Can China and the United States escape Thucydides’s Trap?
The Greek historian’s metaphor reminds us of the attendant dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling power—as Athens challenged Sparta in ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain a century ago. Most such contests have ended badly, often for both nations, a team of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs has concluded after analyzing the historical record. In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 years, the result was war. When the parties avoided war, it required huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part not just of the challenger but also the challenged.
Based on the current trajectory, war between the United States and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than recognized at the moment. Indeed, judging by the historical record, war is more likely than not. Moreover, current underestimations and misapprehensions of the hazards inherent in the U.S.-China relationship contribute greatly to those hazards. A risk associated with Thucydides’s Trap is that business as usual—not just an unexpected, extraordinary event—can trigger large-scale conflict. When a rising power is threatening to displace a ruling power, standard crises that would otherwise be contained, like the assassination of an archduke in 1914, can initiate a cascade of reactions that, in turn, produce outcomes none of the parties would otherwise have chosen.
…and two of the ‘no war’ scenarios involved the Cold War.
The “rising power” versus “ruling power” of the international system model doesn’t fit many of those examples.
France didn’t exercise that level of dominance of Europe in the early 16th century. One could argue the coalescence of the Hapsburg power created a new rival for France, but it’s not as though France circa 1500 was exercising hegemony over Christian Europe.
Similarly the Ottomans had emerged and become dominant in their international system [Islam]and completely absorbed the remnants of the eastern Mediterranean system, and begun intruding on the edge of the Frankish/European system already before the Hapsburgs had come into their Burgundian, let alone Spanish inheritances, and thereby become a major power. So the Ottomans were no upstarts within the system, challenging the long dominant Hapsburgs. They were intruders from outside the system, whose challenge facilitated the rise of the Hapsburgs.