How to Do Philosophy

Tuesday, October 2nd, 2007

In How to Do Philosophy, Paul Graham notes that “judging from their works, most philosophers up to the present have been wasting their time”:

Traditional philosophy occupies a kind of singularity in this respect. If you write in an unclear way about big ideas, you produce something that seems tantalizingly attractive to inexperienced but intellectually ambitious students. Till one knows better, it’s hard to distinguish something that’s hard to understand because the writer was unclear in his own mind from something like a mathematical proof that’s hard to understand because the ideas it represents are hard to understand. To someone who hasn’t learned the difference, traditional philosophy seems extremely attractive: as hard (and therefore impressive) as math, yet broader in scope. That was what lured me in as a high school student.

This singularity is even more singular in having its own defense built in. When things are hard to understand, people who suspect they’re nonsense generally keep quiet. There’s no way to prove a text is meaningless. The closest you can get is to show that the official judges of some class of texts can’t distinguish them from placebos.

And so instead of denouncing philosophy, most people who suspected it was a waste of time just studied other things. That alone is fairly damning evidence, considering philosophy’s claims. It’s supposed to be about the ultimate truths. Surely all smart people would be interested in it, if it delivered on that promise.

His proposal:

Perhaps we should do what Aristotle meant to do, instead of what he did. The goal he announces in the Metaphysics seems one worth pursuing: to discover the most general truths. That sounds good. But instead of trying to discover them because they’re useless, let’s try to discover them because they’re useful.
[...]
The test of utility I propose is whether we cause people who read what we’ve written to do anything differently afterward. Knowing we have to give definite (if implicit) advice will keep us from straying beyond the resolution of the words we’re using.

How Not to Die

Sunday, September 2nd, 2007

Paul Graham explains — to the startups he’s funded — How Not to Die:

A couple days ago I told a reporter that we expected about a third of the companies we funded to succeed. Actually I was being conservative. I’m hoping it might be as much as a half. Wouldn’t it be amazing if we could achieve a 50% success rate?

Another way of saying that is that half of you are going to die. Phrased that way, it doesn’t sound good at all. In fact, it’s kind of weird when you think about it, because our definition of success is that the founders get rich. If half the startups we fund succeed, then half of you are going to get rich and the other half are going to get nothing.

If you can just avoid dying, you get rich. That sounds like a joke, but it’s actually a pretty good description of what happens in a typical startup. It certainly describes what happened in Viaweb. We avoided dying till we got rich.

It was really close, too. When we were visiting Yahoo to talk about being acquired, we had to interrupt everything and borrow one of their conference rooms to talk down an investor who was about to back out of a new funding round we needed to stay alive. So even in the middle of getting rich we were fighting off the grim reaper.

You may have heard that quote about luck consisting of opportunity meeting preparation. You’ve now done the preparation. The work you’ve done so far has, in effect, put you in a position to get lucky: you can now get rich by not letting your company die. That’s more than most people have. So let’s talk about how not to die.

We’ve done this five times now, and we’ve seen a bunch of startups die. About 10 of them so far. We don’t know exactly what happens when they die, because they generally don’t die loudly and heroically. Mostly they crawl off somewhere and die.

For us the main indication of impending doom is when we don’t hear from you. When we haven’t heard from, or about, a startup for a couple months, that’s a bad sign. If we send them an email asking what’s up, and they don’t reply, that’s a really bad sign. So far that is a 100% accurate predictor of death.

Whereas if a startup regularly does new deals and releases and either sends us mail or shows up at YC events, they’re probably going to live.

I realize this will sound naive, but maybe the linkage works in both directions. Maybe if you can arrange that we keep hearing from you, you won’t die.

