A Little Gift from Your Friendly Banker

Friday, December 19th, 2008

It’s fascinating to hop into a time machine and look back at how credit cars were viewed a few decades ago. Paul O’Neil wrote A Little Gift from Your Friendly Banker for the March 27, 1970 issue of Life:

American banks have mailed more than 100 million credit cards to unsuspecting citizens of the Republic during the last four years, and have offered each recipient not only a handful of “instant cash” but a dreamy method of buying by signature after the lettuce runs out. One should not conclude that bankers no longer consider money a sacred commodity. They do. They do. But the soberest of trust institutions now suggest that we forget those strictures on thrift with which they belabored us so vigorously in the past and “live better” by refusing to “settle for second best.” This means that our friendly banker hopes we will run up credit-card bills we cannot pay off in 25 days and will allow him to charge us EIGHTEEN percent a year on the resultant debt. It does not mean that he trusts us. He will put us on the “hot list” in a flash if we go broke in the process or try to support mistresses at his expense.

We tend to be such 1) slippery, 2) careless or 3) compulsively extravagant louts that bankers have always viewed our attempts to wheedle loans from them with vast suspicion, and have kept the notes by which such transactions are solemnized locked up in fortress-like vaults. The credit-card concept has led them to something very like mailing off hundred-dollar bills to every Tom, Dick and Harry in town, with accompanying notes pledging the receiver to act like a good chap and pay it all back later. They have gamely stifled an instinctive sense of horror in so doing because the cards also present them with an irresistible opportunity for new commercial accounts and the quick, vastly profitable development of widespread consumer credit.

Microsoft’s competitive advantage is not Windows

Friday, December 19th, 2008

Cringely notes that Microsoft’s competitive advantage is not Windows:

If Apple would port its Mac software (iWork, iLife, Final Cut, etc) to Windows it could quickly own the software market. Microsoft’s competitive advantage is not Windows — it is Office. Apple could take them out if it chose to. They won’t in 2009. But if the economic crisis really hurts Apple’s 2009 business, taking business away from Microsoft in 2010 could become a real consideration.

Don’t Follow Your Passion

Friday, December 19th, 2008

I haven’t watched Dirty Jobs, but I have seen Mike Rowe discuss his show (on a video podcast), and he’s an interesting guy. In It’s A Dirty Job, And I Love It!, he gives his own advice not to follow your passion:

I’ve been thinking about the first time I castrated a lamb with my teeth. (It’s a real job, I swear.) I was anxious, and judging by the sounds coming from the lamb, I wasn’t the only one. He was propped up on the fence rail, pinned in place by a cheerful rancher named Albert, who was holding the animal’s legs apart for my convenience. The blood in Albert’s mustache was still wet from his demonstration moments before, and he spoke in a way that reminded me of the directions on a bottle of shampoo. “Grab scrotum. Cut tip. Expose testicles. Bend over. Bite down. Snap your head back. Spit testicles into bucket. Rinse and Repeat.”

It wasn’t the first time I found myself cocking my head like an Irish Setter, wondering if I’d somehow misheard the instruction. (Spit testicles in bucket? Really?) I had assumed the same expression a few months earlier, when a jovial bridge worker explained that I would be walking up a skinny suspension cable 600 feet in the air to change a light bulb over The Straits of Mackinac, which connect Lake Michigan to Lake Huron. Likewise, when the happy-go-lucky Shark Suit Tester casually informed me that I would be leaping into the middle of a feeding frenzy to “field-test” the efficacy of his “bite-proof shark suit.”

I didn’t create my show on the Discovery Channel, Dirty Jobs with Mike Rowe, to get myself killed or scare myself half to death. I created it to show that there are hundreds of ways to make a living that no one was talking about. After four years and 200 dirty jobs, I’m no longer surprised by the variety of opportunities out there. What does surprise me is the fact that everybody I’ve met on this gig — with the possible exception of the lamb — seems to be having a ball.

It’s true. People with dirty jobs are in on some sort of a joke. Maggot farmers are ecstatic. Leech wranglers are exultant. I’ve personally witnessed lumberjacks and roadkill picker-uppers whistling while they work. And don’t even get me started on the crab-fishermen, spider-venom collectors and chicken-sexers — they’re having such a blast they’ve sworn off vacation. So why are people with dirty jobs having more fun than the rest of us?

