sells abroad to countries such as Italy and Singapore.

The Gotland-class submarine, a Swedish boat, is the most prominent example of the extreme stealth of non-nuclear AIP submarines. During a joint wargaming exercise in 2005, it tactically sank the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) several times. It was virtually undetectable by all available antisubmarine efforts.

While powered by a Stirling engine, the concept and application of the Gotland-class AIP system are the same as for others. Stirling engines and other forms of non-nuclear AIP, while quieter than nuclear, are louder and less efficient than fuel cells. There are no mechanical parts in the main fuel cell system such as in combustion driven engines. Fuel cells offer the lowest noise levels because almost no sound is produced by an electro-chemical reaction. The only components in the engine room that could contribute to the sound signature are the compressors and pumps for fuel, water, and cooling.

Yet, cooling requirements for fuel cells are much lower than combustion and nuclear because of the low operating temperature of 100°C for proton-exchange membrane fuel cells. Conversely, nuclear-powered submarines need extensive cooling and vibrational dampening because of high operating temperatures, requiring several large coolant pumps and bulky, complicated mechanical systems such as steam turbines and reduction gears.

In addition to the fuel cells, there are advanced lithium-ion batteries on board AIP vessels that can power the electric motor at higher speeds with no loss of acoustic fidelity. Without the nuclear reactor, there also is a smaller infrared heat signature and no radiological trace. There is a significant stealth advantage to fuel cells that lowers the detectable range of the vessel.

Fuel cell AIP submarines do not have the nominally infinite endurance of nuclear-powered submarines; however, they can remain underwater for much longer than alternative AIP options such as closed-cycle diesel generator, Stirling, and MESMA (a French steam turbine). Fuel cells are significantly more efficient than diesel engines, thus requiring less oxygen fuel per kWh of energy produced. Diesel-electric boats have a max underwater time of a couple of days because of battery limits. Fuel cell AIPs can last weeks underwater and have a range of up to 2,000 nautical miles. Further, by forward deploying these vessels in ports that are close to their respective operating areas, the ratio of time on station to transit and refueling time is increased.

They wouldn’t be immune to mines and underwater drones, of course, but one thing at a time.

The tail of the army began to swallow the head

March 14th, 2026

Soldier’s Load by S. L. A. MarshallWith the coming of the Age of Motor Vehicles
Unlimited, S.L.A. Marshall explains (in The Soldier’s Load and the Mobilty of a Nation), the pressing danger of supply shortage was exchanged for the evil of a continuing glut of supply:

Reversing the tale of the hoopsnake, the tail of the army began to swallow the head.

More mobile capacity meant that more supply could go forward more rapidly to troops-or so it seemed. But the end of it was that there were fewer troops in the combat area, and more vehicles had to be brought in to move greater quantities of supplies to the ever-increasing number of soldiers cluttering up the rear.

And by the hundreds of thousands these men felt more or less clearly that the duties they were doing, the time they were marking, wasn’t even incidental to the prosecution of the war, with the result that many became unwilling and malcontent.

So Special Services was brought in to relieve these men from boredom. But to make that possible came more troops, more supply, more vehicles to move the supply, more crews to maintain the vehicles-’and still more men to get bored. The net effect was to drain fighting power away from the force as a whole, not only through sapping its moral strength, but assigning tens of thousands of men — enough to have made a national combat reserve — to unnecessary duties in the rear areas.

On December 1, 1945, near midnight, I stopped to talk to a Negro sentry who was walking post around a mountainous dump of medical supplies at Carentan, France, a few minutes’ drive from Utah Beach. I asked him how long the dump had been there. “Since three weeks after the invasion.” How long had he been doing guard duty at this point? “Since three weeks after the invasion.” Had anything been removed from the pile in that time? “Maybe, but it was so long ago that I’ve forgotten.”

And there he was, one poor soldier who had started walking around a pile of pills and bandages while the war was still within hearing distance. And he had kept
on walking around it for a full year and a half-till long after the guns had at last gone silent on the plains of Bohemia.

