Kulak’s recent review of Infantry Combat: The Rifle Platoon: An Interactive Exercise in Small-Unit Tactics and Leadership, by John F. Antal, intrigued me enough to pick up a (digital) copy. The scenario puts you (as Lieutenant Davis) at the western mouth of Wadi Al Sirree, with the mission to block enemy forces from passing through, with three options:
A forward defense was the simplest option. If the enemy tried to attack through Wadi Al Sirree, he would have to fight through Davis’s men first. It would require the preparation of a platoon battle position east of the tank ditch to deny the enemy access into the trails. He would have to improve their present fighting positions and antitank ditch with mines and wire, thus blocking the enemy’s advance into the valley. This option would maximize simplicity, mass, and unity of command. Sometimes the simplest plan was the best one.
Davis’s second option was a reverse-slope defense at the eastern edge of the four trails that led into the valley. This course of action called for the entire platoon to reposition to the east, abandoning the hill that overlooked the tank ditch. A reverse-slope defense would deny the platoon clear observation of the enemy as he approached the valley, but it would provide better protection from enemy direct and indirect fires. The concept was to allow the enemy to breach the tank ditch and mines, place obstacles to force the enemy to move along the narrow northern trails, and then destroy the enemy at close range as he entered the valley. This course of action maximized security and economy of force.
The third option was to block the enemy in each of the four trails that led into Wadi Al Sirree. Davis knew that he had more short-range weapons than long-range weapons. He could divide the platoon into antiarmor ambush teams and assign each team a trail that led into the valley. The platoon could engage the attacker’s lead vehicles in selected short-range combat areas along each trail. By fighting a close-range battle in the trails that led into the valley, the platoon could pick off the enemy one at a time. The enemy wouldn’t see the defenders until it was too late. This option would maximize surprise and offensive action.
The author, Antal, also includes this amusing quote:
”You will usually find that the enemy has three courses of action open to him, and of these he will adopt a fourth.”
— Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke
You don’t have long to decide:
”Thus decisive action remains the first prerequisite for success in war. Everybody, from the highest commander to the youngest soldiers, must be conscious of the fact that inactivity and lost opportunities weigh heavier than do errors in the choice of means.”
— Truppenfuhrung, German Field Service Regulations, 1933
Hmm.
The straightforward is dangerous, but it depends on how well the enemy is prepared for a breakthrough. If those dudes were trained by Soviet “advisors” and actually listened, they may succeed. If they are not familiar with uses of armor other than as cavalry, basic field fortifications covered by a minefield may deter them from even trying if artillery support cannot do all the job.
The reverse slope would work the best, but only if there are just the tanks and other vehicles, with very few actual soldiers. If there are APCs behind them, and those guys are more familiar with such terrain, tanks will back after the first hit, infantry will dismount in a non-threatened area and then it’s going to be a proper hill skirmish. Indirect fire support may be ineffective against most of the reverse slope as such, but it can work against whoever covers the approaches.
So, also situational.
The narrow pass ambush is something that could have marginal success even with a tiny force as guerrilla style hit-and-run, but would require a good force ratio to make it stick. This could work well against a supply convoy or with sufficient friendly reserves who could envelop by corking those bottles hard and fast. Otherwise it’s dispersal of forces that will be hard to regroup, against a mobile enemy.
It’s on sale for $2.99 this weekend!
I was immediately confused by the tank ditch out in front of the four trails, because my first instinct was to lure the enemy as far into a narrow trail as possible, before springing a trap.
The front slope seemed too vulnerable. The rear slope seemed ideal, if we had long-range anti-tank weapons. I thought the deciding factor would be that we had numerous second-rate anti-tank weapons that would only be effective at short range, from above.
IIRC the tank ditch was an impromptu effort by an oil company engineering team. (And its suboptimal position of course an essential part of the story.)
“The position overlooked a freshly dug tank ditch. The wide, deep ditch blocked the approaches to the valley. Next to the ditch was a large pile of antitank mines, concertina wire, and metal pickets. Davis’s company commander had told him that an allied engineer unit had dug the ditch in preparation for the arrival of the Americans.”
(Yes, its suboptimal position is definitely an essential part of the story.)