Holding a Program in One’s Head

Saturday, August 25th, 2007

Paul Graham shares some tips for Holding a Program in One’s Head:

It’s striking how often programmers manage to hit all eight points by accident. Someone has an idea for a new project, but because it’s not officially sanctioned, he has to do it in off hours — which turn out to be more productive because there are no distractions. Driven by his enthusiasm for the new project he works on it for many hours at a stretch. Because it’s initially just an experiment, instead of a “production” language he uses a mere “scripting” language — which is in fact far more powerful. He completely rewrites the program several times; that wouldn’t be justifiable for an official project, but this is a labor of love and he wants it to be perfect. And since no one is going to see it except him, he omits any comments except the note-to-self variety. He works in a small group perforce, because he either hasn’t told anyone else about the idea yet, or it seems so unpromising that no one else is allowed to work on it. Even if there is a group, they couldn’t have multiple people editing the same code, because it changes too fast for that to be possible. And the project starts small because the idea is small at first; he just has some cool hack he wants to try out.

Even more striking are the number of officially sanctioned projects that manage to do all eight things wrong. In fact, if you look at the way software gets written in most organizations, it’s almost as if they were deliberately trying to do things wrong. In a sense, they are. One of the defining qualities of organizations since there have been such a thing is to treat individuals as interchangeable parts. This works well for more parallelizable tasks, like fighting wars. For most of history a well-drilled army of professional soldiers could be counted on to beat an army of individual warriors, no matter how valorous. But having ideas is not very parallelizable. And that’s what programs are: ideas.

Stuff

Friday, August 24th, 2007

Paul Graham notes that Stuff has gotten a lot cheaper, but our attitudes toward it haven’t changed correspondingly:

I have too much stuff. Most people in America do. In fact, the poorer people are, the more stuff they seem to have. Hardly anyone is so poor that they can’t afford a front yard full of old cars.

It wasn’t always this way. Stuff used to be rare and valuable. You can still see evidence of that if you look for it. For example, in my house in Cambridge, which was built in 1876, the bedrooms don’t have closets. In those days people’s stuff fit in a chest of drawers. Even as recently as a few decades ago there was a lot less stuff. When I look back at photos from the 1970s, I’m surprised how empty houses look. As a kid I had what I thought was a huge fleet of toy cars, but they’d be dwarfed by the number of toys my nephews have. All together my Matchboxes and Corgis took up about a third of the surface of my bed. In my nephews’ rooms the bed is the only clear space.

Stuff has gotten a lot cheaper, but our attitudes toward it haven’t changed correspondingly. We overvalue stuff.

That was a big problem for me when I had no money. I felt poor, and stuff seemed valuable, so almost instinctively I accumulated it. Friends would leave something behind when they moved, or I’d see something as I was walking down the street on trash night (beware of anything you find yourself describing as “perfectly good”), or I’d find something in almost new condition for a tenth its retail price at a garage sale. And pow, more stuff.

In fact these free or nearly free things weren’t bargains, because they were worth even less than they cost. Most of the stuff I accumulated was worthless, because I didn’t need it.

What I didn’t understand was that the value of some new acquisition wasn’t the difference between its retail price and what I paid for it. It was the value I derived from it. Stuff is an extremely illiquid asset. Unless you have some plan for selling that valuable thing you got so cheaply, what difference does it make what it’s “worth?” The only way you’re ever going to extract any value from it is to use it. And if you don’t have any immediate use for it, you probably never will.

The Equity Equation

Thursday, July 19th, 2007

Paul Graham gives The Equity Equation:

An investor wants to give you money for a certain percentage of your startup. Should you take it? You’re about to hire your first employee. How much stock should you give him?

These are some of the hardest questions founders face. And yet both have the same answer:

1/(1 – n)

Whenever you’re trading stock in your company for anything, whether it’s money or an employee or a deal with another company, the test for whether to do it is the same. You should give up n% of your company if what you trade it for improves your average outcome enough that the (100 – n)% you have left is worth more than the whole company was before.

For example, if an investor wants to buy half your company, how much does that investment have to improve your average outcome for you to break even? Obviously it has to double: if you trade half your company for something that more than doubles the company’s average outcome, you’re net ahead. You have half as big a share of something worth more than twice as much.

In the general case, if n is the fraction of the company you’re giving up, the deal is a good one if it makes the company worth more than 1/(1 – n).

