(Yes, its suboptimal position is definitely an essential part of the story.)

The front slope seemed too vulnerable. The rear slope seemed ideal, if we had long-range anti-tank weapons. I thought the deciding factor would be that we had numerous second-rate anti-tank weapons that would only be effective at short range, from above.

The straightforward is dangerous, but it depends on how well the enemy is prepared for a breakthrough. If those dudes were trained by Soviet “advisors” and actually listened, they may succeed. If they are not familiar with uses of armor other than as cavalry, basic field fortifications covered by a minefield may deter them from even trying if artillery support cannot do all the job.

The reverse slope would work the best, but only if there are just the tanks and other vehicles, with very few actual soldiers. If there are APCs behind them, and those guys are more familiar with such terrain, tanks will back after the first hit, infantry will dismount in a non-threatened area and then it’s going to be a proper hill skirmish. Indirect fire support may be ineffective against most of the reverse slope as such, but it can work against whoever covers the approaches.

So, also situational.

The narrow pass ambush is something that could have marginal success even with a tiny force as guerrilla style hit-and-run, but would require a good force ratio to make it stick. This could work well against a supply convoy or with sufficient friendly reserves who could envelop by corking those bottles hard and fast. Otherwise it’s dispersal of forces that will be hard to regroup, against a mobile enemy.