Big Serge performs an autopsy on the Kursk Operation:
Ukrainian forces achieved the basic prerequisite for success in August: they managed to stage a suitable mechanized package — notably, the forest canopy around Sumy allowed them to assemble assets in relative secrecy, in contrast to the open steppe in the south — and achieve tactical surprise, overrunning Russian border guards at the outset. Despite their tactical surprise and the early capture of Sudzha, the AFU was never able to parlay this into a meaningful penetration or exploitation in Kursk. Why?
[…]
More specifically, we can enumerate three problems that doomed the Ukrainian invasion of Kursk:
- The failure of the AFU to widen their penetration adequately.
- The road-poor connectivity of the Ukrainian hub in Sudzha to their bases of support around Sumy.
- Persistent Russian ISR-strike overwatch on Ukrainian lines of communication and supply.
We can see, almost naturally, how these elements can feed into each other — the Ukrainians were unable to create a wide penetration into Russia (for the most part, the “opening” of their salient was less than 30 miles wide), which greatly reduced the number of roads available to them for supply and reinforcement. The narrow penetration and poor road access in turn allowed the Russians to concentrate strike systems on the few available lines of communication, to the effect that the Ukrainians struggled to either supply or reinforce the grouping based around Sudzha — this low logistical and reinforcement connectivity in turn made it impossible for the Ukrainians to stage additional forces to try and expand the salient. This created a positive feedback loop of confinement and isolation for the Ukrainian grouping which made their defeat more or less inevitable.
[…]
Fighting in a severe salient is almost always a bad proposition, and is something of a geometrical motif of warfare going back millennia. In the current operating environment, however, it is particularly dangerous, given the potential of FPV drones to saturate supply lines with high explosive. In this case, the effect was particularly synergistic: the cramped salient amplified the effect of Russian strike systems, and this in turn prevented the Ukrainians from assembling and sustaining the force needed to expand the salient and create more space. Confinement bred strangulation, and strangulation bred confinement. Fighting with a caved in flank for months, the Ukrainian grouping was doomed to operational sterility and eventual defeat almost at the outset.
77,000 casualties, over 400 tanks, over 400 IFC/APC, hundreds of artillery and MLRS…
Including over 1,900 dead Polish troops, over 900 dead Lithuanian troops, some 200 dead UK troops, some 150 dead Americans…
and Russia is expanding into Sumi and Karkhov.
Does he think anyone with a brain did not know all this before the start? “Salients are dangerous.” Well, duh.
Also, he managed to omit the (fairly obvious) objective. What is the point of discussing an operation without its objectives? For “failure” or “success” to even make sense, you need to compare the results with the objectives.
And in context of the objective… it makes sense, at least as a desperate act. Because the entire point, of course, was not to start negotiations from a self-inflicted cauldron. It was: get into range, bracket the power plant, then nuclear blackmail starts, and fighting stops (assuming rather a lot, yes… see “desperate”). Once ceasefire is achieved, obvious problems of this being a salient would not matter anymore. This would be its success. Anything else naturally was its failure, whether quick or slow.
“Does he think anyone with a brain did not know all this before the start? “Salients are dangerous.” Well, duh.”
Why it’s almost as if another army had that lesson slammed in their face around Kursk. Obviously today is different than yesterday.
“Also, he managed to omit the (fairly obvious) objective. What is the point of discussing an operation without its objectives? For “failure” or “success” to even make sense, you need to compare the results with the objectives.”
Agreed. In any endeavor you need to know the goals to understand if you’ve met them, failed to meet them, or only met a part of them.