For example, suppose Y Combinator offers to fund you in return for 6% of your company. In this case, n is .06 and 1/(1 – n) is 1.064. So you should take the deal if you believe we can improve your average outcome by more than 6.4%. If we improve your outcome by 10%, you’re net ahead, because the remaining .94 you hold is worth .94 x 1.1 = 1.034. [1]

One of the things the equity equation shows us is that, financially at least, taking money from a top VC firm can be a really good deal. Greg Mcadoo from Sequoia recently said at a YC dinner that when Sequoia invests alone they like to take about 30% of a company. 1/.7 = 1.43, meaning that deal is worth taking if they can improve your outcome by more than 43%. For the average startup, that would be an extraordinary bargain. It would improve the average startup’s prospects by more than 43% just to be able to say they were funded by Sequoia, even if they never actually got the money.

Trashing Teens

Sunday, June 10th, 2007

In Trashing Teens psychologist Robert Epstein shares some ideas from his new book, The Case Against Adolescence:

We call our offspring “children” well past puberty. The trend started a hundred years ago and now extends childhood well into the 20s. The age at which Americans reach adulthood is increasing — 30 is the new 20 — and most Americans now believe a person isn’t an adult until age 26.

The whole culture collaborates in artificially extending childhood, primarily through the school system and restrictions on labor.

He makes a point Paul Graham makes too:

We have completely isolated young people from adults and created a peer culture. We stick them in school and keep them from working in any meaningful way, and if they do something wrong we put them in a pen with other “children.” In most nonindustrialized societies, young people are integrated into adult society as soon as they are capable, and there is no sign of teen turmoil. Many cultures do not even have a term for adolescence. But we not only created this stage of life: We declared it inevitable. In 1904, American psychologist G. Stanley Hall said it was programmed by evolution. He was wrong.
[...]
Teens in America are in touch with their peers on average 65 hours a week, compared to about four hours a week in preindustrial cultures. In this country, teens learn virtually everything they know from other teens, who are in turn highly influenced by certain aggressive industries. This makes no sense. Teens should be learning from the people they are about to become. When young people exit the education system and are dumped into the real world, which is not the world of Britney Spears, they have no idea what’s going on and have to spend considerable time figuring it out.

The Hacker’s Guide to Investors

Tuesday, May 8th, 2007

Paul Graham presents The Hacker’s Guide to Investors:

  1. The investors are what make a startup hub
  2. Angel investors are the most critical.
  3. Angels don’t like publicity.
  4. Most investors, especially VCs, are not like founders.
  5. Most investors are momentum investors.
  6. Most investors are looking for big hits.
  7. VCs want to invest large amounts.
  8. Valuations are fiction.
  9. Investors look for founders like the current stars.
  10. The contribution of investors tends to be underestimated.
  11. VCs are afraid of looking bad.
  12. Being turned down by investors doesn’t mean much.
  13. Investors are emotional.
  14. The negotiation never stops till the closing.
  15. Investors like to co-invest.
  16. Investors collude.
  17. Large-scale investors care about their portfolio, not any individual company.
  18. Investors have different risk profiles from founders.
  19. Investors vary greatly.
  20. Investors don’t realize how much it costs to raise money from them.
  21. Investors don’t like to say no.
  22. You need investors.
  23. Investors like it when you don’t need them.

He explains his fifth point:

Because most investors are dealmakers rather than technology people, they generally don’t understand what you’re doing. I knew as a founder that most VCs didn’t get technology. I also knew some made a lot of money. And yet it never occurred to me till recently to put those two ideas together and ask “How can VCs make money by investing in stuff they don’t understand?”

The answer is that they’re like momentum investors. You can (or could once) make a lot of money by noticing sudden changes in stock prices. When a stock jumps upward, you buy, and when it suddenly drops, you sell. In effect you’re insider trading, without knowing what you know. You just know someone knows something, and that’s making the stock move.

This is how most venture investors operate. They don’t try to look at something and predict whether it will take off. They win by noticing that something is taking off a little sooner than everyone else. That generates almost as good returns as actually being able to pick winners. They may have to pay a little more than they would if they got in at the very beginning, but only a little.