The answer (aside from the fact that they’re still employed) is because they are blissfully sheltered from the worst advice in the world. I refer, of course, to those preposterous platitudes lining the hallways of corporate America, extolling virtues like “Teamwork,” “Determination” and “Efficiency.” You’ve seen them — saccharine-sweet pieces of schmaltzy sentiment, oozing down from snow capped mountains, crashing waterfalls and impossible rainbows. In particular, I’m thinking of a specific piece of nonsense that implores in earnest italics, to always, always … Follow Your Passion!

In the long history of inspirational pabulum, “follow your passion” has got to be the worst. Even if this drivel were confined to the borders of the cheap plastic frames that typically surround it, I’d condemn the whole sentiment as dangerous, not because it’s cliché, but because so many people believe it. Over and over, people love to talk about the passion that guided them to happiness. When I left high school — confused and unsure of everything — my guidance counselor assured me that it would all work out, if I could just muster the courage to follow my dreams. My Scoutmaster said to trust my gut. And my pastor advised me to listen to my heart. What a crock.

Why do we do this? Why do we tell our kids — and ourselves — that following some form of desire is the key to job satisfaction? If I’ve learned anything from this show, it’s the folly of looking for a job that completely satisfies a “true purpose.” In fact, the happiest people I’ve met over the last few years have not followed their passion at all — they have instead brought it with them.

A highly complex financial arrangement with ever-shifting terms and prices

Thursday, December 18th, 2008

Andrew S. Kahr, a child prodigy who earned his Ph.D. in mathematics from MIT by age 20, changed the credit card from a mass-marketed, straightforward loan at 18 percent to a highly complex financial arrangement with ever-shifting terms and prices:

Now a financial industry consultant, Kahr pioneered several ground-breaking consumer banking products and founded a small credit card company in 1984 that would eventually become Providian, one of today’s top 10 issuers.

Before many others in the industry, Kahr discovered that it was possible to analyze vast troves of consumer financial data and reliably predict which customers were least likely to pay off their credit card balances each month.

“It didn’t require a lot of investigation to see that the people who paid in full every month were not profitable,” Mr. Kahr said in a rare interview with Frontline. Armed with exotic formulas and scoring systems, Mr. Kahr and his colleagues mined the data in relentless pursuit of the most lucrative “revolvers” — consumers who routinely carried high balances, but were unlikely to default.

“I don’t believe in customer irrationality,” Mr. Kahr said. “I don’t find psychographics useful. I follow financial behavior.”

Prospecting for profitable cardholders became an industry-wide preoccupation as growth slowed after 1990. Soon enough, the major credit card companies were using credit scores and other financial data to develop ever more sophisticated pricing and credit strategies. Instead of extending a generic credit line or charging a uniform rate, they set rates and limits based on computer-driven assessments of each consumer’s risk of default. The higher the risk, the higher the rate.

“There was an opportunity to be more selective, both from the standpoint of credit quality and the standpoint of profitability and therefore to be able to offer attractive terms to the customers who we wanted,” Mr. Kahr said.

One of the most attractive terms to customers and banks alike, according to Mr. Kahr, are higher credit lines. So in another innovation, Mr. Kahr saw that credit lines could be increased by slashing the required minimum payment. This increased revenue in two ways. First, since it would take longer to pay off balances, each dollar of principal would generate more interest income. Second, the principal itself would be increased because cardholders would be able to take on more debt while maintaining the same monthly payments.

With minimum payments cut from five percent to two percent, for example, a credit card company could increase a credit line to $5,000 from $2,000 and yet charge the same $100 minimum payment.

Today, two percent is the standard minimum payment, a practice that critics say obscures the true cost of debt and keeps consumers dangerously leveraged. Average household credit card debt, they point out, has nearly tripled since 1990 — from about $2500 to $7500. Mr. Kahr, though, argued that “it is very consumer friendly” to allow people breathing room if they have a difficult month. “That’s very important,” he said, “because when people get behind on their payments, unfortunately, it becomes harder and harder to catch up.”

Recessions mean new IT platforms

Thursday, December 18th, 2008

In his last column for PBS, Cringely makes his usual predictions for the coming year, and he notes that most recessions mean new IT platforms:

The minicomputer hit its stride in the early ’70s recession, the PC in the early ’80s recession, client-server computing in the early ’90s recession (notice these things happen every 10 years or so?), the Internet in the 2001 recession, and now we’re about to see mobile take over in an even bigger way. Desktops will survive but most of the growth will be in mobile devices.

