The third function Russian fighters are optimized for, escort and interdiction, is carried out by a range of aircraft, from the Su-30SM and MIG-31BM to the Su-35S, and will likely involve the Su-57 in the future:
In these missions, Russian aircraft fly beyond the protection of friendly air defences. They are also tasked with trying to disrupt the penetration of Russian airspace by NATO very-low observable (VLO) aircraft. As a result, these mission sets are also those where the gaps between Russian and NATO aircraft are most problematic for the VKS. Conceptually, the Russians want to increase the zone of contested airspace. By expanding the launch points for aero-ballistic missiles, such as the Kinzhal, and low-signature cruise missiles, such as the Kh-69, they hope to reduce NATO’s comfort zone. Because aircraft are exposed during these missions, it is critical for them to reduce the radar cross-section (detectability) of the aircraft. It is important to note that demonstrating an ability to have a reduced radar cross-section airframe — even if not a VLO one — allows Russia to suggest to the world that it can keep up with evolving technological trends. While the Russians therefore use a variety of aircraft in this mission set, it is the future procurement of the Su-57 that will be critical to Russia’s ability to credibly undertake this mission.
While the inherent flexible nature of airpower means that Russia can employ combat aircraft in a wider set of roles — as it attempted in the opening phase of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine — its failures reflected in 2022 how an air force can struggle to operate beyond what it is trained for. Considering, however, the clear tasks for which Russia has optimised its aircraft and aircrew training, it is reasonable to assess that investment within Russian aviation will continue to prioritise Su-34, Su-35S and Su-57 models. The key point is that despite technological inferiority, Russian combat aircraft make a material contribution to Russian combat power, but as Russia’s struggle to build a VLO aircraft demonstrate, the capacity of its aerospace sector to continue to innovate and modernise is fundamental to the capacity of the VKS to expand its opportunities on the battlefield. NATO should therefore be closely concerned with the performance of this sector.