This is similar to the point Robert Shiller makes about the Internet bubble of a few years ago:

Some sociologists talk about collective consciousness. We humans evolved to be very closely linked, and our minds focus on the same ideas. Those [ideas] get reinforced because we hear them all the time.

Back in the late 1990s, you kept hearing that you had to stake your claim on the Internet or you’d miss out on the future. No one cared about the present. Then something happened around March 2000. There was an acceleration of public talk about doubts. You could no longer declare at a cocktail party that Internet stocks were going up. Such statements had become embarrassing — and just like that, word of mouth changed.

Embarrassment is a powerful emotion.

An Alternative Theory of Unions

Tuesday, May 8th, 2007

Paul Graham offers An Alternative Theory of Unions:

Oddly enough, it was working with startups that made me realize where the high-paying union job came from. In a rapidly growing market, you don’t worry too much about efficiency. It’s more important to grow fast. If there’s some mundane problem getting in your way, and there’s a simple solution that’s somewhat expensive, just take it and get on with more important things. EBay didn’t win by paying less for servers than their competitors.

Difficult though it may be to imagine now, manufacturing was a growth industry in the mid twentieth century. This was an era when small firms making everything from cars to candy were getting consolidated into a new kind of corporation with national reach and huge economies of scale. You had to grow fast or die. Workers were for these companies what servers are for an Internet startup. A reliable supply was more important than low cost.

If you looked in the head of a 1950s auto executive, the attitude must have been: sure, give ‘em whatever they ask for, so long as the new model isn’t delayed.

In other words, those workers were not paid what their work was worth. Circumstances being what they were, companies would have been stupid to insist on paying them so little.

If you want a less controversial example of this phenomenon, ask anyone who worked as a consultant building web sites during the Internet Bubble. In the late nineties you could get paid huge sums of money for building the most trivial things. And yet does anyone who was there have any expectation those days will ever return? I doubt it. Surely everyone realizes that was just a temporary aberration.

The era of labor unions seems to have been the same kind of aberration, just spread over a longer period, and mixed together with a lot of ideology that prevents people from viewing it with as cold an eye as they would something like consulting during the Bubble.

The Hacker’s Guide to Investors

Monday, May 7th, 2007

Paul Graham presents The Hacker’s Guide to Investors:

  1. The investors are what make a startup hub
  2. Angel investors are the most critical.
  3. Angels don’t like publicity.
  4. Most investors, especially VCs, are not like founders.
  5. Most investors are momentum investors.
  6. Most investors are looking for big hits.
  7. VCs want to invest large amounts.
  8. Valuations are fiction.
  9. Investors look for founders like the current stars.
  10. The contribution of investors tends to be underestimated.
  11. VCs are afraid of looking bad.
  12. Being turned down by investors doesn’t mean much.
  13. Investors are emotional.
  14. The negotiation never stops till the closing.
  15. Investors like to co-invest.
  16. Investors collude.
  17. Large-scale investors care about their portfolio, not any individual company.
  18. Investors have different risk profiles from founders.
  19. Investors vary greatly.
  20. Investors don’t realize how much it costs to raise money from them.
  21. Investors don’t like to say no.
  22. You need investors.
  23. Investors like it when you don’t need them.

He explains his fifth point:

Because most investors are dealmakers rather than technology people, they generally don’t understand what you’re doing. I knew as a founder that most VCs didn’t get technology. I also knew some made a lot of money. And yet it never occurred to me till recently to put those two ideas together and ask “How can VCs make money by investing in stuff they don’t understand?”

The answer is that they’re like momentum investors. You can (or could once) make a lot of money by noticing sudden changes in stock prices. When a stock jumps upward, you buy, and when it suddenly drops, you sell. In effect you’re insider trading, without knowing what you know. You just know someone knows something, and that’s making the stock move.

This is how most venture investors operate. They don’t try to look at something and predict whether it will take off. They win by noticing that something is taking off a little sooner than everyone else. That generates almost as good returns as actually being able to pick winners. They may have to pay a little more than they would if they got in at the very beginning, but only a little.