He also makes a prediction about venture capital that echos a thought I’ve been mulling:

While investments in technology will continue, the really smart VCs will realize there is a much better and more certain way to make a ton of money in the short term: start a bank. Look for the rebirth of community banks, in this case backed by VCs. Work with me on this one. There is no credit available because the big banks won’t lend. But it takes only about $20 million to start a very fine little bank that WILL loan money because the cash can be acquired from the Fed for almost nothing and lent at high rates to technology companies that can pay it back. By creating banks the technology industry will become self-funding. And when the big banks finally stop being frozen with fear and want to take back the lending business, they’ll have to buy all those little banks for at least a 10X multiple. It’s not like starting Cisco or Dell, but a 10-bagger business model that can be replicated over and over again while actually helping the nation can’t fail.

An unintended boost from President Carter

Wednesday, December 17th, 2008

The credit card business received an unintended boost from President Carter:

In 1980, as part of a short-lived effort to tame inflation, the White House imposed a freeze on soliciting new credit card accounts. The freeze only lasted for a few months, but it was long enough for credit card companies to introduce a new concept — the $20 annual fee — without inciting mass defections.

Annual fees were a vital new source of revenues. But they also helped cover the costs for unprofitable “transactors” — those troublesome customers who avoided interest charges altogether by paying off their balances each month. Now even these customers were contributing to the bottom line.

Lorenzo Fertitta

Tuesday, December 16th, 2008

David Samuels interviews Lorenzo Fertitta, one of the two Fertitta brothers who bought the Ultimate Fighting Championship a few years ago — after going to a show and seeing how mismanaged the business was:

Nobody knew about it and there was nothing going on. We got in the car and we drove out to the venue and it was kind of far away, and there was nobody there. I said, ‘you know, I want to buy a UFC t-shirt, it sounds cool.’ Nobody was even selling t-shirts. They weren’t selling programs. Maybe 15% of the seats were full. It was just amazing, and I was sitting there watching the event going ‘wow, this could really be something. What am I missing? What’s different about me — am I really that sick and twisted — that I really like this? Not that I kinda kinda like it, that I really like it, and nobody else cares.’

The Fertitta brothers bought the franchise for two million dollars — but they had to put in a whole lot more to keep it going:

DS: How much money have you put into it since that initial 2 million bucks?

LF: I think we got up to like 44 million.

DS: What was the year that you stopped putting money back in?

LF: I think we broke even and stopped putting money in — I think ’05 was the breaking even year.

DS: And since then have you taken money out?

LF: Yeah, yeah, we’ve taken some money out.

DS: Have you gotten back your 44 million yet?

LF: We’ve never disclosed that. Um, so I’d rather not. But it takes a lot of money to get back 44 million, I can tell you that. But I’m happy with where we are. We’re on a good trajectory.

If you look at the business model of a boxing promoter, there’s really not a lot to the business model. Most operations are like four or five people. You have the promoter, a secretary, maybe a PR guy, and a fax machine. I mean, what do they really do at the end of the day for an event? They don’t risk any capital. They don’t put up any capital. They don’t do the production. They don’t do any of the creative, any of the production. They don’t do the marketing. Literally what a boxing promoter has to do is schedule the press conference and buy plane tickets, make sure the fighters arrive on time.

DS: And your business model here is what?

LF: We call it the wheel. The UFC wheel. You’ve got your core — the pay per view. That’s essentially your product, right? And then, you know, you have spinoff things. You can sell it on DVD. Then after you sell it on DVD, you repurpose it and sell it too, put it in syndication on UFC Wired, or on Spike TV. Then you have products that you then put on the internet through VOD and other VOD platforms. Then you have other licensing opportunities like apparel and merchandise and video games, and all the way down. So it’s a complex business.

And we want to build the infrastructure to be able to handle that. So we’re going to have a real marketing department, okay? And not just rely on the pay per view providers to say that they’re gonna market for us. I want to control that. We have an in-house team of people that have direct contact with the cable companies. There’s literally maybe a thousand different cable companies in the U.S. that you have to distribute this product to. And I don’t believe in just letting somebody do that for us, so we’re very involved with how that works. As well as with Direct TV and Dish. Beyond that, we have our PR department. And it’s not just about going and hiring a PR firm and saying go do this for us. We have it in-house. We want to build the relationships in-house, we want to know these people. Every other sport just hands everything over to a network and says you guys do whatever you want with it, we’ll have some input or whatever but HBO rolls in and does boxing. Even the NFL. The major networks roll in and they just do everything for them. We do everything. And one thing about Dana that has made us very successful — he is passionate and meticulous about the product, and he gets how the product should be, and how that needs to resonate with the consumer.

