Isegoria

I’m not sure it’s what Toyota knows that GM doesn’t so much as what Toyota does:

Do you know how many hourly jobs GM has laid off from 2006 to July 2008? Take a guess. How about 34,000? And now, they’re talking about another 5,500 layoffs.
[...]
How many hourly jobs has Toyota’s American production system laid off in the same time frame? Zero. That’s right. ZERO. How? Isn’t Toyota experiencing the same slow down in auto sales as GM is? Yes, it is. And yes, Toyota has halted production at its Texas and Indiana plants for the past 3 months. But the 4,500 people who work at those plants have not been laid off.
[...]
“This was the first chance we’ve really had to live out our values,” says Latondra Newton, general manager of Toyota’s Team Member Development Center in Erlanger, Ky. “We’re not just keeping people on the payroll because we’re nice. At the end of all this, our hope is that we’ll end up with a more skilled North American workforce.”

Interesting. But what does that last line mean? “At the end of all this, our hope is that we’ll end up with a more skilled North American workforce.” It means that while these employees were not manufacturing automobiles, they were in training. They were doing safety drills, participating in productivity improvement exercises, attending presentations on material handling and workplace hazards, taking diversity and ethics classes, attending maintenance education and taking a stream of online tests to measure and record their skill improvements. Toyota is shifted the Texas and Indiana workers temporarily to Toyota plants whose assembly lines were moving at full speed, such as the Camry assembly plant in Georgetown, Ky. In addition to all of this, the workers also spent some time painting the plants and even helped build Habitat for Humanity homes. And they were getting paid.
[...]
When, not if, the plants return to full production, Toyota will have well trained employees on the front line, ready and able to meet the demand for their vehicles. And not only will they be well trained, they’ll be happy and motivated to work. Because Toyota is willing to go to the mat for their people, their people will be willing to do the same for Toyota.

That’s the element of the Toyota Production System (TPS) that no one wants to emulate — Add value to the organization by developing your people and partners.

Chinese May Buy GM and Chrysler — which, I suppose, terrifies many Americans:

A take-over of a large overseas auto maker would fit perfectly into China’s plans. As reported before, China has realized that its export chances are slim without unfettered access to foreign technology. The brand cachet of Chinese cars abroad is, shall we say, challenged. The Chinese could easily export Made-in-China VWs, Toyotas, Buicks. If their joint venture partner would let them. The solution: Buy the joint venture partner. Especially, when he’s in deep trouble.

At current market valuations (GM is worth less than Mattel) the Chinese government can afford to buy GM with petty cash. Even a hundred billion $ would barely dent China’s more than $2t in currency reserves. For nobody in the world would buying GM and (while they are at it) Chrysler make more sense than for the Chinese. Overlap? What overlap? They would gain instant access to the world’s markets with accepted brands, and proven technology.

Michael Lewis describes The End of Wall Street’s Boom — but first he describes how and why he wrote Liar’s Poker 20 years ago, when he thought the end was imminent:

To this day, the willingness of a Wall Street investment bank to pay me hundreds of thousands of dollars to dispense investment advice to grownups remains a mystery to me. I was 24 years old, with no experience of, or particular interest in, guessing which stocks and bonds would rise and which would fall. The essential function of Wall Street is to allocate capital — to decide who should get it and who should not. Believe me when I tell you that I hadn’t the first clue.

I’d never taken an accounting course, never run a business, never even had savings of my own to manage. I stumbled into a job at Salomon Brothers in 1985 and stumbled out much richer three years later, and even though I wrote a book about the experience, the whole thing still strikes me as preposterous — which is one of the reasons the money was so easy to walk away from. I figured the situation was unsustainable. Sooner rather than later, someone was going to identify me, along with a lot of people more or less like me, as a fraud. Sooner rather than later, there would come a Great Reckoning when Wall Street would wake up and hundreds if not thousands of young people like me, who had no business making huge bets with other people’s money, would be expelled from finance.

When I sat down to write my account of the experience in 1989 — Liar’s Poker, it was called — it was in the spirit of a young man who thought he was getting out while the getting was good. I was merely scribbling down a message on my way out and stuffing it into a bottle for those who would pass through these parts in the far distant future.

Unless some insider got all of this down on paper, I figured, no future human would believe that it happened.

I thought I was writing a period piece about the 1980s in America. Not for a moment did I suspect that the financial 1980s would last two full decades longer or that the difference in degree between Wall Street and ordinary life would swell into a difference in kind. I expected readers of the future to be outraged that back in 1986, the C.E.O. of Salomon Brothers, John Gutfreund, was paid $3.1 million; I expected them to gape in horror when I reported that one of our traders, Howie Rubin, had moved to Merrill Lynch, where he lost $250 million; I assumed they’d be shocked to learn that a Wall Street C.E.O. had only the vaguest idea of the risks his traders were running. What I didn’t expect was that any future reader would look on my experience and say, “How quaint.”

I love the way he was totally misinterpreted:

I had no great agenda, apart from telling what I took to be a remarkable tale, but if you got a few drinks in me and then asked what effect I thought my book would have on the world, I might have said something like, “I hope that college students trying to figure out what to do with their lives will read it and decide that it’s silly to phony it up and abandon their passions to become financiers.” I hoped that some bright kid at, say, Ohio State University who really wanted to be an oceanographer would read my book, spurn the offer from Morgan Stanley, and set out to sea.

Somehow that message failed to come across. Six months after Liar’s Poker was published, I was knee-deep in letters from students at Ohio State who wanted to know if I had any other secrets to share about Wall Street. They’d read my book as a how-to manual.