This is similar to the point Robert Shiller makes about the Internet bubble of a few years ago:

Some sociologists talk about collective consciousness. We humans evolved to be very closely linked, and our minds focus on the same ideas. Those [ideas] get reinforced because we hear them all the time.

Back in the late 1990s, you kept hearing that you had to stake your claim on the Internet or you’d miss out on the future. No one cared about the present. Then something happened around March 2000. There was an acceleration of public talk about doubts. You could no longer declare at a cocktail party that Internet stocks were going up. Such statements had become embarrassing — and just like that, word of mouth changed.

Embarrassment is a powerful emotion.

An Alternative Theory of Unions

Monday, May 7th, 2007

Paul Graham offers An Alternative Theory of Unions:

Oddly enough, it was working with startups that made me realize where the high-paying union job came from. In a rapidly growing market, you don’t worry too much about efficiency. It’s more important to grow fast. If there’s some mundane problem getting in your way, and there’s a simple solution that’s somewhat expensive, just take it and get on with more important things. EBay didn’t win by paying less for servers than their competitors.

Difficult though it may be to imagine now, manufacturing was a growth industry in the mid twentieth century. This was an era when small firms making everything from cars to candy were getting consolidated into a new kind of corporation with national reach and huge economies of scale. You had to grow fast or die. Workers were for these companies what servers are for an Internet startup. A reliable supply was more important than low cost.

If you looked in the head of a 1950s auto executive, the attitude must have been: sure, give ‘em whatever they ask for, so long as the new model isn’t delayed.

In other words, those workers were not paid what their work was worth. Circumstances being what they were, companies would have been stupid to insist on paying them so little.

If you want a less controversial example of this phenomenon, ask anyone who worked as a consultant building web sites during the Internet Bubble. In the late nineties you could get paid huge sums of money for building the most trivial things. And yet does anyone who was there have any expectation those days will ever return? I doubt it. Surely everyone realizes that was just a temporary aberration.

The era of labor unions seems to have been the same kind of aberration, just spread over a longer period, and mixed together with a lot of ideology that prevents people from viewing it with as cold an eye as they would something like consulting during the Bubble.

Two Kinds of Judgement

Tuesday, April 17th, 2007

Paul Graham says that there are Two Kinds of Judgement: the first kind, where judging you is the end goal, and the second kind, where judging you is only a means to something else.

As children, we tend to face the first — grades, competitions, etc. — much more than the second, so we’re indignant when we’re misjudged:

One thing that leads us astray here is that the selector seems to be in a position of power. That makes him seem like a judge. If you regard someone judging you as a customer instead of a judge, the expectation of fairness goes away. The author of a good novel wouldn’t complain that readers were unfair for preferring a potboiler with a racy cover. Stupid, perhaps, but not unfair.

Microsoft is Dead

Saturday, April 7th, 2007

Paul Graham notes that Microsoft is Dead, but he can’t help but think about what it could do to come back:

The surprising fact is, brilliant hackers — dangerously brilliant hackers — can be had very cheaply, by the standards of a company as rich as Microsoft. So if they wanted to be a contender again, this is how they could do it:
  1. Buy all the good “Web 2.0″ startups. They could get substantially all of them for less than they’d have to pay for Facebook.
  2. Put them all in a building in Silicon Valley, surrounded by lead shielding to protect them from any contact with Redmond.

I feel safe suggesting this, because they’d never do it. Microsoft’s biggest weakness is that they still don’t realize how much they suck. They still think they can write software in house. Maybe they can, by the standards of the desktop world. But that world ended a few years ago.

I already know what the reaction to this essay will be. Half the readers will say that Microsoft is still an enormously profitable company, and that I should be more careful about drawing conclusions based on what a few people think in our insular little “Web 2.0″ bubble. The other half, the younger half, will complain that this is old news.