I love the story about trying to market the reality show:

Dana and I flew to LA maybe 50 times. We met with — you name it. MTV. CBS. ABC. ESPN, HBO, Showtime, Spike, USA. We probably met with the Food Channel too. I don’t know. We met with everybody. And to a ‘t,’ every single person said ‘this won’t work. Get out of my office. This is a joke. It’s boring.’ We were just looking at each other going, ‘what are we missing here?’
[...]
So I got on the phone with Craig one day. I said you know the Ultimate Fighting thing again, he says ‘yeah, we gotta figure a way to get that on.’ I said ‘yeah, but we met with everybody, and everybody’s turned us down.’ And just through talking to Craig, he goes, ‘you know another way you could do it, is you could just bankroll, and then go and sell to sponsors yourself to finance it.’ I go ‘wow, I didn’t even know that, I didn’t even think of that. Maybe that’s what we do.’ So that’s essentially what the strategy was. So we sat back down with Spike. And Spike wasn’t real enthusiastic about it, but after about 3 or 4 meetings, they’re like yeah, okay, we’ll do it. It was gonna be the Trojan horse. We were gonna let people see kind of how these guys are, that they’re not thugs, that they have backgrounds, they’re real guys, it’s gonna be great, they’re gonna live in a house and they’ll fight each other, and it’ll be great. And then I pick up the paper, and it’s like Oscar De La Hoya announces that he’s doing this reality show called the Next Great Champion, or whatever it’s called. And then a couple weeks later, Mark Burnett’s doing The Contender. So that didn’t help either. Because in trying to go and talk to a sponsor, it was like, this is the stupidest thing ever. If I’m gonna put money on anything, I’m gonna do it with Mark Burnett or with De La Hoya.

And do you know how many commercials we sold and how many sponsors we sold that first season? Zero. Spike didn’t promote it at all. We had funded this thing, 8, 10 million bucks to produce this thing, and about three weeks before it was gonna air, we’re like, they’re not gonna commit to any advertising or promotion.We’re screwed. So we spent like three million dollars buying billboards and radio and tv — going look — someone’s like — I’ve been playing blackjack for 8 hours, and I started with a thousand dollars, and I got 5 dollars left, I might as well put it all out. Who cares at this point. So we’re like, let’s just go all in. If it works, it works, if it doesn’t, we’re toast. Put it on, and the ratings came back after the first one, we’re like holy shit. We started looking, compared to Spike’s ratings, we’re like ‘Wow! Those are huge!’

Since the UFC is bringing in good money now, fighters complain that they’re not getting enough of it — but Fertitta offers this:

And one thing that nobody could ever say about me or Frank or Dana is nobody’s check ever bounced, and we never went to anybody and said look, you know what, we can’t afford to pay you as much as we said . Everybody always got paid for the deal they were contracted for. And I will say this. We are the only promoters in the history of combat sport, that actually have paid fighters more than they’re contracted for.

The Decline and Fall of an Ultra Rich Online Gaming Empire

Tuesday, December 16th, 2008

Julian Dibbell describes The Decline and Fall of an Ultra Rich Online Gaming Empire founded by former child-star Brock Pierce:

That Pierce lives the life of a former corporate mogul at the age of 28 is remarkable enough in itself. Even more so, perhaps, is that he got here by dominating an industry in which orcs, trolls, elves, dwarves, and minotaurs are major segments of both the customer base and the labor force. That industry is known to insiders as real-money trading, or RMT, and if I tell you now that I’ve made some money in it myself, that’s not because I expect you to take it on my say-so that there are people who might pay as much as $1,800 for an eight-piece suit of Skyshatter chain mail made entirely of fiction and code. Or that there are millions more — players of World of Warcraft, Age of Conan, EverQuest, EVE Online, and other massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs, or MMOs) — who have given other players real money in exchange for the virtual weapons, armor, currencies, and other sought-after items around which these games revolve. Or that despite the game companies’ widespread prohibition of such transactions, their number has grown to support an estimated $2 billion annual trade, a half dozen multimillion-dollar online retail businesses, and an enormous Chinese workforce earning 30 cents an hour playing MMOs and harvesting treasure to supply the major retailers.

