Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations looks at modern tactics and operations:
If Trident submarines could be targeted, they would go down with many warheads—more than the number of nuclear weapons that would be expended to sink them. These huge submarines seem to have been designed on a cost-effective basis—that is, economies of scale drove the concentration of twenty-four missiles in each vessel, each missile armed with eight multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle warheads (MIRVs), without regard for the possibility that the submarines might be detectable someday. Had the designers factored even the remote possibility that these boats might be tracked at sea or else attacked in port or at dispersed harbors they would have distributed Trident missiles on more submarines, even though that would have been less expedient.
The most striking illustration of the concentration of warheads in the modern nuclear arsenal was the MX missile, which carried about ten. A natural but unforeseen consequence of the first strategic arms limitation treaty, or SALT I, which counted missile launchers rather than warheads, is that the land-based MX system was considered destabilizing because it offered the enemy an opportunity to destroy many warheads with one in a first strike.
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The most recent ASCM attacks from warships or aircraft were in the Falklands War in 1982 and in the extended Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. This should be no reason for complacency. First, new missiles have become hotter and harder to defend against. Second, although there have been no recent sea-launched missile attacks on ships, there have been a great many attacks from the sea, using land-attack missiles. On land it is much harder to assess the number of hits achieved, the effects on the different conflicts, or the recovery time needed to restore an airfield, replace a missile launch site, or reopen a factory. Partly as a result of land-attack missiles from the sea, both states and insurgents have increased the numbers and ranges of missiles to counter them. Third, attacking ships by missiles is less costly than defending against them with hard-kill systems, especially with surface-to-air defensive missiles. Fourth, saturation attacks, in which many missiles arrive on a target simultaneously, have not yet occurred, but such tactics seem likely to be used in the future.
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It is a reminder that the decision to mass or disperse depends on defensive considerations, not offensive ones, and it has done so since World War II, when aircraft carrier battle tactics were developed. In cases when defenses are likely to be stronger when the ships are concentrated, the fleet should be massed the way the U.S. carrier fleets were concentrated in 1944. If defenses are weak, however, as they were against attack from the air in 1942, then a dispersed force is more effective and the need to out-scout the enemy and attack effectively first will be more urgent.
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The principle abides: a fleet that cannot reliably attack first must mass for effective defense. If its defense cannot be made effective, then it must fight dispersed and win by out-scouting the enemy so as to avoid all attacks.
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There is no compelling rationale for sending large, expensive, and highly capable warships into contested coastal waters unless they are able to take several hits and continue fighting without missing a beat. It is better to fight fire with fire, using expendable, missile-carrying aircraft or small surface craft. In fact, ever since the introduction of numerous torpedo boats, coastal submarines, and minefields early in this century, contested coastal waters have been taboo for capital ships, and have become the almost exclusive province of flotillas of small, swift, lethal fast-attack craft.
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A warcraft with great offensive firepower and little means of defense is extremely vulnerable and creates a highly unstable tactical situation. To perform effectively, it depends on a first strike, a stealthy attack, or a better combination of scouting and weapon ranges. A warcraft with such a mix of attributes is an anomaly. Why is such a “mistake” built? Ostensibly, because designers believe that in cases when the measure of effectiveness is simple firepower, ? or ?, it is cost-effective to put many good shots in each craft. But that ignores the force-on-force nature of battle. A better measure of effectiveness is how much deliverable firepower it can muster over its combat life, which is a combination of offensive firepower and counterforce.
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A major consequence of massing for defense is the guarantee that the enemy will be aware of the fleet and its general location. In such cases, electronic-warfare tactics should be designed not to mask the presence of the fleet, which is impossible, but to complicate the enemy’s efforts to track and target the key units that constitute its striking power.
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Some countries will use fishing boats and small vessels that resemble innocent coastal traffic to detect and report enemy presence.
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In cluttered, confined waters the normal advantage of longer-range weapons aided by targeting with satellites and over-the-horizon radar is muted or lost. The cost of individual missiles is also more important in coastal combat because more warships and UAVs likely will be engaged, and running out of ordnance is an important consideration.
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Remotely controlled surface vessels can remain on-station for long periods of time and carry relatively large payloads—both valuable for deterrence. The growing potential for autonomous undersea surveillance and for attack in shallow or confined seas will increase the threat to high-value nuclear submarines and other capital assets, making less expensive manned and unmanned nonnuclear submersibles all the more useful in waters such as the Yellow, Arabian, and Baltic Seas.
The fact that precise homing enables tacticians to equip smaller platforms with offensive capability has led to two recent advancements in missile warfare. One is a system called Club K, developed by the Russian armed forces, in which box launchers are carried on trucks, where they can be at least partially concealed, and can be dispersed widely. The vehicle mobility gives an attacker both maneuverability and survivability at low cost. The mobile launchers also can be used to replace or expand offensive power at sea quickly in cases where larger warships are damaged and cannot be repaired immediately; the launchers can be installed on a wide variety of vessels of varying sizes.
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A disadvantage of the concept is its very invisibility. Influence requires that in edge-of-war scenarios and crises, the deterring force must present the threatening enemy with a visible threat—a task that usually requires the presence of clearly identifiable warships.
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Cares’ analysis is both startling and compelling, showing how, by forcing the enemy to spread his attention among many separate units, a force of ships carrying unmanned attackers and defenders can defeat similar numbers of enemy ships. Cares demonstrates mathematically that because of the power of a numerical advantage, adding only one unmanned surface vehicle in each LCS dramatically increases combat effectiveness.