Why to Not Not Start a Startup

Tuesday, April 3rd, 2007

Paul Graham explains Why to Not Not Start a Startup:

We’ve now been doing Y Combinator long enough to have some data about success rates. Our first batch, in the summer of 2005, had eight startups in it. Of those eight, it now looks as if at least four succeeded. Three have been acquired: Reddit was a merger of two, Reddit and Infogami, and a third was acquired that we can’t talk about yet. Another from that batch was Loopt, which is doing so well they could probably be acquired in about ten minutes if they wanted to.

So about half the founders from that first summer, less than two years ago, are now rich, at least by their standards. (One thing you learn when you get rich is that there are many degrees of it.)

I’m not ready to predict our success rate will stay as high as 50%. That first batch could have been an anomaly. But we should be able to do better than the oft-quoted (and probably made up) standard figure of 10%. I’d feel safe aiming at 25%.

Even the founders who fail don’t seem to have such a bad time. Of those first eight startups, three are now probably dead. In two cases the founders just went on to do other things at the end of the summer. I don’t think they were traumatized by the experience. The closest to a traumatic failure was Kiko, whose founders kept working on their startup for a whole year before being squashed by Google Calendar. But they ended up happy. They sold their software on eBay for a quarter of a million dollars. After they paid back their angel investors, they had about a year’s salary each. [1] Then they immediately went on to start a new and much more exciting startup, Justin.TV.

Is It Worth Being Wise?

Thursday, February 15th, 2007

Paul Graham asks, Is it worth being wise?:

Another sign we may have to choose between intelligence and wisdom is how different their recipes are. Wisdom seems to come largely from curing childish qualities, and intelligence largely from cultivating them.

Recipes for wisdom, particularly ancient ones, tend to have a remedial character. To achieve wisdom one must cut away all the debris that fills one’s head on emergence from childhood, leaving only the important stuff. Both self-control and experience have this effect: to eliminate the random biases that come from your own nature and from the circumstances of your upbringing respectively. That’s not all wisdom is, but it’s a large part of it. Much of what’s in the sage’s head is also in the head of every twelve year old. The difference is that in the head of the twelve year old it’s mixed together with a lot of random junk.

The path to intelligence seems to be through working on hard problems. You develop intelligence as you might develop muscles, through exercise. But there can’t be too much compulsion here. No amount of discipline can replace genuine curiosity. So cultivating intelligence seems to be a matter of identifying some bias in one’s character—some tendency to be interested in certain types of things—and nurturing it. Instead of obliterating your idiosyncrasies in an effort to make yourself a neutral vessel for the truth, you select one and try to grow it from a seedling into a tree.

The wise are all much alike in their wisdom, but very smart people tend to be smart in distinctive ways.

Most of our educational traditions aim at wisdom. So perhaps one reason schools work badly is that they’re trying to make intelligence using recipes for wisdom. Most recipes for wisdom have an element of subjection. At the very least, you’re supposed to do what the teacher says. The more extreme recipes aim to break down your individuality the way basic training does. But that’s not the route to intelligence. Whereas wisdom comes through humility, it may actually help, in cultivating intelligence, to have a mistakenly high opinion of your abilities, because that encourages you to keep working. Ideally till you realize how mistaken you were.

(The reason it’s hard to learn new skills late in life is not just that one’s brain is less malleable. Another probably even worse obstacle is that one has higher standards.)

How Art Can Be Good

Monday, December 11th, 2006

In How Art Can Be Good, Paul Graham argues that there is such a thing as good art; it’s not all “equally valid”:

When I was in art school, we were looking one day at a slide of some great fifteenth century painting, and one of the students asked “Why don’t artists paint like that now?” The room suddenly got quiet. Though rarely asked out loud, this question lurks uncomfortably in the back of every art student’s mind. It was as if someone had brought up the topic of lung cancer in a meeting within Philip Morris.

“Well,” the professor replied, “we’re interested in different questions now.” He was a pretty nice guy, but at the time I couldn’t help wishing I could send him back to fifteenth century Florence to explain in person to Leonardo & Co. how we had moved beyond their early, limited concept of art. Just imagine that conversation.