Iran is playing the long game

March 13th, 2026

Vali Nasr writes in the Financial Times that Iran is playing the long game:

In war, geography matters as much as technology. Iran commands the entire northern shore of the Gulf, looming large over energy fields on its southern shore and all that passes through its waters. Its Houthi allies are perched at the entrance to the Red Sea and along the passage to the Suez Canal; Iran is thus perfectly positioned to squeeze the global economy from both sides of the Arabian Peninsula. Those in command of Iran today are veterans of asymmetric wars in Iraq and Syria. They are now applying the same strategy to fighting the US on the battlefield of the global economy. Drones, short-range missiles and mines setting tankers and ports on fire can have the same effect IEDs had in Iraq, only with greater impact — disrupting global supply chains and sending oil prices higher.

Iran could sustain its counteroffensive more easily and for far longer. Furthermore, a ceasefire alone will not lift the shadow of risk that Iran has imposed over the Gulf, which is now experiencing its nightmare scenario. That is why Iranian leaders are saying they will not accept a ceasefire until Washington fully grasps the global economic cost of waging this war. Businesses, investors and tourists may not return to the Gulf states if they assume that war could resume again. Unless the US is prepared to invade Iran to remove the Islamic republic’s leaders and then stay there to ensure stability and security, confidence in the Gulf will only return if the US and Iran arrive at a durable ceasefire.

Iran says it will only accept a ceasefire with international guarantees for its sovereignty, which would probably mean a direct role for Russia and China. It may also demand compensation for war damages and a verifiable ceasefire in Lebanon. The US would then have to agree to some form of the nuclear deal it left on the table in Geneva in February and commit to lifting sanctions. Iran’s leaders entered this war with the goal of ensuring it will be the last one. Either it breaks them or radically changes the country’s circumstances. They are betting on surviving long enough and squeezing the global economy hard enough to realise that goal.

Iran wants a long and painful war, Kulak emphasizes:

Iran has been sanctioned, suffered major economic decline as a result, had agreements it has signed reneged upon, and been surprise attack during negotiations not just recently but during the Twelve Day War last year… not to mention Iranian allies like Hamas and Hezbollah having their leadership assassinated AT NEGOTIATIONS in nominally neutral gulf countries under the banner of peace.

Then during the most recent negotiations they were surprise attacked, had their own leadership assassinated, and had unarmed naval ships attacked “While they thought they were safe in international waters” (War Secretary, Pete Hegseth) but really while they thought they were safe, as an unarmed participant in peaceful naval exercises with India.

Now, you might have to reach back in your imagination to kindergarten or childhood, or WWE, or maybe tap into some prison experiences… But the basic game theory, that even children and wrestling fans understand, is when you’ve suffered treachery, or sucker punches, or surprise attacks when someone pretends to be trying to negotiate with you… is that, assuming you cannot kill them off (which children, wrestlers, and nation states generally can’t) you have to hit them back or inflict some other pain hard enough that you suitably disincentivize future treachery, and make them not want to mess with you again.

[…]

They’d much rather get bombed for the next 8 months to 4 years but make America, Israel, and the international community suffer enough they fear ever doing it again… Than let the precedent stand that you can sanction them, violate all norms of negotiation, airstrike them by surprise, arm foreign mercenaries to try and overthrow them, assassinate their leaders, sink their ships, bomb their girl’s schools… And then go “that’s enough, we’re cool until next time”.

Because they know that there WILL be a next time.