It’s all true, but don’t take my word for it: Just ask any of the world’s 20 million MMO gamers, for whom real-money trading has become commonplace, despised by some as a form of cheating and a blight on play, accepted by others as a necessary shortcut through some of the most elaborate (and time-consuming) games ever made. I’m mentioning my own familiarity with RMT — I spent most of 2003 peddling virtual items on eBay and made, if you must know, a grand total of $11,356.70 — only to establish that I was around before the virtual treasure trade got to be big business.

Which is to say, I was around before Brock Pierce and the company he founded — Internet Gaming Entertainment — made its mark on the industry. I was around before most people in the trade had even heard of IGE, let alone before it became a synonym for virtual currency sales. I was around when RMT as a profession was almost exclusively the province of small-timers like me and the very notion of a multinational, 500-employee virtual-items business doing over a quarter billion dollars in trades was practically unimaginable. And I was around three years later when rumors of a $60 million Goldman Sachs investment in IGE first broke and for a moment it seemed possible that Pierce had a handle on something deeper and more enduring than just a profitable business: the future maybe, not only of virtual retailing but of economic life in general.

The ascendancy of the credit card industry

Tuesday, December 16th, 2008

Robin Stein traces the ascendancy of the credit card industry to its deft reaction to high inflation and usury laws:

Had circumstances been less dire, the news of four urgent phone calls from a New York bank in a single day likely would have been easier to ignore. “Nobody’s historically more suspicious of outsiders than South Dakotans,” Bill Janklow, the former governor of South Dakota, told Frontline in a recent interview.

But it was 1980, South Dakota’s economy was a mess, and suspicion was an instinct that Janklow could not afford. “We were in the poor house,” he recalled. “It cost 42 cents a bushel in 1980 to haul wheat. When something’s only selling for $2.20 a bushel, you certainly can’t afford to be paying almost 50 cents a bushel to ship it.”

The calls were from Citibank, which was having a serious problem of its own. “It was very simple,” said Walter Wriston, then the chairman of Citibank. “We were going broke.”
[...]
By 1980 Citibank was being squeezed between New York state usury laws and double-digit inflation rates. “You are lending money at 12 percent and paying 20 percent,” Mr. Wriston explained. “You don’t have to be Einstein to realize you’re out of business.”

The bank employed 3,000 people in its credit card unit in Long Island at the time, a fact that Mr. Wriston hoped would entice New York lawmakers to offer relief. “All you have to do is lift the usury ceiling to some reasonable amount and we’ll stay here,” Mr. Wriston recalled telling New York’s political leaders. “And they said, ‘Ah, ha! You really won’t move. We’re not going to do anything.’”

What allowed Wriston to make good on his threat to leave New York was a little-noticed December 1978 Supreme Court ruling. The Marquette Bank opinion permitted national banks to export interest rates on consumer loans from the state where credit decisions were made to borrowers nationwide.

So by early 1980, with New York refusing to go along, Citibank set out on a search for new place to base its credit card division. The pickings were slim. Usury laws were still on the books in the vast majority of the states. And federal banking rules required that before banks could set up operations outside their home state, a formal invitation had to be issued by the legislature of the state they wanted to enter. Local bankers had prevented any state legislature from ever extending such an invitation.

This was why Mr. Wriston was so eager to court Mr. Janklow.

In an effort to stimulate the local economy, South Dakota was in the midst of eliminating its usury laws. Mr. Wriston told Mr. Janklow that if South Dakota would quickly pass a bill inviting Citibank into the state, he would bring 400 jobs. To preempt concerns from local banks about new competition, Citibank also promised to open only “a limited” bank. “We’ll put the facility in an inconvenient place for customers and we’ll pay different interest rates,” Mr. Wriston recalled telling Mr. Janklow. “All we want to do is use it to issue cards.”

For Mr. Janklow, it was an easy decision.

“To me, this wasn’t a credit card deal, it was a jobs deal,” he said. “It was an economic opportunity for the state. I was slowly bleeding to death.”

With bipartisan support and backing from South Dakota’s banking association, Janklow proposed a special “emergency” bill. “Citibank actually drafted the legislation,” he said. “Literally we introduced it, and it passed our legislature in one day.”