Amazon is moving to what it calls Frustration-Free Packaging:

The Frustration-Free Package (on the left) is recyclable and comes without excess packaging materials such as hard plastic clamshell casings, plastic bindings, and wire ties. It’s designed to be opened without the use of a box cutter or knife and will protect your product just as well as traditional packaging (on the right). Products with Frustration-Free Packaging can frequently be shipped in their own boxes, without an additional shipping box.

That last sentence points to one potential downside:

Frustration-Free Packages ship in their original boxes, without an additional box for shipping. If you want the contents of your package to remain a surprise to the recipient, you should select the ‘Gift Wrap’ option during check out. Your gift-wrapped package will be sent in an additional Amazon shipping box. If you include a gift note but not gift wrap, your package will ship in its original box and the contents may be visible to the recipient.

Anyway, the folks at Amazon clearly “get” logistics.

In Squeezy money, The Economist explains how Porsche fleeced some hedge funds and made €6 billion-12 billion ($7.5 billion-15 billion) on Volkswagen shares, all in a few days:

Porsche’s gambit was as old as finance itself. For about three years it had been steadily increasing its stake in VW, a much larger yet less profitable carmaker with which it shares a little production. Its buying had driven up the price of VW’s shares to above the level at which it would make any economic sense for Porsche to buy VW. Seeing this, hedge funds sold shares in VW that they did not own. One strategy was a bet that VW’s share price would fall. Some also bought shares in Porsche, in a wager that shares of both would converge.

The risks of short selling should have been apparent to the brightest hedge-fund managers in Mayfair and Greenwich because of widespread suspicion that Porsche, a dab hand in currency-derivatives markets, was also mucking about with options on VW stock. Adam Jonas of Morgan Stanley warned clients on October 8th of the danger of playing “billionaire’s poker” by betting against Porsche. Max Warburton of Alliance Bernstein said Porsche could make billions by squeezing short-sellers of VW’s shares.

At the time Porsche dismissed these musings as a “fairy-tale”. But on October 26th it executed a handbrake turn, saying that it owned nearly 43% of VW’s shares outright and had derivative contracts on nearly 32% more. That meant it had tied up almost all of the freely available shares (the rest are held by the state government and index funds). Hedge funds quickly did the maths, concluding that they could be caught in an “infinite squeeze” in which they were forced to buy shares at any price.

Their frenzied buying sent VW’s share price soaring (see chart). After languishing below €200 last year, it jumped to more than €1,005 at one point on October 28th, briefly making VW the world’s most valuable company. Porsche may have made paper gains of €30 billion-40 billion in what one analyst described as “one of the most brilliantly conceived wealth transfers ever.” Porsche says it never intended to make money on derivatives and only bought them to protect its planned purchases of VW stock. On October 29th it said that it would settle up to 5% of its VW options, freeing up a similar portion of stock and sending the price down again.

Savvier airline schedules should lead to fewer cheap fares, as airlines stop flying low-demand routes just to keep the schedule the same from Monday through Friday:

No airline has a more complex schedule than Southwest. The low-cost carrier now has more daily flights than any other airline, and it runs a frenetic operation with planes hop-scotching across the country and spending only 20 or 30 minutes on the ground. With more than 500 airplanes and 60 cities to link together, there are literally billions of different ways to set the airline’s schedule.

As a result, Southwest made fewer schedule changes historically than other airlines, and for most of its history was writing schedules by hand. Each new schedule was simply a copy of the previous, with a few changes here and there. But all that has changed.

Southwest’s November schedule was developed with an upgraded version of its in-house schedule-optimization system that reworked the airline’s entire 3,400 daily departures. The airline now flies a completely different schedule on Saturdays — in the past it just erased some flights here and there from the regular schedule on Saturdays. Now some cities like Omaha, Neb.; Salt Lake City; Oklahoma City; and Tulsa, Okla., get nonstop flights to Orlando only on Saturdays.

In January, Southwest will cut 190 flights, reducing its capacity by 6% in the slower winter travel season. That’s more schedule jockeying than the airline has ever done before. And next year, it will add Minneapolis-St. Paul to its route network without increasing its capacity. The scheduling system trimmed flights here and there and improved efficiency, freeing up airplanes to fly to and from Minneapolis.

I think the Wall Street Journal buried the lede on this one:

Southwest’s computer reworked a flight from Austin, Texas, to Orlando because it figured out that the departure around 8 p.m. wasn’t desirable for leisure customers because they’d arrive after 11 p.m. in Florida. Moving the departure to 2 p.m. boosted demand for that flight.

In the past, Southwest’s schedule planners penciled out routes for each aircraft for a seven-day week, with Monday-Friday usually identical, and some changes on the weekend. Schedules were hand-written on sheets of paper that were taped together in scrolls reaching as long as 30 feet.

Southwest tried to hire consulting firms or software providers to devise a system for its unique way of operating. But most airline scheduling systems are geared to long-haul, hub-and-spoke carriers where planes fly into and out of the same city over and over again and airlines want to maximize flight connections. None of the 20 companies Southwest talked to could produce a scheduling system to do the whole job.

Then a Southwest employee, Alex Heinold, came up with a breakthrough on his home computer, devising a formula to match the airline’s unique operation.

It took several years, but the company built the idea into a home-grown schedule “optimizer,” and used it on real schedules for the first time in 2004. The computer took six airplanes out of Southwest’s schedule without cutting any flights, a saving of $180 million in aircraft purchases. The schedule was run through the system again in 2006, and earlier this year, a more advanced system was put into regular use. “We’ve been able to decrease almost every devil that plagued us,” said John Jamotta, senior director of schedule planning at Southwest.

Optimizing the schedule has a benefit for travelers — flights timed when people most want them, going to the places they most want to go, Southwest says.

There is a potential downside — fewer bargain-basement prices.

(Hat tip à mon père.)