Kulak’s recent review of Infantry Combat: The Rifle Platoon: An Interactive Exercise in Small-Unit Tactics and Leadership, mentions that the author, John F. Antal, based the scenario on a real battle from World War 2:
So the twist Antal reveals at the end is that everything about this happening during a fictional future war in the middle east? That was fake.
This was a real battle, it all happened, the overwhelming force, etc. In World War 2.
He changed a bunch, there were no overflying F-18s and helicopters in WW2, but the core tactical scenario, the overwhelming odds and the decisions that had to be made just right by the junior officers for it to actually work… All of that was basically real to a battle that happened in 1940s North Africa.
The very first decision of a forward slope defense vs. ambush in paths, vs. reverse slope defense? That was a decision faced there in 1940s North Africa and did make all the difference.
I didn’t follow the optimal path through the book, so I didn’t reach Section 98:
During World War II the infantry often found itself facing attacks by heavy armored forces. A month after the disastrous rout of U.S. forces at Kasserine Pass, the infantrymen of Patton’s III Corps were spoiling for a rematch. They got their chance on March 24, 1943. K Company of 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry, defended the hills east of El Guettar and demonstrated to the vaunted Afrika Korps what a platoon of determined infantrymen could do.
El Guettar was a typical date-palm oasis in the Tunisian desert. Steep, rocky hills covered the major routes of advance into the area. Elsewhere the valley floor was crisscrossed with deep wadis. On March 24, 1943, K Company was deployed as the right flank of 3d Battalion and controlled the main road through its defensive sector. The commander of K Company was ordered that, if attacked, he was to block the enemy and defend until armored forces could arrive.
The company deployed with 1st Platoon in a reverse-slope defense on a ridgeline that ran down toward the road. The 2d and 3d Platoons were located on the counterslope to the rear. There was a wadi on the reverse slope about fifteen meters below and parallel to the crest of the ridgeline.
1st Platoon moved into position on March 22 and prepared positions behind the ridge. Browning .30-caliber light machine guns and grenadiers were positioned on each flank. Squad machine guns — Browning automatic rifles (BARs) — were posted to cover the crest of the ridge to plaster anyone coming over the top. A two-man observation post was established five hundred meters forward of the company line.
Once it got dark the platoon moved to the top of the ridge and occupied positions on the forward slope to defend against enemy infiltration. By midnight the defense was ready. At 0600 the observation post alerted 1st Platoon of the approach of a German tank column. Since no supporting infantry was observed with the advancing tanks, the K Company commander ordered his men to let the tanks pass down the road unmolested.
Thirty minutes later the observation post reported a line of half-tracks approaching from the east. German mechanized infantry would soon be opposing 1st Platoon. The platoon immediately moved to its reverse-slope defensive positions. The Germans moved short of the ridge, dismounted their infantry from their half-tracks, and assaulted the crest. The fire from the Americans was so effective that the enemy was unable to take the crest, in spite of repeated attempts. The Germans, determined to take the ridge and drive off the Americans, continued the attack all day.
Eight hours later 1st Platoon still stubbornly held its position on the reverse slope. The enemy finally launched a dismounted attack around the left flank but was hammered back by the deadly fire of the platoon’s Browning light machine guns. By 1700 the battle was over and the Germans withdrew, leaving behind five hundred dead and wounded and five destroyed half-tracks. 1st Platoon, K Company, 3d Battalion, 18th Infantry, lost one dead and seven wounded.
This example illustrates the importance of preparation, security, and the intelligent use of terrain to conduct a defense with light infantry against an armored opponent. The positioning of the platoon’s key weapons and the flexibility of the defense to respond to different threats (day versus night positions) was a critical ingredient for their success. The platoon’s use of concentrated fires, delivered from positions that were undetected on the reverse slope of the ridge, surprised the enemy and disrupted his combined-arms synchronization.
In the real-life battle, they let the tanks pass down the road unmolested? How did that work?
Well, according to Wikipedia, the German attack lost momentum when it ran into a minefield:
When the Germans slowed to reorganize, U.S. artillery and anti-tank guns engaged, including 31 M10 tank destroyers which had recently arrived. Over the next hour, 30 of the 10th Panzer’s tanks were destroyed, and by 09:00 they retreated from the valley.
That’s not what I had in mind when ordered to block an armored column with a platoon of light infantry.