James McCormick calls Horse Soldiers, about the CIA and Special Forces efforts in Afghanistan right after 9/11, a well-written book pitched for a general audience — neither a “fire-fight fanboy” tall tale, nor an ass-covering general staff briefing:
Right off the bat, the theme of under-preparation appears. Equipment is assembled in the US by credit card and frantic phone calls to suppliers and retailers all over the US. Out-of-print books are rush-jobbed back into circulation. SF language skills are substantial but are generally of limited utility (Arabic and Russian, for example). The CIA have the only Dari speakers. Map resources are woefully outdated and largely consist of poached Russian maps.Even getting the troops into Afghanistan is an unexpected nightmare. The altitude stresses the Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) helicopters to their limit. Oxygen supplies are interrupted by break-downs in the helicopter systems so that everyone in the chopper passes out on the run over the mountains from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan … except one pilot with a dedicated oxygen supply. The hypoxia leads to ferocious headaches for everyone once they get down to lower altitude near their landing zone. Previously unknown weather conditions called “black stratus” hit the helicopters at 10,000 ft above sea level, creating white-out conditions that grow from the upper altitudes downwards, often extending almost to the ground.
When the troops are finally deposited (often in the wrong locations), they are immediately required to ride small tough horses to keep up with the Afghans. Most of the troops have never ridden, leading quickly to back damage and bleeding saddle sores. An Afghan preference for riding stallions makes novice riding down the narrow cliff-side trails even more harrowing. A general lack of maps leads to improvised methods for planning and navigating across the landscape. Many of the troops from the Northern Alliance are desperately short of clothing, shoes, blankets, food, and ammunition. Most are illiterate but incredibly tough and very courageous.
Quite quickly, the Americans are calling in air-strikes on Taliban vehicles and troops near the initial drop-sites. Day-by-day the Taliban are driven back. Technical and logistical problems plague the troops. The co-ordination and targeting of aerial bombing is still rather experimental as the SF and USAF work out (by trial-and-error) which parts of the GPS and laser technology actually work in the dusty, high-altitude environments. Day by day, the techniques and tools improve … though problems with planes bombing from too high with over-large bombs continues.
On the ground the Americans are living very lean, suffering from a lack of food and water and in extreme exhaustion from climbing, and traveling along dangerous trails laden with Russian and Taliban mines. Radio communications are also disrupted by inadequate supplies and occasionally failed equipment. Co-ordination across the various teams (still roughly only 50 people) is spotty. On one occasion this leads to the bombing of a building by one team with allies of another team still in it.