The arrangement ultimately brought 3,000 high-paying jobs to South Dakota and a host of new suitors from banks across the country. Citibank seemed to just be the beginning.

“It did fall out of the sky,” Mr. Janklow said. “I was going to sleep at night thinking that we were the new financial center of America.”

But other states were quick to catch on. Delaware, which passed similar legislation the following year, would foil Mr. Janklow’s dreams. “By that time, we’d captured a lot, but we thought we were going to get them all. Chase, Manufacturer’s Hanover, Chemical — they all went to Delaware. They were coming here,” he said.

South Dakota would never become the next New York or Hong Kong, but Bill Janklow carved out a niche in credit card operations that remains one of the largest sources of jobs in the state. “The tragedy to me is that if Delaware would have waited one year,” he said, “we would have had 20,000 more jobs in this state today.”

The day Citibank first called will always remain bittersweet to Mr. Janklow. “Four different messages in one day from four different directions,” he added. “That’s never happened to me before or since.”

The inflationary spiral that pushed Citibank to the precipice of disaster propelled the credit card industry into a decade of enormous profits. The elimination of usury restrictions paved the way for double-digit growth. Cardholders, it turned out, were willing to keep on paying 18 percent interest long after inflation subsided and the Federal Reserve lowered the interest rates it charged banks.

Between 1980 and 1990, the number of credit cards more than doubled, credit card spending increased more than five-fold and the average household credit card balance rose from $518 to nearly $2,700. With the cost of money sinking and average balances climbing, profits soared.

Steve Jobs on managing through the economic downturn

Monday, December 15th, 2008

Steve Jobs on managing through the economic downturn:

We’ve had one of these before, when the dot-com bubble burst. What I told our company was that we were just going to invest our way through the downturn, that we weren’t going to lay off people, that we’d taken a tremendous amount of effort to get them into Apple in the first place — the last thing we were going to do is lay them off. And we were going to keep funding. In fact we were going to up our R&D budget so that we would be ahead of our competitors when the downturn was over. And that’s exactly what we did. And it worked. And that’s exactly what we’ll do this time.

Dogbert Explains Risk Management through Financial Derivatives

Monday, December 15th, 2008

Dogbert Explains Risk Management through Financial Derivatives:



Santa Needs a Bailout, Too

Friday, December 12th, 2008

Santa Needs a Bailout, Too, so k are selling their old toys to raise cash for new ones:

The number of postings in the “games/toys for sale” category at craigslist more than doubled to 396,197 last month from 190,157 a year earlier. Many of this year’s listings include the phrases “my son is selling” or “my daughter is selling,” for items ranging from Bratz dolls to the Game Boy Advance.

On eBay, more than 3,600 used toys were available on Dec. 2, and more than 2,000 were sold for an average of $30.21 in the previous week. “Kids are smart, and when their parents are telling them ‘No,’ they are looking for other ways to make it happen,” says Cat Schwartz, eBay’s gadget and toy director.

By late last week, a quarter of the 500 mothers of 8- to 12-year-olds surveyed by the research and strategy firm Just Kid Inc. said their children had considered selling old toys and games to help pay for gifts this holiday season; 11% said their children had already done so and 6% said their children had sold more this year. In many cases, respondents said their children wanted to buy something for themselves.

Pop Psychology

Thursday, December 11th, 2008

In Pop Psychology, Virginia Postrel looks at the psychology of financial bubbles:

For more than two decades, economists have been running versions of the same experiment. They take a bunch of volunteers, usually undergraduates but sometimes businesspeople or graduate students; divide them into experimental groups of roughly a dozen; give each person money and shares to trade with; and pay dividends of 24 cents at the end of each of 15 rounds, each lasting a few minutes. (Sometimes the 24 cents is a flat amount; more often there’s an equal chance of getting 0, 8, 28, or 60 cents, which averages out to 24 cents.) All participants are given the same information, but they can’t talk to one another and they interact only through their trading screens. Then the researchers watch what happens, repeating the same experiment with different small groups to get a larger picture.

The great thing about a laboratory experiment is that you can control the environment. Wall Street securities carry uncertainties — more, lately, than many people expected — but this experimental security is a sure thing. “The fundamental value is unambiguously defined,” says the economist Charles Noussair, a professor at Tilburg University, in the Netherlands, who has run many of these experiments. “It’s the expected value of the future dividend stream at any given time”: 15 times 24 cents, or $3.60 at the end of the first round; 14 times 24 cents, or $3.36 at the end of the second; $3.12 at the end of the third; and so on down to zero. Participants don’t even have to do the math. They can see the total expected dividends on their computer screens.