The Army went ashore relatively light

March 12th, 2026

Soldier’s Load by S. L. A. MarshallS.L.A. Marshall decried (in The Soldier’s Load and the Mobilty of a Nation) the senseless competition between the armed services in arranging special privileges and comforts for their separate forces when engaged in joint operations:

Consider what happened all too frequently in Pacific operations during World War II! The Army went ashore relatively light even when setting up a garrison operation. Because of the shortage of shipping space the men slept on the ground, with a blanket or so and a shelter half; they cut foliage for bedding. This would all have been tolerable if a Navy or Seabee unit had not set up next door with cots for sleeping, good housing and a ship’s store, complete with free beer. (Though it may have happened the other way, with the Navy taking the spitty end of the stick, I never heard of it.) The soldier compared his own lack of luxury and skinned-down installations with the luck of the people next door. The result was the demoralization of the service which felt itself discriminated against by higher authority, and forced by the country to suffer unnecessary hardship. In the beginning the Army had stuck to the policy of shipping luxury goods only when there was stowage space beyond that required for essential military cargo. It was soon compelled to depart from this sound principle and give shipping priority to welfare goods. The load continued to increase as one service vied with another in trying to make its men feel especially favored. That we did not pay an exorbitant price for this encumbering weight was only because we were meeting an enemy already short of shipping and other resources.

Why did Rome, rather than any of its many rivals in Iron Age Italy, become the core of an empire?

March 11th, 2026

Why did Rome, rather than any of its many rivals in Iron Age Italy, become the core of an empire?

A muddy settlement on the Tiber turns into a machine that can raise armies, write laws that outlive empires, build roads that stitch a continent together, and carry water for millions through aqueducts, while running a Mediterranean-wide bureaucracy for centuries. The usual explanations are familiar: institutions, military discipline, geography, luck. All true, and none of them feels fully satisfying on its own. Many societies possessed some of these advantages. Rome was unusual in how consistently it turned them into scalable institutions.

There is another angle that is rarely discussed, mostly because until recently it was not testable. What if part of Rome’s advantage was carried in its people, as average differences in traits linked to learning, planning, and administration?

Ancient DNA makes it possible to ask that question directly. Using the AADR dataset and educational attainment polygenic scores, Iron Age and Republican-era Romans come out unusually high. Besides exceeding earlier Italian groups, they sit at the top of the entire ancient European distribution, even after accounting for sample age and genomic coverage.

That by itself does not explain the rise of Rome. But it does suggest a sharper hypothesis: Rome’s institutions may have been built and operated by a population that, on average, was unusually well suited to master and scale complex social systems.

Nothing is too good for the boys

March 10th, 2026

Soldier’s Load by S. L. A. Marshall ln our times, S.L.A. Marshall explains (in The Soldier’s Load and the Mobilty of a Nation), “we have permitted military thinking to become clouded by what social workers, psychiatrists, business counsel, public-relations advisers and morale experts have to say about what is proper in an army organized according to American standards, meaning the standards which are upheld in American institutions of a quite different nature”:

The military leader has become an unhappy worrier, confused and buffeted between rival groups of medicine men, each vending some special magic. He is told that a new order has arisen, that the rising generation is somehow different, that industrial change has revolutionized the military problem, that how he is presented to the public cuts more ice than what he really is and how he thinks, and that modern science and business methodology can rub a lamp and come up with the perfect answer to every age-old military problem.

[…]

From the viewpoint of the businessman, and of his particular friends in political life, the wartime Army is a great business institution, and a shining mark for the sale of any product which can be given even the pale shadow of a legitimate purpose. They press upon command to accept all manner of things which it would not normally consider. Public sentiment — “nothing is too good for the boys” — moves in the same direction. That these pressures are hard to resist is well understood by everyone who was familiar with the World War II atmosphere in Washington. That they are ever likely to become less is a wishful thought hardly sustained by the passage of postwar events.

In the realm of strategy, generals are just as much amateurs as heads of state

March 9th, 2026

No two heads of state could be more dissimilar in ambitions or temperament than Abraham Lincoln and Louis XIV, but when it came to the conduct of their wars, they shared much in common:

Both kept their generals on a tight leash, spending many hours a day in correspondence directing operations: Louis at his writing desk, Lincoln in the telegraph office. They paid especial attention to the theaters closest to their capitals — the Low Countries and northern Virginia, respectively (Louis established a courier service so efficient that a message sent in the morning could receive a reply that evening).

