David Foster revisits a neglected but significant anniversary:
On May 10, 1940, German forces launched an attack against Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Few people among the Allies imagined that France would collapse in only six weeks: Churchill, for example, had a high opinion of the fighting qualities of the French army. But collapse is what happened, of course, and we are still all living with the consequences. General Andre Beaufre, who in 1940 was a young Captain on the French staff, wrote in 1967:
The collapse of the French Army is the most important event of the twentieth century.
If it’s an exaggeration, it’s not much of one. If France had held up to the German assault as effectively as it was expected to do, World War II would probably have never reached the nightmare levels that it in fact did reach. The Hitler regime might well have fallen. The Holocaust would never have happened. Most likely, there would have been no Communist takeover of Eastern Europe.
This campaign has never received much attention in America; it tends to be regarded as something that happened before the “real” war started. Indeed, many denizens of the Anglosphere seem to believe that the French basically gave up without a fight–which is a considerable exaggeration given the French casualties of around 90,000 killed and 200,000 wounded. But I think the fall of France deserves serious study, and that some of the root causes of the defeat are scarily relevant to today’s world.
I’m not sure why there would have been no Communist takeover of Eastern Europe, but do read the whole thing.
“I’m not sure why there would have been no Communist takeover of Eastern Europe…”
If France and Britain had managed to turn the tide of the war before Hitler invaded the USSR, then the final borders of Soviet control would have looked like this rather than this.
That’s why.
If the French and British forces held out against the initial German offensive, couldn’t we expect the Russians to open up the Eastern Front?
There is a 1987 book, Icebreaker, by Viktor Suvorov, that goes into great detail about Stalin’s preparations for an attack on western Europe. Suvorov argues that Stalin intended for France and Germany to exhaust themselves in mutual combat — after which he would intervene. I find that a lot more plausible than the standard narrative where Stalin is basically neutral and disinterested until Hitler attacks him.
The consensus, for what it’s worth, seems to be that Suvorov overstates Stalin’s ability to launch an attack in 1941. That said, I have trouble imagining Stalin simply standing by as Germany wore itself down on the Western Front. The Allies would practically demand his entry, after all.
See Soviet offensive plans controversy for a better article that doesn’t appeal to consensus.
What is controversial about Suvorov is that he claims Stalin intended to attack on July 6, and that consequently Hitler’s June 22 invasion was justifiable as a preemptive strike. He makes other claims with a stronger factual basis, and it does leave you wondering why, exactly, Stalin had built such a powerful (on paper) army if it wasn’t for defensive purposes.
Organizations miss deadlines all the time; it’s very plausible that Stalin could have wanted to attack on July 2 and the Red Army would be unready on June 22. I don’t find that a persuasive counter argument.