After reading John Antal‘s Infantry Combat: The Rifle Platoon: An Interactive Exercise in Small-Unit Tactics and Leadership (based on Kulak’s review), I read his Seven Seconds to Die, about the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, the first war in history won primarily by robotic systems:
In 44 days, Azerbaijan conducted a multidimensional military campaign that ended in an indisputable military victory against a near equally matched foe holding defensive positions in mountainous terrain.
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The title of this book, Seven Seconds to Die, was derived from a comment made by an anonymous Armenian soldier who said that, when they heard the enemy’s Israeli-made Harop loitering munitions flying overhead, they had seven seconds to run or die.
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Throughout the battlespace, Armenian tanks, air defense systems, artillery, command posts, and soldiers were hit and destroyed by top-attack munitions, many of them autonomous. For the Armenians, whose air defense was either destroyed or ineffective, there was no way to stop the attackers. It did not matter if their positions were camouflaged or not. It did not matter if they were moving or stationary, or whether it was day or night. When they rushed inside their bunkers for protection, the loitering munitions would follow them into the entrance and explode. There was no rest and no safe places.
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From 2010–2020, Azerbaijan spent US $ 24–42 billion to prepare its armed forces. The investments were targeted to create asymmetric advantages for Azerbaijan — command and control systems, unmanned precision strike forces, long-range artillery, layered air defense systems (many purchased from Israel and Turkey), and cyber and information war capabilities. In the Russian tradition, the Azerbaijanis stressed long-range artillery fires and tanks, but they also adopted new precision weaponry such as the Israeli-made Harop loitering munition (LM) and the Turkish-made TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle. They emphasized the training and leadership of their special forces, expecting these units to bear the brunt of close combat with the Armenians.
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Most importantly, the Azerbaijanis relied on Turkey to help them plan and prepare for the pre-emptive war they were waiting to unleash. The Turks were very happy to oblige.
After the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Armenians basked in the glories of their past victories and prepared for a repeat of the first war. They spent a valuable portion of their defense budget, and money from donations they received from the large Armenian diaspora, to improve fixed defensive positions, trench lines and bunkers along the Line of Contact with Azerbaijan. These defensive works became known as the Bagramyan and Ohanyan lines. Elaborate trench lines, sited on high ground overlooking the valleys where Azerbaijani attackers would have to ascend, gave the Armenians a solid sense of security.
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In September, the Azerbaijanis were ready to execute their plan, codenamed “Operation Iron Fist,” and began mobilization weeks before the outbreak of hostilities. The Armenians, confident in their mountain defenses, did not mobilize early. Artsrun Hovhannisyan, Press Secretary of the Armenian Ministry of Defense, boasted a few days before the war: “If Azerbaijan starts a war, Armenian tanks will go as far as Baku.” By late September, the stage was set.
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Former Secretary of the Artsakh Security Council (2020), and former Commander of the Defense Army (1993–99), Samvel A. Babayan talked about his experience on the first day of the war and described it as an unmitigated disaster.
On the morning of September 27, the Armenian side lost 50% of its anti-aircraft forces and 40% of its artillery in 15 minutes. The enemy had satellites looking at us. It happened in 15-20 minutes. If the Armenian side loses 40% of the artillery and 50% of the anti-aircraft, it is a big disaster.
Although Armenia had 26 years since the end of the First Nagorno-Karabakh War to prepare for this day, it was not ready. The elaborate trench lines and bunkers, that may have been well-suited to win the First War, were not camouflaged, prepared or properly defended for the new systems the Armenians would face in the Second War. As events developed, it is doubtful any trench lines without layered and resilient air defense coverage, no matter how well camouflaged, would have made a difference. “Armenia has an army of the 20th century,” reported Sergey Sovetkin, Russian military analyst for Russian Military Review on October 2, 2020, “while Azerbaijan has elements of the 21st century. Hence the difference in battle tactics.”
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The concept was to blind the Armenian defense network, disintegrate the network, then take apart the other systems. To do this the Azerbaijanis were counting primarily on their flying robotic combat systems — unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), loitering munitions, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) unmanned aerial systems. Whenever possible, artillery and rocket forces would attack Armenian systems identified by the drones. The first step was to deceive and overwhelm the Armenian Soviet-era air defense radars and missile systems, by using decoys and electronic jamming, and then destroy key targets using Turkish and Israeli-made UASs for ISR, and UCAVs and LMs for ISR and strike.
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To determine where the main air defense strength of the Armenians was located, Azerbaijan set in motion a sophisticated deception operation. Earlier in 2020, it had purchased 60 1940s-designed, Antonov An-2 biplanes (codenamed “Colt” by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO). The seller, Russia, was more than happy to sell these ancient aircraft for a good price, not understanding or caring about their intended use. Azerbaijan, most likely with help from the Turks, repurposed these aircraft as unmanned, remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). They then filled each aircraft with explosives. In the opening phase of the conflict, the Colts were flown against the Armenian air defenses. Flying at a medium altitude so radar would be sure to pick them up, the Armenian air defense network turned on, identified, and then destroyed several of the incoming aircraft.
As the Armenians were congratulating themselves over this victory, the air defense systems that had engaged the incoming RPVs were identified by Azerbaijani ISR UASs and then hit by precision fire attacks from groups of UCAVS and Harop and Orbiter LMs.
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By the second week of the war, the Armenians were reduced to mostly shoulder-fired man portable air defense systems. Azerbaijan won air supremacy in the first few days of the war and now their UASs, UCAVs, and LMs could fly unmolested across the strike zone to hunt Armenian systems.
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Turkey possesses a robust synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and ground moving target indicator radar capability. During the war, Turkish drones, aircraft and satellites provided Azerbaijan with enhanced situation awareness and real-time targeting information, covering any gaps in its coverage of the battlespace. Since Turkey is just to the west of Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish manned and unmanned systems, flying safely in Turkish airspace, could employ their SAR systems to identify and report the location of Armenian forces. These SAR systems are in aircraft that can operate day and night in all weather conditions.
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Once the EW and artillery were destroyed, the ability of Armenian infantry and tank units to conduct local counterattacks was severely limited. Once the tanks and BMPs were removed, the infantry could only stand in their trenches and hope to repel an Azerbaijani ground assault. When drone strikes hit trucks and wheeled vehicles hauling supplies and reinforcements, the entire defense weakened. When the drones started hunting troops, Armenian morale began to shatter.
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Armenia had not invested in the same class of sensor and strike drones as Azerbaijan. As a result, the high-definition videos produced by these drones, and used by Azerbaijani and Turkish information warfare teams, had a dramatic effect on the Armenian home front. Mothers closely scanned dozens of strike videos on social media, hoping their sons were not in one. Never before in the history of warfare has an information war campaign had such immediate and dramatic high-quality video footage.