Neither man had experience commanding troops in the field, and both made serious mistakes as a result of their micro-management. Yet they also had good reason to take the approach they did. Fighting a war is very different from winning it, and their generals — though professionals in tactics and operational art — did not always see the larger picture. Domestic political constraints, economic factors, and foreign relations had just as much an effect on the course of the war as battlefield victories. In the realm of strategy, the generals were just as much amateurs as the heads of state.

In all of warfare, the leap from operational art to strategy is the hardest to make. Whereas operational art is in many ways an extension of tactics, dealing with the same sorts of considerations, strategy is different in both kind and scale. The problems it seeks to address are of a fundamentally different nature, as are the tools to effect it — yet by the very nature of the problem, it is almost impossible to train anyone to practice good strategy.

In its broadest sense, strategy is the art of accomplishing major national objectives. This encompasses far more than military force alone: it extends to industrial production, economics, diplomatic relations, domestic politics, and so forth. It is the logical extension of synergistic cooperation in warfare, from combined-arms tactics, to joint operations, to whole-of-government strategy. Good strategy is therefore a collaboration of a broad base of subject-matter experts.

Yet unlike other levels of warfare, nothing prepares practitioners from these separate fields to work together. An infantryman is not trained in the specifics of artillery employment, but is trained from the very beginning to fight as part of a combined-arms team. Junior officers frequently gain experience working alongside other services well before they are expected to plan or conduct joint operations. By contrast, there are far, far fewer opportunities for a military officer to work with industrial policy, economic warfare, or diplomacy before he reaches the three- or four-star level.

He foresaw that his army would be in continuous motion for at least three weeks

March 8th, 2026

Soldier’s Load by S. L. A. MarshallOn the day before the Third Army was to attack into Brittany, S.L.A. Marshall explains (in The Soldier’s Load and the Mobilty of a Nation), General Patton was visited by Generals Lord, Stratton, and Eyster of Communications Zone:

They wanted to know how he was set as to supply and what he would expect of the rear establishment. He said, “Gentlemen, I’ve got three days of POL, ammunition and food. That’s all we need for the start. It’s up to you back there to get the rest of it up to me.” He then outlined the operation as he expected it to develop. Brittany was to be cut off. One flank was to turn toward Brest, and the other was to advance on and over the Loire River. In short, he foresaw that his army would be in continuous motion for at least three weeks. The records show that he made the shot just about as he called it. His critics sometimes say of Patton that he did not know logistics and that this was his handicap. That is at best a negative truth. What he didn’t know about the supply problem never slowed the movement of his armies. He respected the controlling principle. He would not overload his own forces. He demanded all the support that could be had from those who were in position to help them along. He may have missed a tree here and there but he kept his eyes on the forest.

The microbe keeps the core instructions for copying DNA and building the ribosomes that read it

March 7th, 2026

A Japanese led team, working with international partners at Dalhousie University and University of Tsukuba, has described a microscopic archaeon called Candidatus Sukunaarchaeum mirabile that blurs the edge between living cells and viruses:

The story began when scientists sequenced DNA from marine plankton and noticed genetic fragments that did not match any known organism. Reconstructing those fragments revealed a circular genome of about 238,000 base pairs.

For comparison, the previous record holder among Archaea, Nanoarchaeum equitans, carries roughly 490,000 base pairs, so this newcomer has kept barely half the DNA of an already-minimalist relative.

Almost everything in this tiny genome is devoted to handling genetic information. The microbe keeps the core instructions for copying DNA and building the ribosomes that read it, yet the usual metabolic pathways for harvesting energy or making amino acids and vitamins are missing. It seems unable to produce most of what it needs and instead leans on its host for supplies.

The authors of the study describe it as a “cellular entity retaining only its replicative core”, a phrase that shows how close it comes to the line between a cell and something simpler.

Even so, Sukunaarchaeum is not a virus. It still builds its own ribosomes and messenger RNA instead of borrowing all of that machinery from its host. At the same time, its tiny genome and single-minded focus on making more copies of itself make its lifestyle look strikingly virus-like.