Here, finally, is a security with security — no doubt about its true value, no hidden risks, no crazy ups and downs, no bubbles and panics. The trading price should stick close to the expected value.

At least that’s what economists would have thought before Vernon Smith, who won a 2002 Nobel Prize for developing experimental economics, first ran the test in the mid-1980s. But that’s not what happens. Again and again, in experiment after experiment, the trading price runs up way above fundamental value. Then, as the 15th round nears, it crashes. The problem doesn’t seem to be that participants are bored and fooling around. The difference between a good trading performance and a bad one is about $80 for a three-hour session, enough to motivate cash-strapped students to do their best. Besides, Noussair emphasizes, “you don’t just get random noise. You get bubbles and crashes.” Ninety percent of the time.

Read the whole thing.

Mismanagement at the Big Three

Wednesday, December 10th, 2008

Ralph Reiland looks at Mismanagement at the Big Three Detroit automakers:

It was a dead heat. General Motors sold 9.37 million vehicles worldwide in 2007 and lost $38.7 billion. Toyota sold 9.37 million vehicles in 2007 and made $17.1 billion.

That was the second best sales total in GM’s 100-year history and the biggest loss ever for any automaker in the world.

For Toyota, that was roughly $1,800 in profit for every vehicle sold. For GM, it was an average loss of $4,100 for every vehicle sold.

Collectively, Detroit’s Big Three automakers are currently losing about $5 billion per month, with Ford, General Motors and Chrysler, respectively, burning through $2 billion, $2 billion and $1 billion in cash every 30 days.
[...]
Currently, UAW workers at Ford, GM and Chrysler earn an average of $28 per hour, plus benefits. At the Toyota and Honda non-union plants in the United States, the hourly rate, excluding benefits, is $26 and $24, respectively.

Add the cost of benefits for the current workforce and the cost of pensions and health care for retirees (benefit-collecting retirees outnumber current workers by three-to-one at GM, Ford and Chrysler) and the difference in labor cost between a Toyota plant in the US. and the plants of Detroit’s automakers jumps to $29 per hour.

More specifically, the hourly compensation cost for labor, including benefits and retirees’ costs, at the Big Three is $73 per hour, compared with $44 per hour at a Toyota factory with American workers in the U.S.

Further, it takes fewer hours of labor to produce a car in Toyota’s U.S. plants than at the plants of Detroit’s automakers.

With more flexible work rules, GM says it could save hundreds of dollars per vehicle. The company maintains, for instance, that a company-wide use on non-union janitors, earning $12 per hour, would cut costs and increase competitiveness by up to $500 million a year.

Similarly, health care costs at GM for active workers and retirees account for more than a quarter of total labor compensation, adding approximately $1,000 in cost to every GM vehicle, compared to $215 in health care costs in each Toyota produced in U.S. plants.

Under UAW contracts, additionally, laid off workers are transferred to a jobs bank and receive 95 percent of their full pay and benefits to not work. This year, the cost to the Big Three will be an estimated $478 million, about $70 million less than Honda spent to build a brand new factory in Indiana.

Somewhere along the line, both management and labor in Detroit forgot the good economic advice of UAW head Walter Reuter: “Getting more and more pay for less and less work is a dead end street.”

Spent Coffee Grounds as a Versatile Source of Green Energy

Tuesday, December 9th, 2008

Narasimharao Kondamudi, Susanta K. Mohapatra, and Mano Misra examined Spent Coffee Grounds as a Versatile Source of Green Energy (PDF) and estimated that one could produce 2,920,000 gallons of biodiesel from the 210,000,000 pounds of coffee grounds Starbucks throws out each year, which would bring in $13,140,000 of revenue — assuming a price of $4.50 per gallon of biodiesel, which sounds like an after-tax retail price — for “just” $25,200,000 in operating costs.

What makes this whole thing look profitable is that one can still sell the non-biodiesel waste as fuel pellets — 89,150 tons for $20,080,000 — bringing the whole thing into the black, with profits of $8,020,000 per year.

I guess we have to ask, What portion of those operating costs go toward producing biodiesel versus fuel pellets?, and, Do those operating costs include the logistical costs of collecting all those coffee grounds?