It had begun to seem possible early in 1943, General Groves explains (in Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project), that the Germans could have progressed to the point where they might be able to use atomic bombs against us, or, more likely, against England:
Although this possibility seemed extremely remote to me, a number of the senior scientists in the project disagreed. One even went so far as to urge that I should warn the American people in an official broadcast that the United States might be hit by an atomic bomb. Naturally, I was opposed to doing any such thing. What I thought more likely was that the Germans would use an ordinary explosive bomb containing radioactive material. If we were unable to neutralize the effects of such a weapon promptly, a major panic could easily sweep through the Allied countries.
However, as the plans for the invasion of Europe began to take form, we considered very seriously indeed the possibility that the Germans might lay down some kind of radioactive barrier along the invasion routes. We could not calculate with any certainty the likelihood of their doing this, for we were truly in the dark then about their progress in atomic development. It had always seemed to most of us that their best prospects lay in the use of plutonium, which would demand a much smaller industrial effort as well as considerably less in the way of time, critical equipment and materials than any other method—provided they were willing to ignore safety precautions. This I felt the Germans would do, for considering what we already knew of their treatment of their Jewish minority, we could only assume they would not hesitate to expose these same citizens to excessive radiation. Hitler and his ardent supporters, we felt, would consider this a proper use for an “inferior” group, quite apart from the saving in effort and materials and time. Moreover, we knew that in the course of developing the plutonium process the Germans were certain to discover that tremendous quantities of highly radioactive fission products would be produced in their reactors. It would be perfectly natural for them to think of using these to lay down a barrier through which ground troops could not pass without disastrous results.
At the request of the Military Policy Committee, a three-man group, Conant, Compton and Urey, assisted by other project members, had made a study of radioactive poisoning; and on the basis of their report we had ordered a supply of portable Geiger counters and were training a number of our personnel to use them.
[…]
The Chief Surgeon, Major General Paul R. Hawley, issued two cover orders designed to insure that GHQ would be promptly alerted if the Germans did resort to radioactive warfare, but worded in such a way as to disguise the real nature of the danger. One order said that trouble had been experienced with fogging (which always results when film is exposed to radiation) on certain photographic and X-ray films and that if any such trouble was noted by troops in the field, an immediate report should be made, citing lot numbers, so that defective film could be withdrawn from use.
I would look to better sources than Groves. A short list where you’ll get a much truer account of the meta:
-1- Carter Hydrick – “Critical Mass” – story of how Borrman traded Germany’s enriched uranium at the end of the war and how it was used in one of the nukes dropped on Japan
-2- David Irving – air tight case of how Japan was trying to surrender for months before the nukes were dropped.
-3- Eustace Mullins – What The Rothschild Empire Did To Japan” by Eustace Mullins [AUDIOBOOK] – https://www.bitchute.com/video/0ANlbHX1GbDv
-4- Stalin’s Chews – by Larry Romanoff – pay particular attention to the section where it talks about the nuking of Japan and WHY Nagasaki was chosen as one of the targets.
https://www.unz.com/lromanoff/stalins-jews/