A report in Science notes that its DNA is “focused almost entirely on replication” and suggests it may sit on an evolutionary path between more conventional cells and fully-viral strategies.

The Russian will not be held back by terrain normally considered impassable

March 6th, 2026

Soldier’s Load by S. L. A. MarshallWhile the supply discipline of the United States Army is regulated by the pressure to give troops all the comforts the middle-class American has learned to expect, S.L.A. Marshall explains (in The Soldier’s Load and the Mobilty of a Nation), the Russian Army, composed of men who have lived hard in their civilian environment, can operate in war on a minimum subsistence level without making its people feel abused:

As the Quartermaster General M. F. Kerner has pointed out, this means that the Communists have a relatively simple logistical problem,_ despite that we commonly think of the tran::portation of supply as being the weak link in the Soviet military system.

Many of Kerner’s revelations about how they improvise in the supply and technical field are highly significant. He continues:

“In my own experience I almost never saw a Russian military truck driver with the equipment to repair his tires. Hundreds of times I have watched these drivers patch up their punctures with the help of an empty oil can, a piece of crude rubber and the help of a heavy stone from the roadside. Piercing the upper part of the can, they filled the bottom with gasoline. Then they cleaned the tire tube, laid the crude rubber patch over the hole, and placed the stone on top. By setting fire to the gasoline, the patch was vulcanized to the tube in ten minutes.

“Fuel for the tanks was usually stored in huge cast-iron drums on trailers attached to the tanks and kept rolling along behind.

“When a tank was out of order, the troops improvised a repair shop in the forest by felling three trees, trimming their branches, and arranging them crosswise to make a lever for lifting the motor or any heavy part of the tank. Bridges were made entirely of timber. If the region was wooded, horses and oxen from local farms were commandeered to transport the trees; if there were no woods, the nearest wooden structure, whether a private home or a public building, was demolished and used for lumber.

“Russian engineers were trained in time of peace to construct wooden bridges, even massive bridges as high as 30 feet, such as those over the Don and Rivers. In the exigency of war, these engineers could put up a bridge with no other tools than axes, hammers and clamps.

“Every army has a system of priorities for supplying its fighting troops. But Soviet transportation, controlled entirely from a central office in Moscow, had a system of such sharp penalties inflicted for minor negligence that a small delay in loading and unloading operations was treated as a serious transgression. The personnel of all forms of transportation came under the jurisdiction of military tribunals which performed their duties right at the front, often trying and sentencing the offender within 24 hours of his dereliction.

“Staff training consists, as far as possible, in practice rather than in theory. During the war, military trainees had to study the current battles, analyze the mistakes made, and even visit the front to accustom themselves to actual combat. All branches of the army, including medical personnel and quartermaster corps underwent this same training.

“Little mail was transported to the front. A dilapidated three-to-four ton truck, no longer useful for priority materiel, sufficed to take care of the mail for a whole division. It was generally accepted as a mere weakness for the soldier at the front to want news of home, and the men were discouraged from writing. As in all other matters concerning the individual, the Russian soldier’s feelings were of no consequence.

“Their success with logistics, in sum, is due not to extraordinary skill and efficiency, hut rather to an endless ability to forage for themselves, to withstand the onslaught of the elements and to make do with whatever comes to hand.”

[…]

This is what [a German general] said: “The Russian will not be held back by terrain normally considered impassable. That was where we made some of our early mistakes. Gradually we learned that it was in just such places that his appearance, and probably his attack, was to be expected. The Russian infantryman could not only overcome terrain difficulties but was able to do so very quickly. Miles of corduroy road were laid through swamp within a few days. Beaten tracks appeared through forest covered in deep snow. Ten men abreast with arms joined, in ranks 100 deep, prepared these routes in 15-minute reliefs of 1,000 men each. Following this human snowplow, guns and other heavy weapons were dragged to wherever they were needed by other teams of infantrymen. During winter, snow caves which could be heated were built to provide overnight shelter for men and horses. Motorization was reduced to an absolute minimum, only the lightest vehicles being used. The horses were tough and required little care. The uniforms were suitable but the men were never over-clad. Mobility came of the mass of men which moved all loads, doing the work of machines when machines would no longer work.”

The entire economy becomes centered around making decisions that are financially safe rather than those that can lead to major payoffs

March 5th, 2026

Labor laws are a large part of the explanation as to why the US is so much wealthier than Europe:

Americans do much better than Europeans, but the US is not clearly economically freer in most areas. For example, Heritage’s 2025 index of economic freedom puts it behind eleven European countries. The US is ranked 27th in the world in overall economic freedom, but 3rd in labor freedom. Given the degree to which the US has surpassed other major nations, perhaps indexes like this are underweighting the importance of this one particular category. America is far from a capitalist paradise; particularly in housing and allowing people to build, we do a pretty poor job.

[…]

Imagine if the entire force of government policy was put toward enforcing a status quo bias in other contexts: government created every possible financial incentive to keep people in the same homes; made sure they continually drive the same cars or buy vehicles from the same companies; or put up an endless number of barriers in the way of them switching grocery stores or banks. Everyone would realize that such policies represent the height of economic illiteracy and would be bound to have all kinds of unintended consequences. Yet we treat labor as different, even though the underlying economic principles are exactly the same.

[…]

In Germany, they not only tell you if you can fire people, but you can’t even decide who to keep! Paying employees indefinitely to leave is the optimistic scenario when they are no longer needed. The worse outcome is that you’re forced to hold on to them indefinitely.

Basically, what this system amounts to is a welfare state, while placing the burden on those who create jobs in the first place. To make another analogy, imagine we wanted to provide healthcare for the poor. But instead of paying for it through general taxation, we said anyone who provides any amount of charity to someone living in poverty must be the one to pick up the tab for their health insurance. How would such a system make sense? And this isn’t simply a matter of finding ways to provide welfare, but something much more extreme, involving locking employers in relationships they can’t get out of. You’re also misallocating labor, since having workers in places where they’re not needed prevents them from making a contribution elsewhere.

[…]

European workers don’t simply go to waste. Rather, the entire economy becomes centered around making decisions that are financially safe rather than those that can lead to major payoffs. The unemployment rate doesn’t look so bad, but you still get society-wide stagnation.

First came the captain in his scarlet uniform

March 4th, 2026

Soldier’s Load by S. L. A. MarshallOverloading has always been the curse of
armies, S.L.A. Marshall explains (in The Soldier’s Load and the Mobilty of a Nation):

Today we stagger along under a burden of soft drink machines, mammy singers and lollypops. In Wellington’s time, it was the soldiers’ wives and the regimental women which hindered movement.

While a prisoner in Srain, Baron Lejuene penned this arresting picture of military impedimenta in his time:

“First came the captain in his scarlet uniform, mounted on a very fine horse and carrying a big open parasol.

“Then came his wife in a pretty costume, with a very small straw hat, seated on a mule, holding up an umbrella and caressing a little black and tan King Charles spaniel on her knee, whilst she led by a blue ribbon a tame goat, which was to supfly her night and morning with cream for her cup o tea.

“Beside madam walked an Irish nurse, carrying slung across her shoulder a bassinet made of green silk, in which reposed an infant, the hope of the family.

“Behind madam’s mule stalked a huge grenadier, the faithful servant of the captain, with his musket over his shoulder, urging on with a stick the long-eared steed of his mistress.

“Behind him again came a donkey laden with the voluminous baggage of the family, surmounted by a tea-kettle and a cage full of canaries, whilst a jockey or groom in livery brought up the rear, mounted on a sturdy English horse, with its hide gleaming like polished steel. This groom held a huge posting whip in one hand, the cracking of the lash of which made the donkey mend its pace, and at the same time kept order among the four or five spaniels and greyhounds which served as scouts to the captain during the march of his small cavalcade.”